On the Blend of the Elements

to Master Philip of Castro Caeli

On the Blend of the Elements

There tends to be a doubt among many in what way the elements are present in a blend.

Now it seems to certain men that, with the active and passive qualities of the elements having been reduced somehow to a mean through alteration, the substantial forms of the elements remain. For if the substantial forms do not remain, there will seem to be a certain corruption of the elements, and not a blend.

On the other hand, if the substantial form of the blended body be the act of matter, with the forms of the simple bodies not having been presupposed, the simple bodies would lose the notion of elements. For an element is that from which something is primarily composed, and it is in that something, and it is indivisible according to species. For with the substantial forms having been withdrawn, accordingly the blended body is not composed from the simple bodies such that they would remain in it.

But it is impossible that they possess themselves in this manner. For it is impossible for matter to sustain the diverse forms of the elements in the same respect. Therefore, if in a blended body the substantial forms of the elements be preserved, it will be necessary that they be present in diverse parts of the matter. However, for the diverse parts of matter to receive these forms is impossible except through the quantity in matter having been presupposed. For when the quantity has been withdrawn, the substance remains indivisible, as is clear in I Physics (185b16). Now a physical body is constituted out of matter under existing quantity and through the arriving substantial form. Therefore, the diverse parts of matter subsisting by means of the forms of the elements admits the notion of many bodies. But it is impossible for it to be many bodies at once. Therefore, the four elements will not be in any part of the blended body whatever; and thus there will not be a blend in truth, but according to sense, just as happens in the aggregation of bodies imperceptible because of their smallness.

Furthermore, every substantial form requires a proper disposition in matter, without which it is not able to be; whence the way towards generation and corruption is alteration. But it is impossible in the same thing for the proper disposition which is required for the form of fire, and the proper disposition which is required for the form of water to come together, because according to such dispositions fire and water are contraries. Now it is impossible for contraries to be in the same place. Therefore, it is impossible because the substantial forms of fire and of water would be in the same part of the blend. Therefore, if the blend be made through the persisting substantial forms of the simple bodies, it follows that it is not a blend in truth, but only to sense, as it were, by the parts placed beside each other being imperceptible because of their smallness.

Some, however, wishing to avoid both accounts, have fallen into more unfitting reasons. For in order that they might distinguish the blending from the corruption of the elements, they said that the substantial forms of the elements somehow remain in the blend. But on the other hand, lest they should be compelled to say that it is only a blend to sense, and not according to truth, they maintained that the forms of the elements do not remain in the blend according to their entirety but are reduced into some mean. For they say that the forms of the elements admit of more and less, and they have contrariety to one another. But because this is manifestly repugnant to common opinion and to the statement of Aristotle saying in the Categories 5 (3b24) that nothing is contrary to substance, and that substance does not admit of more and less, they go on further, saying that the forms of the elements are most imperfect, as being nearer to prime matter. Hence they are middles between substantial and accidental forms. And thus, insofar as they approach to the nature of accidental forms, they are able to admit of more and less.

This position, however, is improbable in manifold ways. First, indeed, because to be a certain mean between substance and accident is entirely impossible; for there would be some mean between affirmation and negation. For it is proper to an accident to be in a subject, but to a substance not to be in a subject. Substantial forms, however, are in fact in matter, but not in a subject; for a subject is a ‘this something’, but a substantial form is what makes a ‘this something’—it does not, however, presuppose it.

Likewise, it is ridiculous to say that a mean is something between those which are not of one genus, as is proved in X Metaphysics 7 (1057a20). For the mean and extremes must be from the same genus. Nothing, therefore, is able to be a mean between substance and accident.

Furthermore, it is impossible for the substantial forms of the elements to admit of more and less. For every form admitting of more and less is divisible per accidens, inasmuch as, namely, the subject can partake of it either more or less. However, motion happens to be continuous according as something is divisible per se or per accidens, as is clear in VI Physics 1 (231b15). For there is change of place, and augmentation and diminution, according to quantity and place, which are divisible per se; but alteration according to those qualities which admit of more and less, such as hot and white. Therefore, if the forms of the elements admit of more and less, both the generation and corruption of the elements will be a continuous motion, which is impossible. For motion is not continuous except in three genera, namely, in quantity, and quality, and where, as is proved in V Physics 1 (225b9).

Furthermore, every difference according to substantial form variegates the species. But that which receives more and less distinguishes what is more from that which is less and in some way is contrary to it, such as the more white and the less white. If, then, the form of fire admits of more and less, the more having been made or the less having been made will variegate the species, and it will not be the same form, but another. And this is what the Philosopher says in VIII Metaphysics 3 (1043b36), that just as in numbers the species is variegated through addition and subtraction, so also in substances.

Therefore, it is needful to find another way by which both the truth of blends is preserved and yet the elements are not totally corrupted but, in some way, remain in the blend.

It ought to be considered, therefore, that the active and passive qualities of the elements are contraries to each other, and they receive both of more and less. Now, from contrary qualities which receive of more and less can be constituted a medium quality which is flavored with the nature of both extremes, such as gray between white and black, and tepid between hot and cold. So then, with the excellences of the qualities of the elements having been remitted, there is constituted from out of these qualities some medium quality which is the proper quality of the blended body, differing nevertheless in diverse ways according to the diverse proportion of the blend. And this quality is, in fact, the proper disposition for the form of the blended body, just as the simple quality is for the form of the simple body. Therefore, just as the extremes are found within the mean, which partakes of the nature of both, so the qualities of the simple bodies are found within the proper qualities of the blended body. The quality of the simple body, however, is indeed other than its substantial form; nevertheless, it acts in virtue of the substantial form. Otherwise, the hot would only heat, while through the action of heat the substantial form would not be drawn forth into act, since nothing acts beyond its own species. In this manner therefore, the virtues of the substantial forms of the simple bodies are preserved in blended bodies.