Article 1 — Whether the creation of formless matter preceded in duration the creation of things

The first point of inquiry is whether the creation of formless matter preceded in duration the creation of things. (Parallel texts: ST I.66.1; I.69.1; I.74.2; In II Sent. 12.4.)

Obj. 1: And it would seem that it did not. For Augustine says that formless matter preceded matter formed from it, as the voice precedes a song. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 1.15 (PL 34:257–58).) Now, the voice precedes a song not in duration but only in nature. Therefore, formless matter precedes formed realities not in duration, but only in nature.

Obj. 2: It might be said that Augustine is speaking of matter with regard to the formation that results from the elemental forms, which were in matter from the very beginning.

On the contrary, as water and earth are elements, so also are fire and air. Now, Scripture, in referring to the formless state of matter, mentions earth and water. Consequently, if matter from the beginning had the forms of the elements, for the same reason Scripture would also have mentioned fire and air.

Obj. 3: The substantial form together with matter are the cause of the accidental qualities, as is clear from the Philosopher in Physics 1. (Aristotle, Physics 1.7, 190a31–b17; 1.9, 192a2–a34.) Now, the active and passive qualities are, properly speaking, the accidental properties of the elements. Hence, if substantial forms were in matter from the beginning, it follows that the active and passive qualities were there also, so that there was no formlessness there, apparently.

Obj. 4: But it will be said that there was formlessness or confusion as regards the position of the elements.

On the contrary, according to the Philosopher, each of the elements has a location to the degree that it has a species, for the elements are in their proper places from the power of their forms. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 4.3, 310a20–311a12.) Hence, if from the beginning matter had substantial forms, it follows that each element had its own location; thus, there was no confusion of elements in respect of which matter could be called formless.

Obj. 5: If matter be called formless for no other reason but that the elements had not yet their proper and natural location, it would seem to follow that matter is said to be formed by the fact that the elements were allotted their natural position. But this is not verified in the work of distinction, where certain waters are placed above the heavens, whereas water’s natural position is beneath the air and immediately above the earth, as is clear in On the Heavens 4. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 4.2, 308b12–310a12.) Therefore, the formlessness of matter was not owing to the aforesaid confusion of position.

Obj. 6: It will be said, perhaps, that the waters are stated to be above the heavens insofar as they are raised above them by evaporation.

On the contrary, as philosophers prove, the vaporized waters cannot be raised above the entire atmosphere; in fact, they do not rise more than half way; and consequently, much less can they rise above fire and yet further above the heavens.

Obj. 7: A formlessness of matter is expressed in the words the earth was void and empty (Gen 1:2). Now, matter is said to be “void” in respect of the power of generation, and “empty” in respect of adornment (according to the explanation of holy men), which refers to the things that move on the face of the earth. Consequently, the formlessness of matter does not refer to position, nor did it precede in duration the formation of matter.

Obj. 8: He who can give all at once is less liberal if he gives by degrees; therefore, it is written: say not to your friend: ‘go and come again, and tomorrow I will give to you’ (Prov 3:28). Now, God was able to give perfect being to things at once. Hence, since he is supremely liberal, he did not make matter formless before giving it a form.

Obj. 9: Movement from center to center results from the elements insofar as they possess their natural positions. Now, in the very formlessness of matter it is apparent that there was movement from center to center, because the vaporized waters, as we are told, arose above the earth. Therefore, the elements had already their natural positions.

Obj. 10: The rare and the dense are the causes of the heavy and the light, as is clear in Physics 4. (Aristotle, Physics 4.9, 217b7–28.) Now, the rare and the dense were already in the elements, for we are told that the waters were more rarefied than they are now. Therefore, things were heavy or light and the elements had their own places, which belong to them by reason of levity and heaviness.

Obj. 11: In this formless condition of things, it is clear that the earth had its own position, and we are given to understand that it was covered with the waters, when we read: let the waters that are under the heaven be gathered together into one place, and let the dry land appear (Gen 1:9). Therefore, the other elements likewise had their respective positions so that there was no formlessness in matter.

Obj. 12: From a perfect agent issues a perfect effect, since every agent produces its like. Now, God is the most perfect agent. Therefore, from the very first he produced perfect matter, and thus it was formed, since form is the perfection of matter.

Obj. 13: If formless matter preceded the formation of things in duration, matter so existing either lacked every form, or it had some form. If it lacked every form, it was only in potency and not in act, and consequently, it was not yet created, since existence is the terminus of creation. If, on the other hand, it had a certain form, this was either some elemental form or the form of a mixed body. If it was an elemental form, it had either one form or several. If several, there was already diversity on account of the diverse elemental forms. If one only, it follows that one particular elemental form naturally precedes the others in matter, and thus, one element would be the principle of the others, as the oldest natural philosophers asserted, saying that there is only one element; this is refuted by the Philosopher. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.4–8, 331b4–335a23.) And if it had the form of a mixed body, it follows that the form of a mixed body naturally precedes the elemental forms in matter, and this is clearly false; for mixing occurs only by something that moves the elements to the form of the mixed body. Therefore, it is impossible that matter was at first formless and afterwards formed.

Obj. 14: It will be said perhaps that matter had the elemental forms, but not in the same way as now, since the waters were more rarefied and, in the manner of vapor, mixed with the air.

On the contrary, each elemental form requires a particular measure of rarity or density, without which it cannot exist. Now, rarity, whereby a thing rises to the place of air, surpasses the condition of water; for it is the nature of water that it be heavy in comparison to air. Consequently, if the waters were so subtle that in the mode of vapor they rose to the place of the air, they did not have the species of water; and thus, the elemental forms were not in matter, whereas above we have stated the contrary to be the case.

Obj. 15: The various genera of things were formed from formless matter during the works of the six days. Now, among the works of the six days, the firmament was formed on the second day. Hence, if formless matter was subject to the elemental forms, it would follow that the heavens were made from the four elements, and this is refuted by the Philosopher. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.4–6, 269b2–270a21.)

Obj. 16: A natural body stands to its shape as matter to its form. Now, a natural body cannot exist without some shape. Therefore, neither can matter exist without having been formed.

Obj. 17: If matter was without a form when it was first created, the gathering of the waters that took place on the third day would never have been. But this would seem impossible, because if the waters covered the earth on all sides, there was no place into which they could be gathered together. Therefore, it seems that formless matter did not precede the formation of things. However, that the waters covered the earth on all sides is apparent from the fact that the elements were separate, as is proved in On the Heavens 3. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 3.3–8, 268b26–302b9.)

Obj. 18: It will be said perhaps that there were hollow places under the surface of the earth into which the waters subsided, so that the earth provided a place for the waters to congregate.

On the contrary, such hollows or caverns in the earth are caused by rocks upholding the upper parts of the earth and preventing it from falling toward the center; and this could not apply here, for, because rocks are mixed bodies, it would follow that a mixed body existed before the formation of the elements. Therefore, such cavernous places were impossible.

Obj. 19: If there were such hollow places in the earth, they could not be empty. Therefore they would be full of air or water, which seems impossible, since it is contrary to the nature of either to be underneath the earth.

Obj. 20: The water that covered the earth on all sides either had its natural position or it did not. If it had its natural position, it could not be removed thence except by violence, since a body is not moved from the place in which it naturally rests except by violence. But this is not in keeping with the original institution of things, whereby nature was established, since nature is incompatible with violence. On the other hand, if this position of the water was violent, the water could by its nature return to the disposition which it lacked, since a thing moves naturally from a place in which it rests violently. Consequently, the gathering together of the waters into one place should not be ascribed to the work of formation.

Obj. 21: Things were created in accordance with the order that they naturally possess. Now, distinction is naturally prior to confusion, just as the simple is naturally prior to a compound. Hence, it was not fitting to the institution of things that they should be at first in a state of confusion and afterwards be made distinct.

Obj. 22: A process from actuality to potency is more suitable to the corruption of things than to their institution; for things come to be from the fact that they are brought from potency into act. Now, to proceed from mixed bodies to elements is to proceed from the actual to the potential, since the elements are, as it were, matter in relation to the form of the mixed body. Therefore, it was not suitable to the institution of things that they should first of all be in a state of confusion and mixture, and afterwards be made distinct.

Obj. 23: This would seem to be consonant with the errors of the ancient philosophers: namely, of Empedocles, who held that the parts of the world were divided from one another by strife, whereas previously they had been fused together by friendship; and of Anaxagoras, who held that at first all things were together, and that afterwards the mind began to make distinctions by separating things from this confusion and mixture. These opinions have of course been sufficiently refuted by later philosophers. Therefore, we must not hold that by a priority of duration a formlessness and confusion of matter preceded its formation.

On the contrary (1), Gregory, commenting on Sirach 18:1, he that lives forever created all things together, says that all things were created together through their matter’s substance but not through their form’s species; (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 32.12 (PL 76:644–46).) and this would not be unless matter’s substance existed before form’s species were present in it. Therefore, formless matter preceded the formation of things in point of duration.

Furthermore (2), that which does not exist cannot have any activity. Now, formless matter has a certain activity, for it desires form, as is said in Physics 3. (Aristotle, Physics 3.5–6, 206a7–207a31.) Therefore, matter can exist without form, and thus, it is not incongruous to suppose that formless matter preceded the formation of things in point of duration.

Furthermore (3), God can do more than nature. Now, nature makes a potential being an actual being. Therefore, God can make that which is a being simply to be a potential being; and thus, he could make matter exist without a form.

Furthermore (4), we must not deny the existence of what Scripture declares to have been; for as Augustine says, no Christian contradicts the statements of Holy Scripture. (Augustine, On the Trinity 5.1 (PL 42:911–12).) Now, the divine Scriptures assert that at one time the earth was void and empty. Therefore, we must not deny this. And however this be explained, it pertains to a formlessness of matter. Therefore, at some time matter’s substance preceded its formation; otherwise, it would never have been formless.

Furthermore (5), we have shown that spiritual and corporeal creatures were made at the same time. (Q. 3, a. 18.) Now, the formless state in the spiritual creature preceded its formation even in point of duration. Therefore, the same is to be said of the corporeal creature. The middle premise is proved: the “formation of the spiritual creature” is understood as its turning to the Word, whereby it was enlightened. And as soon as light was made, light was divided from darkness, which in the spiritual creature denotes sin. But there could be no sin in the angels in the first instant of their creation, because then the demons would never have been good. Therefore, the spiritual creature was not formed in the first instant of its creation.

Furthermore (6), that from which a thing is made precedes even in time that which is made from it. Now, God created the sphere of the earth from an unseen matter, which, according to Augustine, was formless matter, as is said in Wisdom 11:18. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 1.15 (PL 34:257–58); cf. Genesis 1:21 (PL 34:279–85).) Therefore, formless matter preceded the formed sphere of the earth in time.

The first premise is proved thus: according to the Philosopher, the coming to be of things can be expressed in two ways. (Aristotle, Physics 1.5, 188a31–b25; 1.7, 189b32–191a22.)

In one way, if I say, “this comes to be that” through itself, which belongs to a subject (for example, “a man comes to be white”), or accidentally, as from a privation or contrary (for example, when I say, “a not-white or a black thing comes to be white”).

In another way, as when I say, “this comes to be from so and so,” which does not belong to the subject except in the account of privation. For we do not say, “a white man comes to be from a man,” but “a white thing comes to be from a not-white or a black thing,” or even “from a black or not-white man.”

Accordingly, that from which a thing is made is either a privation or contrary, or it is matter subject to privation or contrary. And in either case, that from which a thing comes to be must precede in point of time, since contraries cannot be in the same subject together, nor can matter be subject at the same time to privation and form. Therefore, that from which a thing is made precedes in time that which is made from it.

Furthermore (7), the action of nature as far as possible imitates the action of God, just as the action of a second cause imitates that of the first cause. Now, the process of nature’s action is from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore, God also at first in order of time produced something imperfect, and afterwards perfected it, and thus, formless matter preceded its formation.

Furthermore (8), Augustine says that when Scripture mentions earth and water in the words of Genesis 1:2, the earth was void and empty, and the spirit of God moved over the waters, the earth and the water are not being named because it was already such, but it could be such. Hence, primary matter at one time had not as yet the species of earth and water, but only was able to have it; and consequently, matter without a form preceded its formation.

I answer that, as Augustine says, this question admits of a twofold discussion: one regards the very truth about the things; the other regards the sense of the text, in which Moses, inspired by God, presents the world’s beginning. (Augustine, Confessions 12.17–19 (PL 32:834–37).)

As to the first discussion, two things are to be avoided: one is asserting something that is false about this question, especially as such that it contradicts a truth of faith; the other is believing something to be true, then wanting to assert that this pertains to a truth of the faith, for as Augustine says, when a man thinks his false opinions to be the teaching of godliness, and dares obstinately to affirm what he does not know, he becomes an obstacle to others. (Augustine, Confessions 5.5 (PL 32:709).) He says that such a one is an obstacle because the truth of the faith is made ridiculous to the unbeliever when a simple-minded believer asserts as pertaining to the faith that which is shown to be false by means of most certain teachings, as Augustine also says in The Literal Interpretation of Genesis 1. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 1.1 (PL 34:216–18).)

As regards the other discussion, two things also are to be avoided.

One is someone saying that one must understand the words of Scripture, which teaches the creation of things, in a way that is manifestly false. For falsehood cannot underlie the divine Scriptures, which we have received from the Holy Spirit, just as neither can it underlie the faith, which is taught by the Scriptures.

The other is someone wanting to force Scripture to one sense in such a way that it wholly excludes any other senses that contain truth in themselves, and that can, while preserving the details of the text, be adapted to Scripture. For it pertains to the dignity of Holy Scripture that it contains many senses under the one text, in order that in this way it might agree with the diverse understandings of men, such that each person might marvel at being able to find in divine Scripture the truth that he has conceived in his own mind. And through this also, it might be more easily defended against unbelievers, since when it becomes apparent that what one wants to understand from sacred Scripture is false, he can fall back upon some other sense. Hence, it is not unbelievable that Moses himself and the other authors of the Holy Books were divinely given to know the various truths that men could understand, and that they expressed them under one line of text, so that in this way each and every one of them is the author’s sense. Whence, even if expositors of sacred Scripture adapt certain truths to the text that were not understood by the author, without a doubt the Holy Spirit, who is the principal author of divine Scripture, understood them. Consequently, every truth that can be adapted to the sacred Scripture without prejudice to the details of text is its sense.

Having laid down these things, we must observe that expositors of sacred Scripture have accepted various senses about the opening of Genesis, none of which is contrary to the truth of the faith. And as far as concerns the present question, they may be divided into two paths, taking in two ways the formlessness of matter indicated at the beginning of Genesis by the words, the earth was void and empty.

Some understood these words to mean that matter was formless in the sense that matter is understood to be without any form while being in potency toward all forms. Now, such matter cannot exist in the nature of things unless it be formed by some form, since whatever is found in the nature of things exists actually and is not had by matter except through form, which is matter’s act; whence in the nature of things it is not possible to find it without form.

Moreover, since nothing can be contained in a genus that is not determined to a species by some difference of that genus, matter cannot be a being unless it be determined to some specific mode of being, and this cannot come to be except through form. Consequently, if formless matter be understood in this sense, it is impossible that it precede its formation in duration; rather, it precedes it only in the order of nature, inasmuch as that from which something comes to be naturally precedes that which comes to be from it, just as night was created before. This was the view taken by Augustine.

Others took the view that the formlessness of matter is not such that matter lacks every form, but according to how we say something is “unformed” when it does not yet have the final completion and comeliness of its nature; in this sense it can be asserted that the formlessness of things preceded their formation even in duration. If this is asserted, it seems congruent with the order of its wise Maker, who, in bringing things into existence out of nothing, did not at once establish them, after nothingness, in the ultimate perfection of their nature; rather, at first he made them in a certain imperfect existence and afterwards led them to perfection. In this way he would show both that their being came from God—so as to refute those who assert that matter is uncreated—and that he himself would still be seen as the author of the perfection of things—so as to refute those who ascribe the formation of lower things to other causes. Such was the view of Basil the Great, Gregory, (That is, Gregory Nazianzen.) and others who followed them. Since, however, neither opinion is in conflict with the truth of the faith, and since both senses are compatible with the details of the text, let us now respond, while supporting either of them, to the arguments advanced on both sides.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of formless matter understood as being devoid of all form; in this case, we must say that its formlessness preceded its formation by an order of nature alone. In the next article, we shall state his view on the order of the formation.

Reply Obj. 2: There are several opinions on this point.

Plato, upon seeing the Scriptures of Genesis, is said to have understood (There was a popular belief in the Middle Ages that Plato had received a primitive revelation about the origin of things.) the number and order of the elements being signified there such that it speaks of earth and water in the strict sense. Now, the waters are indicated as being above the earth, since it is written: let the waters be gathered together into their own place, and let the dry land appear (Gen 1:9). Above these two, he places the air as being mentioned in the words: the Spirit of the Lord moved over the waters, where he takes spirit to denote the air, and takes the heaven to mean fire, because it is located above all the others.

But because, following Aristotle’s proofs, the heavens cannot be of a fiery nature, as their circular movement demonstrates, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.4, 269a2–b17.) Rabbi Moses agrees with Aristotle’s opinion, and while adopting Plato’s view as to the three first elements, contended that fire is denoted by the darkness, because in its own proper sphere, fire does not shine, and he holds that the position of fire is indicated in the words: upon the face of the deep. He holds also that by the word “heavens” we are to understand the fifth essence. (Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed 2.30.)

But as Basil observes in The Hexameron, Scripture is not wont to signify the air by the Spirit of the Lord, and by mentioning the extremes it implies the intermediate elements, (Basil the Great, Homilies on the Six Days, Homily 2.6 (PG 29:41–44).) and with reason, inasmuch as it is evident to the senses that water and earth are bodies, whereas air and fire are not so intelligible to simpler minds, such as those for whose instructions the Scriptures were given.

According to Augustine, the earth and water mentioned before the formation of light do not denote the completely formed elements, but formless matter itself lacking of all species. (Augustine, Dialogue of 65 Questions, q. 21 (PL 40:740).) Moreover, the formlessness of matter is expressed by these two elements more powerfully than by the others because they are more akin to formlessness, insofar as they possess more of matter and less of form, and again, because they are better known to us and indicate to us more clearly the matter of the other elements. Therefore, it wished to signify this by two rather than by one element only, lest if only one were mentioned, we might be led to think that this one alone was formless matter.

Reply Obj. 3: In the opinion of Basil and other holy men, by a certain formlessness existing in things, at the beginning of things, does not imply that the elements lacked their natural qualities. Rather, each had its form, both substantial and accidental.

Reply Obj. 4: The position of the elements may be considered in two ways.

First, as regards their respective natures, and in this way, fire naturally contains the air, air the water, and water the earth.

Second, as regards the necessity of generation, which is around the middle place; and thus, it is necessary that the surface of the earth be partly covered by water, so as to favor the generation and preservation of mixed substances, especially of perfect animals, which require air for breathing.

We must reply, then, that this formlessness of the first state is not viewed in reference to the position that is natural to the elements in themselves (for all the elements had this position), but in reference to that position that belongs to them in their order to the generation of mixed things. For this position was not perfect as yet, seeing that mixed bodies themselves had not yet come forth.

Reply Obj. 5: With regard to the waters that are above the heavens, there have been various opinions.

For some have said that those waters are the spiritual natures; this was the view of Origen. But it does not seem that this can be understood in a literal sense, since position does not belong to spiritual natures, such that the firmament might divide them and the lower corporeal waters, as Scripture has it (Gen 1:6).

Hence, others hold that the name “firmament” is understood to be the airy sky near us, above which vaporous waters are raised by evaporation, which are the matter for rains; in this way, for example, the airy heaven stands between the higher waters, which are suspended as a vapor in the intermediate space of air, and the bodily waters that we see situated on the earth. Rabbi Moses agrees with this explanation. (Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed 2.30.) But it would seem to be incompatible with the details of the text, since the text goes on to say that God made the two great lights and the stars, and that he set them in the firmament of the heaven (Gen 1:16).

Consequently, others maintain that the firmament signifies the starry heaven, and that the waters situated above the heavens are of the same nature as the elemental waters, but that they are set there by divine providence in order to temper the power of the fire, of which they held the entire heaven to consist, according to Basil. In support of this view, some, according to Augustine, advanced two arguments. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.4–5 (PL 34:265–67).) One was that, since water by means of rarefaction can rise into the intermediate air where the rains are produced, if it be yet more rarefied and divided into yet smaller particles (for it is infinitely divisible, like everything continuous), it will be able, by its subtlety, to rise above the starry heaven, and remain there in a fitting way. The other argument is that the star Saturn, whose heat must be extreme on account of the rapidity of its movement, inasmuch as its orbit is great, is found to effect cold; they say that this is occasioned by the proximity of that water cooling this star.

But this explanation we consider to be defective in that it ascribes to the Scriptures certain things the contraries of which are proved true with sufficiently evident arguments.

First, as regards the position itself, for it would seem to upset the natural position of bodies. For since a body should be higher to the degree that it is more formal, it would seem inconsistent with the nature of things that water, which is the most material of all bodies (besides of earth), should be set even above the starry heaven itself. Moreover, it would seem out of keeping that things of the same species should be allotted different natural places, which would be the case if one part of the element of water were immediately above the earth and another part above the heavens. Nor is it enough to reply that God’s omnipotence upholds those waters above the heavens against their nature, since we are discussing how God instituted the natures of things, and not the miracles that he may have been pleased to work in them, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.1 (PL 34:263–64).)

Second, the argument about the rarefaction or divisibility of the waters seems altogether futile. For though mathematical bodies can be divided to infinity, natural bodies are divided to a certain limit, since a quantity is determined for each and every form according to its nature, just as the other accidents are. Hence, neither can rarefaction of water continue to infinity; rather, it reaches a determinate limit, which is in the rarity of fire. Moreover, water might continue to be rarefied until it was no longer water but air or fire, if the measure of water’s rarity were exceeded. Nor would it be possible for water naturally to rise above the regions of air and fire unless it lost the nature of water so as to surpass their rarity. Nor again would it be possible for an elemental body, which is corruptible, to become more formal than the starry heavens, which are incorruptible, and thus be set above them naturally.

Third, the second argument is obviously utterly trivial. For heavenly bodies, as philosophers show, are not susceptible to impressions from foreign bodies. And it would be impossible for Saturn to be cooled by those waters without all the stars that are in the eighth sphere being cooled as well, whereas many of these stars are observed to be hot in their effect.

Therefore, one should offer an explanation so that the truth of Scripture would be defended from any criticism, such that we might say that those waters are not of the same nature as our elemental waters; rather, they are of the nature of the fifth essence, having transparency in common with our waters, just as even the empyrean heaven has brilliance in common with our fire. And some call these waters the “crystalline heaven,” not because they are frozen in the manner of crystals—since, according to Basil in The Hexamerons, only a silly child or an imbecile could imagine such things about the heavens (Basil the Great, Homilies on the Six Days, Homily 3.4 (PG 29:61–62).)—but on account of the solidity of this heaven, as it is written about all the heavens that they are strong as though they were made of molten brass (Job 37:18). And this heaven, according to astronomers, is the ninth sphere. Hence, Augustine does not adopt any of these explanations but dismisses them as doubtful; thus, he says: howsoever these waters may be there and of what kind they may be, one thing is certain, they are there. Surely the written Word has greater authority than the combined genius of men. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.5 (PL 34:267).)

Reply Obj. 6: The sixth objection we grant.

Reply Obj. 7: If, according to the exposition of Basil and his followers, we take “the earth” to signify the element of earth itself, (Basil the Great, Homilies on the Six Days, Homily 4.5 (PG 29:87–92).) we may consider it first as the principle from which certain things originate, like plants, of which it is like a mother (as is said in the book On Vegetables), and with respect to them, it was void before it produced them; for we do say that a thing is void or vain if it fails to attain its proper effect or end. (Albert the Great (ca. 1200–1280 AD), De vegetabilibus libri VII, historiae naturalis pars XVIII, ed. Ernest Meyer and Karol Jessen (Berlin: Georgii Reimeri, 1867), bk. 4, tract. 2, ch. 2, pp. 238–39.) Second, we may consider it as a certain abode and place of the animals, in respect of which it is said to have been empty.

Or, following the text of the Septuagint, which reads invisible and incomposite, part of the earth was invisible through being covered with water, as also because a light was not yet produced so as to render it visible, while it was incomposite because there were as yet no plants and animals to adorn it, nor was it as yet a fit place for their generation and conservation. If, however, “the earth” signifies primary matter, as Augustine maintains, then it is said to be void in comparison with the composite body in which it subsists, because a void is opposite to firmness and solidity, (Augustine, Dialogue of 65 Questions, q. 21 (PL 40:740).) while it is described as being empty in comparison with the forms that were not fulfilling its potency. Hence, Plato compares the receptivity of matter to a place, inasmuch as place receives that which is located therein; (Plato, Timaeus 51a–52d.) and “empty” and “full” are terms which are properly applied to a place. Again, matter considered in its formlessness is described as “invisible” inasmuch as it lacks form, which is the principle of all knowledge, and “incomposite” inasmuch as it only subsists in a composite state.

Reply Obj. 8: It pertains to the liberality of a giver not only that he give quickly, but also that he give ordinately and each gift at a suitable time. Hence, when the text continues, when you can give at present, we must understand the possibility not only of giving absolutely, but also of giving most suitably. Therefore, in order to observe a suitable order, God instituted his creatures at first in a certain imperfection, so that by degrees they might proceed from nothingness to perfection.

Reply Obj. 9: As we have already stated, the position that pertains to the nature of the elements was in the elements; hence, the objection does not avail against this opinion.

Reply Obj. 10–11: The same answer applies to the tenth and eleventh objections.

Reply Obj. 12: A perfect effect belongs to a perfect agent. But this effect need not be simply perfect from the very beginning, according to the mode of its own nature; rather, it will suffice if it be perfect according to that time, in the way in which a child may be described as perfect as soon as it is born.

Reply Obj. 13: According to the view that we are defending at present, matter is not said to have been formless because it lacks all form, or because it had but one form that would be in potency to all forms, (as the ancient naturalists maintained, who asserted that there was only one principle), or a form under which many forms are contained in power (as happens in mixed bodies). Rather, matter had the various elemental forms in its various parts. Nevertheless, matter was said to be formless because the forms of mixed bodies had not yet come to matter, to which forms the forms of the elements were in potency; nor was the position of the elements yet suitable for their generation, as we have already stated.

Reply Obj. 14: Nothing, neither the authority of Genesis in Scripture nor any argument, forces us to say that at the beginning of things matter was subject to the elemental forms in a different way than they are now; however, it was possible that something rose from the waters as vapor to the place of the air, as happens now, and then perhaps in greater volume, seeing that the earth was wholly covered by the waters.

Reply Obj. 15: There are several opinions about the firmament, which was created on the second day.

Some hold that this firmament is not distinct from the heaven, which is stated to have been made on the first day, but they contend that Scripture at first announces the works collectively, and afterwards, explains how they were done in the course of the six days. This is the view expressed by Basil in his Hexaemeron. (Basil the Great, Homilies on the Six Days 2 (PG 29:27–52).)

Others maintain that the firmament created on the second day is distinct from the heaven stated to have been made on the first, and this view admits of a threefold explanation.

Some have asserted that the heaven described as created on the first day signifies the spiritual creature, whether formed or still unformed, and that the firmament described as made on the second day is the corporeal heaven that we see. This is the opinion of Augustine, as is clear in The Literal Interpretation of Genesis and Confessions 12. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 1.9 (PL 34:251–53); Confessions 12.9, 12.12–13 (PL 32:829, 831–32).)

Others say that the heaven described as created on the first day is the empyrean heaven, and that the firmament described as created on the second day is the starry heaven visible to us. This is the view of Strabo, as is clear in the Gloss on Genesis 1. (Glossa ordinaria 1, 3–54, at Genesis 1:1 (PL 113:67–82).)

Others say that the heaven made on the first day is the starry heaven, and that the firmament made on the second day signifies the region of the air near the earth that divides waters from waters, as was stated above. Augustine alludes to this opinion in The Literal Interpretation of Genesis, and it is held by Rabbi Moses. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.1 (PL 34:263–64); Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed 2.30.)

If this last explanation be adopted, it is easy to solve the difficulty, because the firmament made on the second day has not the nature of the fifth essence; whence, as regards the firmament, there is no reason why in its production there should not have been a process from formlessness to formation, whether in respect of its subtlety, through the rising vapors being diminished by the gathering of the waters into one, or in respect of its position, through the air taking the place of the receding waters.

On the other hand, in the case of the first three opinions, which hold the firmament to denote the starry heaven, there is no need to ascribe to the heaven a process from formlessness to formation, as though it acquired a new form, since Scripture does not bind us to ascribe such a process to the lower elements. But we must understand a power as bestowed on the firmament for the generation of mixed bodies, and that its formation consisted in this, just as we have already said about the formation of the lower elements in relation to the generation of mixed bodies. (Q. 4, a. 1, ad 4, ad 13.) For just as the lower elements are the matter of the mixed bodies, so the firmament is the active cause of the mixed bodies.

Hence, we may take the division of the lower from the higher waters in the way in which a middle existing on the border of two extremes distinguishes between them. For the lower waters are subject to change inasmuch as, through the movement of the firmament, they become the matter of mixture, whereas the higher waters do not. Yet according to the opinion of Augustine, if we suppose formless matter to have been prior in point of time, there is no great difficulty; for we must ascribe matter in some sense to a heavenly body, seeing that it also has movement. (Augustine, On Genesis Against the Manichees 1.12 (PL 34:181–82); cf. On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 1.12–15 (PL 34:256–57).) Hence, there is nothing to prevent this preceding its form by order of nature, although no formation accrued to it from time. Nor are we, therefore, bound to say that the heavenly body and the lower elements have one nature in common, although they are signified by one name (by “earth” or “water,” for instance, in the opinion of Augustine), because this unity is not one of substance but of proportion, insofar as every matter is considered as in potency to form.

Reply Obj. 16: This is clear from what has already been said, since the formless condition of matter does not imply that it is devoid of all form, but is to be taken as already explained.

Reply Obj. 17: The opinion of Augustine, who held that the “earth” and “water” previously mentioned signify not the elements but primary matter, is not incompatible with the gathering together of the waters. (Augustine, Dialogue of 65 Questions, q. 21 (PL 40:740).) Thus, he says himself that as the words let a firmament be made indicate the formation of the heavenly bodies on the second day, so the words let the waters be gathered together signify the formation of the lower elements on the third day. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.7–8 (PL 34:268–69).) Hence, as the words let the waters be gathered together mean that the water received its form, so the words let the dry land appear denote the same with regard to the earth. The reason for these words being used in the formation of these elements instead of words significant of making, like “let water and earth be made”—as when the heaven was mentioned, for example, let a firmament be made—was in order to indicate the imperfection of these forms and their affinity to formless matter. The expression gathered together is used in connection with water to denote its mobility, and the word appear in connection with the earth to signify its stability. Hence, Augustine says: of the waters it is said ‘Let them be gathered together,’ and of the earth ‘Let it appear,’ because water glides and flows away, whereas the earth abides. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.11 (PL 34:273).)

If, however, we adopt the view of Basil and other holy men who said that in both cases the same earth is signified, and likewise, the same water but differently disposed before and after, several replies are suggested. Some have said that part of the earth was not covered by water, and to it that the water that covered the inhabitable earth was, by God’s command, gathered together. This is disproved from the text itself by Augustine, who says: if part of the earth was bare where the waters could be gathered together, then the dry land appeared already, and this contrary to the details of the text. (Augustine, On Genesis Against the Manichees 1.12 (PL 34:181–82).) Hence, others have said that the waters were rarefied as a cloud, and afterwards condensed and gathered into a smaller place. But this involves no less a difficulty, both because they were not truly water if they had the form of vapor, and also because they would have occupied a place in the air, and the difficulty remains to find a place for the air. Consequently, others say that there were hollow places in the earth that, by God’s activity, could receive the multitude of waters. But against this would seem to be the fact that it is accidental if one part of the earth be further than another from the center; whereas in this formation of things nature receives its proper measure, as Augustine says in the same work. (Augustine, On Genesis Against the Manichees 1.12 (PL 34:181–82); cf. On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.1–4 (PL 34:263–66).)

Therefore, it would seem better to hold with Basil that the waters were distributed over various parts of the earth, and afterwards, gathered together; the text itself even seems to signify this when it uses the word gathering. (Basil the Great, Homilies on the Six Days, Homily 4.2–3, 4.5 (PG 29:79–84, 87–92).) For even if the waters covered the whole earth, they would not need to be everywhere as deep as they are now in some parts.

Reply Obj. 18: Seeing that mineral bodies do not show any evident superiority of excellence over the elements, as living bodies do, they are not described as having been formed apart from the elements; but they can be understood as having been produced at the same time as the elements. Hence, nothing prevents the existence of hollow places before the waters were gathered together, so that the earth could afterwards provide room for the waters to be gathered together in the depressions of its surface. However, the words used by Augustine in his allusion to this view seem to mean that these hollow places did not already exist beneath the surface, but that they were formed on the surface of the earth when the waters were gathered together. For he says the following: by subsiding in all directions, the earth was able to provide these hollow places into which the waters flowing and rushing together were received, and the dry land appeared in those parts that the waters had abandoned. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 1.12 (PL 34:256).) The same view is expressed by Basil in The Hexameron: when the waters were commanded to gather together, a place for their gathering was at once formed, so that by God’s command sufficient place was provided to receive the confluence of the many waters. (Basil the Great, Homilies on the Six Days, Homily 4 (PG 29:77–94).) It may be that sufficient place was made by depressions in the earth’s surface, since we also see that certain parts are accidentally higher, as is clear with hills and mountains.

Reply Obj. 19: If the hollow places did not already exist, in accordance with what we have said in the last reply, this objection is to no purpose. If, however, they were already in existence, we reply that, although it is contrary to nature for water or air to be situated beneath the earth if this be left to itself, it is not so if the earth be somehow hindered in its movement. For in caverns beneath the earth we find the earth held up by little supports that arise from the floor, along with air, since nature does not allow a vacuum. But if it be contended that the shallow waters spread over the whole surface of the earth were subsequently gathered together into greater depths, as stated above, these objections will cease.

Reply Obj. 20: If we consider the position natural to the elements and befitting their nature absolutely, then it is natural for water to cover the whole earth on all sides just as the air covers the waters. But if we consider the elements in their order to the generation of mixed bodies, in which the heavenly bodies also take an active part, then such position as what was given to them afterwards befits them. Hence, as soon as the dry land appeared in some part of the earth, we are told at once that the plants were produced. That the heavenly bodies should exercise an active influence on the elements is not contrary to nature, as the Commentator says in On the Heavens 3: thus, the ebb and flow of the sea, although it is not the natural movement of water as a heavy body, since it is not towards the center, nevertheless is natural to water as moved by a heavenly body instrumentally. (Averroes, On the Heavens 3, comm. 20.) Much more truly may this be said to occur in the elements by the divine ordination, whereby the whole nature of the elements subsists. As regards the point at issue, both would seem to work together in the gathering together of the waters—the divine power principally and the heavenly power secondarily. Hence, immediately after the formation of the firmament, the text refers to the gathering of the waters together. Yet a certain aptitude can be found even from the very nature of water. For in the elements, the container is more formal than the contained, as is clear from the Philosopher in Physics 8; (Aristotle, Physics 8.4, 254b17–256a3; 8.6, 259b3–260a19.) hence, water fails to be a perfect container of the earth to the degree that it is not perfectly formal, as are fire and air, it more approaching an earthlike consistency than a fire-like rarity.

Reply Obj. 21: The state of confusion ascribed to the world in its beginning is not viewed in reference to a mingling of the elements; rather, it was in reference to a contrast with the present state of things, the various parts of the world being distinct from one another and favorable to the generation and preservation of living beings.

Reply Obj. 22–23: This suffices for the replies to the twenty-second and twenty-third objections.

We must now deal with the arguments on the other side, which support Augustine’s view.

Reply Sed Contra 1: Gregory’s (That is, Gregory the Great.) words express the view that we have already upheld. They do not mean, however, that when things were first created the matter of all things was made devoid of species of form, but without certain forms (namely, those of living things) and the order requisite for their generation, as we have explained above. (Q. 4, a. 1, ad 4, ad 13.)

Reply Sed Contra 2: The desire for form is not any action of matter, but a certain orientation of matter to form, insofar as matter is in potency to it, as the Commentator explains regarding Physics 1. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics 1.9, LC 80B–81H TC 85, 192a16–25.)

Reply Sed Contra 3: Were God to make a being only in potency, he would do less than nature, which makes a being in act. For the perfection of an action is viewed in reference to the terminus to which it tends more than to the terminus from which it originates. Moreover, the very argument involves a contradiction: namely, that anything might come to be that exists only in potency; for what has been made must exist when it exists, as is proved in Physics 6, (Aristotle, Physics 6.6, 237a35–b23.) whereas what exists only in potency does not exist, simply speaking.

Reply Sed Contra 4: If, as Augustine holds, the words of Scripture the earth was void and empty are taken as being about matter utterly devoid of form, we are not to suppose that there was a time when it was actually so, but that its nature was such, if we consider it apart from inherent forms.

Reply Sed Contra 5: The formation of a spiritual creature may be understood in two ways: first, by the infusion of grace; second, by the consummation of glory.

The first, according to Augustine’s opinion, was bestowed on the spiritual creature from the first moment of its creation; and in that case, the darkness from which the light was divided does not signify the sin of the wicked angels, but rather the formlessness of the nature, which was not formed as yet but remained to be formed by subsequent works, as is said in The Literal Interpretation of Genesis. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.8 (PL 34:269–70).) Or, as he says in the fourth book of the same work, the day signifies God’s knowledge, and the night the creature’s knowledge, which is indeed darkness in comparison with God’s. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 4.22–23, 4.29–32 (PL 34:311–13, 315–17).) Or, if the darkness does signify the sinful angels, then this distinction refers to their sin not as present but as to come, because it was within God’s foreknowledge; therefore, he says in his work addressed to Orosius: foreseeing that some of the angels would fall through pride, by the ordinance of his unfailing foreknowledge he divided the good from the bad, calling the bad “darkness” and the good “light.” (Augustine, Dialogue of 65 Questions, q. 25 (PL 40:741).)

The second formation does not pertain to the creation of things at the beginning, but rather to the course of things whereby they are governed by divine providence. For this last, according to Augustine, is true of all those things in which an activity of nature is required; this needed to have occurred in this formation because, by the movement of their free decision, some were converted such that they remained standing; others turned away such that they fell.

Reply Sed Contra 6: The world is said to have been made of invisible matter because formless matter preceded the world not in time but by the order of nature. Likewise, privation was not at any time in matter before the advent of all form, but matter understood without form is understood as with privation.

Reply Sed Contra 7: It is owing to the imperfection of nature that acts through movement that it proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect; for movement is the act of the imperfect. God, however, by reason of the perfection of his own power, was able at once to give being to perfect things; hence, the comparison fails.

Reply Sed Contra 8: The words of Augustine should not be understood such that matter was at a certain time in such potency to the elemental forms that it had none of them, but that considered in its own essence it includes no form actually, being in potency to them all.