Objection 1: It would seem that matrimony still comes under a precept. For a precept is binding so long as it is not recalled. But the primary institution of matrimony came under a precept, as stated in the text (Sentences IV, D. 26); nor do we read anywhere that this precept was recalled, but rather that it was confirmed: what God has joined together let no man put asunder (Matt 19:6). Therefore, matrimony still comes under a precept.

Obj. 2: Further, the precepts of natural law are binding in respect of all time. Now matrimony is of natural law, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore, etc.

Obj. 3: Further, the good of the species is better than the good of the individual, for the good of the State is more divine than the good of one man (Ethics 1.2). Now the precept given to the first man concerning the preservation of the good of the individual by the act of the nutritive power is still in force. Much more, therefore, does the precept concerning matrimony still hold, since it refers to the preservation of the species.

Obj. 4: Further, where the reason of an obligation remains the same, the obligation must remain the same. Now the reason why men were bound to marry in olden times was lest the human race should cease to multiply. Since, then, the result would be the same if each one were free to abstain from marriage, it would seem that matrimony comes under a precept.

On the contrary, It is written: he that does not give his virgin in marriage does better (1 Cor 7:38), namely, than he that gives her in marriage. Therefore, the contract of marriage is not now a matter of precept.

Further, No one deserves a reward for breaking a precept. Now a special reward, namely, the aureole, is due to virgins (Q. 96, A. 5). Therefore, matrimony does not come under a precept.

I answer that, Nature inclines to a thing in two ways. In one way as to that which is necessary for the perfection of the individual, and such an obligation is binding on each one, since natural perfections are common to all. In another way, it inclines to that which is necessary for the perfection of the community; and since there are many things of this kind, one of which hinders another, such an inclination does not bind each man by way of precept; else each man would be bound to agriculture and building and other such offices as are necessary to the human community; but the inclination of nature is satisfied by the accomplishment of those various offices by various individuals.

Accordingly, since the perfection of the human community requires that some should devote themselves to the contemplative life, to which marriage is a very great obstacle, the natural inclination to marriage is not binding by way of precept, even according to the philosophers. Hence Theophrastus proves that it is not advisable for a wise man to marry, as Jerome relates (Against Jovinian 1).

Reply Obj. 1: This precept has not been recalled, and yet it is not binding on each individual, for the reason given above, except at that time when the paucity of men required each one to betake himself to the begetting of children.

The replies to objections 2 and 3 are clear from what has been said.

Reply Obj. 4: Human nature has a general inclination to various offices and acts, as already stated. But since it is variously in various subjects, as individualized in this or that one, it inclines one subject more to one of those offices, and another subject more to another, according to the difference of temperament of various individuals. And it is owing to this difference, as well as to divine providence which governs all, that one person chooses one office such as husbandry, and another person another. And so it is too that some choose the married life and some the contemplative. Therefore, no danger threatens.