Chapter 122 — That not all punishment is contrary to the will in the same way

Not all punishment is opposed to the will in the same way. Some punishments are opposed to what man actually wills; and this kind of punishment is felt most keenly. Some punishments are opposed not to the act of the will but to the habitual tendency of the will, as when a person is deprived of something, for instance, his son or his property, without his knowledge. In this case, nothing actually thwarts his will; but the withdrawal of the good would be against his will if he were aware of what was happening. At times a punishment is opposed to the will according to the very nature of that faculty. For the will is naturally ordered to what is good. Thus if a person is lacking in a virtue, this is not always opposed to his actual will, for he may, perhaps, despise this virtue; nor need it be against his habitual will, for he may, perhaps, have a habitual disposition of will toward what is contrary to the virtue. Nevertheless, such a privation is opposed to the natural rectitude of the will, whereby man naturally desires virtue.

Consequently, as is evident, the degrees of punishment may be measured by two standards: first, by the quantity of the good of which a man is deprived by his punishment; second, by the greater or less opposition it arouses in the will. For sometimes it is less contrary to the will to be deprived of a greater good than to be deprived of a lesser.

Providence