Lecture 1 — Job returns to himself: the creator does not deny his creature

^10:1^ My soul is weary of my life, I will unleash my eloquence against myself, I will speak from the bitterness of my soul.

^10:2^ I will say to God: Do not condemn me. Tell me why you judge me so.

^10:3^ Does it seem good to you to calumniate me, to chastise me, the work of your hands, and to aid the plot of the wicked?

^10:4^ Are your eyes made of flesh? Or do you see like a man sees?

^10:5^ Are your days like the days of a man? And are your years like man’s time,

^10:6^ that you should interrogate me about my evildoing and examine my sin?

^10:7^ Know that I have done nothing wicked since there is no one who can take me from your hand.

^10:8^ It was your hands that made me; they fashioned me wholly round about, and so do you cast me down unexpectedly?

^10:9^ Remember, I beseech you, that you have made me like clay, and will you grind me to dust?

^10:10^ Did you not pour me out like milk and curdle me like cheese?

^10:11^ With skin and flesh you clothed me; with bones and sinew knit me together.

^10:12^ You gave me life and mercy and your visitation guarded my spirit.

^10:13^ Although you hide these things in your heart, yet I know you remember everything.

174. My soul is weary of my life. Job earlier proposed that both the innocent and the unjust are assailed by trials in this world, and touched upon one reason which he could think of for the punishment of the innocent, namely, that the earth, as if forsaken by God, had been exposed to the almost evil will of an iniquitous power, which punishes the innocent at will. He showed that this explanation was not true because there was something clearly unfitting in that argument. Then he asked who was the one who punishes the innocent and why. He intends now to pursue this question. Before proceeding to this investigation, however, he shows from what point of view he is speaking. For he is speaking in the person of the afflicted man, according to the conceptions which sadness supplies him. So he first speaks about the weariness which he suffers in this life because of the tribulations which he is suffering. These render life itself wearisome in proportion to their depth. For although living is enjoyable in itself, living in anguish is wearisome. So he says, my soul is weary of my life. For just as a man who finds his life enjoyable chooses to live, so a man who finds life burdensome tries to deprive himself of life. For this reason he adds, I will unleash my eloquence against myself. Something which is destructive to someone is against him. A man therefore speaks against himself when he chooses to be deprived of life.

But he clearly says, I will unleash, for many times a man suffers some disturbances in his heart because of passion, either of sorrow, desire, anger, or the like, but he still controls all these movements by reason, so that he does not express them externally by word. However, when his reason wishes to show what it is suffering internally, it produces the hidden disturbances in words, and then reason is said to unleash eloquence which was previously kept hidden internally. To express this he says, I will speak from the bitterness of my soul, as if to say, “The words which I will reveal externally show internal bitterness,” giving us to understand that he speaks in the persona of the bitter man. But lest this unleashing of speech again be interpreted as reason being overcome by sorrow, he adds, I will say to God: do not condemn me. For when reason is overcome by passion, man murmurs against God and at times goes so far as blasphemy. But when reason remains rightly ordered amid tribulations, one submits himself to God and expects the cure to come from him, saying, do not condemn me. At the same time, he addresses the resolution of the question. Since the author had asked above (Job 9:24) what was the cause of the punishment of the innocent in the world, he here at last confesses that God is the author of punishment when he begs that he not be condemned by him, as Kings says, the Lord brings death and gives life (1 Sam 2:6), the text by which the heresy of the Manicheans is refuted.

175. With these premises, and supposing that God is the author of punishment, he inquires about the cause of his own punishment, saying to God, tell me why you judge me so, that is, help me understand the reason why I am punished by you. For he knew that the investigation of reason cannot arrive at the goal of truth unless God divinely teaches it. Man must know the cause of his punishment, either to correct himself or to endure the trials with more patience. He proceeds to investigate the question with a kind of disjunction: it is necessary that one who suffers is either innocent or a sinner. He first proceeds supposing that he is innocent.

Because we come to the knowledge of divine things through human ones, he proposes two ways the innocent are sometimes condemned by human judgment.

176. The first way is because of the malice of the one meting out the punishment. There are three ways in which punishments are inflicted on the innocent from this cause. Sometimes they heap calumnies upon the innocent through cunning. On this theme he says, does it seem good to you to calumniate me? Sometimes, however, they oppress them by violence, and he expresses this, saying, and to chastise me, the work of your hands? Sometimes they do not cause the innocent to suffer for their own interest, but since they inordinately love evil men, they even help them in the persecution of the innocent. Therefore, he adds, and to aid the plot of the wicked? Consider carefully, however, that sometimes one and the same thing can be both good and evil in different natures. For a dog to become angry is something good; but for a man to become angry is something evil. No one in his right mind entertains any doubt as to whether God does anything from an evil intention. For there cannot be anything evil in the highest good.

But there may be something evil in man which belongs to divine goodness, such as not being merciful, inasmuch as mercy implies passion, is something blameworthy in man. Yet divine goodness requires it because of its perfection. It is clear that the three actions cited—to calumniate, to chastise, and to aid the counsels of evil men—are evil in man. So he calls into the question whether they can be goods in God. He does not ask then, do you calumniate me or do you oppress? but does it seem good to you to calumniate me and to chastise, as if supposing as a certainty that God never does anything unless it seems good to him, and this is truly good. Likewise, note here that no one imputes those things which exist naturally to fault or evil. For it is natural that each thing destroy its contrary; thus God, too, who is good in highest degree, hates those things which happen contrary to him, and destroys them. The Psalm expresses this, you hate all who do evil and you will destroy them (Ps 5:7). If, then, men were not made by God but by some contrary principle, as the Manicheans falsely claimed, it would seem good that God would chastise men on their own account.

To exclude this possibility, he does not simply say, to oppress me, but he adds, the work of your hands. Also, it would seem good that God would fulfill the wills of the just. However, those who will to calumniate and oppress innocent men are not just, but wicked, and especially if they should will this not from ignorance, or accidentally, but from deliberate, premeditated choice. So, since he supposes himself to be innocent in the first part of the debate, it follows that those who wish to oppress him or to calumniate him from deliberation are evil. He therefore clearly says, and to aid the plot of the wicked?

177. After removing this cause, because this cannot seem good to God, since Job is the work of the hands of God, and since his enemies who oppress him are shown to be evil, he next proceeds to the second way in which the innocent are sometimes afflicted in human judgment. Sometimes, when someone innocent is falsely accused before a judge, the judge, acting according to justice, subjects him to torture to discover the truth.

The causes of this are three defects in human knowledge.

The first is because all human knowledge proceeds from sense, and because the senses belong to the body and are about corporeal objects, a judge cannot know the interior conscience of the accused. He excludes this from God as a possibility when he says, are your eyes made of flesh? This is as though he were to say: do you see through the corporeal senses that you see only corporeal things and cannot know interior things? He uses the eyes because the sight exceeds all other senses in man.

The second defect is that man cannot understand even all corporeal things through the bodily senses. For he cannot know what happens in things far away or removed from him. He shows this is not the case with God when he says, or do you see like a man sees, in that you cannot know what happens everywhere, even things which are hidden?

The third defect of human knowledge is from the nature of time, both because his knowledge increases from day to day and also because, through the passage of time, he forgets those things which he knows, so it is necessary for him to learn by repetition, as it were. He then shows this is not the case with God, saying, are your days like the days of a man? in that your knowledge increases from day to day. And are your years like man’s time, in that you forget in the course of time. He continues, that you should interrogate me about my evildoing and examine my sin, to investigate through tribulations if I have sinned in work, or am evil by thought, like men investigate criminal guilt using torture. So, after the investigation of this sort is completed, and you find no sin in me, you will know that I have done nothing wicked, as though you could not know this otherwise than by ferreting out my crimes using torture. You do this freely and without contradiction, since there is no one who can take me from your hand. For sometimes judges fail to discover the truth using torture while those who ought to be tortured are taken out of their hands.

178. He had already stated that he is a work of God’s hands, to show by this that it cannot seem good to God to oppress him because of what he is, as though he delighted in his suffering. He clearly explains now what he had merely stated as a given before: it was your hands that made me. To preclude someone from accepting the heresy of the Manicheans, that the soul of man was made by God, but the body was formed by a creator contrary to God, he continues, they fashioned me wholly round about. He says round about because the body seems to be round about the soul like a garment is to the one wearing it, or the house is to the householder. He says wholly to refer to each member of the body. He says they fashioned to allude to the fact that man is said to be formed from the slime of the earth. The hands may be interpreted as the divine operation, and so he uses the plural, hands, because, although there is one divine power operating, its operation is nevertheless multiplied in many effects, both because of the diversity of the effects, and also because of the variety of mediate causes, through the mediation of which he produces his effects.

He says then, and so will you cast me aside suddenly? because it seems sudden when someone who produces something corrupts it without clear cause. When someone creates something, he wills it to exist; indeed, he made it to exist. Someone who destroys something wills it not to be. So it seems that if someone destroys something which he made before, he seems to have suddenly changed his mind, unless some obvious and completely new cause arises which makes it clear that what was to come about, now should be corrupted. But there can be no sudden change of will like this in God, and so he asks almost in surprise, and so will you cast me aside suddenly? He seems to say, “It seems unfitting for you now to destroy without cause someone you earlier made.” Or the words, it was your hands that made me, can refer to the constitution of the substance and the words; they fashioned me wholly round about, can refer to those things which modify the substance, whether they are the goods of the soul or of the body, or of exterior chance.

179. Since his general position was that he had been formed and created by God, he proceeds in detail to the manner of his creation, comparing himself with someone who wants to remember something which he seems to have forgotten. For God seems to have forgotten the benevolence which he had toward his creation when he exposes it to corruption. He is like one who forgets; the Psalm expresses the same idea, how long, O Lord, will you forget me in the end (Ps 12:1), and also, remember, I beseech you, that you have made me like clay.

Here we should note carefully that he recalls two productions of man.

The first is the first institution of nature, which alludes to what Genesis says, God formed man from the slime of the earth (Gen 2:7), and so he says, you made me like the clay. Here he also seems to refer to the composition of man from primary elements. Since it was also said to the first man, you are dust and to dust you shall return (Gen. 3:19), he says as a consequence, and will you grind me to dust, which also befits the nature of matter. What is generated from earth according to nature is fittingly resolved back into the earth. From this, someone might wonder, since it seems greater to form a man from the earth than to retain men already formed in being so that he does not revert to the earth, why God, who formed man from the dust permitted him to return to the dust. The question is whether this is only a result of the necessity of matter, that man has nothing more than other things formed from the earth, or whether it is a result of divine providence punishing man for some fault.

180. Next, he treats the making of man with reference to the propagation by which man is generated from man. Note here that he attributes every work of nature to God, not so as to exclude the operation of nature, but in the way things done through secondary causes are attributed to the principle agent. Similarly, the operation of the saw is attributed to the carpenter. The fact that nature operates comes from God, who instituted it for this purpose.

In the generation of man, first comes the release of the seed, and to express this he says, did you not pour me out like milk? Seed is the product of nourishment, like milk.

Second, the physical mass is formed in the womb of the woman, and he expresses this, saying, and curdle me like cheese? For the seed of the male is related to the matter which the female furnishes in the generation of man and other animals like rennet is related to the generation of cheese.

Third, the distinction of the organs takes place. Their strength and consistency comes from the nerves and bones, encased externally by skin and flesh. So he says, with skin and flesh you clothed me, with bones and sinews knit me together.

Fourth comes the animation of the fetus, and this is especially true in the case of the rational soul, which is not infused until after organization. Certain seeds of virtue are divinely infused together with the rational soul in man, some common to all, and others special to the individual. For this reason, some men are naturally disposed to one virtue, others to another. Job says further on, mercy grew in me from my infancy and came forth from the womb with me (Job 31:18). He therefore says here, you gave me life and mercy.

Last comes the conservation of life, both in the womb of the mother, and after leaving the womb. This conservation is partly due to natural principles and partly to gifts of God which are added over and above nature, pertaining to the soul, the body, or exterior goods. Expressing this theme, he says, and your visitation guarded my spirit. For according to the language of Scripture, as God is said to draw back from someone when he withdraws his gifts from him, so he is said to visit him when he bestows his gifts on him.

181. To preclude someone thinking, because he had said, remember, I beseech you, that you made me like clay, that he was of the opinion that God could forget, he excuses himself concerning this language, saying, although you hide these things in your heart, I know that you still remember the whole universe. For God is said to hide something in his heart like a man when he does not show by external effect what he has in thought or in affection. So he says that God hides these things in his heart because he does not externally show in effect that he recognizes him as his own creation, him whom he casts down so suddenly.