Chapter 148 — That all things were made for the sake of man

All things are directed to the divine goodness as to their end, as we have shown. Among things ordained to this end, some are closer to the end than others, and so participate in the divine goodness more abundantly. Consequently, lower creatures, which have a lesser share in the divine goodness, are also in some way ordered to higher beings as to their ends. For in any series of ends, beings that are closer to the ultimate end are also ends with respect to beings that are more remote. For instance, a dose of medicine is administered to procure a purge, the purge is designed to promote slimness, and slimness is desirable for health; and thus slimness is, in a way, the purpose of the purging, as the purging is the purpose of the medicine. And such subordination is reasonable. For just as in a series of efficient causes, the power of the first agent reaches the ultimate effects through intermediate causes, so in a series of ends, whatever is farther removed from the end attains to the ultimate end through the intermediacy of beings that are closer to the end. Thus, in our example, the medicine is only ordered to health through the purging. Similarly, in the order of the universe, lower beings obtain their last end chiefly insofar as they are ordered to higher beings.

The same conclusion is manifest if we turn our attention to the order of things in itself. Things that come into being naturally are born to be treated as they are treated. Now we observe that more imperfect things are used by more noble beings; for example, plants draw their nutriment from the earth, animals feed on plants, and these in turn serve man’s use. We conclude, then, that lifeless beings exist for the sake of living beings, plants for the sake of animals, and these for the sake of men. And since, as we have shown, intellectual nature is superior to material nature, it follows that the whole of material nature is subordinate to intellectual nature. But among intellectual natures, that which has the closest ties with the body is the rational soul, which is the form of man. In a certain sense, therefore, we may say that the whole of bodily nature exists for man, inasmuch as he is a rational animal. And so the consummation of the whole of bodily nature depends, in some way, on man’s consummation.