Lecture 10 — Cause and species of flavors
As colors come from mixture of white and black, so flavors from sweet and bitter.
And these are also according to proportions, for each is more or less, whether according to numbers in the mixture and the change, or indeterminately. But the ones that cause pleasure are only those mixed numerically.
The sweet flavor is rich-tasting; bitter and salty are almost the same; pungent, harsh, astringent, and sharp are in the middle.
The species of moistures and of colors are almost equal. If one posits seven species of each, then, as it is reasonable for gray to be a kind of black, it follows that yellow belongs to white as oily does to sweet. And in the middle between black and white are punic, alurgon, green, and cyanum. And the others are mixed from these.
As black is privation of white in the transparent, so bitter and salty are of sweet in the nourishing moist. Therefore the ash of all burnt things is bitter, for the potable has been evaporated from them.
Democritus and most students of nature—whichever ones speak about the senses—do something very inconsistent: they make all sensible objects, objects of touch. If this is so, it is clear also that each of the other senses is a kind of touch. But it is not difficult to discern that this is impossible.
Moreover, they treat the common objects of all the senses as if they were proper. Size and shape, rough and smooth, and the sharp and dull that are in masses, are common objects of the senses—if not of all of them, then of sight and touch. Therefore they are deceived about these, but they are not deceived about the proper objects; for instance, sight is not deceived about color or hearing about sounds.
Some reduce the proper objects to these, as Democritus does. Of white and black, he says that one is “rough,” the other “smooth.” And he reduces flavors to shapes.
But to know the common objects belongs either to no sense, or above all to sight. If it were above all to taste, then, since it belongs to the surest sense to discern what is smallest in any genus, taste would have to be best at perceiving the other common objects, and best at discerning shapes.
Moreover, all sensible objects have contrariety, for example of white to black in color, and of bitter to sweet in flavors. But shape is not thought to be contrary to shape. For to which of the polygons is the circumference contrary?
Moreover, since there are infinite shapes, there would necessarily be infinite flavors. Why then does this one cause a sensation but not that one?
Something, then, has been said about flavor and the object of taste. Other affections of flavors have their proper consideration in the philosophy about plants.
148. As colors come (442a12). After the Philosopher has determined the generation of flavor, here he distinguishes species of flavors. On this point, he does three things.
First, he shows the generation of intermediate flavors in general.
Second, he shows how intermediate flavors are diversified, where he says and these are also according to proportions (442a13; [149]).
Third, he shows how sweet and bitter are related to one another, where he says as black is privation of white (442a25; [153]).
Accordingly, he first says that as intermediate colors are generated from mixture of white and black, so intermediate flavors are generated from mixture of sweet and bitter, whether from these in themselves or from mixture of the causes of sweet and bitter.
Heat causes the sweet flavor by thoroughly digesting the moisture. The cause of bitterness is privation of this completely digested moisture. Other flavors are caused according as the moisture is in an intermediate state because it is neither wholly consumed nor wholly undigested.
Flavor more immediately follows from moisture than from heat. Therefore, one should consider the intermediate and extremes not in relation to heat, but in relation to moisture affected in a way by dryness and heat, for the nature of flavor principally consists in this. Otherwise, if the intermediate and extremes in flavor were taken in relation to heat, sweet and bitter would not be extremes, but sweet would be intermediate. For intense heat that consumes the cold, but does not digest
149. Then, when he says and these are also according to proportions (442a13), he treats of the distinction of intermediate flavors.
First, with respect to the difference between pleasant and unpleasant;
second, with respect to terms, where he says the sweet flavor is rich-tasting (442a17; [150]);
third with respect to number, in a comparison with colors, where he says the species of moistures (442a19; [152]).
Accordingly, he first says that intermediate flavors vary according to different proportions of the mixture, that is, inasmuch as each of them either more or less approaches sweetness or bitterness. This happens in two ways, as described in the case of colors: (1.3, 439b27–30; cf. ch. 6, nn. 97–104.) in one way according to a numerical proportion observed in the mixture described, and in the alteration of the moisture by the heat; in another way according to an indeterminate difference without numerical proportion. And only those flavors are pleasing to taste that are mixed according to a numerical proportion.
150. Then, when he says the sweet flavor is rich-tasting (442a17), he distinguishes intermediate flavors by name. He says that the rich-tasting flavor is almost the same as the sweet, for both indicate digestion of the moisture by the heat. However, the heat evidently dominates the moisture more in the sweet flavor. Thus the rich-tasting flavor is closer to a watery or insipid flavor, because of an abundance of the moisture in it.
Likewise the bitter flavor and the salty are almost the same, for both evidence an extreme heat that consumes the moisture. However, there seems to be greater consumption of moisture in the bitter than in the salty: in the salty the moisture infused into the body seems to be consumed; but in the bitter the moisture binding together the substance of the body seems to be not just consumed, but dissolved, whether in whole or in part. Hence the remains of dissolved and burnt bodies are bitter.
151. In the middle are the pungent flavor, i.e., the flavor with “bite”; the harsh, i.e., vinegary flavor; the astringent; and the sharp. The pungent and the vinegary consist in moisture that, because of the weakness of the heat, is undigested. For this reason unripened fruits have either a vinegar flavor, like sour plums, or a pungent flavor, like sour pears. But the pungent seems to have more earth, which is why earth has an almost pungent flavor. The vinegary seems to have more cold.
The astringent flavor seems also to have much earth: it is close to the pungent, but it has more heat, for it more closely approaches digestion
152. Then, when he says the species of moistures (442a19), he distinguishes intermediate flavors with respect to number by means of a comparison with colors. He says that the species of “moistures”—that is, flavors—are almost equal in number to the species of colors. Seven species of flavors are to be enumerated, in such a way that the rich-tasting flavor is not distinguished from the sweet, but the salty is distinguished from the bitter. Thus, if to the other four are added these three flavors, there will be seven flavors. Likewise it is reasonable to say, on the side of colors, that gray is related to black as salty is to bitter; and that yellow is related to white as rich-tasting is to sweet. In the middle will be these colors: punic, i.e., red; alurgon, i.e., citron; green; and cyanum or blue, i.e., the color of the sky. These are arranged such that green and blue more closely approach black, while red and citron more closely approach white. There are also very many other species of colors and flavors by mixture of the species mentioned with one another.
153. Then, when he says as black is privation of white (442a25), he compares bitter to sweet. He says that as black is the privation of white in the transparent, so bitter or salty is the privation of sweet in nourishing moisture. For one of two contraries always stands as a privation, as is clear from Metaphysics 10. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.4, 1055b26–27; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Metaphysics, bk. 10, lect. 6, n. 2054.) Because bitter is the privation of sweet, the ash of all burnt things is bitter, because of evaporation of the nourishing moistness, which he calls the potable.
154. Then, when he says Democritus and most students of nature (442a29), he eliminates false opinions of others about the nature of flavors.
First, with reference to all sensible objects in general.
Second, with reference to flavors in particular, where he says some reduce the proper objects (442b10; [156]).
On the first point, he does two things.
He disproves the opinion of the ancients, first, inasmuch as they reduced all sensible objects to tangible qualities;
second, inasmuch as they reduced proper sensible objects to common sensibles, where he says moreover, they treat the common objects (442b4; [155]).
Accordingly, he first says that Democritus and most natural philosophers—whichever ones got involved in speaking about the senses—do something very inconsistent, because they say that all sensible objects are objects of touch. If this were true, it would follow that any sense power would be touch, since powers are distinguished according to objects. But it is easy to see that this is false, because other senses perceive through an external medium, and touch does not.
155. Then, when he says moreover, they treat the common objects (442b4), he criticizes the ancients for treating the common sensible objects as if they were proper. They reduced colors, flavors, and other sensible objects to size and shape. Size and shape; rough and smooth according as they pertain to shape; and likewise sharp and dull, which pertain to features of shapes that have angles—these are common objects of the senses. Although not all of them are perceived by all senses, all are perceived at least by touch and sight, and so they are not proper sensibles, because thus they would be perceived by only one sense.
He speaks of the sharp and the dull “in masses” (in glebis), or, according to another reading, “in bulks” (in molibus). (See Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle’s “On Sense Perception,” trans. Alan Towey, pp. 83–84.) He means the sharp and the dull “in bodies,” and he says this in order to distinguish them from what is called sharp in the case of voices, and in the case of flavors.
He shows that the foregoing are common sensibles by means of a sign: the senses are deceived about the kinds of things mentioned, but are not deceived about the proper sensibles; for instance, sight is not deceived about color or hearing about sounds.
156. Then, when he says some reduce the proper objects (442b10), he eliminates the opinions on a specific point.
First, he relates them.
Second, he disproves them, where he says but to know the common objects (442b13; [157]).
Accordingly, he first says that some reduce the proper sensible objects to these common ones. For example, Democritus said that black is rough, thinking that the darkness of black is caused by higher parts in the roughness hiding the other parts; and he said that white is smooth, thinking that the brightness of white comes from the smoothness being completely illuminated because its parts lie level. And he reduced flavors to shapes, because he found “sharp and dull” in flavors as well as in shapes, being deceived by an equivocation.
157. Then, when he says but to know the common objects (442b13), he disproves the abovementioned opinion about flavors by three arguments.
The first is that no sense apprehends shapes as its proper objects, and if they were the proper objects of a sense, they would pertain above all to sight. But if flavors were shapes, it would follow that taste above all would know them. If this is true, then, since any sense is surer inasmuch as it can better discern even what is smallest in any genus, it would follow that taste, as the surest sense, would be best at sensing the common sensibles, and best at discerning shapes, which is obviously false, because sight is more powerful in this regard.
158. He presents the second argument where he says moreover, all sensible objects (442b17). It is this. All sensible objects have contrariety, because alteration occurs with respect to them, as was proved in Physics 7. (Aristotle, Physics 7.2, 244b2–245a22; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Physics, bk. 7, lect. 5.) For example, in color the contraries are black and white, in flavors sweet and bitter, and the same is clear in other cases.
159. There seems to be an exception in the case of light, which of itself does not have contrariety: for it exists as a proper quality of the highest body, which is without contrariety; and darkness is opposed to it as a privation, not a contrary. However, light does have contrariety according as it is participated in colors.
But shape does not seem to be contrary to shape, for it is impossible to determine to which of the polygons—that is, figures with several angles—the circumference—that is, the circle, which has no angles—is contrary. For contraries stand farthest apart, but no shape can be instanced such that another shape with more angles cannot be found. Therefore flavors are not shapes.
160. He presents the third argument where he says moreover, since there are infinite shapes (442b21). It is this. Shapes are infinite, as are also numbers, for they are multiplied according to the number of angles and lines, as is clear in the triangle and the square. Therefore, if flavors were shapes, it would follow that there are infinite species of flavors. This is clearly false, because there is no reason why one flavor would be perceived and not another. But the sense power does not discern an infinite number of flavors. Therefore flavors are not shapes.
161. Finally, adding an epilogue, he concludes that something has been said about flavor and the object of taste (442b23), but other properties of flavors have their proper consideration in the book On Plants. However, Aristotle did not write this book, but Theophrastus, as Alexander says at this point in the commentary. (Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle’s “On Sense Perception,” trans. Alan Towey, p. 86.)
Chapter 11 of 19