Article 6 — Whether there are ideas in God of those things that do not exist, will not exist, and have not existed

Sixth, it is asked whether there are ideas in God of those things which do not exist, will not exist, and have not existed? (Parallel texts: ST I.15.3, ad 2; above, q. 2, a. 8, ad 3.)

Obj. 1: It seems not, for nothing has an idea in God unless it has a determined act of existence. But that which does not exist, never has existed, and never will exist has no determinate act of existence at all. Therefore, neither does it have an idea in God.

Obj. 2: But it was said that, even though it does not have a determinate act of existence in itself, it has, nevertheless, such a determinate act in God.

On the contrary, a thing is determinate in so far as it is distinguished from another. But all things as they exist in God are one and are not distinct from each other. Therefore, even in God it does not have a determinate act of existence.

Obj. 3: According to Dionysius, exemplars are those good acts of the divine will which cause and predetermine things. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, para. 8 (PG 3:824C).) But the things which are not, have not been, nor will be were never predetermined by the divine will. Therefore, they do not have an idea or exemplar in God.

Obj. 4: An idea is ordained to the production of a thing. If there is, therefore, an idea of something which will never be given existence, it seems that such an idea is useless. But this would be absurd. Therefore.

On the contrary (1), God knows things by means of ideas. But as we said above, (Above: q. 2, a. 8.) he knows those things which are not, have not been, nor will be. Therefore, there is an idea in God of all that does not exist, has not existed and never will exist.

Furthermore (2), A cause does not depend on its effect. Now, an idea is a cause of the existence of things. Therefore, it does not depend in any way on their existence. Consequently, there can be ideas of those things which do not exist, have not existed, and never will exist.

I answer that properly speaking, an idea belongs to practical knowledge that is not only actually but also habitually practical. Therefore, since God has virtually practical knowledge of those things which he could make, even though he never makes them or never will make them, there must be ideas of those things which are not, have not been, nor will be. But these ideas will not be the same as those of the things which are, have been, or will be, because the divine will determines to pro duce the things that are, have been, and will be, but not to produce those which neither are, have been, nor will be. The latter, therefore have, in a certain sense, indeterminate ideas.

Reply Obj. 1: Even though that which never existed, does not exist, and will no exist lacks a determined act of existence in itself, it exists determinately in God’s knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2: It is one thing to be in God, another to be in his knowledge. Evil is not in God; it is, however, contained in his knowledge. Now, a thing is said to be in God’s knowledge if God knows it; and because God knows all things distinctly, as we said in the previous question, things are distinct in his knowledge even though in him they are one.

Reply Obj. 3: Even though God may never will to bring into existence things of this class, whose ideas he possesses, he wills that he be able to produce them and that he possess the knowledge necessary for producing them. Consequently, Dionysius is saying that the nature of an exemplar demands, not a will that is predefining and effecting, but merely a will that can define and effect.

Reply Obj. 4: Those ideas are not directed by God’s knowledge to the production of something in their likeness, but rather to this, that something can be produced in their likeness.