Chapter 102 — That assimilation to the divine is the cause of diversity in things

The reason for the diversity and distinction in things must be understood in light of this end. Since the divine goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, on account of the distance that separates each creature from God, it had to be represented by many creatures, so that what is lacking to one might be supplied by another. Even in syllogistic conclusions, when the conclusion is not sufficiently demonstrated by one means of proof, the means must be multiplied in order to make the conclusion clear, as happens in dialectical syllogisms. Yet not even the entire universe of creatures perfectly represents the divine goodness by setting it forth adequately, but represents it only in the measure of perfection possible to creatures.

Moreover, a perfection existing in a universal cause simply and in a unified manner is found to exist in the effects of that cause as multiple distinct perfections. For a perfection has a nobler existence in a cause than in its effects. But the divine goodness is one, and is the simple principle and root of all the goodness found in creatures. Hence creatures must be made like the divine goodness in the way that many and distinct things are assimilated to what is one and simple. Therefore, multiplicity and distinction occur in things not by chance or fortune but for an end, just as the production of things is not the result of chance or fortune, but is for an end. For existence, unity, and multiplicity in things all come from the same principle. The distinction among things is not caused by matter; for things were originally constituted in being by creation, which does not require any matter. Moreover, things which issue purely from the necessity of matter seem to be chance events.

Furthermore, multiplicity in things is not explained by the order of intermediate agents, as though from one, simple first being there could proceed directly only one thing, which nonetheless would be far removed from the first being in simplicity, so that a multitude could issue from it, and thus, as the distance from the first, simple being increased, the more numerous a multitude would be discerned. Some have suggested this explanation. But we have shown that there are many things that could not have come into being except by creation, which is exclusively the work of God, as has been proved. Hence we conclude that many things have been created directly by God himself.

It is likewise evident that, according to that view, the multiplicity and distinction among things would be fortuitous, as not being intended by the first agent. But the multiplicity and distinction existing among things were devised by the divine intellect and established in things so that the divine goodness might be represented by created things in various ways, and that different things might participate in the divine goodness in varying degree. All this was so that a certain beauty might shine forth from the very order existing among diverse things, a beauty which would direct the mind to the divine wisdom.