That the Vow of Poverty Binds under Mortal Sin, and What Quantity Is Enough to Make a Mortal Sin

SOMEONE will ask whether these things which we have said to be against the vow of poverty will always be a mortal sin, or when they will be. We have already said that it is the common opinion of doctors and saints that he who sins against the vow of poverty commits a mortal sin of theft against the Seventh Commandment of the law of God. I say, then, that, as the Seventh Commandment binds under mortal sin ex genere suo, as theologians say, that is to say, of its own kind and nature, but by reason of the smallness of the matter the theft may be a venial sin, as the theft of an apple or of a halfpenny, so also the vow of poverty of its own kind binds under mortal sin; but in so light a matter one may break it without committing more than a venial sin. And if you go on to ask what will be considered a notable quantity, so as to amount to mortal sin, that is a question much debated among the doctors on the matter of theft, what quantity should be called “notable,” to make the theft a mortal sin; and according to that standard, they say, will be the breach of the vow of poverty. Thus the quantity that will be enough for a mortal sin against the Seventh Commandment will also be ‘“‘notable” and sufficient for a mortal sin against the vow of poverty.

For the greater elucidation and confirmation of this, some theologians observe that the gravity of this sin is determined by two elements. The first is the fact that the offender appropriates and takes to himself what is another’s against the will of its owner; the second is that thereby he breaks a vow made to God. Looking only at the first element, they say a greater quantity seems necessary to make a mortal sin here than in theft, because the thing taken is not so entirely another’s, nor the owner so entirely unwilling as in theft; but looking at the second element, that quantity will be enough for a mortal sin that would be enough for a mortal sin of theft, because the obligation created by the vow of poverty, not to appropriate or take anything against the will of the superior, is much greater than the obligation created by the Seventh Commandment, not to take anything against the will of the owner.

In the case we related above (Chapter XI) from St. Gregory, what that monk had taken, according to Surius’ version of the matter (and he says that he drew it from the original) was only three reals [a real was worth about eight cents] and that from his brother, and that for a shirt which his order would have had to give him if the other had not supplied it. Nevertheless, St. Gregory judged that that quantity was enough at that time for a mortal sin, as is seen by the punishment and excommunication wherewith he punished for it. Of moderns who have written in our times [A.D. 1600] some reckon the amount of three reals [twenty-five cents] a notable quantity and sufficient for a mortal sin against the vow of poverty; others say four reals, others five. In the Carthusian Order a much smaller quantity is judged enough for a mortal sin, since they hold it sufficient for the deprival of ecclesiastical burial and for excommunication, as Navarro observes.

But granting that in the vow of poverty we may allow a little wider license, and that the value of three or four reals [twenty-four cents, or thirty-two cents] is a light matter, and that it would be necessary to go beyond that to amount to a mortal sin, as some would have it, should a religious, a man aiming at perfection, expose himself to these contingencies and risks: “Did what I received, gave, or kept, amount to the quantity sufficient for a mortal sin or not?” “Did it amount to four or to six reals [thirtytwo cents, or forty cents]?” Buyers and boys who, when they go to market, appropriate sometimes a halfpenny, sometimes a farthing, are excused from mortal sin by the “parvity of the matter;” but what religious is there who, if sent to market, could bring himself to appropriate a halfpenny, on the plea that it does not amount to more than a venial sin? Now, if you could not bring yourself to do that, but would take it for a sacrilegious and very low trick, neither should you dare to give or receive anything without leave, alleging that it did not amount to a mortal sin, for such giving or receiving is at least equivalent to appropriation. Let us make account of small things, especially in so grave a matter as this, which touches one of the three essential vows of religion, since he who dares to be a defaulter in this, saying that it will not amount to a mortal sin, is in great danger of a mortal breach of the vow of poverty, since covetousness and the desire of having, of giving and receiving, is a strong passion, linked closely to our nature, which has a great liking for the same. So it blinds and deceives to a great extent; and often, though we cannot say for certain that the thing amounted to a mortal sin, we can say for certain that there was doubt of it; and a religious ought to be very far from putting himself in such doubts and risks.