Lecture 3 — Problems arising from intellect as an intelligible

One might well inquire (if the intellect is simple and impassible, having nothing in common with anything else, as Anaxagoras said) how it understands, if understanding is a being acted upon. For it seems that one thing acts and another is acted upon only insofar as there is something common to the two.

Again, if it is itself an intelligible, then either there is intellect in other intelligible things (unless it is intelligible through something else), the intelligible being one in species; or it will have, mixed with itself, something that makes it intelligible, as other things have.

Or what about the passivity in a general sense, already alluded to in making distinctions on this point? Before it understands, the intellect is its intelligible objects potentially, but actually nothing. It must be as with a tablet on which there is nothing actually written; and so indeed it is in the case of intellect.

And it is itself intelligible like other intelligible objects. For in things that are without matter, the intellect and what is understood by it are the same. For speculative knowledge is the same as what is knowable in this way.

The reason why there is not always understanding must be considered. In material things, each intelligible object exists only potentially. Hence in them there is no intellect, for the understanding of such things is an immaterial potency. The intelligible exists, however, in them.

720. One might well inquire (429b22). Having manifested the nature and object of the potential intellect, Aristotle now presents some relevant difficulties; and this, in two stages.

First, he states two problems;

second, at or what about the passivity (429b29; [722]), he answers them.

The first of the two problems might be stated thus: if intellect is, as Anaxagoras said, simple and impassible, having nothing in common with anything else, how can it understand? For to understand is a certain way of being acted upon, and it belongs to the account of a patient to have something in common with the agent; because it is insofar as there is something common to the two (that is, to the agent and the patient) that it seems that this one acts and the other is acted upon. For things that act and things that are acted upon must communicate with each other in matter, as is shown in On Generation 1. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.1, 314b26–27; 1.7, 324a34, b4–7.)

721. The second difficulty he states at again, if it is (429b26). This difficulty is occasioned by his earlier statement that once the intellect is in act it can understand even its very self. (Lect. 2, n. 704.) Now, if intellect itself is intelligible, it is so in either of two ways: either it is intelligible of itself and not in virtue of something else, or it has something connected to it that makes it intelligible. If it is intelligible of itself, and not through something else, then, since the intelligible of this sort is one in species, it seems to follow that if this is not only intelligible but also an intellect, then other intelligibles are also intellects, and thus all intelligible things understand. Unless it is intelligible by way of something else conjoined with it; then it would follow that the intellect will have something that makes it intelligible, as other things that are understood do; and thus it seems that here too what is understood always understands.

722. Then, at or what about the passivity (429b29), he removes these difficulties.

And first, he solves the first difficulty, saying that, as was already distinguished about passivity in regard to sense, one can speak of passivity in a general sense, that is, “to be acted upon” is common to both the passion that is in contrary dispositions—as is the first mutual passion in natural things, which communicate in matter—and to the “being acted upon” that is spoken of in reference only to a reception. (Bk. 2, lect. 11, nn. 365–66.) The intellect, then, is said to be acted upon just as it is its intelligible objects potentially, but actually nothing, before it understands. It must be as with a tablet on which there is nothing actually written, but on which many things can be written. And so it is as well in the case of the potential intellect, because nothing of the intelligible objects is in it in act but only in potency.

723. This rules out not only the early natural philosophers’ view, that the soul understands all things because it is composed of all things, but also Plato’s opinion that the human soul naturally possesses knowledge of all things but only its union with the body has caused it to forget. This theory is implicit in Plato’s reduction of learning to remembering.

724. After this, at and it is itself (430a2), he answers the second difficulty.

And first, he solves the question;

second, at the reason why there is not (430a5; [727]), he responds to a fresh objection.

First, then, he says that the potential intellect is itself intelligible, not through its own essence, but like other intelligible objects, through some intelligible species. He proves this from the fact that what is understood in act and the understanding in act are one—just as he said earlier in this book that the sensible in act and the sense in act are one. (Bk. 2, lect. 26, nn. 590–93.)

Now, something is intelligible in act in virtue of its being actually abstracted from matter; for, as we have seen, things become objects of the intellect in the way that they are separable from matter. (Lect. 2, nn. 707–19.) So, he says, in things that are without matter, that is, if we receive the intelligible in act, then the intellect and what is understood by it are the same, just as the sensing in act and what is sensed in act are the same. For speculative knowledge and what is knowable in this way (that is, the knowable in act) are the same. Therefore, the species of the actually understood reality is the species of the intellect itself, and in this way, through it, it can understand its very self. That is why the Philosopher above has studied the nature of the potential intellect through studying the very act of understanding and what is understood. (Lect. 1, nn. 672–99.) For we know our intellect only through understanding our understanding.

725. The reason why the potential intellect is not understood through its own essence but through an intelligible species is the fact that, in the order of intelligible things, it is only in potency; for, as it is proved in Metaphysics 9, nothing is understood except insofar as it is in act. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.9, 1051a29–33; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Metaphysics, bk. 9, lect. 10, nn. 1888–94.) And there is a like dependence in sensible realities too. For what in them is purely in potency, that is, prime matter, does not have any action through its own essence but only through some form joined to it; but sensible substances, which exist in a certain respect in potency and in a certain respect in act, have an action of themselves. So, too, the potential intellect, which is only in potency within the order of intelligible things, neither understands nor is understood except through the species received in it.

726. But God, who in the order of intelligible things is pure actuality, and also the other separated substances, which are intermediates between potency and act, both understand and are understood through their own essence.

727. Next, at the reason why (430a5), he answers an objection to the above solution. For if the potential intellect has something that makes it intelligible, like other things, it remains to consider why there is not always understanding, that is, why it does not always understand the intelligible. The reason is that in material things, the species is not actually intelligible but is only potentially so; and only what is actually intelligible, not the merely potentially so, is the same thing as the intellect; so that in them, the things that have their species in matter, there is no intellect, that is, they cannot understand. For the understanding of such things (that is, intelligible objects) is a certain immaterial potency. However, that which is in the matter is intelligible, but only potentially, whereas what is in an intellect is an actually intelligible species.