Lecture 4 — Creation through Christ

^1:15^ Who is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of every creature: [n. 29]

^1:16^ For in him were all things created in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers. All things were created through him and in him. [n. 36]

^1:17^ And he is before all: and by him all things consist. [n. 44]

29. After Paul recalled for us the universal and special benefits of grace, he now commends the author of this grace, that is, Christ. And he does this,

first, in his relation to God;

second, in relation to all of creation, at the firstborn;

and third, in relation to the Church, at and he is the head (Col 1:18).

30. As to the first, we should note that God is said to be invisible because he exceeds the capacity of vision of any created intellect, so that no created intellect, by its natural knowledge, can attain his essence: behold, God is great, and we know him not (Job 36:26); he dwells in unapproachable light (1 Tim 6:16). And therefore, he is seen by the blessed by means of grace, and not by reason of their natural capacity.

Dionysius gives the reason for this: all knowledge terminates at something which exists, that is, at some nature that participates in the act of existence; but God is the very act of existence, not participating in the act of existence, but participated in; and thus he is not known. It is of this invisible God that the Son is the image.

31. Let us now see in what way the Son is called the image of God, and why he is said to be invisible.

The notion of an image includes three things. First, an image must be a likeness; second, it must be derived or drawn from the thing of which it is a likeness; and third, it must be derived with respect to something that pertains to the species or to a sign of the species. For if two things are alike, but neither is derived from the other, then neither one is the image of the other; thus one egg is not said to be the image of another. And so something is called an image because it imitates.

Further, if there is a likeness between two things, but not according to species or a sign of the species, we do not speak of an image. Thus, a man has many accidents, such as color, size and so on; but they are not the reason for calling something an image of a man. But if something has the shape or figure of a man, then it can be called an image, because this shape is a sign of the species. Now the Son is like the Father, and the Father is like the Son. But because the Son has this likeness from the Father, and not the Father from the Son, we, properly speaking, say that the Son is the image of the Father, and not conversely: for this likeness is drawn and derived from the Father.

Further, this likeness is according to species, because in divine matters the Son is somehow, although faintly, represented by our mental word. We have a mental word when we actually conceive the form of the thing of which we have knowledge; and then we signify this mental word by an external word. And this mental word we have conceived is a certain likeness, in our mind, of the thing, and it is like it in species. And so the Word of God is called the image of God.

32. As to our second question, we should note that the Arians misunderstood the text: for they thought about the image of God as they did of the images they made of their ancestors, so they could see in these images the loved ones no longer with them (just as we make images of the saints to see in these images those whom we cannot see in reality). And so they said that to be invisible was unique to the Father, and that the first visible reality was the Son, who manifested the goodness of the Father. They were saying that the Father was truly invisible, but the Son was visible, and thus their natures would be different. But the Apostle refutes this when he says: he reflects the glory of God and bears the very stamp of his nature, upholding the universe by his word of power (Heb 1:3). And thus the Son is not only the image of the invisible God, but he himself is invisible like the Father: who is the image of the invisible God.

33. Then when he says, the firstborn of every creature, he commends Christ in relation to creatures.

First he does so;

and second, he amplifies it, at for in him.

34. We should note, about the first point, that the Arians understood this to mean that Christ is called the first-born because he is the first creature. But this is not the meaning, as will be clear. So we have to understand two things: how this image is generated, and in what way it is the first-born of creatures.

In regard to the first, we should note that things generate in various ways depending on their nature and manner of existence, for men generate in one way, and plants in another, and so on for other things. But the nature of God is his existence and his act of understanding and so it is necessary that his generating or intellectual conceiving is the generating or conceiving of his nature. (In us, however, our intellectual conceiving is not the conceiving of our nature, because our nature is not the same as our act of understanding). Therefore, since this image is a word and concept of an intellect, it is necessary to say that it is the offspring of the nature, so that the one receiving the nature from the other is generated by necessity.

35. Second, we have to understand in what way the Son is called the first-born. God does not know himself and creatures through two different sources; he knows all things in his own essence, as in the first efficient cause. The Son, however, is the intellectual concept or representation of God insofar as he knows himself, and as a consequence, every creature. Therefore, inasmuch as the Son is begotten, he is seen as a word representing every creature, and he is the principle of every creature. For if he were not begotten in that way, the Word of the Father would be the first-born of the Father only, and not of creatures: I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, the first-born before every creature (Sir 24:5).

36. Then when he says, for in him were all things created, he explains what he has just said, that is, that the Son is the first-born because he was generated as the principle of creatures; and this with respect to three things.

First, with respect to the creation of things;

in the second place, with respect to their distinction, in heaven and on earth;

and third, with respect to their preservation in existence, and by him all things consist.

37. He says that the Son is the firstborn of every creature because he is generated or begotten as the principle of every creature. And so he says, for in him were all things created.

With respect to this, we should note that the Platonists affirmed the existence of Ideas, and said that each thing came to be by participating in an Idea, like the Idea of man, or an Idea of some other kind. Instead of all these we have one, that is, the Son, the Word of God. For an artisan makes an artifact by making it participate in the form he has conceived within himself, enveloping it, so to say, with external matter; for we say that the artisan makes a house through the form of the thing which he has conceived within himself. This is the way God is said to make all things in his wisdom, because the wisdom of God is related to his created works just as the art of the builder is to the house he has made. Now this form and wisdom is the Word; and thus in him all things were created, as in an exemplar: he spoke and they were made (Gen 1), because he created all things to come into existence in his eternal Word.

38. With respect to the differences among things, we should note that some, like the Manicheans, were mistaken in thinking that earthly bodies, since they are corruptible, were made by an evil god, while the heavenly bodies, because they are incorruptible, were made by the good God, that is, by the Father of Christ. This was an error, because both types of bodies were created in the same. And so he says, in heaven and on earth.

This difference is based on the different parts of corporeal nature. In the beginning, that is, in the Son, God created the heavens and the earth (Gen 1:1).

39. The Platonists also said that God created invisible creatures, that is, the angels, by himself, but created bodily natures by the angels. But this is refuted here, because Paul says, visible and invisible. As to the first he says: by faith we understand that the world was framed by the word of God; that from invisible things visible things might be made (Heb 11:3). About the second we read: we have seen but few of his works. For the Lord has made all things, and to the godly he has granted wisdom (Sir 43:32–33).

This difference in things is based on the nature of created things.

40. The third difference is concerned with the order and degrees found in invisible realities, when he says, whether thrones, or dominations, or principalities, or powers. The Platonists were mistaken in this matter for they said that there are different perfections found in things, and attributed each of these to its own first principle. And they said there was an order of principles according to the orders of these perfections. Thus they affirmed a first being, from whom all things participate in existence; and another principle, distinct from this, a first intellect, from which all things participate in intelligence, and then another principle, life, from which all things participate in life.

But we do not agree with this, for all the perfections found in things are from one principle. Thus he says, whether thrones, or dominations and so on. As if to say: they do not depend on an array of principles, but on the one unique Word of God.

41. Why does Paul say in his letter to the Ephesians: he has made him the head over all the Church? (Eph 1:22). For he does not seem to be saying the same thing there as here.

I reply that here Paul is giving a descending list of such beings, because he is showing the procession of creatures from God; but in Ephesians he gives an ascending list, because he is showing that the Son of God, as man, is above all creatures. In Ephesians, the principalities are placed under the authorities (or powers), and the virtues are between the dominions and authorities; but here in our text, the principalities are placed above the authorities, and between the dominions and the authorities. This is the way the teaching of Gregory differs from that of Dionysius. For Dionysius arranges the spiritual beings as they are in Ephesians, because he puts the dominions, the virtues and authorities in the second hierarchy. But Gregory arranges them as Paul does here, because he puts the dominions, principalities and authorities in the second hierarchy; and the virtues, archangels and the angels in the third hierarchy.

We should note, as Gregory and Dionysius say, that the spiritual gifts from which these different orders receive their names are common to all of them; yet some orders receive their name from certain of these gifts, and others receive their name from different gifts. The reason for this can be seen from the teachings of the Platonists: whatever belongs to something belongs to it in one of three ways: essentially, or by participation, or causally. A thing belongs essentially to another if it belongs to it according to a certain proportion to its nature; this is the way to be rational belongs to man. A thing belongs by participation to another if it surpasses the nature of the thing which has it, although the thing participates to a certain extent in it, although imperfectly; thus man is intellectual by participation, while to be intellectual, which is superior to being rational, is in the angels essentially. One thing belongs to another causally if it accrues to it, as artifacts belong to a person; for they do not exist in him as in matter, but exist in his artistic power. Now a thing is named only from what belongs to it essentially; thus we do not define man as an intellectual or artistic being, but as rational.

In regard to the gifts present in the angels, those which belong to the higher angels essentially, belong to the lower ones by participation; and those which belong to the lower ones essentially, are present in the higher angels causally. Consequently, the higher angels receive their names from the higher gifts.

But the highest thing in a spiritual creature is that it attain to God and somehow participate in him; and therefore the higher angels receive their name because they attain God: seraphim, as being fervent or on fire with God; the cherubim, as knowing God; and the thrones, as having God seated in them.

42. For one thing can participate in another in three ways: first, it can receive what is proper to the nature of what it is participating in; second, it can receive a thing insofar as it knows it; and third, it can somehow serve the power of a thing. For example, a doctor participates in the art of medicine either because he possesses in himself the art of medicine, or because he has received a knowledge of the art, or because he serves or devotes himself to the medical art. The first way of participating is greater than the second, and the second way is greater than the third.

In Sacred Scripture, what is divine is signified by fire: the Lord your God is a devouring fire (Deut 4:24). And so the highest order of angels is called the seraphim, as though on fire with God and having a divine property. The second order is the cherubim, who attain God by knowledge. And the third are the thrones, who serve or are devoted to his power. The other orders are not given their names because they attain God, but because of some activity of God. Some angels direct or command, and these are the dominions. Others accomplish and carry out what is commanded, the principal angels who do this are the principalities: princes went before, joined with singers (Ps 68:27). Among the others who carry out commands, some act over spiritual creatures, such as the authorities (powers), who restrain the evil spirits. If some act over natural things, they are called virtues, and these perform miracles. If they act over human beings, they are called archangels if they are concerned with great matters, and angels if concerned with lesser things.

And so Paul concludes, all things were created through him, as by an efficient cause, and in him, as in an exemplary cause: all things were made through him, and without him was not anything made that was made (John 1:3).

43. Since someone might ask: are all things eternal? the Apostle says in answer: no! He is before all, i.e., that is, before all times and other things: the Lord possessed me in the beginning of his ways, before he made anything from the beginning (Prov 8:22). Or, he is before all in dignity: who among the heavenly beings is like the Lord? (Ps 89:6).

44. As relating to the conservation of things he says, and by him all things consist, that is, they are conserved. For God is to things as the sun is to the moon, which loses its light when the sun leaves. And so, if God took his power away from us, all things would immediately cease to exist: upholding the universe by his word of power (Heb 1:3).