Objection 1: It would seem that no consent can be compulsory. For, as stated above (Sentences II, D. 25, I-II, Q. 6, A. 4) the free-will cannot be compelled. Now consent is an act of the free-will. Therefore, it cannot be compelled.

Obj. 2: Further, ‘violent’ is the same as ‘compulsory.’ Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethics 3.1), a violent action is one the principle of which is without, the patient concurring not at all. But the principle of consent is always within. Therefore, no consent can be compulsory.

Obj. 3: Further, every sin is perfected by consent. But that which perfects a sin cannot be compulsory, for, according to Augustine (On Free Choice of the Will 3.18), no one sins in what he cannot avoid. Since, then, violence is defined by jurists (Digesta Iustiniani) as the force of a stronger being that cannot be repulsed, it would seem that consent cannot be compulsory or violent.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, domination is opposed to freedom. But compulsion belongs to domination, as is clear in a certain definition from Cicero: for he says that force is the impetus of the dominant thing retaining a thing within foreign boundaries. Therefore, force does not happen to a free will; and thus neither does it happen in consent, which is its act.

On the contrary, That which cannot be, cannot be an impediment. But compulsory consent is an impediment to matrimony, as stated in the text (Sentences IV, D. 29). Therefore, consent can be compelled.

Further, In marriage there is a contract. Now the will can be compelled in the matter of contracts; for which reason the law adjudges that restitution should be made of the whole, for it does not ratify that which was done under compulsion or fear (Sentences IV, D. 29). Therefore, in marriage also it is possible for the consent to be compulsory.

I answer that, Compulsion or violence is twofold. One is the cause of absolute necessity, and violence of this kind the Philosopher calls violent simply (Ethics 3.1), as when by bodily strength one forces a person to move. The other causes conditional necessity, and the Philosopher calls this a mixed violence, as when a person throws his merchandise overboard in order to save himself. In the latter kind of violence, although the thing done is not voluntary in itself, yet taking into consideration the circumstances of place and time it is voluntary. And since actions are about particulars, it follows that it is voluntary simply, and involuntary in a certain respect (Cf. I-II, Q. 6, A. 6). Wherefore this latter violence or compulsion is consistent with consent, but not the former. And since this compulsion results from one’s fear of a threatening danger, it follows that this violence coincides with fear which, in a manner, compels the will, whereas the former violence has to do with bodily actions.

Moreover, since the law considers not merely internal actions, but rather external actions, consequently it takes violence to mean absolute compulsion, for which reason it draws a distinction between violence and fear. Here, however, it is a question of internal consent, which cannot be influenced by compulsion or violence as distinct from fear. Therefore, as to the question at issue, compulsion and fear are the same, for, according to lawyers, fear is the agitation of the mind occasioned by danger imminent or future (Ethics 3.1).

This suffices for the replies to the objections: for the first set of arguments consider the first kind of compulsion, and the second set of arguments consider the second.