Chapter VIII

What then ? Hath free choice perished, because man is not able not to sin ? By no means : but man hath lost free counsel, by means of which he before possessed the power not to sin ; he lost it, moreover, in such a manner that, because he is not able indeed any longer not to be disturbed, it befalleth him in his wretched state to have lost also freedom of pleasure, by means of which he before possessed also the power of being able not to be disturbed. There remaineth, therefore, even after sin, freedom of choice, which, although in a state of misery, is yet intact. And the fact that man is not able of himself to shake himself free of the bondage of sin, or of misery, doth not signify the destruction of freedom of choice, but privation of the two remaining kinds of freedom. For there neither belongeth, nor ever hath belonged, to freedom of choice, as such, to possess either power or wisdom, but merely will : it maketh us neither able, nor wise, but simply willing. Therefore we are not to bethought to have lost freedom of choice, if we cease to be either powerful or wise, but only if we cease to be willing. For where there is not will, there is not freedom. I do not say, if we ceased

E 41 to will what is good, but if we ceased to will at all : it must be allowed without contradiction that, when the will— not goodness of will — no longer existeth, then also freedom of choice is lost. But if the case be that the will is merely unable to will what is good, it meaneth that it lacketh, not freedom of choice, but freedom of counsel. Again, if the will be unable, not indeed to will what is good, but to perform the good which it willeth, then let it be assured that it lacketh freedom of pleasure, not that it hath lost freedom of choice. If, then, freedom of choice everywhere accompanieth the will, in such a way that, unless the will wholly cease to be itself, it lacketh it not, but alike in evil and in good remaineth the will ; thus none the less doth free choice also abide in its fulness whether in evil or in good. And as the will, even wien in the state of misery, doth not cease to be the will, but is called, and is, the miserable will, as it is also called, and is, the blessed will ; so also can neither any adversit}, nor necessity, either destroy or (so far as in it Heth) * in any degree lessen freedom of choice.

But, although free choice remaineth everywhere equally without any diminution, nevertheless it will not find itself able of itself to revive from an evil to a good state, after

• "Quantum in se est." The limitation, whatever it may be, of liberuni arbitrium, cannot be imposed ab extra : free choice always remains self- determining.

the same fashion in which of itself it was able to fall from a good into an evil state. xnd what wonder is it if one that lieth prone be not able of himself to rise again, seeing that when standing upright he was unable by any effort of his own to advance to a better position ? In fine, while freedom of choice still in some measure had with it the other two kinds of freedom, it was unable from the lower vantage ground of them to rise to higher levels, that is to say, to rise from the states of being able not to sin and being able not to be disturbed to those of not being able to sin and not being able to be disturbed : but if, even however aided by those other two kinds of freedom, it yet was not strong enough to advance from the good to the better, how much less, now that it is deprived of them, will it be able of itself to escape from evil to the good in which it stood of old ? "

Man, therefore, hath need of "the power of God, and the; wisdom of God," even Christ, in order that, by reason of the fact that He is wisdom, He may reinfuse into him true wisdom,* and thus restore to him the state of freedom of counsel, and in order that, by reason of the fact that He is power, He may re-establish in him full power, and thus restore to him the state of freedom of pleasure ; in such a measure that, being in virtue of the one perfectly good, he may no longer know sin, and, being in virtue of the other completely blessed, he may suffer no adversity. But in truth it is in the future life that such perfection as this is to be expected, when both kinds of freedom now lost will be restored to free choice ; not merely in the measure in which in this world they are restored to any righteous person, however perfect he may be ; nor merely in the measure in which it was granted even to our first parents to possess them in Paradise ; but as already now the angels possess them in heaven. INIeanwhile, however, let it suffice in this body of death, and in this evil world, that by freedom of counsel we obey not sin in lust, while by freedom of pleasure we fear notto suffer adversity for righteousness' sake. But, in this sinful flesh and in this evil day, if not wholly to lack, certainly not to consent to sin, this is in no small measure to be wise ; and, if not yet wholly to enjoy felicity, at least for truth's sake manfully to endure contempt, this is in no small measure to be powerful.®

Truly it behoveth us here, meanwhile, by freedom of counsel to learn no longer to abuse freedom of choice, in order that in the future we may be able fully to enjoy freedom of pleasure. Thus, indeed, we are restoring in ourselves the image of God ; thus by means of grace we are being prepared to win that ancient honour which we lost through sin. And blessed is he who shall deserve to hear it said concerning himself : " Who is he, and we will praise him ? For he did wondrous things while he lived ; he was able to transgress, yet did he not transgress ; to do evil, yet did he not do evil." 1