Lecture 22 — “Genus,” “falsity,” and “accident”

The term “genus” (or “race”) is used if there is a continuous generation of things having the same species. For example, “as long as the genus of man lasts” means “while there is continuous generation of men.”

And the term also designates that from which things are first brought into being. For it is in this way that some men are called Hellenes by race and others Ionians, because the former come from Hellen and the latter from Ion as the ones who begot them.

Again, the term is applied to the members of the genus more from the begetter than from the material principle. For some people are also said to derive their race from the female, as those who come from Pleia.

Further, the term is used in the sense that the plane is called the genus of plane figures, and the solid the genus of solid figures. For each of the figures is either a plane of such and such a kind or a solid of such and such a kind; and this is the subject underlying the differences.

Again, “genus” means the primary element present in definitions, which is predicated quidditatively of the thing whose differences are called “qualities.” The term “genus,” then, is used in all these senses: in one as the continuous generation of a species; in another as the primary mover of the same species; and in another as matter. For that to which the difference or quality belongs is the subject which we call “matter.”

Things are said to be “diverse” (or “other”) in species whose first subject is diverse and cannot be resolved one into the other or both into the same thing. For example, form and matter are diverse in genus. And all things that are predicated according to a different categorical figure of being are diverse in genus. For some signify the quiddity of beings, others quality, and others something else, in the sense of our previous distinctions. For they are not analyzed into each other or into some one thing.

“False” means in one sense what is false as a thing, and that either because it is not combined or is incapable of being combined.

For example, the statement that the diagonal is commensurable or that you are sitting belong to this kind. For the former is always false and the latter is sometimes so, since it is in these senses that these things are non-beings.

But there are things that exist and are fitted by nature to appear either other than they are or as things that do not exist, as a shadowgraph and dreams. For these in fact are something, but not that of which they cause an image in us.

Therefore, things are said to be false either because they do not exist or because the image derived from them is not of something real.

A “false notion,” inasmuch as it is false, is the notion of something non-existent. Hence every notion is false when applied to something other than that of which it is true—for example, the notion of a circle is false when applied to a triangle.

Now of each thing there is in a sense one notion, which is its essence, but there are also in a sense many, since the thing itself and the thing with a modification are in a sense the same, as Socrates and musical Socrates.

But a false notion is absolutely speaking not the notion of anything. And it is for this reason that Antisthenes entertained a silly opinion when he thought that nothing could be expressed except by its proper notion—one term always for one thing. From this it would follow that there can be no contradiction and almost no error.

It is possible, however, to express each thing not only by its own notion, but also by that which belongs to something else not only falsely but also truly, as eight may be said to be double through the notion of two. These are the ways, then, in which things are said to be false.

A false man is one who chooses such thoughts not for any other reason but for themselves and one who is the cause of such thoughts in others, just as we say that those things are false which produce a false image or impression.

Hence, the speech in the Hippias which says that the same man is true and false is refuted, for it assumes that that man is false who is able to deceive, even though he is knowing and prudent.

And further, it assumes that one who is capable of willing evil things is better. And this false opinion is arrived at by way of induction.

For one who limps voluntarily is better than one who does so involuntarily; and by “limping” we mean imitating a limp.

For if a man were to limp voluntarily, he would be worse in this way, just as he would be in the case of moral character.

An “accident” is what attaches to anything and which it is true to affirm is so, although not necessarily or for the most part. For example, if someone discovers a treasure while digging a hole for a plant, the discovery of the treasure is an accident to the digger. For the one does not necessarily come from the other or come after it, nor does it happen for the most part that someone will find a treasure when he digs a hole to set out a plant. And a musician may be white, but since this does not happen necessarily or for the most part, we say that it is accidental. But since something belongs to something, and some belong somewhere and at some time, then whatever attaches to a subject, but not because it is now or here, will be an accident.

Nor does an accident have any determinate cause, but only a contingent or chance cause—that is, an indeterminate one. For it was by accident that someone came to Aegina, and if he did not come there in order to get there, but because he was driven there by a storm or was captured by pirates, the event has occurred and is an accident, though not of itself, but by reason of something else. For the storm is the cause of his coming to the place to which he was not sailing, and this was Aegina.

And in another sense, “accident” means whatever belongs to each thing of itself but not in its substance—for example, it is an accident of a triangle to have its angles equal to two right angles. And these same accidents may be eternal, but none of the others can be. But an account of this has been given elsewhere.

“Genus”

1119. Here he gives his views about a particular kind of whole, namely, a genus.

First, he gives the different senses in which the term “genus” is used;

second (1024b9; [1124]), he treats the different senses in which things are said to be diverse (or other) in genus, at things are said.

He accordingly says, first, that the term “genus” is used in four senses.

First, it means the continuous generation of things that have the same species. For example, it is said, as long as “the genus of man lasts, meaning while the continuous generation of men will last. This is the first sense of genus given in Porphyry: a multitude of things having a relation to each other and to one principle.

1120. In a second sense, “genus” (“race”) means that from which things are first brought into being—that is, some things proceed from a begetter. For example, some men are called Hellenes by race because they are descendants of a man called Hellen, and some are called Ionians by race because they are descendants of a certain Ion as their first begetter. Now people are more commonly named from their father, who is their begetter, than from their mother, who produces the matter of generation, although some derive the name of their race from the mother. For example, some are named from a certain woman called Pleia. This is the second sense of genus given in Porphyry.

1121. The term “genus” is used in a third sense when the surface or the plane is called the genus of plane figures, and the solid, or body, is called the genus of solid figures, or bodies. This sense of “genus” is not the one that signifies the essence of a species, as animal is the genus of man, but the one that is the proper subject in the species of different accidents. For surface is the subject of all plane figures. And it bears some likeness to a genus, because the proper subject is given in the definition of an accident just as a genus is given in the definition of a species. Hence the proper subject of an accident is predicated like a genus. For each of the figures, that is, plane figures, is such and such a surface. And this, a solid figure, is such and such a solid, as though the figure were a difference qualifying surface or solid. For surface is related to plane (or surface) figures, and solid to solid figures, as a genus, which is the subject of contraries; and difference is predicated in the sense of quality. And for this reason, just as when we say “rational animal” such and such an animal is signified, so too when we say “square surface,” such and such a surface is signified.

1122. In a fourth sense, “genus” means the primary element given in a definition, which is predicated quidditatively, and differences are its qualities. For example, in the definition of man, “animal” is given first and then “two-footed” or “rational,” which is a certain substantial quality of man.

1123. It is evident, then, that the term “genus” is used in so many different senses: in one sense as the continuous generation of the same species, and this pertains to the first sense; in another as the first moving principle, and this pertains to the second sense; and in another as matter, and this pertains to the third and fourth senses.

For a genus is related to a difference in the same way as a subject is to a quality. Hence it is evident that genus as a predicable and genus as a subject are included in a way under one meaning, and that each has the character of matter. For even though genus as a predicable is not matter, still it is taken from matter as difference is taken from form. For a thing is called an animal because it has a sentient nature, and it is called rational because it has a rational nature, which is related to sentient nature as form is to matter.

1124. Things are said (1024b9). Here he explains the different senses in which things are said to be “diverse” (or other) in genus, and he gives two senses of this corresponding to the last two senses of “genus.” For the first two senses are of little importance for the study of philosophy.

In the first sense, then, some things are said to be diverse in genus because their first subject is diverse. For example, the first subject of color is surface, and the first subject of flavors is something moist. Hence, with regard to their subject genus, flavor and color are diverse in genus.

1125. Further, the two different subjects must be such that one of them is not reducible to the other. Now a solid is in a sense reducible to surfaces, and therefore solid figures and plane figures do not belong to diverse genera. Again, they must not be reducible to the same thing. For example, form and matter are diverse in genus if they are considered according to their own essence, because there is nothing common to both. And in a similar way the celestial bodies and lower bodies are diverse in genus inasmuch as they do not have a common matter.

1126. In another sense, those things are said to be diverse in genus which are predicated according to a different categorical figure of being, that is, of the predication of being. For some things signify quiddity, some quality, and some signify in other ways, which are given in the division made above where he dealt with being [889–94]. For these categories are not reducible one to the other, because one is not included under the other. Nor are they reducible to some one thing, because there is not some one common genus for all the categories.

1127. Now it is clear from what has been said that some things are contained under one category and are in one genus in this second sense, although they are diverse in genus in the first sense. Examples of this are the celestial bodies and elemental bodies, and colors and flavors.

The first way in which things are diverse in genus is considered rather by the natural scientist and also by the philosopher, because it is more real.

But the second way in which things are diverse in genus is considered by the logician, because it is conceptual.

“False”

1128. “False” means (1024b17). Here he gives the various senses of the terms which signify a lack of being or incomplete being.

First, he gives the senses in which the term “false” is used.

Second [1139], he deals with the various senses of “accident.”

In regard to the first he does three things.

First, he shows how the term “false” is used of real things;

second (1024b26; [1130]), how it is used of definitions, at a “false notion”;

third (1025a2; [1135]), how men are said to be false, at a false man.

He accordingly first says that the term “false” is applied in one sense to real things inasmuch as a statement signifying a reality is not properly composed. And there are two ways in which this can come about.

In one way, by forming a proposition which should not be formed; this is what happens, for instance, in the case of false contingent propositions.

In another way, by forming a proposition about something impossible, and this is what happens in the case of false impossible propositions.

For if we say that the diagonal of a square is commensurable with one of its sides, it is a false impossible proposition; for it is impossible to combine “commensurable” and “diagonal.” And if someone says that you are sitting while you are standing, it is a false contingent proposition; for the predicate does not attach to the subject, although it is not impossible for it to do so. Hence one of these—the impossible—is always false, but the other—the contingent—is not always so. Therefore, those things are said to be false which are non-beings in their entirety, for a statement is said to be false when what is signified by the statement is nonexistent.

1129. The term “false” is applied to real things in a second way inasmuch as some things, though beings in themselves, are fitted by nature to appear to be either other than they are or as things that do not exist, as a shadowgraph, a delineation in shadow. For sometimes shadows appear to be the things of which they are the shadows, as the shadow of a man appears to be a man. The same applies to dreams, which seem to be real things yet are only the likenesses of things. And one speaks in the same way of false gold, because it bears a resemblance to real gold.

Now this sense differs from the first, because in the first sense things were said to be false because they did not exist, but here things are said to be false because, while being something in themselves, they are not the things of which they cause an image, that is, which they resemble. It is clear, then, that things are said to be false either because they do not exist or because there arises from them the appearance of what does not exist.

1130. A “false notion” (1024b26). He indicates how the term “false” applies to definitions. He says that a notion, or a definition, is of something non-existent inasmuch as it is false.

Now he says inasmuch as it is false because a definition is said to be false in two ways.

Either it is a false definition in itself, and then it is not the definition of anything, but has to do entirely with the nonexistent;

or it is a true definition in itself but false inasmuch as it is attributed to something other than the one properly defined, and then it is said to be false inasmuch as it does not apply to the thing defined.

1131. It is clear, then, that every definition which is a true definition of one thing is a false definition of something else. For example, the definition which is true of a circle is false when applied to a triangle. Now, for one thing there is, in one sense, only one definition signifying its quiddity; in another sense there are many definitions for one thing.

For in one sense the subject taken in itself and the thing with a modification, that is, taken in conjunction with a modification, are the same, as Socrates and musical Socrates.

But in another sense they are not, for it is the same thing accidentally but not in itself. And it is clear that they have different definitions. For the definition of “Socrates” and that of “musical Socrates” are different, although in a sense both are definitions of the same thing.

1132. But a definition which is false in itself cannot be a definition of anything. And a definition is said to be false in itself, or unqualifiedly false, by reason of the fact that one part of it cannot stand with the other. Such a definition would be had, for example, if one were to say, “inanimate living thing.”

1133. Again, it is clear from this that Antisthenes’ opinion was foolish. For since words are the signs of things, he maintained that just as a thing does not have any essence other than its own, so too in a proposition nothing can be predicated of a subject but its own definition, so that only one predicate absolutely or always may be used of one subject. And from this position it follows that there is no such thing as a contradiction, because if “animal,” which is included in his notion, is predicated of man, “non-animal” can not be predicated of him, and thus a negative proposition cannot be formed. And from this position it also follows that one cannot speak falsely, because the proper definition of a thing is truly predicated of it. Hence, if only a thing’s own definition can be predicated of it, no proposition can be false.

1134. But his opinion is false, because of each thing we can predicate not only its own definition but also the definition of something else. And when this occurs in a universal or general way, the predication is false. Yet in a way there can be a true predication. For example, eight is said to be double inasmuch as it has the character of duality, because the character of duality is to be related as two is to one. But inasmuch as it is double, eight is in a sense two, because it is divided into two equal quantities. These things, then, are said to be false in the foregoing way.

1135. Then, at a false man (1025a2), he shows how the term “false” may be predicated of a man, and in regard to this he does two things.

First, he gives two ways in which a man is said to be false.

In one way, a man is said to be false if he is ready to think, or takes pleasure in thinking, thoughts of this kind—that is, false ones—and chooses such thoughts not for any other reason but for themselves. For anyone who has a habit finds the operation relating to that habit to be pleasurable and readily performed, and thus one who has a habit acts in accordance with that habit and not for the sake of anything extrinsic. For example, a debauched person commits fornication because of the pleasure resulting from coition, but if he commits fornication for some other end—for instance, that he may steal—he is more of a thief than a lecher. And similarly one who chooses to speak falsely for the sake of money is more avaricious than false.

1136. In a second way, a man is said to be false if he causes false notions in others, in much the same way as we said above that things are false which cause a false image or impression. For it is clear from what has been said that the false has to do with the non-existent. Hence a man is said to be false inasmuch as he makes false statements, and a notion is said to be false inasmuch as it is about something nonexistent.

1137. Hence, the speech (1025a6). Second, he excludes two false opinions from what has been laid down above.

He draws the first of these from the points made above. He says that since a false man is one who chooses and creates false opinions, one may logically refute or reject a statement made in the Hippias, one of Plato’s works, which said that the same notion is both true and false. For this opinion considered that man to be false who is able to deceive, so that, being able both to deceive and to speak the truth, the same man is both true and false. And similarly the same statement will be both true and false, because the same statement is able to be both true and false—for example, the statement “Socrates sits” is true when he is seated, but is false when he is not seated. Now it is evident that this is taken unwarrantedly, because even a man who is prudent and knowing is able to deceive, but he is not false because he does not cause or choose false notions or opinions, and this is the reason why a man is said to be false, as has been stated [1135].

1138. And further (1025a8). Then he rejects the second false opinion. This opinion maintained that a man who does base things and wills evil is better than one who does not. But this is false. For anyone is defined as being evil on the grounds that he is ready to do or to choose evil things. Yet this opinion wishes to accept this sense of “false” on the basis of a sort of induction from a similar case. For one who voluntarily limps is better and nobler than one who limps involuntarily. Hence he says that to do evil is like limping inasmuch as the same notion applies to both. And in a sense this is true, for one who limps voluntarily is worse as regards his moral character, although he is more perfect as regards his power of walking. And similarly one who voluntarily does evil is worse as regards his moral character, although perhaps he is not worse as regards some other power. For example, even though that man is more evil, morally speaking, who voluntarily says what is false, still he is more intelligent than one who believes that he speaks the truth when he in fact speaks falsely, though not willfully.

“Accident”

1139. An “accident” (1025a14). Here, finally, he gives the different senses in which the term “accident” is used, and there are two of these.

First, “an accident” means anything that attaches to a thing and is truly affirmed of it, although not necessarily or for the most part, that is, in the majority of cases, but in a minority; for example, if one were to find a treasure while digging a hole to set out a plant. Hence, finding a treasure while digging a hole is an accident. For the one is not necessarily the cause of the other such that the one necessarily comes from the other.

Neither do they necessarily accompany each other such that the latter comes after the former as day follows night, even though the one is not the cause of the other.

Neither does it happen for the most part, or in the majority of cases, that this should occur, that is, that one who sets out a plant finds a treasure. And similarly a musician is said to be white, although this is not necessarily so nor does it happen for the most part. Hence our statement is accidental. But this example differs from the first, for in the first example the term “accident” is taken in reference to becoming, and in the second example it is taken in reference to being.

1140. Now, just as something belongs to some definite subject, so too it is considered to belong somewhere, that is, in some definite place, and at some time, at some definite time. And therefore it happens to belong to all of these accidentally if it does not belong to them by reason of their own nature—for example, when white is predicated of a musician, this is accidental, because white does not belong to a musician as such. And similarly if there is an abundance of rain in summer, this is accidental, because it does not happen in summer insofar as it is summer. And again if what is heavy is high up, this is accidental, for it is not in such a place inasmuch as the place is such, but because of some external cause.

1141. And it should be borne in mind that there is no determinate cause of the kind of accident here mentioned, but only a contingent cause, whatever one there happens to be, or a chance cause, a fortuitous one, which is an indeterminate cause. For example, it was an accident that someone came to Aegina, that is, to that city, if he did not come there in order to get there, that is, if he began to head for that city not in order that he might reach it but because he was forced there by some external cause; for example, because he was driven there by the winter wind which caused a tempest at sea, or even because he was captured by pirates and was brought there against his will. It is clear, then, that this is accidental and that it can be brought about by different causes. Yet the fact that he reaches this place in sailing occurs not of itself, that is, inasmuch as he was sailing (since he intended to sail to another place), but by reason of something else, another external cause. For a storm (or pirates, or something of this kind) is the cause of his coming to the place to which he was not sailing, to Aegina.

1142. In a second sense, “accident” means whatever belongs to each thing of itself but is not in its substance. This is the second mode of essential predication, as was noted above [1055]. For the first mode exists when something is predicated per se of something which is given in its definition, as animal is predicated of man, which is not an accident in any way. Now it belongs per se to a triangle to have two right angles, but this does not belong to its substance. Hence it is an accident.

1143. This sense of accident differs from the first, because accidents in this second sense can be perpetual. For a triangle always has three angles equal to two right angles. But none of those things that are accidents in the first sense can be perpetual, because they are always such as occur in the minority of cases. The discussion of this kind of accident is undertaken in another place—for example, in book 6 of this work [1172], and in Physics 2. “Accident” in the first sense, then, is opposed to what exists in itself; but “accident” in the second sense is opposed to what is substantial. This completes book 5.