Chapter 2

Now we should consider what opinion the other Peripatetics held on this same subject. Let us, then, first note the words of Themistius in his Commentary on De anima (ed. Barbari, Bk. III, chap. 23): The intellect which we say is in potentia (the possible intellect) is more connatural to the soul, indeed, than is the active. I do not say to the soul in general, but to the human soul alone. Now, just as light makes things potential in vision, and at its coming, endowing these potential objects with colors, causes both sight and colors to be in act, but the same intellect also makes objects that are potentially intelligible to be actually intelligible. And a little later he explains: The operative intellect holds the same relation to that intellect which is in potency as does art to matter. On this account also, understanding is immediate with us whenever we wish. For art is not the possession of the inferior matter, but it exists within the total intellect, which is factive. Thus, if a builder in wood did not exist extrinsic to the wood, his power would penetrate it throughout. So, in fact, it is with the active intellect: supervening the intellect which is potential, it makes one intellect with it.

Shortly afterward he continues: We, therefore, are like that which is in potency; but intellect, like that which is in act. So indeed, as in all things composed of potency and act, this thing will be one thing and that which belongs to it will be another; so I will be one thing, and the existence which is mine will be another. Consequently the intellect is likewise a composite of what is potential and what is active. My existence is from what is in act: since those things which I think of and which I write, the intellect, composed of potency and act, writes. It writes, however, not inasmuch as it is in potency, but as it is active: for thus is operation derived from it. And a little later he says more clearly: An animal, therefore, is one thing, and the existence of an animal is another. The existence of the animal is from the soul of the animal. So also what I am is one thing, and my existence is another. However, my existence is from the soul; yet it is maintained, not from all the soul. For it is not from the sensitive soul, since that was matter for the imagination; nor again, from the imagination; nor again, from the imaginative soul, for that was matter for the potential intellect; nor from the possible intellect, for that was matter for the active intellect. Therefore, from the active intellect alone do I possess my existence. Again, shortly afterward, he adds: And nature, having progressed to this point of perfection ceases.…And so we are active intellect.

Afterward also, rejecting the opinion of certain philosophers, he says that: When, indeed, Aristotle replied that in every nature there is that which is as matter, and that which moves or perfects the matter, he necessarily says that in the soul also these differences exist: what is made to exist as this particular kind of intellect in the soul, and what makes it such in the soul. For he says in the soul there is such an active intellect, and that of the human soul this is the worthiest, most exalted part. . . . From these same words it is proper to confirm that Aristotle thought the active intellect was something which belonged to us, or even was our very selves.

From the foregoing words of Themistius it is therefore evident that he says not only the possible intellect, but also the active intellect are parts of the human soul, and that Aristotle thought this; and moreover, that man is what he is, not by reason of the sensitive soul, as some have falsely said, but by reason of the intellective and more principal part of his soul.

I myself have not seen the books of Theophrastus. But Themistius introduces his words in the Commentary on De anima, quoting him as follows: It is better, however, to set forth the statements of Theophrastus regarding the possible intellect, and that which is active. In regard to the possible intellect, he says: “In what way is the intellect something ‘from without’ and in what way superimposed, yet connatural? And because nature of itself maintains a certain natural kind of existence, namely, that of act and potency in all things, it will completes this same order in higher beings. But it must not be understood that the possible intellect is nothing of itself—for this opinion must be disputed—but that it is a kind of potency, just as in material things. And the active intellect, that from without, must be considered not as an object, but as comprising generation itself.”

Theophrastus asked two questions:

first, how the active intellect is extrinsic to us and yet connatural;

secondly, what is the nature of the possible intellect. He answers the second question by saying that the possible intellect is in potency to all things, not as though it were not existent, but as the senses are in potency to sensible objects. From this he infers the answer to the first question, by saying that the active intellect should not be thought of as extrinsic to the soul, as something added to it accidentally, or as preceding it in time, but as existing from the beginning of generation and as embracing and comprising human nature.

That Alexander also held that the possible intellect is the form of the body, even Averroes admits, although I think he wrongly interprets the words of Alexander, just as he assumed too much from what Themistius said. For Averroes says that Alexander taught that the possible intellect is nothing else than a capacity or readiness which is in human nature for the active intellect and for intelligible objects. This readiness or aptitude he regarded as no thing other than the possible intellect which is in the soul, as related to intelligible objects. Hence he said it was not a power in the body, since this power had no corporeal organ and not as Averroes falsely claimed, because he thought no readiness or apt potency was a bodily power.

Furthermore, that we may pass from the Greeks to the Arabian philosophers, we note, in the first place, that Avicenna evidently considered the intellect a power of the soul, which is the form of the body; for thus he speaks in his book, De anima: "The active intellect, that is, the practical intellect, requires the body and the corporeal powers for all its actions. The contemplative intellect also needs the body and its faculties, but not at all times and in every way; for It is sufficient for itself, through itself. "Moreover, the soul is none of these powers, but it is that which possesses them and, as we will show later, is a solitary substance, per se, which has an aptitude for various actions, some of which are not accomplished or in any way possible except through instruments and through use of them; but others of them have no need of such instruments.

Further, in the First Part, he says: "The human soul is the first perfection of the natural, instrumental body, since to it is attributed the power of deliberate, elective action and, by means of reflection, of arriving at an apprehension of universal ideas." But what he afterward states and proves to be true is: "The human soul also, according as it is proper to it in itself—namely, according to its power of intellect alone—is not related to the body as a form (which is limited to the body) and does not require any organ to be prepared for itself."

In addition, the statement of Algazel may be cited, for he says: "When the mingling of elements has been so well and so perfectly equalized that none fairer or more perfect can be found, then it is apt to receive from the Creator the form of forms, more beautiful than all others, that is, the human soul." But in this soul are two powers: the one is operative, the other is knowing; and this latter he calls the intellect, as is evident in succeeding passages. And afterward by many arguments he proves that the operation of the intellect does not take place through any bodily organ.

This, however, we may omit, not wishing, as it were, merely by the authority of these philosophers to combat the error previously stated, but desiring only to show that not only the Latin philosophers—whose words certain of our opponents do not relish—but both the Greeks and the Arabs held this opinion: namely, that the intellect is a part or power or virtue of the soul, which is the form of the body. Therefore, I wonder from which of the Peripatetics any may boastfully claim to have derived this error; unless, perhaps, it is because those holding it prefer less to be true in their thinking in company with the other Peripatetics, than to err in company with Averroes, who was not so much a Peripatetic as a corrupter of Peripatetic philosophy.