Chapter VIII. On the Harmony of the Virtues as Revealed by Consideration

Consideration will also show thee the beautiful concord and connection which exists between the virtues, and how they depend one upon the other. Thus, for example, thou mayest already understand that prudence is the mother of fortitude, and that every species of daring, which is not the offspring of prudence, ought to be accounted, not so much an act of fortitude as of temerity. It is likewise consideration which, seated as an arbiter — if I may express it so — between the pleasures of sense and the necessities of the body, appoints the proper limits for both, allowing and giving to the latter what is sufficient, withholding from the former what is superfluous. In this way it produces a third virtue which is called temperance, and which observes the golden mean in the use of sensible goods. For in the light of consideration it appears as much a violation of temperance to refuse obstinately what one has need of, as to indulge oneself in superfluities. I say, then, that it is the part of temperance not only to retrench what is superfluous, but also to allow what is needful. This doctrine is favoured by the authority of St. Paul, yea, rather, it is explicitly taught by him, where he warns us not to " make provision for the flesh in its concupiscences" (Rom. xiii. 14). For by the words, " make not provision for the flesh," he cuts away superfluities, and by adding, " in its concupiscences," he shows that he has no intention of excluding what is necessary. In my opinion, therefore, it would be no bad definition of temperance to say that it is a virtue which inclines us neither to exceed nor to curtail what is necessary, according to the counsel of the Philosopher — " Nothing too much." *

Then, as regards justice, which, as thou knowest, is one of the four cardinal virtues, can there be a doubt that the soul which would acquire it has to begin with consideration ? For, manifestly, she must reflect upon herself before she can accommodate her own disposition to the rule of justice, which prescribes that we should neither do to another the evil we are unwilling should be done to ourselves, nor omit to do to another the good we desire for ourselves. In these two canons of conduct the virtue of justice entirely consists.

But justice is by no means a solitary virtue. To make this manifest, let us examine together the beautiful relation and harmony uniting it with temperance, and again uniting these two with the other two virtues above-mentioned, namely, prudence and fortitude. Now I have said that it is a part of justice not to do to another what we do not wish should be done to ourselves, and that the virtue is complete when we add what the Lord enjoins, " All things, therefore, whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them " (Matt. vii. 12). But evidently neither one nor the other of these rules can have any relation to justice, unless our own will, from which the whole form of the virtue is derived, is so ordered that we neither seek for ourselves anything superfluous nor obstinately refuse what is necessary — that is to say, unless we have acquired the virtue of temperance. Besides, justice itself can only be just by keeping within the bounds which temperance prescribes for it. For that justice which is not ruled and moderated by temperance, merits no commendation, as the Wise Man implies where he says, " Be not over just " (Eccles. vii. 17). Yea, even wisdom refuses not to submit to the restrictions of temperance. Hence the Apostle, " according to the wisdom given him by God " (2 Peter iii. 15), warns us " not to be more wise than it behoveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety " (Rom. xii. 3). On the other hand, the Lord Himself, in the Gospel, shows that justice is necessary to temperance, where He reproves the temperance of those who fasted in order to gain the esteem of men (Matt. vi. 16). There was temperance indeed in their use of food, but there was no justice in their hearts, because they sought by their fasting, not to please God, but only to win human favour. Again, how can there be either justice or temperance apart from fortitude ? For evidently there is need of fortitude, and of more than ordinary fortitude, to restrain our desires and our repugnances within the narrow limits of too much and too little, so that the will shall be content with that medial measure, bare, pure, unique, constant, perfectly uniform, as being equally removed from extremes on every side, which alone is recognised as the province of virtue. Tell me now, if thou canst, to which of these three virtues in particular, to fortitude, justice, or temperance, wouldst thou prefer to have assigned this golden mean ? For it is so perfectly coincident with all that it seems to be proper to each. Shall we say that this and this alone is virtue ? But then we should have to deny a plurality of virtues — since all would be one. Therefore, as without it there can be no virtue at all, perhaps we had better say that it is the one intimate essence and soul, so to speak, of all the virtues, wherein all are so united as to appear not many but one — the more especially, because the different virtues have it in common, not by mere participation, but as held by each one whole and entire. Thus, for instance, what is more essential to justice than the golden mean ? For if in any respect it goes outside that mean, it no longer, as is plain, renders everyone his due, which, nevertheless, is its specific function. To temperance, likewise, what is so essential, since this virtue owes its very name to the fact that it excludes whatever lies outside the limits of moderation ? I think thou wilt be ready to acknowledge that the same mean is equally a part of fortitude, to which belongs in a special manner the duty of forcibly defending its integrity against the invasion of the vices that attempt to oppress it on all sides, and thus of preserving it as the solid foundation of good and the firm seat of the virtues. Consequently, to keep the golden mean is the essence of justice, of temperance, and of fortitude. But wherein, then, do they differ ? See if it be not in the manner. For justice preserves the mean in the affection, fortitude gives it its force and stability, whilst to temperance appertains its possession and use. It only remains to show that prudence is not excluded from this solidarity. Is it not prudence which first discovers and brings to light the golden mean, when it has been long neglected and put aside by the soul, stowed away out of sight, so to speak, through the envy of the passions, and buried, as it were, in the darkness of oblivion ? Therefore I say to thee, by few is the mean of virtue found, because few are possessed of prudence. And so what justice seeks, prudence finds, fortitude defends, and temperance possesses.

However, I have no intention to treat here of the virtues in particular. The foregoing remarks have been made merely for the purpose of exciting thee to apply thyself to consideration, which leads us to the knowledge of such truths as those I have been discussing. For wasted surely will thy life have been, if no part thereof be devoted to so useful and sacred a study.