Objection 1: It would seem that all who perform works of mercy will not be punished eternally, but only those who neglect those works. For James 2:13 says: judgment without mercy to him that has not done mercy, and Matthew 5:7 says: blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy.

Obj. 2: Further, we find a description of our Lord’s discussion with the damned and the elect (Matt 25:35–46). But this discussion is only about works of mercy. Therefore, eternal punishment will be awarded only to such as have omitted to practice works of mercy: and consequently the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 3: Further, it is written: forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors (Matt 6:12), and further on: for if you will forgive men their offenses, your heavenly Father will forgive you also your offenses (Matt 6:14). Therefore, it would seem that the merciful, who forgive others their offenses, will themselves obtain the forgiveness of their sins, and consequently will not be punished eternally.

Obj. 4: Further, a Gloss of Ambrose on 1 Timothy 4:8: godliness is profitable to all things, says: the sum total of a Christian’s rule of life consists in mercy and godliness. Let a man follow this, and though he should suffer from the inconstancy of the flesh, without doubt he will be scourged, but he will not perish: whereas he who can boast of no other exercise but that of the body will suffer everlasting punishment. Therefore, those who persevere in works of mercy, though they be shackled with fleshly sins, will not be punished eternally: and thus the same conclusion follows as before.

On the contrary, It is written: neither fornicators nor adulterers shall possess the kingdom of God (1 Cor 6:9–10). Yet many are such who practice works of mercy. Therefore, the merciful will not all come to the eternal kingdom: and consequently some of them will be punished eternally.

Further, It is written: whosoever shall keep the whole law, but offend in one point, is become guilty of all (Jas 2:10). Therefore, whoever keeps the law as regards the works of mercy, and omits other works, is guilty of transgressing the law, and consequently will be punished eternally.

I answer that, As Augustine says in the book quoted above (The City of God 21.22), some have maintained that not all who have professed the Catholic faith will be freed from eternal punishment, but only those who persevere in works of mercy, although they be guilty of other crimes. But this cannot stand, because without charity nothing can be acceptable to God, nor does anything profit unto eternal life in the absence of charity. Now it happens that certain persons persevere in works of mercy without having charity. Therefore, nothing profits them to the meriting of eternal life or to exemption from eternal punishment, as may be gathered from 1 Corinthians 13:3. Most evident is this in the case of those who lay hands on other people’s property, for, after seizing on many things, they nevertheless spend something in works of mercy.

We must therefore conclude that if anyone should die in mortal sin, neither faith nor works of mercy will free him from eternal punishment, not even after any length of time whatever.

Reply Obj. 1: Those will obtain mercy who show mercy in an ordinate manner. But those who, while merciful to others, are neglectful of themselves do not show mercy ordinately; rather do they strike at themselves by their evil actions. Wherefore such persons will not obtain the mercy that sets free altogether, even if they obtain that mercy which rebates somewhat their due punishment.

Reply Obj. 2: The reason why the discussion refers only to the works of mercy is not because eternal punishment will be inflicted on none but those who omit those works, but because eternal punishment will be remitted to those who, after sinning, have obtained forgiveness by their works of mercy, making unto themselves friends of the mammon of iniquity (Luke 16:9).

Reply Obj. 3: Our Lord said this to those who ask that their debt be forgiven, but not to those who persist in sin. Wherefore the repentant alone will obtain by their works of mercy the forgiveness that sets them free altogether.

Reply Obj. 4: The Gloss of Ambrose speaks of the inconstancy that consists in venial sin, from which a man will be freed through the works of mercy after the punishment of purgatory, which he calls a scourging.

Or, if he speaks of the inconstancy of mortal sin, the sense is that those who while yet in this life fall into sins of the flesh through frailty are disposed to repentance by works of mercy. Wherefore such a one will not perish, that is to say, he will be disposed by those works not to perish.

Appendix 1

Purgatory

Concerning purgatory, we must ask about eight things:

(1) Whether there is a purgatory after this life.

(2) Whether souls are purified and the damned are punished in the same place.

(3) Whether the suffering of purgatory exceeds all the temporal punishment of this life.

(4) Whether that suffering is voluntary.

(5) Whether souls in purgatory are punished by demons.

(6) Whether venial sin is expiated as to its guilt by the suffering of purgatory.

(7) Whether purgatorial fire delivers from the debt of punishment.

(8) Whether one person is freed from that suffering more quickly than another.

Article 1

Whether there is a purgatory after this life?

Obj. 1: It seems that there is no purgatory after this life. For it says in Revelation 14:13, blessed are the dead who die in the Lord. From now on the Spirit says that they may rest from their labors. Therefore, for those who die in the Lord, no purgatorial labor remains after this life; neither for those who do not die in the Lord: for they cannot be purified. Therefore, there is no purgatory after this life.

Obj. 2: Further, charity is related to the eternal reward as mortal sin is to the eternal punishment. But those who die in mortal sin are carried off to eternal punishment immediately. Therefore, those who die in charity go immediately to their reward. And then no purgatory remains to them after this life.

Obj. 3: Further, God, who is consummately merciful, tends more to reward good deeds than to punish bad ones. But just as those who are in the state of charity do commit certain bad deeds that are not deserving of eternal punishment, so too those who are in mortal sin sometimes do things that are good in their genus which are not deserving of the eternal reward. Therefore, since those good deeds are not rewarded in the damned after this life, neither should those bad deeds be punished after this life. And so the same as before.

On the contrary, 2 Maccabees 12:46 says: it is a holy and wholesome thought to pray for the dead that they might be loosed from their sins. But no one needs to pray for the dead who are in paradise, for they lack nothing. Nor again for those who are in hell, for they cannot be released from their sins. Therefore, after this life there are some who can be released from their sins, who have not been yet. And such people have charity, without which the remission of sins does not happen: for charity covers all sins (Prov 10:12). Therefore, they do not come to eternal death, for whoever lives and believes in me shall never die (John 11:26). Nor will they be admitted into glory unless they are purified, for nothing unclean shall arrive there, as is clear from the book of Revelation. Therefore, some purgatory remains after this life.

Further, Gregory of Nyssa says: if anyone consenting to Christ as his friend was able to purify his sins less in this life, after his passing from here the fire of purgatory will be enkindled. (In the Contra Errores Graecorum, pt. 2, ch. 40, this quotation is attributed to St. Gregory of Nyssa’s “Sermon on the dead” (Sermo de defunctis). It is perhaps traceable to the saint’s De Mortuis (PG 46:521D–524B).) Therefore, after this life a certain purgation remains.

I answer that, From the things that have been determined above, (Cf. Sentences, Dist. 14, Q. 2, A. 1, qa. 2.) it is clear enough that there is a purgatory after this life. For, if after guilt is effaced through contrition, the debt of punishment is not entirely taken away, nor are venial sins always taken away when mortal ones are forgiven, and God’s justice requires that sin be ordered by the due punishment, a person who dies after contrition and absolution for sin but before making the due satisfaction must be punished after this life.

And therefore those who deny purgatory are speaking against divine justice. And because of this, it is erroneous and contrary to the faith. Therefore, Gregory of Nyssa adds after the words quoted, we preach this, preserving the dogma of truth, and so we believe.

The universal Church also holds this when it prays for the dead that they be released from their sins, which can only be understood about those who are in purgatory. Now anyone who opposes the Church’s authority incurs heresy.

Reply Obj. 1: That authority is speaking about the labor of working for meriting and not meriting, and not about the labor of suffering for purification.

Reply Obj. 2: Evil does not have a complete cause, but comes about from particular defects, whereas good arises from one complete cause, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 30 (PG 3:730).) And so any defect prevents the perfection of the good, but not any good would prevent some consummation of an evil, for there is never an evil without some good. And therefore venial sin prevents someone who has charity from reaching the perfect good, namely, eternal life, until he is purified. But mortal sin cannot be prevented by having some good attached to it, so that it would lead less directly to the last of evils.

Reply Obj. 3: The person who falls into mortal sin puts to death all his previous good acts, and those that he does while remaining in mortal sin are dead. For he who offends God deserves to lose all the goods that he has from God. Consequently, no reward remains after this life for someone who dies in mortal sin, the way that sometimes punishment remains for one who dies in charity, which does not always blot out every evil that it encounters, but only what is contrary to itself.

Article 2

Whether the place where souls are purified is the same as where the damned are punished?

Obj. 1: It seems that the place where souls are purified is not the same as where the damned are punished. For the punishment of the damned is eternal, as is clear in Matthew 25:46: these will go into everlasting fire. But purgatory is a temporal fire, as the Master said above. Therefore, both cannot be punished together in the same fire, and so it is necessary that there be different places.

Obj. 2: Further, the punishment of hell is named by many names, as it says in Psalm 11:6: fire, brimstone, and storms of winds, etc. But the punishment of purgatory is only named with one name, namely, fire. Therefore, they are not punished in the same fire and in the same place.

Obj. 3: Further, Hugh of St. Victor says: it is probable they are punished in the places where they incurred guilt. (Hugh of St. Victor, De Sacramentis Fidei, Bk. 2, pt. 16, ch. 4 (PL 176:586).) Gregory also tells in his Dialogues that bishop Germanus of Capua found Paschasius being purified in the baths. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Bk. 4 (SC 265), ch. 40.) Therefore, they are not purified in hell, but in this world.

On the contrary, Gregory says that just as in the same fire gold is reddened while chaff turns to smoke, so in the same fire a sinner reduced to ashes while one of the elect is purified. (In fact, Augustine, The City of God (CCSL 47), Bk. 1, ch. 8.) Therefore, the fire of purgatory and of hell is the same, and thus they are in the same place.

Further, Before the coming of Christ the holy patriarchs were in a worthier place than the place where the souls are purified after death, for there was no sensible pain there. But that place was either the same as hell or attached to it, otherwise Christ would not be said to have descended into hell when he descended to limbo. Therefore, purgatory is in the same place as, or connected with, hell.

I answer that, Concerning purgatory’s location nothing specific is expressly found in Scripture, nor can one offer effective arguments about it. Yet probably, and according to what agrees most with the words of the saints and the revelation made to many, there are two places for purgatory. One is according to the common law. And in this purgatory’s location is a lower place, connected with hell, so that it is the same fire that torments the damned in hell and purifies the just in purgatory; although the damned, as lower in merit, are also relegated to a lower place. The other is the place for purgatory by special dispensation; and this is why it is read sometimes that certain people are punished in different places, whether for the instruction of the living, or for the aid of the dead, so that by making their suffering known to the living, it might be reduced through the Church’s intercession.

However, some people say that according to the common law purgatory’s place is wherever a man sins. But this does not seem probable, since a man can be punished at the same time for sins that he committed in different places.

But other people say that they are punished above us according to the common law, for they are in a middle place between us and God according to their state. But there is nothing in this, for they are not punished for being above us, but for what is lowest in them, namely, sin.

Reply Obj. 1: The fire of purgatory is eternal as to its substance, but temporal as to the effect of purification.

Reply Obj. 2: The suffering of hell exists for the sake of affliction, and so it is named from all those things that usually afflict us here. But the suffering of purgatory is chiefly for purifying the traces of sin, and this is why only the suffering of fire is attributed to purgatory, because fire has the capacity to purify and consume.

Reply Obj. 3: That argument proceeds according to a special dispensation, and not according to the common law.

Article 3

Whether the punishment of purgatory exceeds all temporal suffering of this life?

Obj. 1: It seems that the suffering of purgatory does not exceed all the temporal suffering of this life. For the more something is passive, the more it is afflicted if it has the sensation of injury. But a body is more susceptible to being acted upon than a separated soul, both because it has a contrariety to the fire acting on it, and because it has matter that is susceptible to a quality acting on it, which cannot be said about a soul. Therefore, the pain that a body suffers in this world is greater than the suffering by which a soul is purified after this life.

Obj. 2: Further, the suffering of purgatory is directly ordered against venial sin. But venial sins, since they are the lightest of sins, should have the lightest punishment, if the number of lashes are according to the measure of the offense (Deut 25:2). Therefore, the suffering of purgatory is very light.

Obj. 3: Further, liability to punishment, since it is an effect of guilt, is not intensified unless the guilt is intensified. But in someone whose guilt is already forgiven, guilt cannot be intensified. Therefore, when someone has been forgiven for a mortal sin yet has not made full satisfaction for it, his liability to punishment does not grow after he has died. But in this life he was not liable to punishment with respect to the worst punishment. Therefore, the punishment that he will suffer after this life will not be worse than every suffering of this life.

On the contrary, Augustine says in one of his sermons: that fire of purgatory will be harsher than anything one can feel or see or think in this world of punishments. (Among the works spuriously attributed to Augustine: Serm. suppos. 104 (PL 39:1947).)

Further, The more universal a punishment is, the greater it is. But the whole separated soul is punished, since it is simple; but it is not so with the body. Therefore, that suffering that belongs to the separated soul is greater than every suffering that the body suffers.

I answer that, In purgatory there are two punishments: one of loss, namely, inasmuch as souls are held back from the divine vision; the other, of sense, according as they are physically punished by fire. And in both, the least punishment of purgatory exceeds the greatest punishment of this life.

For the more something is desired, the more troubling is its absence. And because the affection by which the highest good is desired in holy souls after this life is the most intense, since the affection is not held back by the weight of the body, and since the enjoyment of the highest good would have been attained by then had nothing impeded it, they suffer extremely from this detainment.

Similarly, because sorrow is not so much due to an injury but to the sensation of the injury, the more sensitive someone is, the more he suffers from anything harmful, which is why the injuries that happen in the most sensitive places are the most painful. And since all the sensation of the body is from the soul, for this reason if anything injurious is at work in the soul itself, it necessarily must be most afflicted. Now for the moment we will suppose that the soul suffers from a physical fire (Cf. Q. 70, A. 3; Sentences Dist. 44). And therefore the punishment of purgatory in the suffering of loss and of sense exceeds every punishment of this life.

However, some people argue this conclusion from the fact that the whole soul is punished without the body. But there is nothing in this, for then the punishment of the damned would be less after the resurrection than before, which is false.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the soul is less susceptible to harm than the body, nevertheless it is more aware of suffering. And where there is greater sense of suffering there is greater pain, even if there is less harm.

Reply Obj. 2: The severity of that punishment is not so much from the amount of sin as from the disposition of the one punished, for the same sin is punished more heavily there than here; just as someone who has a finer complexion is punished more than another by the same lashes inflicted, and yet the judge, imposing the same number of lashes on both for the same faults, acts justly.

This suffices for the reply to the third objection.

Article 4

Whether that suffering is voluntary?

Obj. 1: It seems that that suffering is voluntary. For those who are in purgatory have upright hearts. But this is uprightness of heart, that someone conform his own will to the divine will, as Ambrose says. (In fact, Prosper of Aquitaine, De Vocatione Omnium Gentium, Bk. 2, ch. 2 (PL 51:649); a newer edition is available as CSEL 97.) Therefore, since God wills to punish them, they voluntarily endure that punishment.

Obj. 2: Further, every wise person wills whatever is necessary for attaining his intended end. But those who are in purgatory know that they cannot attain to glory unless they are first punished. Therefore, they will to be punished.

On the contrary, No one begs to be freed from suffering that he willingly endures. But those who are in purgatory beg to be freed, as is clear from many things that are told in the Dialogues. (See Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Bk. 4, ch. 41.) Therefore, they do not endure that suffering willingly.

I answer that, Something is called voluntary in two ways. In one way, by an absolute will, and then no punishment is voluntary, for by the very nature of punishment it is contrary to the will.

In another way, something is said to be voluntary by a conditional will, as burning is voluntary because of the health that will result; and in this way a punishment can be voluntary in two ways. In one way, because by this punishment we acquire some good, and so the will itself takes on a punishment, as is seen in the case of satisfaction; or also because someone accepts it willingly, and he did not wish it to be, as happens in martyrdom. In the other way, because although no good accrues to us by the punishment, nevertheless we cannot attain the good without the punishment, as is seen in the case of natural death. And then the will does not take on the punishment but wishes to be freed from it; and yet the will endures it, and for this it is said to be ‘voluntary.’ And this is how the punishment of purgatory is voluntary.

Now some people say that it is not voluntary in any way, for the souls are so absorbed by their sufferings that they do not know they are being purified by them, but they believe themselves to be damned. But this is false: for unless they knew they would be freed, they would not beg for prayers, which they often do.

And by this the answers to the objections are clear.

Article 5

Whether souls in purgatory are punished by demons?

Obj. 1: It seems that the souls in purgatory are punished by the demons. For as the Master says at the end of Distinction 47, they will have as torturers in their punishments those who were their provokers in sin. But the demons incite us not only to mortal sin, but also to venial sin, when they cannot do worse. Therefore, they also torture those souls who are in purgatory for venial sins.

Obj. 2: Further, purification from sins applies to the just both in this life and after this life. But in this life they are purified through the sufferings inflicted by the devil, as is seen in the case of Job. Therefore, those to be purified after this life are also punished by demons.

On the contrary, It is unjust that someone who has triumphed over another be subject to him after the triumph. But those who are in purgatory have triumphed over the demons by dying without mortal sin. Therefore, they are not subject to being punished by them.

I answer that, Just as after the day of judgment divine justice will set a fire in which the damned will be punished for eternity, so also now the elect are purified after this life only by divine justice, not by the ministry of demons over whom they have arisen as victors, nor by the ministry of angels, for fellow citizens would not afflict their own so forcefully. But nevertheless it is possible that they lead them to places of suffering, and that even the demons themselves, who rejoice in the sufferings of men, accompany them and attend those to be purified, both so that they might be sated by their sufferings, and so that at their departure from the body, they might seize upon something of their own there.

But in this world, while it is still the place of battle, men are punished both by bad angels as enemies, as is seen in Job, (Chapters 1 and 2.) and by good ones, as is seen in the case of Jacob, (Genesis 32:25.) whose femoral nerve withered from the angel’s striking it. And Dionysius also says explicitly in On the Divine Names 4 that good angels sometimes punish. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, n. 22 (PG 3:723).)

And by this the solutions to the objections are clear.

Article 6

Whether venial sin is expiated by the suffering of purgatory as to guilt?

Obj. 1: It seems that by the punishment of purgatory venial sin is not expiated as to guilt. For commenting on 1 John 5:6: there is a sin that is mortal, etc., the interlinear Gloss says: for what is not corrected in this life, forgiveness is sought in vain after death. (The Gloss is quoting from Gregory the Great, Moralia in Iob (CCSL 143A), Bk. 16, par. 68.) Therefore, no sin is remitted as to its guilt after this life.

Obj. 2: Further, it is the same faculty that falls into sin and is freed from sin. But the soul cannot sin venially after death. Therefore, neither can it be absolved.

Obj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Bk. 4 (SC 265), ch. 41: Ex quibus nimirum sententiis constat quia qualis hinc quisque egreditur, talis in iudicio praesentatur.) that everyone will be at the judgment as he left the body; for where the tree falls, there it will lie (Eccl 11:3). Therefore, if someone departed this life with venial sin, he will come to the judgment with venial sin, and so no one is expiated from fault by purgatory.

Obj. 4: Further, it was said above (Q. 2, A. 2; Cf. Sentences Dist. 17, Q. 2, A. 2, qa 3) that actual fault is not effaced by anything but contrition. But after this life there will be no contrition, which is a meritorious act, for then there will be neither merit nor demerit, since, according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, Bk. 2, ch. 4 (PG 9:878).) as the fall was to the angels, so is death to humans. Therefore, after this life no venial sin is forgiven as to its fault in purgatory.

Obj. 5: Further, venial sin is only in us by reason of the fomes, which is why in the first state of man Adam would not have sinned venially (Sentences II, D. 21, Q. 2, A. 3). But after this life in purgatory there will be no sensuality provoked by corrupt fomes in the separated soul, for the fomes is called the law of the flesh (Rom 7:22). Therefore, there will be no venial sin there; and so it cannot be expiated by the fire of purgatory.

On the contrary, There is what Gregory says in his Dialogues 4, (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Bk. 4 (SC 265), ch. 41.) and Augustine says in On True Repentance, (Pseudo-Augustine, On True and False Repentance, ch. 17, n. 33 (PL 40:1127).) that certain light faults are forgiven in the future. Nor can this be understood as referring to the punishment, for as to the debt of punishment, every fault, no matter how serious, is expiated by the fire of purgatory. Therefore, venial sins are purified by the fire of purgatory as to their guilt.

Further, By wood, hay, and straw, venial sins are understood (Cf. 1 Cor 3:12). But wood, hay, and straw are consumed by purgatory. Therefore, venial sins themselves are remitted after this life.

I answer that, Some people have said that after this life no sin is remitted as to its fault, and if someone dies with mortal sin, he is damned and has no capacity for forgiveness. But it cannot be that he died with venial sin without mortal sin, for the final grace itself purifies venial fault. For venial sin happens when someone who has Christ as a foundation loves something temporal too much, an excess that indeed happens from the corruption of concupiscence. Hence if grace entirely conquers the corruption of concupiscence, as was the case in the Blessed Virgin, there remains no room for venial sin. And so, since in death that concupiscence is entirely diminished and annihilated, the powers of the soul are completely subjected to grace, and venial sin is expelled.

But this opinion is worthless both in itself and in its cause. In itself, indeed, because it is contrary to the statements of the saints and the Gospel, which cannot be explained about the remission of venial sins as to punishment, as the Master says in the text; for then both light and serious sins would be forgiven in the future. But Gregory holds that light sins alone will be remitted after this life. (See Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Bk. 4 (SC 265), ch. 41.) Nor does it suffice that they say that here specifically light sins are spoken of, lest it be thought that we will suffer nothing serious for them, for the remission of punishment removes more gravity from the punishment than it brings.

Now as to this opinion’s cause, its worthlessness is apparent, for bodily defect, such as there is at the end of life, does not remove or diminish the corruption of concupiscence as to its root, but as to its act, as is seen even in those who are extremely weakened. Nor again does it calm the powers of the soul, so that they are subject to grace, for the tranquillity of the powers and their subjection to grace is when the lower powers obey the higher ones that delight in the law of God (Rom 7:22); which cannot exist in that state, since the act of either one is impeded; unless tranquillity means the absence of fighting, as also happens in people sleeping. Nor, however, is sleep said to diminish concupiscence because of this, or to calm the powers of the soul, or to subdue them to grace.

And furthermore, if it were granted that that defect would radically diminish concupiscence, and the powers of the soul would be subject to grace, this would still not suffice for the purification of venial sin already committed, although it would suffice for its future avoidance; for actual fault, even venial, is not remitted without an actual movement of contrition, no matter how much grace is habitually intended, as was said above. (Q. 12, Art. 2; Cf. Sentences, Dist. 16, Q. 1, A. 2, qa 3) Now it sometimes happens that someone dies in his sleep while in a state of grace, who fell asleep with some venial sin; and a person like this cannot have an act of contrition for venial sin before his death. Nor can it be said, as they say, that if he did not repent in act or intention in a general or specific way, it would be turned into mortal sin, because venial sin becomes mortal when it pleases the one doing it; for not just any pleasure makes a venial sin mortal (otherwise every venial sin would be mortal, for every venial sin pleases, since it is voluntary); but the kind of pleasure that has to do with the enjoyment in which every human perversity consists, when we enjoy the things that should be used, as Augustine says. (See Augustine, 83 Questions (CCSL 44A), Qu. 30.) And thus that pleasure that makes a mortal sin is actual pleasure, for every mortal sin consists in an act. However, it can happen that after someone has committed a venial sin, he thinks nothing actually about abandoning the sin or holding to it, but he thinks perhaps that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles; and in this thought he falls asleep and dies. Therefore, it is clear that this opinion is entirely irrational.

And therefore it should be said with others that venial sin in someone who dies with grace is remitted after this life by the fire of purgatory, for that punishment, which is voluntary in a certain way, will have the power by virtue of grace of expiating every fault that can exist together with grace.

Reply Obj. 1: The Gloss is speaking of mortal sin.

Or it could be said that, although it is not corrected in itself in this life, it is, however, corrected in merit, for a man has merited here so that there his suffering may be meritorious to him.

Reply Obj. 2: Venial sin happens from the corruption of the fomes, which will not exist in a separated soul existing in purgatory. And therefore it could not sin venially, but the remission of venial guilt is from the grace informing it, which will exist in purgatory in a separated soul; and therefore it is not the same.

Reply Obj. 3: Venial sins do not change the state of man, for they neither take away nor diminish charity, according as the amount of free goodness of the soul is measured. And therefore when venial sins are remitted, the soul remains as before.

Reply Obj. 4: After this life there cannot be merit with regard to the essential reward, but with regard to some extra reward there can be, as long as a person remains in the state of a wayfarer in some way. And therefore in purgatory there can be a meritorious act as to the remission of venial guilt.

Reply Obj. 5: Although venial sin happens from the tendency of the fomes, nevertheless guilt is contracted in the mind. And therefore, even once the fomes are destroyed, guilt still remains.

Article 7

Whether the fire of purgatory delivers from the debt of punishment?

Obj. 1: It would seem that the fire of purgatory does not deliver from the debt of punishment. For every cleansing is in respect of some uncleanness. But punishment does not imply uncleanness. Therefore, the fire of purgatory does not deliver from punishment.

Obj. 2: Further, a contrary is not cleansed save by its contrary. But punishment is not contrary to punishment. Therefore, one is not cleansed from the debt of punishment by the punishment of purgatory.

Obj. 3: Further, a gloss on 1 Corinthians 3:15: He shall be saved, yet so, says, this fire is the trial of tribulation of which it is written, ”the furnace tries the potter’s vessels” (Cf. Sirach 27:6). Therefore, man expiates every punishment by the pains of this world, at least by death, which is the greatest punishment of all, and not by the fire of purgatory.

On the contrary, The pains of purgatory are more grievous than all the pains of this world, as stated above (A. 3). Now the satisfactory punishment which one undergoes in this life atones for the debt of punishment. Much more, therefore, is this effected by the punishment of purgatory.

I answer that, Whosoever is another’s debtor is freed from his indebtedness by paying the debt. And since the obligation incurred by guilt is nothing else than the debt of punishment, a person is freed from that obligation by undergoing the punishment which he owed. Accordingly, the punishment of purgatory cleanses from the debt of punishment.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the debt of punishment does not in itself imply uncleanness, it bears a relation to uncleanness by reason of its cause.

Reply Obj. 2: Although punishment is not contrary to punishment, it is opposed to the debt of punishment, because the obligation to punishment remains from the fact that one has not undergone the punishment that was due.

Reply Obj. 3: Many meanings underlie the same words of Sacred Scripture. Hence this fire may denote both the present tribulation and the punishment to come, and venial sins can be cleansed from both of these. That natural death is not sufficient for this has been stated above. (Sentences IV, Dist. 20)

Article 8

Whether one person is delivered from this punishment sooner than another?

Obj. 1: It would seem that one person is not delivered from this punishment sooner than another. For the more grievous the sin, and the greater the debt, the more severely is it punished in purgatory. Now there is the same proportion between severer punishment and graver fault as between lighter punishment and less grievous fault. Therefore, one is delivered from this punishment as soon as another.

Obj. 2: Further, in point of duration unequal merits receive equal retribution both in heaven and in hell. Therefore, seemingly it is the same in purgatory.

On the contrary, There is the comparison of the Apostle, who denotes the differences of venial sins by wood, hay, and stubble. Now it is clear that wood remains longer in the fire than hay and stubble. Therefore, one venial sin is punished longer in purgatory than another.

I answer that, Some venial sins cling more persistently than others, according as the affections are more inclined to them, and more firmly fixed in them. And since that which clings more persistently is more slowly cleansed, it follows that some are tormented in purgatory longer than others, for as much as their affections were steeped in venial sins.

Reply Obj. 1: Severity of punishment corresponds properly speaking to the amount of guilt: whereas the length corresponds to the firmness with which sin has taken root in its subject. Hence it may happen that one may be delayed longer who is tormented less, and vice versa.

Reply Obj. 2: Mortal sin, which deserves the punishment of hell, and charity, which deserves the reward of heaven, will, after this life, be immovably rooted in their subject. Hence as to all there is the same duration in either case. It is otherwise with venial sin which is punished in purgatory, as stated above (A. 6).

Appendix 2

The Punishment for Original Sin

Concerning this we must ask about two things:

(1) Whether a sensible punishment is due to original sin after death among those who die in original sin.

(2) Whether those who are punished for original sin alone feel any interior spiritual sorrow in their souls.

Article 1

Whether a sensible punishment is due to original sin in itself?

Obj. 1: It seems that a sensible punishment is due to original sin in itself. For Augustine says, hold to this unshakeably, and have no doubt that children who pass away from this world without the sacrament of baptism will be punished in eternal suffering (De Fide ad Petrum Diaconum). But suffering means sensible punishment. Therefore, children, who will be punished for original sin alone, will endure a sensible punishment.

Obj. 2: Further, greater punishment is due to greater fault. But original sin is a greater sin than venial sin, for it contains more turning away from God by the fact that it removes grace, while venial sin can coexist with grace. And again, original sin is punished by eternal punishment, but venial sin by temporal punishment. Therefore, since sensible punishment is due to venial sin, much more is it due to original sin.

Obj. 3: Further, sins are punished more severely after this life than in this life, where there is room for mercy. But in this life sensible punishment corresponds to original sin, for children who have only original sin endure many sensible sufferings, but not unjustly. Therefore, it is also due sensible suffering after this life.

Obj. 4: Further, just as in actual sin there is a turning away from God and a turning toward something else, so too in original sin there is something that corresponds to the turning away, namely, the privation of original justice, and something that corresponds to the turning-toward, namely, concupiscence. But a sensible punishment is due to actual sin by reason of the turning-toward. Therefore, it is also owed to original sin by reason of concupiscence.

Obj. 5: Further, the bodies of children after the resurrection are either passible or impassible. If impassible, since no human body can be impassible except by the gift of impassibility, as it is in the blessed, or by reason of original justice, as in the state of innocence: therefore, the bodies of children either will have the gift of impassibility and so they will be glorified, and there will be no difference between baptized and unbaptized children, which is heretical; or else they will have original justice, and then they will be without original sin, nor will they be punished for original sin, which is likewise heretical. But if they are passible, every passible thing necessarily suffers from the presence of anything active; therefore, they will suffer sensible pain from the presence of sensible bodies.

On the contrary, Augustine says that the punishment of children who are bound only by original sin is the slightest of all. But this would not be the case if they were tormented with sensible punishment, for the punishment of the fires of hell is the most severe. Therefore, they will not endure sensible punishment.

Further, The harshness of sensible punishment corresponds to pleasure in the fault: as much as she glorified herself and dwelt in pleasures, etc. (Rev 18:7). But there is no pleasure in original sin, just as there is no operating; for pleasure results from operation, as is evident from Ethics 10. Therefore, a sensible punishment is not due to original sin.

I answer that, A punishment should be proportionate to guilt, as Isaiah 27:8 says: in measure against measure, when it has been cast off, then he will judge it. Now the defect that is contracted by original sin, having the account of guilt, is not by the removal or corruption of any good that human nature obtains by its own principles, but by the removal or corruption of something that was superadded to nature; nor does this guilt belong to this or that man except according as he possesses a nature like this, which is stripped of this good that ought to have been in him by nature and was possible to be preserved. And so no other punishment is owed to him except the privation of that end to which was ordered the gift that was withdrawn, an end that human nature cannot attain by itself. But this is the vision of God. And so the lack of this vision is the sole proper punishment of original sin after death. For if another sensible punishment were inflicted for original sin after death, a person would be punished not only according to his guilt, for sensible punishment pertains to what is proper to the person, since this punishment is through the suffering of this particular one. Therefore, just as his guilt was not through his own operating, so neither should the punishment be through his own suffering, but only by the absence of that for which his nature is insufficient of itself. Now in other perfections and goods that human nature possesses from its principles, the damned will suffer no detriment for original sin.

Reply Obj. 1: In the authority cited, suffering does not mean sensible punishment, but only the punishment of loss, which is the lack of the divine vision; as also the word fire in Scripture is often used to represent every punishment.

Reply Obj. 2: Among all sins, original sin is the least, by the fact that it is the least voluntary. For it is not voluntary by the will of a person, but only by the will of the principle of the nature. Now actual sin, and venial also, is voluntary by the will of the person in whom it exists. And therefore less punishment is due to original sin than to venial sin.

Nor does it matter that original sin cannot coexist with grace. For the lack of grace does not have the account of guilt, but of punishment, except to the extent that it is from the will. Therefore, where there is less of the voluntary, there is less guilt.

Likewise too it does not matter that a temporal punishment is due to actual venial sin. For this is incidental, inasmuch as someone who dies in venial sin alone has grace, by the power of which punishment is purged.

Reply Obj. 3: There is no parity between pain of sense before and after death, since before death the pain of sense results from the power of the natural agent, whether the pain of sense be interior, as fever or the like, or exterior, as burning and so forth. Whereas after death nothing will act by natural power, but only according to the order of divine justice, whether the object of such action be the separate soul, on which it is clear that fire cannot act naturally, or the body after resurrection, since then all natural action will cease through the cessation of the first movable, which is the cause of all bodily movement and alteration.

Reply Obj. 4: Sensible pain corresponds to sensible pleasure, which is in the conversion of actual sin: whereas habitual concupiscence, which is in original sin, has no pleasure. Hence, sensible pain does not correspond thereto as punishment.

Reply Obj. 5: The bodies of children will be impassible not through their being unable in themselves to suffer, but through the lack of an external agent to act upon them: because after the resurrection no body will act on another, least of all so as to induce corruption by the action of nature, but there will only be action to the effect of punishing them by order of the divine justice. Wherefore those bodies to which pain of sense is not due by divine justice will not suffer punishment. On the other hand, the bodies of the saints will be impassible, because they will lack the capability of suffering; hence impassibility in them will be a gift, but not in children.

Article 2

Whether unbaptized children feel spiritual affliction in the soul?

Obj. 1: It appears that unbaptized children feel spiritual affliction in the soul, because as Chrysostom says, the punishment of God in that they will be deprived of seeing God will be more painful than their being burned in the fire of hell (Hom. xxiii in Matth.). Now these children will be deprived of seeing God. Therefore, they will suffer spiritual affliction thereby.

Obj. 2: Further, one cannot, without suffering, lack what one wishes to have. But these children would wish to have the divine vision, else their will would be actually perverse. Therefore, since they are deprived of it, seemingly they also suffer.

If it be said that they do not suffer, because they know that through no fault of theirs they are deprived thereof, on the contrary. Freedom from fault does not lessen but increases the pain of punishment: for a man does not grieve less for that he is disinherited or deprived of a limb through no fault of his. Therefore, these children likewise, although deprived of so great a good through no fault of theirs, suffer none the less.

Obj. 3: Further, as baptized children are in relation to the merit of Christ, so are unbaptized children to the demerit of Adam. But baptized children receive the reward of eternal life by virtue of Christ’s merit. Therefore, the unbaptized suffer pain through being deprived of eternal life on account of Adam’s demerit.

Obj. 4: Further, separation from what we love cannot be without pain. But these children will have natural knowledge of God, and for that very reason will love Him naturally. Therefore, since they are separated from Him for ever, seemingly they cannot undergo this separation without pain.

On the contrary, If unbaptized children have interior sorrow after death, they will grieve either for their sin or for their punishment. If for their sin, since they cannot be further cleansed from that sin, their sorrow will lead them to despair. Now sorrow of this kind in the damned is the worm of conscience. Therefore, these children will have the worm of conscience, and consequently theirs would not be the mildest punishment, as Augustine says it is. (Cf. A. 1, Sed Contra.) If, on the other hand, they grieve for their punishment, it follows, since their punishment is justly inflicted by God, that their will opposes itself to divine justice, and thus would be actually inordinate, which is not to be granted. Therefore, they will feel no sorrow.

Further, Right reason does not allow one to be disturbed on account of what one was unable to avoid; hence Seneca proves that a wise man is not disturbed. (Ep. lxxxv, and De Ira ii, 6) Now in these children there is right reason deflected by no actual sin. Therefore, they will not be disturbed because they undergo this punishment which they could in no way avoid.

I answer that, On this question there are three opinions. Some say that these children will suffer no pain, because their reason will be so much in the dark that they will not know that they lack what they have lost. It, however, seems improbable that the soul freed from its bodily burden should ignore things which, to say the least, reason is able to explore, and many more besides.

Hence others say that they have perfect knowledge of things subject to natural reason, and know God, and that they are deprived of seeing Him, and that they feel some kind of sorrow on this account, but that their sorrow will be mitigated insofar as it was not by their will that they incurred the sin for which they are condemned. Yet this again would seem improbable, because this sorrow cannot be little for the loss of so great a good, especially without the hope of recovery: wherefore their punishment would not be the mildest. Moreover, the very same reason that impugns their being punished with pain of sense, as afflicting them from without, argues against their feeling sorrow within, because the pain of punishment corresponds to the pleasure of sin; wherefore, since original sin is void of pleasure, its punishment is free of all pain.

Consequently others say that they will know perfectly things subject to natural knowledge, and both the fact of their being deprived of eternal life and the reason for this privation, and that nevertheless this knowledge will not cause any sorrow in them. How this may be possible we must explore.

Accordingly, it must be observed that if one is guided by right reason, one does not grieve through being deprived of what is beyond one’s power to obtain, but only through lack of that which, in some way, one is capable of obtaining. Thus no wise man grieves for being unable to fly like a bird, or for that he is not a king or an emperor, since these things are not due to him; whereas he would grieve if he lacked that to which he had some kind of claim. I say, then, that every man who has the use of free-will is adapted to obtain eternal life, because he can prepare himself for grace whereby to merit eternal life; (Cf. I-II, 109, 5 and 6) so that if he fail in this, his grief will be very great, since he has lost what he was able to possess. But children were never adapted to possess eternal life, since neither was this due to them by virtue of their natural principles, for it surpasses the entire faculty of nature, nor could they perform acts of their own whereby to obtain so great a good. Hence they will in no way grieve for being deprived of the divine vision; nay, rather will they rejoice for that they will have a large share of God’s goodness and their own natural perfections.

Nor can it be said that they were adapted to obtain eternal life, not indeed by their own action, but by the actions of others around them, since they could be baptized by others, like other children of the same condition who have been baptized and obtained eternal life: for this is of superabundant grace that one should be rewarded without any act of one’s own. Wherefore the lack of such a grace will not cause sorrow in children who die without baptism any more than the lack of many graces accorded to others of the same condition makes a wise man to grieve.

Reply Obj. 1: In those who, having the use of free-will, are damned for actual sin, there was aptitude to obtain eternal life, but not in children, as stated above. Consequently there is no parity between the two.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the will may be directed both to the possible and to the impossible as stated in Ethics III.5, an ordinate and complete will is only of things which in some way are proportionate to our capability; and we grieve if we fail to obtain this will, but not if we fail in the will that is of impossibilities, and which should be called ‘velleity’ rather than ‘will’, for one does not will such things absolutely, but one would if they were possible. (Cf. I-II, 13, 5, ad 1; III, 21, 4)

Reply Obj. 3: Everyone has a claim to his own inheritance or bodily members, wherefore it is not strange that he should grieve at their loss, whether this be through his own or another’s fault: hence it is clear that the argument is not based on a true comparison.

Reply Obj. 4: The gift of Christ surpasses the sin of Adam, as stated in Romans 5:15. Hence it does not follow that unbaptized children have as much of evil as the baptized have of good.

Reply Obj. 5: Although unbaptized children are separated from God as regards the union of glory, they are not utterly separated from Him: in fact they are united to Him by their share of natural goods, and so will also be able to rejoice in Him by their natural knowledge and love.