Lecture 2 — Inference of form in sensible substances

But since that which has the character of a subject or matter has been admitted by all to be substance, and this is what is in potency, it remains to explain what it is that constitutes the substance of sensible things in the sense of act.

Now, Democritus is like one who thinks that there are three differences in things. For he holds that the underlying body, as matter, is the same for all things, but that it differs in contour, which is shape; or in disposition, which is position; or in distribution, which is arrangement.

However, there seem to be many differences, inasmuch as some things are said to exist by reason of the way in which their material parts are combined.

Some things are combined by mixture, like honey-water; others by a binding, as the binding around a head; others by birdlime, as a book; others by a nail, as a chest; and others in several of these ways.

Others differ by position, as a threshold and a lintel, for these differ, in a sense, according to their position;

others differ in point of time, as dinner and breakfast;

others with respect to place, as the spirits;

others by reason of sensible properties, as hardness and softness, density and rarity, dryness and moistness.

And some things differ by some of these differences, and others by all taken together. Some differ by excess and others by defect.

For this reason, it is evident that being is also used in the same number of ways; for a threshold is such because it is placed in this particular position, and to be a threshold means to be placed in such and such a position. Likewise, to be ice means to be congealed in such and such a way.

However, the being of some things will be defined in all of these ways: one by being mixed; others by being combined; others by being tied together; others by being condensed; and others by other differences, like a hand and a foot.

Further, we must consider the genera of differences, for these will be the principles of being of things, like differences in degree, or in density and rarity, and others such as these. For all are instances of excess and defect. Indeed, if anything differs either in figure or in smoothness and roughness, these are reducible to differences in straightness and curvature. Further, the being of some things will consist in being mixed, and their non-being will consist in the opposite state.

It is evident, then, from these instances that, if substance is the cause of the being of each thing which is composed of these differences, we must look for the cause of the being of each one of these among these differences.

Now, substances is none of these differences, nor any combination of them, yet it is found analogously in each. And just as, in the case of substance, that which is predicated of matter is the act itself, in a similar way, this is most true in the case of other definitions.

Thus, if a threshold has to be defined, we shall say that it is a piece of wood or stone placed in such and such a position; and we shall say that a house is bricks and timbers placed in such and such a position. (Or again, in some cases, there is also the final cause.)

And if ice is to be defined, we shall say that it is water frozen or condensed in such and such a way; and we shall say that a harmony is such and such a combination of high and low notes. Likewise in other things.

From these instances, then, it is evident that different matters have a different act and intelligible structure. For, of some things, it is combination, of others, mixing, and of others, some of those differences mentioned above.

Therefore, among those who give definitions, those who state what a house is by saying that it is stones, bricks, and timbers are speaking of a potential house; for these are its matter.

But those who say that it is a shelter for protecting goods and bodies, or add some other such property, speak of its act. And those who speak of both of these together speak of the third kind of substance, which is the thing composed of these.

For the intelligible structure which is expressed by means of differences seems to be that of the form or act of a thing, but that which is expressed by a thing’s intrinsic parts is rather that of its matter. The same thing is true of the definitions of which Archytas approved, for they are both of these together. What is stillness? Rest in a large expanse of air, where air is as matter and rest as act or substance. What is a calm? Smoothness of the sea, where the sea is as subject or matter, and smoothness as act or form.

From what has been said, then, it is evident what sensible substance is and how it exists. In one sense it has the character of matter, and in another the character of form (because it is act), and in a third sense it is the thing composed of these.

1691. Having investigated the material principle in sensible substances, the Philosopher examines their formal principle.

First (1042b9; [1691]), he links up this discussion with the foregoing one, saying that, since all recognize substance in the sense of matter and subject (for even the oldest philosophers held that matter is the substance of material things) and this kind of substance is something potential, it now remains to explain what form is, which is the act of sensible things.

1692. Now, Democritus is like one (1042b11). Then he carries out his intention, and in regard to this, he does two things.

First (1042b11; [1692]), he examines the differences in sensible things that indicate a formal principle.

Second (1043a12; [1699]), he draws some conclusions, at from these instances.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he examines certain accidental differences of sensible things.

Second (1043a2; [1696]), he shows how these differences are related to substantial differences, at it is evident.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First, he investigates the accidental differences of sensible things.

Second (1042b25; [1694]), he shows how these differences are related to those things whose differences they are, at for this reason.

In regard to the first, he does two things.

First (1042b11), he gives Democritus’ opinion about the differences of things. He says that Democritus is like one who thinks that there are three differences in things, that is, according to the principles which he gives he seems to think that all differences of things are reduced to three genera. For he held that the material principles of things are indivisible bodies, which, being of the same nature, are similar to each other; but that they constitute a diversity of things because they differ in position, shape, and arrangement. Thus, he seems to hold that the underlying body, as a material principle, is one and the same in nature, even though it is divided into an infinite number of parts, and that it differs—that is, it is divided into different things—because of differences in shape, position, and arrangement. For things differ in figure by being straight or curved; in position by being above or below, right or left; and in arrangement by being before or after.

1693. However, there seem to be (1042b15). Second, he shows that the position of Democritus is unsatisfactory, because there seem to be many other differences of things that are not reducible to the foregoing ones. For some things differ by reason of the different way in which their material parts are combined. In some things, the material parts are combined by being mixed, as honey-water; in others, by being tied together by some bond, like the binding around a woman’s head; in others, by glue or birdlime, as occurs in books; in others, by a nail, as occurs in a chest; and in others, the parts are united in several of the aforesaid ways.

On the other hand, some things differ from each other by their position, like a lintel and a threshold, which differ because they are placed in such and such a way—one being above and the other below. Again, some differ in point of time, like dinner, which is the evening meal, from breakfast, which is the early morning meal. Others differ with respect to place, as the spirits, that is, the winds, of which the Aquilonian comes from the north, the Favonian from the west, the Austerian from the south, and the Subsolian from the east. Others differ by reason of sensible properties, that is, by hardness and softness and other characteristics of this kind. And some things differ in several of these ways, and others in all of them. And some differ by excess and some by defect. He adds this because the ancient philosophers held that all qualities of sensible bodies are reduced to excess or defect.

1694. For this reason (1042b25). He shows the way in which these differences are related to those things whose differences they are. In regard to this, he does two things.

First (1042b25), he shows that these differences constitute the being of the things whose differences they are.

Second (1042b31; [1695]), he concludes that, in order to grasp the principles of being, we must reduce these differences to certain primary genera of differences, at further, we must consider.

First, then, he says that, because these differences are constitutive of the things we have mentioned above, it is evident that the being of the aforesaid realities is diversified according to these differences; for a difference completes the definition, which signifies the being of a thing. Thus, a threshold is this particular thing because it is placed in this particular position, and its being, that is, its proper intelligible structure, consists in being placed in such and such a position. Similarly, being ice is being condensed in such and such a way.

And by each of the differences mentioned, the being of things of a certain type is differentiated: some by being mixed; others by being combined; and others by other differences, as a hand and a foot and other parts of this kind, which have peculiar differences of their own inasmuch as they are directed to certain definite operations.

1695. Further, we must consider (1042b31). He concludes that, since the being of things consists in their differences and has to be known in this way, it will be worth our while to grasp the genera of differences by reducing the secondary differences of a genus to the primary differences; because common and proper differences of this kind will be the principles of being of a whole genus. This is evident in differences of degree, of rarity and density, and in other things of this kind. For density and rarity and the like are reduced to the genus of the great and small, because all these signify excess and defect. Similarly, if things differ in figure or in roughness or smoothness, these are reduced to differences of straightness and curvature, which are the primary differences of figure. Again, it is necessary that some be reduced to being mixed or not being mixed, for the being of some things consists in the fact that they are mixed, and their non-being in just the opposite state.

1696. It is evident, then (1043a2). He shows how these differences are related to the substances of things. He says that it is now evident from the foregoing that we must try to discover in these differences the formal cause of the being of each thing, if it is in this way that substance in a formal sense, or the whatness of a thing, is the cause of the being of each thing, as was clear in book 7 (1041a6–1041b28; [1648–80]). For these differences signify the form or whatness of the above-mentioned things. However, none of these differences are substance or anything akin to substance, as though belonging to the genus of substance, but the same proportion is found in them as in the genus of substance.

1697. For just as in the genus of substance the difference (which is predicated of the genus and qualifies it in order to constitute a species) is related to the genus as act or form, so also is this true in other definitions. For we must not understand that difference is form or that genus is matter, since genus and difference are predicated of the species but matter and form are not predicated of the composite. But we speak in this manner because a thing’s genus is derived from its material principle, and its difference from its formal principle. The genus of man, for example, is animal, because it signifies something having a sensory nature, which is related materially to intellectual nature, from which is taken “rational,” the difference of man. But “rational” signifies something having an intellectual nature. It is for this reason that a genus contains its differences potentially, and that genus and difference are proportionate to matter and form, as Porphyry says. And for this reason too it is said here that act, that is, difference, is predicated of matter, that is, of the genus. The same thing occurs in other genera.

1698. For if one wishes to define a threshold, he shall say that it is a piece of stone or wood placed in such and such a position, and in this definition, stone or wood is as matter and position as form. Similarly, in the definition of a house, stones and timbers are as matter, and being combined in such and such a way as form. And again in the definitions of some things there is also added its end, on which the necessity of the form depends. And similarly in the definition of ice, water is as matter and being frozen is as form. So too in the definition of a harmony, the high and low notes are as matter and the way in which they are combined is as form. The same thing applies in all other definitions.

1699. From these instances (1043a12). He draws two additional conclusions from the above.

First, there are different acts or forms for different matters. For in some things the act consists in being combined; in others, it is in being mixed, or in some of the aforesaid differences.

1700. Therefore, among those who (1043a14). He states the second conclusion. Since, in a definition, one part is related to the other as act to matter, some people in defining things give an inadequate definition by stating only their matter, as those who define a house by means of cement, stones, and timbers, which are the material of a house; because such a definition does not signify an actual house but a potential one. Those who say that a house is a shelter for riches and bodies state the form of a house, but not its matter. However, those who state both define the composite substance; therefore, their definition is a complete definition. But the conceptual element which is derived from the differences pertains to the form, whereas that which is derived from the intrinsic parts pertains to the matter.

1701. The definitions which Archytas accepts are similar to these. For example, stillness, which signifies the state of the atmosphere when it is windless, is rest in a large expanse of air; for if only the smallest amount of air in a vessel is at rest, we do not speak of stillness. In this definition, air is as matter and rest as form. Similarly, when a calm is defined as the smoothness of the sea, the sea is as matter and smoothness as form. Now, in these definitions, the matter is substance and the form is an accident, but in the definition of a house, the matter is its parts and the act is the form of the whole.

1702. From what (1043a26). He summarizes the things said about form. The text is clear here.