Lecture 2 — Providence governs the world

^5:8^ This is why I entreat the Lord and set my eloquence before God.

^5:9^ He does great things, which are unsearchable, wonderful and without number.

^5:10^ He brings rain on the face of the earth, and irrigates everything with water.

^5:11^ He sets those who are lowly on high and he lifts up the mournful with favor to safety.

^5:12^ He frustrates the desires of evildoers so that their hands achieve no success.

^5:13^ He surprises the wise in their own craftiness and dissipates the plan of evil men;

^5:14^ they come upon darkness in the daylight, and grope at noonday as at night.

^5:15^ But he will make the poor safe from the sword of their mouth, and the needy from the violent hand.

^5:16^ He will be the hope of the poor, and injustice will shut her mouth.

98. This is why I entreat the Lord. Because Eliphaz had proposed that all things which happen on earth have a determined cause, and had proved this by the fact that natural things appear to be disposed to an end; and because the very fact that natural things exist to attain an end is the most powerful argument for showing that the world is ruled by divine providence and that all things do not happen by chance, Eliphaz therefore immediately concludes from the premises about the government of divine providence. Note that if there is no divine providence, prayer would be without fruit, and God would not have knowledge of man’s deeds. One who concedes the rule of divine providence must still admit these things. Therefore, from the fact that all things which happen on earth are for an end, Eliphaz concludes that it is necessary to concede the rule of providence. This is why I entreat the Lord, as if to say, “Since God disposes human affairs, this prayer is fruitful.” Further, and I set my eloquence before God, since God knows human deeds, words and thoughts. To strengthen this conclusion, he adds those things which especially demonstrate divine providence.

99. Note that those who deny providence say that everything which appears in the world occurs from the necessity of natural causes; for example, the necessity of heat and cold, of gravity and lightness, or something like this. Divine providence is most powerfully demonstrated by those things which cannot be explained by natural principles like these, one of which is the determined quantity of the bodies of this world. For no reason can be assigned from some natural principle why the sun or the moon or the earth should be a certain mass, and not a greater or lesser one. Thus, it is necessary to say that this determination of masses is from the ordering of some intellect, and he discusses this when he says, he does great things, that is, he puts order in a thing by determining mass.

Further, if everything were to come about from the necessity of natural principles, since natural principles are known to us, we would have a way of investigating everything in this world. There are some things in this world, however, the knowledge of which we cannot arrive at by any investigation; for example, spiritual substances, the distances of the stars, and other things like this. So everything clearly does not proceed from the necessity of natural principles, but is instituted by some superior intellect, and so he says, unsearchable. Likewise, there are also some things which we see whose nature we can in no way discuss; for example, that the stars have a certain configuration in this part of the heaven and another in another part of the heaven. Hence it is clear that this certainly does not arise from natural principles, but from some higher intellect, and he adds, and wonderful things. For the unsearchable and the wonderful differ in that the unsearchable is hidden in itself and cannot be investigated, but the wonderful is indeed seen, though its cause cannot be investigated.

100. Note also that some held that the disposition of things proceeded from God according to a certain measured order. For instance, only one first effect which already had something of composition and plurality proceeds from one first simple thing. Thus, from this (namely, the One), two or three things proceed which are still less simple, and so on, so that the whole multiplicity of things proceeds in grades in this way. According to this position, the whole arrangement of the universe does not happen from the ordering of the divine intellect but from some necessity of nature. Hence, to answer this argument, he says, without number, either because things have been produced in being without necessity of numerical order, or because innumerable things have been produced immediately by God. This is especially apparent in the first heaven where there are very many stars. Thus Eliphaz shows that the production of things is from God, and not from the necessity of nature.

101. Consequently, he shows that the course of created things is governed by divine providence. First, in natural things, which seem to have been made for the use of man and the other animals, although the natural order of the elements seems to demand another thing. For if someone should consider heaviness and lightness in the elements, clearly, earth naturally lies beneath water, water to air, and air to fire. Some of the earth uncovered from water is found to be immediately in contact with the air; otherwise animals which breathe could not live on land.

Further, so that the earth uncovered by water might not be rendered unfruitful and uninhabitable with drought, it is watered in two ways by God:

first, of course, by rain, which falls from above upon the earth; and to this he says, he brings rain on the face of the earth.

In another way by springs, rivers and brooks, with which the earth is irrigated, whose source is found under the earth in the same way that the source of rain is found in the heavens. So he says, and irrigates everything with water.

102. Then he shows the activity of divine providence even in human affairs. If human affairs were to run their course as their arrangement seems to demand, there would appear to be little or no trace of divine providence in them. But when human affairs run their course in another way, foolish men who do not consider higher causes attribute this to chance or fortune.

Solomon personifies them when he says in Qoheleth, again I saw that under the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the intelligent, nor favor to the men of skill; but time and chance happen to all (Eccl 9:11). Eliphaz, however, refers this to a higher cause; namely, to the providence of God.

First, as to the oppressed who are raised up from the lowest station to a higher place, he says, he sets those who are lowly, that is, those cast down, on high; and the sorrowful are born to joy. Regarding this he says, and he lifts up the mournful to safety with his favor.

Second, he speaks of those who oppress others. These are of two sorts. Some openly oppress others through force, and as to these he says, he frustrates the designs of evildoers, so that their hands achieve no success, because they are impeded in accomplishing their works by God, so that they cannot bring their evil intention into effect. Some, however, deceive others by cunning. As for these he says, he surprises the wise in their own craftiness, because what the cunning plan go contrary to their design, and dissipates the plan of evil men, when what they seemed to wisely plan cannot be effected because of impediments put in their way from on high. Sometimes not only are their cunning plans impeded in deed, but even their minds are clouded, so that they do not discover better things in taking counsel. So he says, they come upon darkness in the daytime, because in something which is clear, they are completely ignorant of what they are doing, and grope at noonday like in the night; in things which are in no way doubtful, they hesitate as though they were obscure.

103. To prove these things seem to happen from divine providence, he goes on to describe what useful purpose they serve. For when the cunning of evildoers is impeded, the poor are freed from their deceptions. This is why he adds, but he will make the poor safe from the sword of their mouth. For those who are cunning in evil often seduce others by flattering and deceptive language and these words are compared to a harmful sword. As the Psalm says, their tongue is a sharpened sword (Ps 56:5). But when the works of powerful evil men are impeded by God, the poor are clearly also saved, and so he goes on to say, the needy from the violent hand. Two things follow from this. One is that men, who are powerless in their own right, must confide in divine power, because God has care over human affairs, and so he says, he will be the hope of the poor. The other is that powerful and evil men hold themselves back lest they be totally ruined, and so the text continues, and injustice will shut her mouth, namely, so that it does not completely waste itself in the harm of others.