Objection 1: It would seem that the bodies of the damned will rise again with their deformities. For that which was appointed as a punishment for sin should not cease except the sin be forgiven. Now the lack of limbs that results from mutilation, as well as all other bodily deformities, are appointed as punishments for sin. Therefore, these deformities will not be taken away from the damned, seeing that they will not have received the forgiveness of their sins.

Obj. 2: Further, just as the saints will rise again to final happiness, so the wicked will rise again to final unhappiness. Now when the saints rise again, nothing will be taken from them that can pertain to their perfection; therefore, nothing pertaining to the defect or unhappiness of the wicked will be taken from them at the resurrection. But such are their deformities. Therefore, etc.

Obj. 3: Further, just as deformity is a defect of the passible body, so is slowness of movement. Now slowness of movement will not be taken from the bodies of the damned at the resurrection, since their bodies will not be agile. Therefore, for the same reason neither will their deformity be taken away.

On the contrary, It is written: the dead shall rise again incorruptible (1 Cor 15:52); where a Gloss says, the dead, i.e., sinners, or all the dead in general, shall rise again incorruptible, i.e., without the loss of any limbs. Therefore, the wicked will rise again without their deformities.

Further, There will be nothing in the damned to lessen the sense of pain. But sickness hinders the sense of pain by weakening the organ of sense, and in like manner the lack of a limb would prevent pain from affecting the whole body. Therefore, the damned will rise again without these defects.

I answer that, Deformity in the human body is of two kinds. One arises from the lack of a limb: thus we say that a mutilated person is deformed, because he lacks due proportion of the parts to the whole. Deformities of this kind, without any doubt, will not be in the bodies of the damned, since all bodies of both wicked and good will rise again whole.

Another deformity arises from the undue disposition of the parts, by reason of undue quantity, quality, or place—which deformity is, moreover, incompatible with due proportion of parts to whole. Concerning these deformities and like defects, such as fevers and similar ailments which sometimes result in deformity, Augustine remained undecided and doubtful (Handbook on Faith, Hope, and Charity 92) as the Master remarks (Sentences IV, D.44). Among modern masters, however, there are two opinions on this point.

For some say that such deformities and defects will remain in the bodies of the damned, because they consider that those who are damned are sentenced to utmost unhappiness from which no affliction should be rebated.

But this would seem unreasonable, for in the restoration of the rising body we look to its natural perfection rather than to its previous condition. Hence those who die under perfect age will rise again in the stature of youth, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1). Consequently, those who had natural defects in the body, or deformities resulting therefrom, will be restored without those defects or deformities at the resurrection, unless the demerit of sin prevent; and so if a person rise again with such defects and deformities, this will be for his punishment. Now the mode of punishment is according to the measure of guilt. But it happens that a certain damned sinner, subject to minor sins, has deformities or defects that someone else who would be damned for more serious sins did not have. Wherefore if he who had deformities in this life should rise again with them, while the other who had them not in this life, and therefore, as is clear, will rise again without them (though deserving of greater punishment), the mode of the punishment would not correspond to the amount of guilt; in fact, it would seem that a man is more punished on account of the pains which he suffered in this world, which is absurd.

Hence others say with more reason that he who fashioned nature will wholly restore the body’s nature at the resurrection. Therefore, whatever defect or deformity was in the body through corruption, or weakness of nature or of natural principles (for instance, fever, purblindness, and so forth) will be entirely done away with at the resurrection: whereas those defects in the human body which are the natural result of its natural principles, such as heaviness, passibility, and the like, will be in the bodies of the damned, while they will be removed from the bodies of the elect by the glory of the resurrection.

Reply Obj. 1: Since in every tribunal punishment is inflicted according to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, the punishments which in this temporal life are inflicted for some particular sin are themselves temporal, and extend not beyond the term of this life. Hence, although the damned are not pardoned their sins, it does not follow that there they will undergo the same punishments as they have in this world: but the divine justice demands that there they shall suffer more severe punishment for eternity.

Reply Obj. 2: There is no parity between the good and the wicked, because a thing can be altogether good, but not altogether evil. Hence the final happiness of the saints requires that they should be altogether exempt from all evil; whereas the final unhappiness of the wicked will not exclude all good, because if a thing be wholly evil it destroys itself, as the Philosopher says (Ethics 4.5). Hence it is necessary for the good of their nature to underlie the unhappiness of the damned, which good is the work of their perfect Creator, who will restore that same nature to the perfection of its species.

Reply Obj. 3: Slowness of movement is one of those defects which are the natural result of the principles of the human body; but deformity is not, and consequently the comparison fails.