Article 7 — Whether the children who were born of Adam in the state of innocence had full knowledge of all things, as Adam did

Seventh, it is asked whether (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 20, ch. 5.) the children who were born of Adam in the state of innocence have had full knowledge of all things, as Adam did? (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 23, q. 2, a. 2; ST I.101.1.)

Obj. 1: It seems that they would, for according to Anselm, (Anselm, On the Virginal Conception, cc. 10, 22–23 (PL 158:456).) Adam would have begotten sons such as he himself was. But Adam had full knowledge of all natural things, as has been said. (Above: a. 4.) Therefore, his sons, too, would have had that knowledge immediately at birth.

Obj. 2: As the affections are perfected by virtue, so the understanding is perfected by knowledge. But the sons born of Adam, in the state of innocence, would have had the fullness of all the virtues immediately at birth. For he would have passed original justice on to them, as Anselm says. (Anselm, On the Virginal Conception, cc. 10, 22–23 (PL 158:456).) Therefore, they would likewise have had all knowledge.

Obj. 3: According to Bede, (Although this sentence is generally attributed to Bede, the editors of the 1970 Leonine edition were not able to find its source.) weakness, concupiscence, ignorance, and malice result from sin. But there would have been no wickedness, weakness, or concupiscence in those children immediately at birth. Therefore, there would not have been any ignorance either; hence, they would have had all knowledge.

Obj. 4: It would have been more fitting for them to be born perfect in soul than in body. But they would have been born without any bodily defect. Therefore, there would likewise have been no ignorance in their souls.

Obj. 5: According to Damascene, man in the state of innocence was as another angel. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 11 (PG 94:916C).) But, immediately upon their creation, the angels had knowledge of all natural things. Therefore, for the same reason, men in the state of innocence had it, also.

Obj. 6: Adam’s soul and the souls of his sons had the same nature. But in its very beginning Adam’s soul was created full of all natural knowledge, as has been said. (Above: a. 4.) Therefore, the souls of his sons would have been created with the same fullness of knowledge.

Obj. 7: Greater perfection of knowledge belongs to man than to the other animals. But, immediately at birth, the other animals have natural [instinctive] judgment of what is helpful and what is harmful. Thus, a newborn lamb flees from the wolf and follows its mother. (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 20, ch. 4.) Therefore, children in the state of innocence with much greater reason would have had perfect knowledge.

On the contrary (1), Hugh of St. Victor says (Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments, bk. 1, part 6, ch. 26 (PL 176:279).) that they would not have been born with perfect knowledge, but would have reached it in the course of time.

Furthermore (2), since the soul is the perfection of the body, its development must be proportionate to that of the body. But in the state of innocence Adam’s children would not have had full bodily stature as Adam did when he was first created. (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 20, ch. 4.) Therefore, for the same reason they would not have had the fullness of knowledge as Adam had.

Furthermore (3), sons receive existence, nature, and instruction from their father. (Aristotle, Ethics 8.11, 1161a16; cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 2, ad 9.) But, if Adam’s sons had had full knowledge as soon as they were born, they would not have been able to receive instruction from him. Therefore, the full relationship of paternity would have not been preserved between them and the first parent.

I answer that on this question, there have been two opinions. For, some have said (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 20, cc. 4–5.) that children in the state of innocence would have been perfect, just as Adam, with reference to everything belonging to the soul, that is, as regards both virtues and knowledge. They would not, however, have been perfect as regards the body. This was due to the exigencies of their mother’s womb, for they had to be born. Others, (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 20, ch. 5; Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, bk. 2, part 1, inq. 4, tract. 3, q. 2, ch. 2, n. 502, 2:718; Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 20, dubia 5–6.) however, following Hugh, (Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments, bk. 1, part 6, ch. 26 (PL 176:278–279).) say that, just as they would not immediately have received perfect stature of body, but in time would have reached it, so, too, they would in time have reached perfect knowledge.

However, in order to know which of these opinions contains more truth, we must remember that the same reasons do not hold for Adam and for his sons immediately upon birth. For, since Adam (See above: a. 4.) was ordained to be the source of the whole human race, as soon as he was created he had to have not only what belonged to the beginning of natural perfection but also that which belonged to its term. But his sons, who were not constituted the source of the human race, but as having existence from its source, did not have to be set at the term of natural perfection. It was enough for them to have at birth only as much as the initial state of natural perfection demands. However, according to two opinions, the initial stage of the natural perfection of knowledge is placed at different levels. For some, as the Platonists, (Cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, bk. 1, ch. 24, nn. 57–59; Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 12, ch. 15 (PL 42:1011); On the Size of the Soul, ch. 20 (PL 32:1055); Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, bk. 1, ch. 12, nn. 6–10; Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, ch. 2 (PG 40:552); Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 3, verse 11 (PL 63:777A).) have held that the soul comes to the body filled with all the sciences, but it is clouded over by the body and thus its capacity for free use of the knowledge which it has is inhibited except with reference to some universals. But afterwards, through the exercise of study and of the senses, these obstacles are removed, so that it can use its knowledge freely. Thus, they say that learning is the same as remembering. But, if this opinion were true, we would have to say that in the state of innocence, as soon as children were born, they would have had knowledge of all things because the body in that state of innocence was altogether subject to the soul, and, so, the weight of the body would not have been able so to oppress the soul that it would lose its perfection in any way.

But this opinion seems to proceed from the position that the nature of the angels and of the soul is the same, so that the soul would have full knowledge as soon as it is created, (Book of Causes, prop. 10 (9).) just as an intelligence is said to be created full of forms. For this reason, the Platonists said (Cf. Plato, Timaeus 41a–42b; Macrobius, Commentary on the Dream of Scipio, bk. 1, ch. 11, nn. 11–12; ch. 12; Albert the Great, Summa de homine, q. 5, a. 3.) that souls existed before being united to bodies and, after leaving bodies, return as intelligences to stars of rank equal to theirs. But this opinion is out of harmony with Catholic truth. (Aquinas, SCG, II.83.) Therefore, others (Averroes, On the Soul, bk. 3, comm. 5 and 17.) according to the opinion of Aristotle say that human understanding is last in the order of intelligible things, just as first matter is last in the order of sensible things. And as matter, considered in its essence, has no form, so the human understanding, in the beginning, is like a tablet, on which nothing is written, (Cf. Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429b31.) but, later, acquires knowledge through the senses by virtue of the agent intellect. Thus, the beginning of natural human knowledge is, indeed, to be in potency to all things knowable, but to know from the beginning only those things which are known immediately through the light of the agent intellect, that is to say, universal first principles. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.7, 72b23.) Hence, it was not necessary for Adam’s sons to have knowledge of all things immediately at birth, but they would have reached it as they advanced in age. Nevertheless, it is necessary to ascribe to them some perfect knowledge, namely, the knowledge of things which must be chosen or avoided, a knowledge which pertains to prudence. For, as is proved in the Ethics, (Aristotle, Ethics 6.11, 1144b32; 6.12, 1144a6; 6.13, 1144b1.) without prudence the other virtues cannot exist. And Adam’s children must have had these virtues because of original justice. To me this opinion seems to contain more truth, if we look to what was required by the integrity of nature. But, if by divine grace anything else had been given them beyond that which integrity of nature required, this could not be asserted, since there is no express authority for it.

Reply Obj. 1: Adam would have begotten sons like himself in those things which were due to him by his specific nature. But it was not necessary for his sons to be born like him in those things which were due to him as the source of the whole human race.

Reply Obj. 2: For the perfect union with God, which the state of innocence demands, all the virtues are needed, but not all the sciences.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the children would not have all knowledge as soon as they were born, they would not have had the ignorance which follows from sin, which is a lack of knowledge of things which ought to be known. For they would have been ignorant of those things which their state did not require them to know.

Reply Obj. 4: In the bodies of these children there would have been no defect by which they would be deprived of a good which then was their due. Nevertheless, their bodies did lack a good which would accrue to them later, such as fullness of stature and the gifts of glory. The same must be said of the soul.

Reply Obj. 5: Angels are on a higher level of nature than souls, although souls can be equal to them in the gifts of grace. Consequently, it is not necessary to concede to the soul as something natural that which is naturally due to angels. However, in the state of innocence, man is said to be as another angel because of the fullness of grace.

Reply Obj. 6: Although the soul of Adam and the souls of his sons had the same nature, they did not have the same office. For Adam’s soul was made a source from which all teaching would come to posterity. Therefore, it had to be perfect immediately, which was not necessary for the souls of his children.

Reply Obj. 7: At the beginning, brute animals receive natural [instinctive] judgment in order to know what is harmful and what is helpful, because they cannot reach this through their own investigation. Man, however, can reach this and many other things through the investigation of reason. Hence, it is not necessary for all knowledge to exist in him naturally. Nevertheless, the knowledge of practical matters, which pertains to prudence, is more natural to man than the knowledge of speculative matters. For this reason we find that some are naturally prudent but do not naturally possess learning, as is said in the Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 6.9, 1143b6.) For this reason men do not forget prudence as easily as they forget science. Therefore, at that time the children would have been more perfect in the matters which pertain to prudence than in those which pertain to speculative science, as has been said.