Article 6 — Whether a spiritual substance is united to a heavenly body

Sixth, it is asked whether a spiritual substance is united to a heavenly body. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a.3; ST I.70.3; Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 5, a. 9, ad 14; SCG II.70; III.23–24; Disputed Questions on the Power of God, q. 6, a. 6; Disputed Questions on the Soul, q. 8; Quodlibet 12, q. 5, a. 2; Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, bk. 2, lect. 3; bk. 3, lect. 13; Response to Master John of Vercelli on the 43 Articles, aa. 1–18; Response to the Lector of the Venetians on the 36 Articles, aa. 1, 3.)

Obj. 1: And it would seem that it is. For Dionysius says in chapter seven of On the Divine Names that the divine wisdom conjoins the ends of primary beings to the beginnings of secondary beings. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 3 (PG 3:871B).) From this it can be gathered that a lower nature at its highest point touches a higher nature at its lowest point. Now the highest thing in corporeal nature is a heavenly body, and the lowest thing in spiritual nature is a soul. Therefore, a heavenly body is animate.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the form of a more noble body is more noble. Now a heavenly body is the noblest of bodies, and a soul is the noblest of forms. If, therefore, some lower bodies are animate, much more will a heavenly body be animate.

Obj. 3: It was said that, although a heavenly body is not animate, yet the form whereby that body is a body is more noble than the form whereby man’s body is a body.

On the contrary, either there is another substantial form in the human body besides the rational soul, which gives actual being to the body, or there is not. If there is not, but the soul itself gives actual substantial being to a body—since the soul is the noblest of forms—it will follow that the form through which the human body is a body is more noble than the form through which a heavenly body is a body. But if there should be another substantial form in man which gives actual being to the body besides a rational soul, it is obvious that through that form a human body is able to take on a rational soul. Now, that which is able to take on perfect goodness is better than that which is not, as is said in On the Heavens 2. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.12, 292b17–19.) If, therefore, a heavenly body is not able to take on a rational soul, it will still follow that the form through which the human body is a body is more noble than the form through which the heavenly body is a body, which seems incongruous.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the perfection of the universe requires that to no body be denied that toward which it has a natural inclination. Now every body has a natural inclination toward that which it needs for its own activity. The proper activity, however, of a heavenly body is circular movement, and for this it stands in need of a spiritual substance. For this movement cannot be the consequence of any corporeal form, as are the movements of heavy and of light objects, because the movement would have to cease when it arrived at some definite place, as happens in the case of heavy and of light objects. This is clearly false. Therefore, the only remaining alternative is that heavenly bodies have spiritual substances united to themselves.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, everything that, while existing in a particular condition, is naturally moved, cannot be at rest while existing in that same condition, save in a violent fashion; an example of this is a heavy or a light body that exists outside its own place. But if the movement of the heavens comes from a natural form, they must be naturally moved while existing in any place whatever; therefore, in whatever place it be said that they are at rest, they will not be at rest except through violence. Now, nothing violent can go on forever. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.3, 286a17–18.) Therefore, the heavens are not forever at rest after the day of judgment as we assert according to faith. Since, therefore, this is incongruous, it would seem necessary to say that the heavens are moved by a voluntary movement. And so, it follows that the heavens are animate.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, in any genus that which exists of itself is prior to that which exists through something else. But the heavens are primary in the genus of movable things. Therefore, they are moved of themselves, as self-moving movers. Now, every self-moving mover is divided into two parts, one of which is that which does the moving through appetite, as, for example, the soul, and the other that which is the moved, as, for example, the body. Consequently, a heavenly body is animate.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, nothing which is moved by an entirely extrinsic mover has a natural movement. Since, therefore, the movement of the heavens comes from a spiritual substance—because, according to Augustine in On the Trinity 3, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 4, para. 9 (PL 42:873; CCSL 50:135–36).) God manages corporeal substance through spiritual substance—if that substance were not united to it, but were entirely extrinsic, the movement of the heavens would not be natural. This contradicts the Philosopher in On the Heavens 1. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.2, 268b14–16; cf. Physics 2.1, 192b21–23.)

Obj. 8: Furthermore, that spiritual substance which moves the heavens, if it were merely extrinsic, could not be said to move the heavens only by willing, because in that case its willing would be its acting, which is characteristic of God alone. Accordingly, it would be necessary to impart something in order to produce motion. In that case, since its power is limited, it would follow that fatigue would come upon it in its moving over a long course of time. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.1, 284a16–18.) This is incongruous, and particularly so according to those who assert the eternity of movement. Therefore, the spiritual substance which moves the heavens is united thereto.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, as is held in Physics 8, (Aristotle, Physics 8.6, 259b28–31; 8.5; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, bk. 8, lect. 13, n. 1082.) the movers of the lower spheres are moved accidentally, but the mover of the higher sphere is not. But the mover of a higher sphere is united to its own sphere as mover. Therefore, the movers of the lower spheres are united to them not only as movers but as forms; thus, the lower spheres at least are animate.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, as the Commentator says in Metaphysics 11, (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, bk. 11, comm. 48.) the separated substances are in the best disposition in which they can possibly be, and this means that each one of them moves a heavenly body both as an agent and as an end. Now, this could not be the case unless they were somehow united to them. Therefore, incorporeal substances are united to the heavenly bodies; thus, the heavenly bodies would seem to be animate.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, the Commentator, in the same book, (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, bk. 11, comm. 25.) expressly says that the heavenly bodies are animate.

Obj. 12: Furthermore, nothing acts outside its own species; for an effect cannot be more powerful than its cause. Now, living substance is better than non-living substance, as Augustine says in On True Religion. (Augustine, On True Religion, bk. 1, ch. 29, para. 52; ch. 55, para. 109 (PL 34:145, 170; CCSL 32:221; CSEL 77:38).) Since, therefore, heavenly bodies cause life, especially in the case of animals generated from putrefaction, it would seem that the heavenly bodies live and are animate. (Cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Power of God, q. 6, a. 6, obj. 10.)

Obj. 13: Furthermore, the Commentator says in his book On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere that circular movement is proper to the soul. (Averroes, On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere, ch. 2.) Therefore, those bodies especially seem to be animate for which it is natural to be moved in a circular fashion. Such are the heavenly bodies. Therefore, the heavenly bodies are animate.

Obj. 14: Furthermore, to praise, to show forth, and to rejoice are proper only to an animate and knowing thing. But the aforesaid actions are attributed to the heavens in Holy Scripture: praise him, you highest heavens (Ps 148:4); the heavens are telling the glory of God (Ps 19:1 [18:2]); rejoice over her, O heaven (Rev 18:20). Therefore the heavens are animate. (Cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Soul, q. 8, obj. 19, ad 19.)

On the contrary (1), there is what Damascene says in On the Orthodox Faith 2, let no one think that the heavens or the stars are animate, for they are inanimate and insensible. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 6 (PG 94:886).)

Furthermore (2), a soul united to a body is not separated from it save by death. But the heavenly bodies cannot be mortal, since they are incorruptible. Therefore, if some spiritual substance be united to them as souls, they will be perpetually bound to them; and this seems incongruous, that some angels should be perpetually assigned to some bodies.

Furthermore (3), the heavenly society of the blessed consists of angels and of souls. But the souls of the heavens, if the heavens are animate, are included in neither division. Therefore, there would be some rational creatures which cannot be participants in beatitude; and this seems incongruous.

Furthermore (4), every rational creature, considered according to its own nature, is able to sin. If, then, some rational creatures are united to heavenly bodies, there would be nothing against some one of them having sinned; thus, it would follow that some one of the heavenly bodies is moved by an evil spirit, which seems absurd.

Furthermore (5), we ought to implore the intercession of the good spirits. If, then, some spirits are united to heavenly bodies, since it is not fitting to assert that they are evil, but it should be asserted that they are good, seeing that they assist God in the management of corporeal nature, it would follow that their intercession ought to be implored. But it would seem absurd if anyone were to say, “O sun,” or, “O moon, pray for me.” It should, therefore, not be asserted that some spirits are united to heavenly bodies.

Furthermore (6), a soul holds together the body to which it is united, according to the Philosopher in On the Soul 1. (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.5, 411b6–9; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 1, lect. 14, n. 206.) If, then, heavenly bodies are animate, it would follow that some created spiritual substance holds together the whole heavens. This is absurd, since this is characteristic of Uncreated Wisdom alone, in whose person it is said in Sirach 24:5, alone I have made the circuit of the vault of heaven.

I answer that concerning this question there have been different opinions, both among the ancient philosophers and also among the doctors of the Church. (Cf. Basil the Great, Homilies on the Six Days, homily 3 (PG 29:76).) Anaxagoras, however, thought that the heavenly bodies were inanimate; hence, he was killed by the Athenians, for he said, the sun is a stone on fire. (Cf. Augustine, City of God, bk. 18, ch. 41, para. 2 (PL 41:601; CSEL 40.2:332; CCSL 48:636).) But Plato and Aristotle and their followers asserted that the heavenly bodies are animate. (Cf. Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, bk. 1, ch. 14; Boethius, Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagogue, bk. 2, ch. 5 (PL 64:93A; CSEL 48:184); bk. 3, ch. 4 (PL 64:123B; CSEL 48:257); bk. 4, ch. 7 (PL 64:124B; CSEL 48:259); Augustine, City of God, bk. 13, ch. 16, para. 2 (PL 41:388; CSEL 40.1:635: CCSL 48:397–98); Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.2, 285a29–30; 2.12, 292a18–21.) Likewise also, among the doctors of the Church, Origen asserted that the heavenly bodies are animate. (Origen, On First Principles, bk. 1, ch. 7 (PG 11:173A).) And Jerome followed him, as is clear from a certain Gloss on Ecclesiastes 1:6: the spirit goes forward surveying all in its circuits. (Glossa ordinaria, in Bibliorum Sacrorum cum Glossa ordinaria iam ante quidem a Strabo Fulgensi, collecta: nunc autem novis patrum, cum Graecorum, tum Latinorum expositionibus locupletata cum postilla Nicolai Lyrani (Venice: 1603), vol. 3, pp. 1751–52, at Ecclesiastes 1:6 (PL 113:1117); Jerome, Commentary on Ecclesiastes, at 1:6 (PL 23:1016C–17A; CCSL 72:255); Alcuin, Commentary on Ecclesiastes, at 1:6 (PL 100:672C).) However, Damascene affirms that heavenly bodies are inanimate, as is clear from the passage quoted above. (Above: sed contra.) But Augustine leaves the question doubtful in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2 (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 18, para. 38 (PL 34:279–80; CSEL 28.1:62).) and in his Handbook on Faith, Hope, and Charity. (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 15, para. 58 (PL 40:260; CCSL 46:88); cf. ST I.70.3, resp.)

Both opinions, however, have the account of probability. (Cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Soul, q. 8, ad 3; Quodlibet XII, q. 5, a. 2, resp.; Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 5, a. 9, ad 14; SCG II.70, 90.) For the consideration of the nobility of the heavenly bodies leads to asserting that they are animate, since in the genus of “things,” living things are preferred to all non-living things. But the consideration of the nobility of spiritual substances leads us to the contrary view. For higher spiritual substances cannot have any of the activities of the soul except those which pertain to the intellect, since the other activities of life are the acts of the soul insofar as it is the form of a corruptible and changeable body. For these activities take place along with a certain change and corporeal alteration. Nor does the intellect of higher substances seem to need to get knowledge from sensible things, as our intellect does. If, therefore, none of the activities of life are in them except understanding and willing, which do not need a corporeal organ, their dignity would seem to exceed union with a body. Of these two considerations, however, the second is more effective than the first. For the union of soul and body does not take place for the sake of the body, namely, that the body may be ennobled, but for the sake of the soul, which needs the body for its own perfection, as was said above. (Above: a. 2, obj. 5; cf. ST I.70.3, resp.)

Now, if one studies the matter more closely, he will perhaps find that there is either little or no discrepancy between these two opinions; and this is to be understood as follows. For it cannot be said that the movement of a heavenly body is a consequence of some corporeal form, as movement upwards is a consequence of the form “fire.” (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 4.8, 214b14.) For it is obvious that a single natural form tends toward but one thing.

Now, the account of movement is at variance with oneness, because it is of the essence of movement that a thing should be otherwise in the present and at a previous time. Hence, a natural form does not tend toward movement for the sake of the movement itself but for the sake of being in some place, and when this has been reached, the movement ceases. This is what would happen in the case of the movement of the heavens if it were a consequence of some natural form.

One should say then that the movement of the heavens comes from some intelligent substance. For the end of this movement can only be a certain abstract intelligible good, for the sake of which the intelligent substance which moves the heavens does its moving, namely, in order that it may take on a likeness of that good in its working and in order that what is virtually contained in that intelligible good may be made explicit in act, especially the filling up of the number of the elect, for whose sake all other things seem to exist.

Thus, then, there will be two orders of spiritual substances. Some of these will be movers of the heavenly bodies and are united to them as movers are to movable things, as Augustine also says in On the Trinity 3 (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 4, para. 9 (PL 42:873; CCSL 50:135–36).) that all bodies are ruled by God through the rational spirit of life; and the same view is held by Gregory in Dialogues 4. (Gregory the Great (ca. 540–604 AD), Dialogues, bk. 4, ch. 6 (PL 77:329B).) But some substances will be ends of these movements, and these are wholly abstracted and not united to bodies. But others are united to heavenly bodies in the way in which a mover is united to a mobile thing. This seems to suffice for preserving the meaning of Plato and of Aristotle. With respect to Plato, this point is obvious. For Plato, as has been said above, did not say that even the human body is animate in any other sense except insofar as the soul is united to the body as a mover. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 413a9; Aquinas, In II Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, ad 3; SCG II.57.) But from the statements of Aristotle it is obvious that he did not assert in the heavenly bodies any of the virtues of the soul save the intellectual. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 3.13, 434b3–8.) But the intellect according to him is not the act of any body. (Below: a. 9, ad 8.) Now, to say further that heavenly bodies are animate in this way, like lower bodies which grow and sense through a soul, is contrary to the incorruptibility of the heavenly bodies. Thus, then, it must be denied that heavenly bodies are animate in the way in which lower bodies are animate. But it must not be denied that the heavenly bodies are animate, if by animation nothing else is meant than the union of a mover to a mobile thing. Augustine seems to touch on these two ways in On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2; for he says, it is usually asked whether the stars of the heavens are those conspicuous bodies alone, or whether they have certain ruling spirits of their own; and if they have, whether they are also vitally inspired by them, as bodies are animated by the souls of animals. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 2, ch. 18, para. 38 (PL 34:279–80; CSEL 28.1:62).) But although he himself leaves both suppositions doubtful, as is clear from what follows, it must be said according to the above considerations that they have ruling spirits, by which, nevertheless, they are not animated in the same fashion as lower animals are animated by their souls.

Reply Obj. 1: A heavenly body borders on spiritual substances, insofar as a lower order of spiritual substances is united to the heavenly bodies after the manner of a mover.

Reply Obj. 2: According to Averroes’s view, the heavens are composed of matter and form, just as an animal is among lower beings. (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, bk. 1, comm. 24, 92; bk. 2, comm. 22.) But “matter” is, nevertheless, used equivocally in both instances. For in higher things it is not a potency toward actual being as in lower things, but only toward place. Hence, an actually existing body is itself matter, and does not need a form to give it actual being, since it is actually a being, but only to give it motion. And so, a heavenly body has a more noble form than a human body, but in another way. If, however, it be said, as others say, that a heavenly body is itself composed of matter and corporeal form, then one will still be able to say that that corporeal form will be the most noble, inasmuch as it is a form and an act which fulfils the whole potentiality of matter, so that there does not remain in it a potentiality to another form.

Reply Obj. 3: Through this the solution to the third is also clear.

Reply Obj. 4: From the fact that a heavenly body is moved by a spiritual substance, it follows that it has an inclination toward the substance itself as toward a mover, and not otherwise.

Reply Obj. 5–6: And the same thing must be said as to the fifth and the sixth.

Reply Obj. 7: A spiritual substance which moves the heavens has a natural power which is determined with respect to the movement of such a body; likewise, the body of the heavens has a natural aptitude for being moved by such a movement. And on this account, the movement of the heavens is natural, although it comes from an intelligent substance.

Reply Obj. 8: There is probability in the statement that a spiritual substance moves a heavenly body by a command of the will. For although in regard to a change of form corporeal matter does not obey a created spirit according to the will of the latter, but obeys only God, as Augustine says in On the Trinity 3, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 8, para. 13 (PL 42:875; CCSL 30:139).) yet the fact that it can obey such a spirit according to its will in regard to a change of place is evident even in the case of ourselves, in whom, immediately after a command of the will, there follows a movement of our bodily members.

If, nevertheless, over and above a command of the will there should be added also the influence of some power, there is not on this account any fatigue that follows from the limited character of the power. For every power of a higher order, although it is limited in itself and in relation to something higher than itself, is, nevertheless, unlimited in relation to its own inferiors, as, for instance, the power of the sun also is unlimited in relation to things capable of generation and corruption, and through the production of these things, even if it were to go on forever, it would not be lessened. Similarly, the virtue of the intellect is unlimited in relation to sensible forms. And so too the power of a spiritual substance which moves the heavens is unlimited in relation to corporeal movement; hence, fatigue in it does not follow.

Reply Obj. 9: The soul which moves corruptible animals is united to them in respect of their actual being, but the spiritual substance which moves the heavenly bodies is united to them merely in respect of their being moved. Hence, being moved accidentally is attributed to the soul of a corruptible animal by reason of its very self. For when the body with which it is one in being is moved, it must itself be moved accidentally. But being moved accidentally is attributed to the mover of a lower sphere, not by reason of its very self, but by reason of the mobile thing, insofar, that is, as the lower sphere is moved accidentally, as having been brought downward by the movement of the higher sphere. But the mover of a higher sphere is not moved accidentally in either way, because its sphere is not brought downward but brings others downward.

Reply Obj. 10: On this point, we find that Averroes has expressed different views. For in the book On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere, (Averroes, On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere, ch. 1.) he said that what moves the heavenly bodies as agent and as end is one and the same. This is surely quite erroneous, particularly in relation to the view whereby he asserts that the first cause is not above the substances that move the first heaven. For on this view, it follows that God is the soul of the first heaven, inasmuch as the substance which moves the first heaven as agent is called its soul.

The argument on which he made this statement is very inadequate. For because in the case of substances separated from matter the thing that understands and the thing that is understood are the same, he thought that the thing which desires and the thing which is desired are the same; and there is no parallel here. For knowledge of anything whatever takes place according as the thing known is in the knower, but desire takes place by way of a turning of the desirer toward the thing desired.

Now, if the good desired were present in the desirer of its very self, it would not be proper to it to do any moving toward the attainment of the desired good. Hence, one should say that the desired good, which moves as an end, is something other than the desirer, which moves as an agent. This, too, is the very same statement which the Commentator makes in Metaphysics 11; (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, bk. 11, comm. 36–38, 41, 44.) for there he asserts two movers: one conjoined, which he calls the soul, and the other separated, which moves as an end. Nevertheless, from all this we get nothing more than the fact that a spiritual substance is united to a heavenly body as its mover.

Reply Obj. 11: He says heavenly bodies are animate because spiritual substances are united to them as movers, and not as forms. Hence, in Metaphysics 7, he says that the formative power of semen does not act save through the heat which is in the semen, not in the sense of being a form in it, like the soul in natural heat, but in the sense of being enclosed there, as a soul is enclosed in heavenly bodies. (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, bk. 7, comm. 31.)

Reply Obj. 12: A heavenly body, inasmuch as it is moved by a spiritual substance, is its instrument. And so, it does its moving in virtue of a spiritual substance to produce life in those lower bodies, just as a saw acts in virtue of an art to make a box.

Reply Obj. 13: From this reasoning nothing more can be gathered than that the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual substances.

Reply Obj. 14: According to Damascene, the heavens are said to show forth the glory of God, to praise, or to rejoice, in a material sense, insofar as they are, for men, the matter of praising or showing forth or rejoicing. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 6 (PG 94:886).) For similar sayings are found in the Scriptures about mountains, hills, and other inanimate creatures.

Reply Sed Contra 1: Damascene denies that the heavenly bodies are animate in the sense that spiritual substances are united to them as forms, as to corruptible living things. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 6 (PG 94:886).)

Reply Sed Contra 2: One angel is assigned to the guardianship of one man for as long as he lives; hence, there is no incongruity if one angel is assigned to move a heavenly body for as long as it is moved.

Reply Sed Contra 3: If heavenly bodies are animate, the spirits presiding over them are counted among the company of the angels. Hence, Augustine says, in his Handbook on Faith, Hope, and Charity, nor do I know for certain whether the sun, the moon, and all the stars belong to the company of the angels; although to some they may seem to be luminous bodies, not having sense or intelligence. (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, bk. 1, ch. 15, para. 58 (PL 40:260; CCSL 46:81).)

Reply Sed Contra 4: On this point there is no doubt, if we follow the opinion of Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 4 (PG 94:873–75).) who asserts that the angels who sinned belonged to the number of those who are set over corruptible bodies. But if, according to Gregory’s belief, (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, bk. 2, homily 34 (PL 76:1250; CCSL 141).) some of the higher also sinned, it must be said that God preserved from a fall those whom he appointed to this service, as he did many of the others also.

Reply Sed Contra 5: We do not say: “O sun, pray for me,” both because a spiritual substance is not united to the body of the heavens as a form but merely as a mover, and also to remove all occasion of idolatry.

Reply Sed Contra 6: According to the Philosopher in Physics 4, (Aristotle, Physics 8.10, 267b6–9; see above: a. 4, obj. 10.) the mover of the heavens is in some part of them, and not in the whole; and so, it does not compass the circuit of heaven. But it is otherwise with the soul, which gives being to the body as a whole and in its parts.