Sermon LXXX. On the Image of God, and the Soul which is Made according to the Image; and on the Errors of Gilbert De La Porree

"In my bed by night I sought Him Whom my soul loveth: I sought Him, and found Him not. I will rise and will go about the city: in the streets and the broad ways I will seek Him Whom my soul loveth: I sought Him and I found Him not."

"The watchmen who kept the city found me: Have you seen Him

Whom my soul loveth?

"When I had a little passed beyond them, I found Him Whom my soul loveth: I held Him and I will not let Him go, till I bring Him into my mother's house, and into the chamber of her that bore me."

Some of you, my brethren,- as it appears, are feeling disappointed because, for several days past, I have given myself up so exclusively to the delight of studying, with wonder and admiration, the mystical meanings of this speech of the Spouse, that my sermons have been seasoned with few moral applications, if any at all. That certainly is not in accordance with my usual practice. But I want your permission now to go over again what has been treated already. I will not proceed until all has been rehearsed. I pray you, then, to tell me, if you remember, at what verse I began to defraud you of these moral reflections, so that we may commence again from there. It shall be my care to make good whatever loss you may have suffered, or rather I should say that this shall be the care of the Lord to Whom we look for everything. Whence, therefore, am I to begin with the rehearsal? Unless I am mistaken, the starting-point should be the verse, "In my bed by night I sought Him Whom my soul loveth," because there and thenceforward my sole concern has been to remove the thick veil of allegory, and to place clearly before you the sense of this secret and delightful intercourse between Christ and His Church. Let us therefore go back to seek for moral interpretations; and do not be afraid that the work shall prove wearisome to me, provided it be profitable to you. The most convenient plan wiU be to endeavour to apply to the Word and the individual soul what I have already said concerning Christ and the Church.

But here I may be met with the objection, "Why dost thou join these two together? What is there in common between the Word of God and the soul of man?" I answer, "Much in every way." For, in the first place, there is a close natural affinity between them, since the Word is the Image of God and the soul is made according to this Image. And secondly, their likeness to each other bears witness to that affinity, since the soul has been made not only according to the Image but also to the likeness of the Image. Do you ask in what consists their likeness to each other? But let me speak first about the Image. The Word is Truth, the Word is Wisdom, the Word is Justice. And under each of these respects He is an Image. An Image of what? An Image of Justice, an Image of Wisdom, an Image of Truth. For the Word as an Image is Justice of Justice, and Wisdom of Wisdom, and Truth of Truth; in the same manner as He is the Light of Light and God of God. But the soul is none of these things, because she is not the Image. Nevertheless she is capable of them, and is desirous of them too; and perhaps it is with respect to this capacity and this desire that she is said to be made according to the Image. She is a noble creature whose greatness is revealed in the fact that she possesses in herself such a capacity for participating in the perfections of the Word; and in her yearning for the same, she gives proof of her righteousness. We read in Ecclesiastes that "God made man right"; and that He made him great also is clear, as I have said, from his capacity for greatness. For it is necessary that what has been made according to the Image should bear some resemblance to the Image, and that its participation in the name of the Image should not be in vain; just as the Image Itself has not received the name of Image as a bare and empty title. Consequently of Him Who is the Image, that is, of the Word, we read that being "in the form of God, He thought it not robbery to be equal with God." Here we have insinuated to us the righteousness of the Word, in that He is affirmed to be in the form of God, and His Majesty in that He is affirmed to be equal with God; in order to make it appear that, just as the Image is conformed in both these perfections to Him of Whom He is the Image, so is there on the other hand a corresponding conformity between the Image and the soul which is made according to the Image. For it is of the Same of Whom the Word is the Image that we hear David singing in the psalms, at one time, "Great is our Lord and great is His power" at another, "The Lord our God is righteous and there is no iniquity in Him." From this great and righteous Lord, the Word, His Image, has that He also is great and righteous, and from the Image the soul which is made according to the Image.

But I say: since we have assigned greatness and righteousness both to the Image and to the soul which is made according to the Image, does the Image therefore possess nothing more than that which is made according to the Image? Yes, my brethren, and infinitely more. For the soul has received these perfections in measure, but the Image according to equality with the Giver. And is not this something more? But there is a further difference to which I would invite your attention. The soul owes her greatness and her righteousness to creation and condescension, whereas it is by generation they belong to the Word. Now there can be no doubt that it is a more magnificent thing to be great and righteous in the latter way than in the former. Neither shall it be gainsaid that the soul in the following respect too is surpassed by the Word, in that, namely, whilst she possesses the perfections in question merely as gifts bestowed by God, He has them by God and also of God. That is to say, He has them from the very Substance of the Father. For the Image of God is consubstantial with God, and -everything which God seems to communicate to this same Image of Himself is essential and substantial, not accidental in Both. There is still another point deserving of your attention, as to which the Image immeasurably transcends that which is made according to the Image. Greatness and righteousness, as everybody knows, differ from each other in their proper natures. Nevertheless,they are one in the Image. What is more, they are one with the Image. For to the Image, not alone is it the same thing to be great as to be righteous, but it is also the same thing to be both great and righteous as simply to be. Such, however, is not the case with the 1, soul. Greatness and righteousness in her are both distinct from her substance, and distinct from each other. For if, as I have already pointed out, the soul is great in that she is capable of things divine and eternal, and is righteous in that she is desirous of things divine and eternal, it follows that a soul which neither seeks nor relishes "the things above but the things that are upon the earth" can no longer be called righteous but rather curved, although she does not cease thereby to be great,_> since she still retains her natural capacity for eternal glory. Indeed it is not possible that she should at any time be without this capacity, even though it is destined never to be realised. Thus is fulfilled the word of the Prophet David, "Surely man continueth as an image";¹ yet only in part, so as to make manifest the pre-eminence of the Word Who is the perfect Image. For how could the Word fall from being either great or righteous, since these attributes belong to Him in such a manner that He is rather identified with them than possessed of them? And it may be said that for this reason also "man continueth as an image" in part, lest if he lost completely the qualities of an image, viz., both greatness and righteousness, he should also lose the hope of salvation. By ceasing to be great, he would cease to be capable of eternal glory, because, as I have said, the soul's greatness consists in this capacity. But how could anyone hope for what he is incapable of receiving?

Consequently, "man continueth as an image "in the greatness which he retains even after he has lost his righteousness, halting, as it were, in one leg, and become as "children that are strangers." For it is of such, as I think, that the Psalmist says, "The children that are strangers have lied to me, strange children have faded away, and have halted from their paths." Very appropriately are they described as "children that are strangers." For they are still children because of the greatness which they have preserved; and they are strangers inasmuch as they have lost their righteousness. Nor would the Psalmist have said of them that they "have halted," but rather that they have fallen, or used some other similar expression, if men had put off all resemblance to an image. As the case is, however, "man continueth as an image "according to the greatness which he still possesses; whilst as regards righteousness he halts, so to speak, having been deposed and cast down from the dignity of an image, agreeably to what we read in Holy Scripture, "Surely man continueth as an image: yea and he is disquieted in vain." In vain, truly, because, as the Psalmist goes on to say, "He storeth up; and he knoweth not for whom he shall gather these things." Wherefore, my brethren, does he not know for whom he storeth, unless because, by stooping down to vile and earthly things, he treasureth up only earth for himself? Certainly as to those treasures which he lays up to himself on earth, "he knoweth not for whom he shall gather "them, whether for the moth that consumes, or for the thief that breaks through and steals, or for the enemy that plunders, or for the fire that devours. And therefore to the man who thus miserably bends and inclines himself to those things which are upon the earth we may apply the mournful words of the psalm, "I am become miserable and am bowed down even to the end: I walked sorrowful all the day long." For such a one experiences in himself the truth of that saying of the Wise Man, "God made man right, and he hath entangled himself with an infinity of cares." And immediately he heard addressed to him the words of mockery, "Bow down that we may go over "thee.

But what has led us hither? It was, I think, my endeavour to show that greatness and righteousness (by which two perfections I affirmed every image of God to be constituted) are neither one and the same in the soul, nor one and the same with the soul, whilst maintaining on the contrary the equally orthodox position that the same two are identified in the Word and with the Word. And with regard to righteousness, what I have said is sufficient to make it evident that it is something distinct both from the soul and from the greatness of the soul, since the soul continues in existence after she has ceased to be righteous, and continues also to be great. But how am I to establish the distinction between the soul herself and her greatness? For the same argument which I employed to prove the soul distinct from her righteousness is not available here, since the soul cannot lose her greatness as she can lose her righteousness. Nevertheless I maintain that the soul is not her greatness,² and my reason is this, because although the soul is never found without her greatness, that greatness may be found apart from the soul. Would you like to know where? In the angels. For the greatness of the angels is derived from the same source as the greatness of the soul, namely, from their capacity for things divine and eternal. But if the fact that the soul can exist without being righteous is sufficient to demonstrate her distinction from righteousness, it must equally follow that she is distinct from her greatness, from the fact that she cannot vindicate this greatness as something proper to herself. Since therefore righteousness does not belong universally to souls, and greatness does not belong exclusively to souls, it is manifestly and equally impossible for one or the other to be identified with the soul. Here is another argument. No form can be identical with that of which it is the form. Now her greatness is a form of the soul. Nor does the fact that it is inseparable from the soul prevent it from being a form of the same. For all essential differences are similarly inseparable, and not only all specific and strictly so-called properties, but also certain qualities common to many species, as well as innumerable other forms. The soul, consequently, is not her greatness any more than is the crow her blackness, or the snow its whiteness, or man his risibility or his rationality. And yet you will never find either a crow without blackness, or snow without whiteness, or a man who is devoid of risibility or rationality. It is just the same with the soul with regard to her greatness. Although inseparable, they are quite distinct from each other. How in truth could they be otherwise than mutually distinct, since the one is a substance and a subject in, which the other inheres as a quality or an accident? It is only the supreme and uncreated Nature, Which is one God in three Persons, That vindicates for Itself such a pure and incommunicable simplicity of essence as excludes not alone all kinds of difference of thing from thing, but y likewise all distinctions relating to place and time. For, abiding in Itself, that Divine Nature is whatever It has³ and is what It is eternally and unchangeably. V Things which are manifold elsewhere are reduced in It to unity, and things in their own natures distinct in It become identical, so that the multitude of Its perfections does not impair Its unity nor their variety prejudice Its simplicity. It contains in Itself all places and in their proper places disposes the whole universe of creatures, yet occupies no place Itself. It is unaffected by the succession of time which pursues its course outside and beneath It. It has no future to look forward to, no past to look back upon, no present to experience.

Let us keep far away, my dearest brethren, let us keep far away from those modern teachers, rather heretics.^ than mere dialecticians, who most impiously maintain that neither the greatness by which God is great, nor the goodness by which He is good, nor the wisdom by which He is wise, nor the justice by which He is just, nor lastly the Divinity by which He is God, is Itself God. God is God, they say, by reason of His Divinity, yet His Divinity is not God. Perchance they think it would be degrading the Divinity to regard It as God, since It is so great that It makes God to be God. But if It be not God, what then is It? Either It is God, or It is something which is distinct from God, or It is nothing at all. Thou, the heretic, dost not concede that It is God. And I suppose thou wilt not assert that It is nothing, since thou confessest It to be so indispensably necessary to God that without It, not only would He not be God, but it is It alone which makes Him to be God. But if thou declarest the Divinityto be something which is distinct from God, this Something must be either greater than God, or less than God, or equal to God. But how can that be less than God which alone makes God to be God? It remains then to say that It is either greater than God or equal to Him. If It be greater than God, then we must admit that not God but the Divinity of God is the Supreme Good. And if It be equal to God, the consequence is that we have two Supreme Goods instead of one. Both these conclusions are equally opposed to Catholic truth. And as regards the greatness of God, His goodness. His justice, and His wisdom, I hold exactly the same as I do concerning His Divinity, namely, that all such perfections are one in God and one with God. For He is good by nothing distinct from that by which He is great, and He is just and wise by nothing distinct from that by which He is great and good, and He is all these at once by nothing distinct from that by which He is God, and He is God by nothing distinct from Himself.

But the heretic will say to me, "What? Dost thou deny that God is God by His Divinity?" Surely not. But I maintain that the same Divinity by Which He is God is Itself God, and I am obliged to do so lest I should be found asserting the existence of something more excellent than God. I also affirm that God is great by His greatness, but that this greatness is nothing distinct from Himself, because otherwise I should have to admit something greater than God. And I say that he is good by reason of His goodness, which however, I hold to be really identical with Himself, lest by allowing a distinction I should seem to myself to have discovered something better than God. Similarly with regard to the other divine perfections. Willingly, and securely, and without stumbling do I walk in the footsteps of him who has said, "God is great only by that greatness which is what He is, otherwise that greatness shall be greater than God." These, my brethren, are the words of St. Augustine,⁴ that mighty hammer of heretics, li then anything at all can be rightly predicated of God, it will be more correct and more proper to say: God is Greatness, God is Goodness, God is Justice, God is Wisdom, than: God is great, God is good, God is just, God is wise.f

With good reason, therefore, did Pope Eugenius and the other bishops, at the council recently held by his Holiness at Rheims, condemn as perverse and open to suspicion of heresy, the explanation which Gilbert, Bishop of Poitiers, gives in his book to the most orthodox and Catholic words of Boethius concerning the Holy Trinity. The commentary runs thus, "The Father is Truth, that is to say, the Father is true; the Son is Truth, that is to say, the Son is true; The Holy Ghost is Truth, that is to say, the Holy Ghost is true; and these three are not three Truths but one Truth, that is to say, They are one True." O most obscure and perverse exposition! How much better and truer had it been to speak thus contrariwise. "The Father is true, that is to say, the Father is Truth; the Son is true, that is to say, the Son is Truth; the Holy Ghost is true, that is to say, the Holy Ghost is Truth; and these Three are one True, that is to say, They are one Truth." In this way indeed would Gilbert have spoken had he condescended to imitate St. Fulgentius, who says,⁵ ** The one Truth of the one God, or rather the one Truth which is the one God, does not suffer the creature to share in the service and worship which belongs to the Creator." A faithful instructor this, who spoke most truly of Truth, and entertained pious and Catholic sentiments respecting the pure and perfect simplicity of the Divine Substance, in Which nothing can be found that is not Itself, nor is Itself anything distinct from God. But there are several other passages in that same Commentary of Bishop Gilbert's, wherein he seems to depart even more manifestly from the orthodox faith. I shall just mention one by way of example. Boethius writes, "When we hear the words, ' God, God, God,' the reference is to the Divine Substance," to which our Commentator subjoins, "He means not any substance which itself is God, but the Substance by which God is." Heaven forbid that the Catholic Church should ever admit such a doctrine, should ever admit either a substance or anything else by which God is and which is not itself God!

However, I am not now speaking against Gilbert himself, because in the aforesaid Council of Rheims he had the humility to submit to the verdict of the bishops, and with his own mouth condemned both these and all other blameworthy opinions found expressed in his writings. But I speak against those who, in defiance of the apostolic interdict, promulgated in the same Council, are said to be still reading and transcribing his book, obstinately persisting in the error which its author has abjured, and more willing to imitate the example of his transgression than that of his repentance. And not only on their account, but for your sakes also, my brethren, I have thought it worth while to make this digression, taking occasion from the distinction which I was pointing out between the Image and the soul made according to the Image; so that if any of you should have ever happened to drink a draught of these stolen waters (to whose sweetness the Book of Proverbs bears testimony) he may now, after receiving the antidote, vomit forth the poison. Then, having purged his mind of everything unwholesome, let him come to hear what, according to my promise, remains still to be said concerning the likeness of the soul to the Word and to "draw (purer) water with joy (not out of mine, but) out of the fountains of the Saviour," the Bridegroom of the Church, Jesus Christ Our Lord, Who is over all things, God blessed for ever. Amen.

Footnotes

1. "Verumtamen in imagine pertransit homo" (Ps. xxxviii. 7), in the Douay Version, "Surely man passeth as an image." The change has been made to suit the context. — (Translator.) ↩

2. This greatness of the soul, namely, her capacity for eternal glory, belongs to what theologians call the "obediential power" (potentia obedientialis) of creatures, by which is meant their capacity to be made, according to the divine good pleasure, the instruments or the recipients of supernatural effects. On the question of its distinction from the being of its subject, Suarez appears to differ from St. Bernard. "This potency," he says (Disp. 43, s. 4) is nothing superadded to the natures of things, or really distinct from them." But it is evident from the arguments he uses that what he denies it to be is an adventitious supernatural quality, not a natural inseparable accident or condition. The capacity for heavenly bliss survives, therefore, in the reprobate, because they are still subject to God's dominion, although by His free decree it shall never be actualised. — Cf. Hickey, Sum. Phil. Schol., v. 1, n. 320.—(Translator.) ↩

3. In his work De Consideratione, 1. v. c. vi. we find this truth more fully expressed:"' When I had a little passed beyond them I found Him Whom my soul loveth.' Who is He? I know not how to answer better than to say that He is Who is. This is the name He desired should be given to Himself, this is the name He revealed to us, when at His command Moses said to the people, ' He Who is hath sent me to you.' It is a most appropriate name. None other would be so suitable to the Eternity Which is God. Shouldst thou call Him good, shouldst thou call Him great, shouldst thou call Him blessed, shouldst" thou call Him wise, shouldst thou give Him any other name whatever, thou summest all up when thou sayest that He is. For to Him to he is to be all perfect. Though thou shouldst assign Him a thousand such attributes, thou wouldst not have passed outside His simple existence. If thou expressest them, thou dost add nothing thereto, nor dost thou subtract anything therefrom if thou expressest them not." — (Translator.) ↩

4. De Tfinitate, 1. v. c. 10, n. 11. •f These two modes of predication with regard to God are thus contrasted by Hurter, Theol. Dogm., vol. ii. p. 29: "Predication by abstract substantives expresses the absolute perfection of the divine simplicity; whereas that by concrete adjectives, such as good, just, wise, always imports some composition, as signifying a quality superadded and inherent. For he who is good is possessed of goodness: but he who is said to possess goodness seems to be distinct from goodness, is not goodness itself, and therefore, in order to be good, must be informed by goodness; but information presupposes composition. Again, the former mode of predication expresses the infinity of the divine perfections, for what goodness can be wanting to One who is goodness itself? It expresses original (underived) perfection, for goodness is not good by anything distinct from itself. Lastly, it expresses perfection not as a quality inhering in the substance, but as identical with the substance or essence." But he adds, "Since such substantival predicates signify abstract perfection, lest it be thought that God has only an abstract and ideal existence, viz., in the minds of men, it is well to combine the concrete with the abstract, and to speak of Him, not only as goodness, wisdom, justice, etc., but also as good, wise, and just, because this latter manner of expression indicates His objective existence." — (Translator.) ↩

5. De Fide orth., can. 3. ↩