Objection 1: It would seem that it is not expedient to grieve for sin continually. For it is sometimes expedient to rejoice, as is evident from the Gloss on Philippians 4:4, rejoice in the Lord always, which says that it is necessary to rejoice. Now it is not possible to rejoice and grieve at the same time. Therefore, it is not expedient to grieve for sin continually.

Obj. 2: Further, that which, in itself, is an evil and a thing to be avoided should not be taken upon oneself, except insofar as it is necessary as a remedy against something, as in the case of burning or cutting a wound. Now, sorrow is in itself an evil; wherefore it is written: drive away sadness far from you, and the reason is given: for sadness has killed many, and there is no profit in it (Sir 30:24–25). Moreover, the Philosopher says the same (Ethics 7.13–14; 10.5). Therefore, one should not grieve for sin any longer than suffices for the sin to be blotted out. Now, sin is immediately blotted out after the first sorrow of contrition. Therefore, it is not expedient to grieve any longer.

Obj. 3: Further, Bernard says: sorrow is a good thing, if it is not continual; for honey should be mingled with wormwood (Sermons on the Song of Songs). Therefore, it seems that it is inexpedient to grieve continually.

On the contrary, Augustine says: the penitent should always grieve, and rejoice in his grief (On True and False Penance).

Further, It is expedient always to continue, as far as it is possible, those acts in which beatitude consists. Now such is sorrow for sin, as is shown by the words, blessed are they that mourn (Matt 5:5). Therefore, it is expedient for sorrow to be as continual as possible.

I answer that, We find this condition in the acts of the virtues, that in them excess and defect are not possible, as is proved in Ethics 2.6–7. Wherefore, since contrition, so far as it is a kind of displeasure seated in the rational appetite, is an act of the virtue of penance, there can never be excess in it, either as to its intensity or as to its duration, except insofar as the act of one virtue hinders the act of another which is more urgent for the time being. Consequently, the more continually a man can perform acts of this displeasure, the better it is, provided he exercises the acts of other virtues when and how he ought to.

On the other hand, passions can have excess and defect, both in intensity and in duration. Wherefore, as the passion of sorrow, which the will takes upon itself, ought to be moderately intense, so ought it to be of moderate duration, lest, if it should last too long, man fall into despair, cowardice, and such like vices.

Reply Obj. 1: The sorrow of contrition is a hindrance to worldly joy, but not to the joy which is about God, and which has sorrow itself for object.

Reply Obj. 2: The words of Ecclesiasticus refer to worldly joy: and the Philosopher is referring to sorrow as a passion, of which we should make moderate use according as the end, for which it is assumed, demands.

Reply Obj. 3: Bernard is speaking of sorrow as a passion.