Chapter II. The Relation of the Holy Ghost to the Human Reason

In the last chapter I have, I trust, established the indissolubility of the union between the Holy Spirit and the Holy Catholic Church; from which follows, by necessity, its perpetual infallibility, both active and passive. I have indicated, at least in outline, the organs through which that infallibility is exercised, and have noted the degrees of authority possessed by them, and the kind and degrees of assent required by the acts and words of the Church or of its members.

In the present chapter I purpose to trace out the relation of the Holy Spirit to the reason of man, both the collective reason of the Church and the individual reason of its members taken one by one.

Now there are two ways in which the relation of the Holy Spirit delivering the revelation of God to the human reason may be treated.

1. First, we might consider the relation of revelation to reason in those who as yet do not believe; that is, in the examination of evidence to establish the fact of a revelation, and to ascertain its nature.

2. Secondly, the relation of revelation to reason after the fact has been accepted.

In the first case the reason acts as a judge of evidence, in the second it submits as a disciple to a Divine Teacher.

In the former case the reason must, by necessity, act as a judge in estimating the motives of credibility. Adults in every age become Christian upon being convinced by the proper evidence that Christianity is a divine revelation. This process of reason is the preamble of faith. Once illuminated, the reason of man becomes the disciple of a Divine Teacher.

Such was the state of those who in the beginning came as adults to Christianity. Now they are the exceptions in Christendom. The rule of God's dealings is that revelation should be, not a discovery, but an inheritance. To illustrate my meaning I may say — Adult baptism was at first the rule, now it is the exception; Infant baptism is the rule of God's dealing with us. So we inherit revelation before we examine it; and faith anticipates judgment. Again, to state the same in other words, there are two ways of considering the relation of reason to revelation, the one according to the logical and the other the historical order.

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S. Thomas treats it in the logical order. He says that science or rational knowledge is useful and necessary to faith in four ways: (1) Faith presupposes the operations of reason on the motives of credibility for which we believe. (2) Faith is rendered intrinsically credible by reason. (3) Faith is illustrated by reason. (4) Faith is defended by reason against the sophisms of false philosophy.1

It will perhaps be easier if we take the historical order, because it follows more simply the method of (rod's dealing with us. We will therefore treat first of the rule, and hereafter, so far as needs be, of the exceptions.

I speak then of the relations of reason to revelation in those who are within the light and tradition of truth.

I. The first relation of reason to revelation is to receive it by intellectual apprehension. It is like the relation of the eye to the light. There are, I may say, two kinds of sight, the passive and the active; that is, in plain words, there is a difference between seeing and looking. In the former the will is quiescent, in the latter it is in activity. We see

1 Sanseverino, I principali Sistemi della Filosofia sul Criteria. Napoli, 1858, p. 14.

a thousand things when we look only at one; we see the light even when we do not consciously fix the eye upon any particular object by an act of the will. So the intellect is both passive and active. And the intellect must first be in some degree passively replenished or illuminated by an object before it can actively apply itself to it. What is this but to go back to our old lessons in logic, to the three primary operations of the mind — apprehension, judgment, and discourse or process of reasoning? Now the apprehension of our logic is what may be called the passive relation of the reason to revelation, by which it apprehends, or understands, or knows, call it which we will, the meaning or outline of the truth presented to it before as yet it has made any act either of judgment or of discourse.

And this may be said to be the normal and most perfect relation of the reason to revelation. It is the nearest approach which can be made in this world to the quiescent contemplation of truth. It is the state into which we return after the most prolonged and active process of the intellect; the state to which we ascend by the most perfect operations of reasoning. The degrees of explicit knowledge deepen the intensity of knowledge; but the difference of knowing God as a child and knowing God as a philosopher is not in kind but in degree of discursive knowledge, and the knowledge of the philosopher may be less perfect than the knowledge of the child.

The proof of this appears to be evident. Eevelation is not discovery, or rather revelation is the discovery of Himself by God to man, not by man for himself. It is not the activity of the human reason which discovers the truths of revelation. It is God discovering or withdrawing the veil from His own intelligence, and casting the light of it upon us. These are truisms; but they are truths almost as universally forgotten and violated in the common habits of thought as they are universally admitted when enunciated.

We may take an illustration from science. Astronomy is a knowledge which comes to us by discovery. It was built up by active observation, and by reasoning. A tradition of astronomy has descended to us from the highest antiquity, perpetually expanding its circumference and including new regions of truth. But its whole structure is the result of the active reason. Even star-gazing is an active process of search. Chemistry again is still more a science of discovery, of experiment, of conjecture, and of active inquiry after secret qualities in minerals, vegetables, gases, and the like. Hardly any part of it can be said to be self-evident, or to anticipate discovery. Much more all the truths which come by the application of science, by the crossing, as it were, of the races and families of truths in the natural world.

All these branches and provinces of human knowledge may be called discoveries, not revelations. They are the fruits of an intense, prolonged, and accumulated cultivation of the human reason, and of the distinct soil or subject-matter of each region of truth.

Such may be called the genesis of science. But the relation of science to revelation is not our subject. I speak of it only to show the difference between the relation of reason to natural science and to revelation, and so dismiss it. When we come to revelation, the process of the reason is inverted. We start from a knowledge which we have not discovered, which we passively received, which we may cultivate for ever without enlarging its circumference or multiplying the articles of faith.

It is impossible to quote Scripture without seeming to use it in proof. But I quote it now, not as proof, but only as the best formula to express my meaning, which must be proved indeed by other proper reasons.

First, then, though the existence of God may be proved by reason and from lights of the natural order, it is certain that the knowledge of (rod's existence anticipated all such reasoning. The theism of the world was not a discovery. Mankind possessed it by primeval revelation, was penetrated and pervaded by it before any doubted of it, and reasoning did not precede but follow the doubts. Theists came before Philosophers, and Theism before Atheism, or even a doubt about the existence of God.1 S. Paul says that 'the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things which are made, His eternal power also and divinity, so that they are inexcusable.'2 The word seen signifies that God reflects Himself from the face of His works, and that the human intelligence, which was illuminated with the traditional knowledge of God, could read by reasoning the proofs of His existence in that reflection. These primary truths, therefore, of natural theology are propounded by the visible world to the reason of man. The knowledge of the existence of God pervaded the human intelligence as a traditional axiom, an inherited light, a consciousness of the human family anterior to all reflections upon the proofs, or analysis of the evidence from which it springs. The alleged

1 Viva, Theses Damnatce. Prop, de Peccato Philosophico ab Alex. VIIL damn. Pars iii. p. 13, sec. 12.

2 Rom. i. 20.

instances of individuals and races without the knowledge of God are anomalies in the history of mankind, and errors in philosophy.

What is true of natural is still more true of revealed theology. The knowledge which God has discovered of Himself came to man by gift and by infusion, not by logic nor by research. 6 God who at sundry times and in divers manners hath spoken to us in time past by the prophets, has in these last days spoken to us by His Son.' l ' The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, and we beheld His glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth.' e God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts.'2

The Incarnation was the revelation of God by personal manifestation and immediate illumination of the human reason. The Disciples knew Him gradually, not by gradual processes of discovery, but by gradual revelation of Himself. The light of 'the face of Jesus Christ ' was the source of their illumination. As He gradually revealed Himself by His miracles, His words, His passion, His resurrection, His ascension, their apprehension of His Godhead and His power enlarged its circle, and their consciousness of His Divine personality and power

1 Heb. i. 1. 2 S. John i. 14; 2 Cor. iv. 6.

pervaded all their intellect with the evidence of a supernatural light. What Jesus was to His Disciples the Holy Spirit was still further to the Apostles. The day of Pentecost filled up the whole outline of the revelation of which Jesus was both the subject and the first Discoverer, that is, Reveal er to the human reason.

But these are self-evident truths. The collective intelligence of the Apostles was the centre and springhead of the collective intelligence of the Church. The Church is composed of head, body, soul, intelligence, and will; and the illumination of truth pervades it in all its faculties, and sustains in it a perpetual consciousness of the whole outline of revelation. All that Jesus revealed in person or by His Spirit hangs suspended in the mind of the Church. It was not discovered by it, but revealed to it, and received by the quiescent intellect, which thereby was illuminated by a divine light. Its activity was elicited by the infusion of revealed truth, and the intelligence of the Church apprehended and comprehended by an active knowledge the revelation it had received.

And thus truth became an inheritance, descending from generation to generation, anticipating all discovery, search, or doubt,.and filling the intelligence with its light, taking possession of it by a divine operation. It is sustained indeed by the presence of a Divine Person and an infallible Teacher. But this latter point does not enter at present into the matter before us, which is to consider of the relations of the reason in individuals, or of the faithful as a body, to the deposit of revelation, and not the relations of the * magisterium Ecclesiae,' or of the operation of the reason of the Church under the assistance and as the organ of an infallible Teacher. This would need a separate treatment, and involve another class and series of questions, and must be reserved for another place.

II. The second relation of the reason to revelation is to propagate the truth it has received. ' Gro ye and make disciples of all nations.' l (Freely have ye received, freely give.'2 They were the messengers of a Divine Teacher, the witnesses of an order of divine facts. The reason of the Apostles diffused what it had received. They enumerated what they had learned, not as discoveries — nor as conclusions of dialectics — nor as philosophies — nor as criticisms — but as declarations of the Divine mind and will. (The Jews require signs, and the Greeks seek after wisdom: but we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews indeed a stumbling-^lock, and unto the Gren-

1 S. Matt, xxviii. 19. 2 S. Matt. x. 8.

tiles foolishness; but unto them that are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God.' ]

The reason of mankind, in like manner, received the revelation declared to it both by the lights of nature and by the lights of Pentecost. (I was found of them that did not seek me; I appeared openly to them that asked not after me.' 2

The preaching of the Apostles was an affirmation of truth; not as a problem to be proved, but as a revelation to be believed. As when our Divine Lord said, 'Search the Scriptures,' He did not rest the proof of His own Divine personality, mission, and truth upon the private judgment of His hearers; so the Apostles, when they preached Jesus at Berasa or at Athens, referred their hearers to Scripture and to nature, not as if their preaching depended upon these, but because their preaching was the key and fulfilment of the meaning both of Scripture and of nature. What they had apprehended from the lips of a Divine Teacher, they declared in His name to the apprehension of other men; and in this tradition of truth from intelligence to intelligence, the reason in its quiescent apprehension was filled with an absolute certainty which- anticipated all enquiry. 1 1 Cor. i. 22, 24. 2 Isaias in Rom. x. 20.

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The searching of Scriptures added nothing objectively to the light and certainty of the truth delivered to them. It only assured them subjectively that what the Apostles taught was what nature and Scripture taught likewise, so far as they extended. To the Athenians S. Paul was a babbler and a word-sower, and Jesus and the Eesurrection were strange gods, till they believed the Apostle to be a teacher sent from God. They then believed not anything they had discovered, but what they heard.

III. A third relation of reason to revelation is to define the truths divinely presented to it. What was apprehended was immediately clothed in words. The intellect invests its thoughts in words as it apprehends them. The illumination of the day of Pentecost found utterance at once in many tongues. It clothed itself in the words of many languages; and those words certainly were not chosen without the assistance of the same Divine Teacher who revealed the truths which they expressed. The first definitions of the Christian Faith are the Articles of the Baptismal Creed. We may pass over the historical traditions of the time and place of its first compositions. It is enough for our purpose to say, that the same doctrines, in the same order, and, so far as the diversity of language admits, in the same words, were delivered to the catechumens and to the baptized throughout the world. In S. Irenaeus, Tertullian, Origen, S. Cyprian, and S. Gregory Thaumaturgus, the outline of this universal creed may be read. The Churches of Csesarea, Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, in the East; of Borne, Aquileia, Eavenna and Tours, of Graul, Africa, and Spain, in the West, taught them in the same terms and order. In S. Cyril of Jerusalem in the East, and in S. Nicetas in the West, the Baptismal Creed may be found expounded. In the Councils of Nice and Constantinople it was more explicitly declared. In all this, the reason of the Church denned by a reflex act, the truths of which it was possessed.

Again: the Church in its General Councils has lineally defined the original revelation according to the needs of each successive age. The eighteen General Councils are one continuous action of the same mind, preserving the identity of truth, and defining it by a growing precision of expression.

In like manner, the theology of the Church consists chiefly in an enunciation of revealed truths. Its dialectical, or polemical, processes are not its primary operations. S. John, who is called the Theologian, may be taken as a type of the sacred science. The heavens were opened to him, and the throne and the

H2 heavenly court, the history and future of the Church were revealed. What he saw he fixed in words. What was visible in the heavens he transcribed upon the page of the Apocalypse. It was a process of apprehension and description, by which the structure and action of the kingdom of God in heaven and earth was delineated.

Such, in its primary operation, is the nature of theology which defines and enunciates the divine truths and facts of revelation, and presents them in their manifold unity, symmetry, and relations, and that in three distinct spheres or circles of truth: first, the original Eevelation; secondly, the definitions framed of apostolical tradition, of pontiffs, and of councils; and thirdly, the judgments and dogmatic facts, in which the Church speaks infallibly.

In all this the reason is as a disciple who intelligently apprehends, rehearses, and defines the truths which he has received.

IV. A fourth relation of reason to revelation is to. defend it. And this may be in two ways, negatively and positively.

By negatively I mean that the reason can demonstrate the nullity of arguments brought against revelation, either by showing their intrinsic invalidity, or by the analogy of the facts of nature.

But in this process the reason does not assume to demonstrate the truth of revealed doctrines, which rest upon their own proper evidence. It is reason against reason. Reason contending for revelation against reason contending against it. All the while revelation stands upon its own basis, that is the natural and supernatural witness, or consciousness and illumination of the Church. The argument against objectors simply clears away what may be called the criticism or rationalism of the human reason opposing itself to the revelation of the Divine.

The positive defence of theology occupies itself with demonstrating the possibility of revelation, its fitness, its probability, the necessity of a revelation, and the fact.

The first and simplest form of this defensive operation of the reason is to be found in the ancient Apologies, such as those of Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Arnobius, Minueius Felix, in which the possibility, probability, and fitness of revelation are assumed, and the whole effort of the apologists is directed to prove the fact, and that Christianity is that revelation. But this is addressed not to those who are within the Church, but to those who are without; that is, to Jews and Gentiles.

In these Apologies we find the simple enunciation of the doctrines of faith, but no system or method of theological science.

It is remarkable how little trace of scientific theology is to be found in the Oriental Church. Exuberant as it was in expositions of Holy Scripture, and in dogmatic treatises on the mysteries in controversy during the period of the four first General Councils, of which the Commentaries of Origen and S. John Chrysostom, and the works of S. Athanasius, S. Gregory of Nyssa, S. Gregory of Nazianzum, S. Basil, and S. Cyril of Alexandria, are witness, nevertheless there is hardly to be traced any attempt at a theological method or complete scientific expression of revelation. Dialectical, exact, and positive as S. Augustine is, it cannot be said that a scientific method of theology is to be found in his works. Some theologians are of opinion, that traces of such a scientific treatment are to be found in the writings of Theophilus of Antioch, Clement of Alexandria, S. Cyril of Jerusalem, Lactantius, and others; but in truth the first writer in whom anything of scientific arrangement or completeness of method is to be found is S. John of Damascus in the eighth century. And it may be said that his work, c De Orthodoxa Fide,' is both the first and the last to be found in the Oriental Church, so stationary and unreflective, it would seem, has the Oriental mind become since its separation from the centre of spiritual and intellectual activity, the Chair of S. Peter. Since S. John of Damascus, I hardly know what the Greek Church has produced, except a few meagre Catenas of the Fathers upon certain books of Holy Scripture, the works of Theophylact, a body of miserable Erastian canon law, a few still more meagre catechetical works, and many virulent and schismatical attacks upon the Primacy of the Holy See. It may be truly said that the history of the human intellect in the last eighteen hundred years is the history of Christianity, and the history of Christianity is the history of the Catholic Church. It is in the Catholic Church that the human intellect has developed its activity and its maturity, both within the sphere of revelation and beyond it.

It was not before the eleventh century that theology assumed a scientific and systematic form. Italy and France may claim the precedence, because the two who led the way in this work were born in, or reared by them; but it is no little glory to England that they were both Archbishops of Canterbury, Lanfranc and his disciple S. Anselm. It was another Archbishop of Canterbury who gave to the theological studies of England a scientific direction by introducing into the University of Oxford the study of Aristotle; which, strange to say, endures to this day — I mean S. Edmund. After these came Hugh and Eichard of S. Victor, Hildebert of Tours, Eobert Pool, Otto of Frisingen, S. Bernard, and others. It was at this period that the first explicit collision took place between reason ministering to revelation as its disciple, and reason dissecting it as a critic; that is, between S. Bernard and Abelard.

There may be said to be three epochs in the science of theology.

S. Anselm is not untruly thought to be the first who gave to theology the scientific impulse which has stamped a new form and method on its treatment. His two works, the ' Cur Deus Homo,' or (Eatio Incarnationis,' and that on the Holy Trinity called ' Fides quserens Intellectum DivinsB Essentiae et SSmae Trinitatis,' may be said to mark the first of the three epochs in theological science. The chief axiom of S. Anselm's theological method may be expressed in his own words • ' Sicut rectus ordo exigit ut profunda Christianse fidei prius credamus quam ea praBSumamus rations discutere, ita negligentia mihi videtur, si postquam confirmati sutnus in fide, non studemus quod credimus intelligere.' l

1 Cur Deus Homo, lib. i. c. 2.

The second epoch was constituted by the f Liber Sententiarum ' of Peter Lombard, which formed the text of the Schools for nearly two centuries. Alexander of Hales, Albertus Magnus, S. Bonaventura, S. Thomas, and many more commented on the Book of the Sentences, and formed the School of the Sententiastse, who were fated to pass away before the greater light of the third epoch.

The third epoch was made by S. Thomas. It is indeed true that England may claim somewhat of this glory. Before the Summa Theologica of S. Thomas, Alexander of Hales had formed a Summa Universae Theologia?, which would have inaugurated a new period, had not the more perfect amplitude, order, and unity of S. Thomas cast all others into shade. From this time the Book of the Sentences gave way to the Sum of Theology as the text of the Schools, and the Sententiastae yielded to the Summista3. From this time onward two great streams of scientific theology flow towards us, the one of Dominican commentators on the Sum of their great doctor, such as Caietan, Sylvius, the Sotos, and others; the other, which sprung later, of Jesuit commentators, Suarez, Vasquez, De Lugo, and the like.

Since the Council of Trent, another mode of treating theology has arisen. The controversy with the pretended appeal to antiquity, threw the Catholic theologian more and more upon the study of the History of Dogma; and theology assumed what is called the positive method. Nevertheless, the Scholastic method still held and holds to this day its ascendency. And that because it represents the intellectual process of the Church, elaborating, through a period of many centuries, an exact conception and expression of revealed truth. The Scholastic method can never cease to be true, just as logic can never cease to be true, because it is the intellectual order of revealed truths in their mutual relations, harmony, and unity. To depreciate it is to show that we do not understand it. The critical and exegetical studies which are tributary to it may be advanced and corrected, but the form of the Scholastic theology has its basis in the intrinsic nature and relations of the truths of which it treats. All else is subordinate and accidental.

V. The last relation of which I will speak is that of transmitting theology by a scientific treatment and tradition. The mind or intelligence of the Church has had, as we have seen, many relations to the revelation entrusted to it, namely, that of passive reception, from which arises the consciousness of supernatural knowledge; — that of enunciation, which presupposes apprehension or conception of the truths received; — that of definition, or the precise verbal expression, and the orderly digest of the doctrines of faith; — that of defence, by way of proof and evidence; — and, finally, by a scientific treatment and tradition. I say scientific, because theology, though not a science proprie dicta, may be truly and correctly so described.

The definition of Science, according to both philosophers and theologians, is cthe habit of the mind conversant with necessary truth,' that is, truth which admits of demonstration and of the certainty which excludes the possibility of its contradictory being true. According to the Scholastic philosophy, Science is defined as follows: —

Viewed subjectively, it is f The certain and evident knowledge, of the ultimate reasons or principles of truth, attained by reasoning.'

Viewed objectively r, it is 'The system of known truths belonging to the same order, as a whole, and depending upon one only principle.'!

This is founded on the definition of Aristotle. In the sixth book of the Ethics, ch. 3, he says: ' From this it is evident what Science is; to speak accurately,

1 Sanseverino, Elementi di Filosofia Speculativa, vol. i. pp. 130, 131. Napoli, 1862.

and not to follow mere similitudes, for we all understand that what we know cannot be otherwise than we know it. For whatsoever may or may not be, as a practical question, is not known to be or not to be. For that which is known is necessary; therefore eternal. For whatsoever is necessary is simply eternal.'

Such also is the definition of S. Thomas, who says, ' Whatsoever truths are truly known, as by certain knowledge (ut certa scientia), are known by resolution into their first principles, which of themselves are immediately present to the intellect; and so all science is constituted by a vision of the thing as present, so that it is impossible that the same thing should be the object both of faith and of science, because, that is, of the obscurity of the principles of faith.' l Nevertheless, he affirms that from principles accepted by faith, truths may be proved to the faithful, as from principles naturally known to others; and that, therefore, theology is a science: but this, as Vasquez shows from Caietan, is to be understood not simply, but relatively— non simpliciter, sed secwndum quid. The opinion of Caietan, founded on S. Thomas, is, that theology is to be understood in two ways — as it is in itself, and as it is in us. The former is as it is in God

1 D. Thorn. De Veritate, qusest. xiv. art. 9.

and the blessed, which is properly science; the latter, as it is in us, as 'viatores,' in which state it is a science subalternate, deriving its principles from the science in (rod by faith, and therefore not to be called properly a science. l The Thomists generally seem to have held 'that theology in us, as "viatores," when deduced from articles known by divine faith only, is true and proper science, not only in itself, but as it is in us; but, nevertheless, imperfect in its kind.'2 But the more common opinion among the Scholastic theologians affirms that theology in us, ' viatores,' as it is in us, is not true and proper science. Such is the opinion also of Vasquez, and of many quoted by him. The summary of the question is given by Gregory of Valentia, who says: ' That theology is not science is taught by Durandus, Ocham, Gabriel, and others, whose opinions I hold to be the truest. The foundation of all these is most certain, namely, that it is of the essence of science, according to Aristotle, that the assent elicited by it should be evident; for he who knows, must know that the thing cannot be otherwise than he knows it to be. But the habit of theology does not elicit such an assent. For theological assent must be resolved into two, or at least one

1 Vasquez, vol. i. pp. 10, 11; Caiet. in S. Thorn. Sum. Theol. Pars I. qusest. i. art. 2. 2 Ibid. p. 11.

proposition resting on faith, which cannot be evident.

Therefore, theological assent is not evident

But- this does not detract from the dignity of theology. For though it be not a proper science, it is a habit absolutely more perfect than any science.' 1

Gregory of Valentia goes on to say, 'Let theology, then, be neither science in itself — as the philosophers describe it — nor properly a science subalternated to the science of God and of the blessed, but only improprie, by reason of a certain similitude which it bears to sciences which are properly subalternated to higher sciences, because it proceeds from the assertions of faith, or from principles which are known by the knowledge and science of God and of the blessed. Yet nevertheless by the best of rights it may be called a science, because, absolutely, it is a habit more perfect than any science described by philosophers.' 2

Gregory of Valentia proceeds to show that theology is more perfect than science properly so called. He does so by affirming that it is wisdom. This he proves by showing that it has the ' three conditions of wisdom. First, it treats of the highest and universal truths. Secondly, it is so called in Scripture. Thirdly, it may be proved to be so by the authority

1 Greg, de Val. disp. i. qusest. i. punct. 3.

2 Ibid, punct. 3.

of Aristotle; because the five conditions required by him in wisdom, and found by him in metaphysics — the highest wisdom in his esteem — are fulfilled in an eminent degree by theology.' First, it deals with universals. Second, with things the most removed from sense. Third, it is a most certain habit of the intellect, proceeding from the most certain causes. Fourth, it is self- caused, and not caused by any other science. Fifth, it is directed by no other science, but directs itself and all other sciences.1

(Theology, then,' as Vasquez says, f does not mean any kind of knowledge of God, for so faith also might be called theology; nor does it mean the knowledge by which we know how to explain and to defend that which is delivered in Scripture: but by theology is understood a science by which, from principles revealed in Scripture, or by the authority of councils, or confirmed and believed by the tradition of the Church, we infer other truths and conclusions by evident consequence.' 2

Following the principles here laid down, theology may be called a science. First, because it is a science, if not as to its principles, at least as to its form, method, process, development, and transmission. And

1 Greg, de Valent. disp. i. qusest. i. punct. 4.

2 Vasq. in S. Thorn, disp. iv. art. 2.

because, if its principles are not evident, they are, in all the higher regions of it, infallibly certain; and because many of them are the necessary, eternal, and incorruptible truths which, according to Aristotle, generate science.

Kevelation, then, contemplated and transmitted in exactness and method, may be called a science and the queen of sciences, the chief of the hierarchy of truth; and it enters and takes the first place in the intellectual system and tradition of the world. It possesses all the qualities and conditions of science so far as its subject-matter admits; namely, certainty as against doubt, definiteness as against vagueness, harmony as against discordance, unity as against incoherence, progress as against dissolution and stagnation.

A knowledge and belief of the existence of God has never been extinguished in the reason of mankind. The polytheisms and idolatries which surrounded it were corruptions of a central and dominant truth which, although obscured, was never lost. And the tradition of this truth was identified with the higher and purer operations of the natural reason, which have been called the intellectual system of the world. The mass of mankind, howsoever debased, were always theists. Atheists, as

I have said, were anomalies and exceptions. The theism of the primeval revelation formed the intellectual system of the heathen world. The theism of the patriarchal revelation formed the intellectual system of the Hebrew race. The theism revealed in the incarnation of God has formed the intellectual system of the Christian world. (Sapientia sedificavit sibi domum.' The science or knowledge of God has built for itself a tabernacle in the intellect of mankind, inhabits it, and abides in it.

The intellectual science of the world finds its perfection in the scientific expression of the theology of faith. But from first to last the reason of man is the disciple, not the critic, of the revelation of God: and the highest science of the human intellect is that which, taking its preamble from the light of nature, begins in faith; and receiving its axioms from faith, expands by the procession of truth from truth.

From what has been said many conclusions follow, which can only be stated now by way of propositions. To discuss them would need many chapters. It is evident —

1. First, that the highest and most perfect operation of the reason in respect to revelation presupposes the reception of revelation by faith, of which the whole structure of scientific theology, and the contemplation of truth by the intellect illuminated by faith, are both example and proof.

2. Secondly, that the highest discursive powers of the reason are developed by revelation, which elevates it from the contemplation of the first principles and axioms of truth in the natural order to a higher and wider sphere, unattainable by the reason without faith.

3. Thirdly, that reason is not the source nor the measure of supernatural truth; nor the test of its intrinsic credibility.1 This principle has been lately affirmed by Pius IX. in the recent Brief to the Archbishop of Munich.

4. Fourthly, that the Church alone, by Divine illu-

1 In the Brief of Pius IX. to the Archbishop of Munich the contrary to this is expressly condemned. < Hinc dubitare nolumus, quin ipsius conventus viri commemoratam veritatem noscentes ac profit entes uno eodemque tempore plane rejicere ac reprobare voluerint recentem illam ac prseposteram philosophandi rationem, quse etiamsi divinam revelationem veluti historicum factum admittat, tamen ineffabiles veritates ab ipsa divina revelatione propositas humanae rationis investigationibus supponit, perinde ac si illse yeritates rationi subjectse essent, vel ratio suis viribus et principiis posset consequi intelligentiam et scientiam omnium supernarum sanctissimse fidei nostrse veritatum, et mysteriorum, quae ita supra humanam rationem sunt, ut hsec nunquam effici possit idonea ad ilia suis yiribus, et ex naturalibus suis principiis intelligenda, aut demonstranda.' — Litt. Pii PP. IX. ad Archiep. Monac. Dec. 21, 1863.

mination and assistance, knows, teaches, and authoritatively imposes belief in matters of revealed truth.

5. Fifthly, that theological science, or the operation of reason and criticism upon revealed truth, does not generate faith; but that faith, through the operations of the illuminated reason, acting as a disciple and not as a critic, generates theological science.

6. Sixthly, that if theology in its highest form may not be properly called science, by reason of the obscurity of its principles; much less may historical and biblical criticism be elevated to the character of science.

7. Seventhly, that to erect historical and biblical criticism, or theology founded on it, into a science which is to form the public opinion of the Church, to control the hierarchy, and to conform to itself even the judgment of the Holy See, is to invert the whole order of the Divine procedure which has committed the custody and enunciation of revealed truth to the Church, in its office of witness, judge, and teacher.

8. Eighthly, that the Church, acting judicially and magisterially, is the creator of theological science, and controls it by its decisions, which are infallible.

9. Ninthly, that the converse of this would subordinate the Ecclesia docens to the Ecclesia discens.

10. Tenthly, that this subordination of the objective faith and science of the Ecclesia docens to the subjective faith and science of its individual members is of the nature of Gnosticism, Illuminism, and of Kationalism.

11. Eleventhly, that in the ultimate analysis, this procedure would constitute the critical science of the natural reason as the coordinate test of revealed truth by the side of the supernatural discernment of the Church.

Though I cannot enter upon any of these propositions now, I am unwilling to pass over a passage of remarkable beauty bearing on this principle in the works of S. Francis of Sales.

6 In a general council, the controverted points of doctrine are first proposed, and theological arguments are employed to discover the truth. These matters having been discussed, the bishops, and particularly the Pope who is their head, conclude and decree what is to be believed; and as soon as they have pronounced, all acquiesce fully in their decision. We must observe, that this submission is not founded on the reasons which have been alleged in the preceding argument, but on the authority of the Holy Ghost, who, presiding invisibly at the council, has concluded, determined, and decreed by the mouth of His ministers, whom He has established pastors of the Church. The arguments and discussions are carried on in the porch; but the decision and acquiescence, by which they are terminated, take place in the sanctuary, where the Holy Spirit specially resides, animating the body of the Church, and speaking by the mouth of the bishops, according to the promise of the Son of God.' l

12. Twelfthly, that if coordinate, unless submissive, the critical reason makes itself superior.

13. Thirteenthly, that the superior test is ultimately the sole test of truth, which would be thereby placed in what is called the scientific reason, that is to say of individuals.

14. Fourteenthly, that the scientific reason would be thereby constituted as the ultimate measure and source of truth, which is pure Rationalism, of which the method laid down in the work called 'Essays and Reviews ' is the most recent example among us.

I conclude, then, as I began, that the reason is the disciple, not the critic, of revelation; and that the relation of docility to divine light and to a divine guide is not only consistent with the elevation and development of the human intellect, but the true and only condition of its highest powers and of its scientific perfection. And of this the intellectual

1 S. Francis of Sales, Treatise on the Love of G-od, b. ii. c. xiv.

history and state of Christendom is evidence. I cannot better express my meaning than by words used on the same subject on another occasion: —

6 In a word, it is not science which generates faith, but faith which generates science by the aid of the reason illuminated by revelation. In what I have hitherto said, I have assumed one truth as undeniable and axiomatic, namely, that God has revealed Himself; that he has committed this revelation to His Church; and that He preserves both His revelation and His Church in all ages by His own presence and assistance from all error in faith and morals. Now, inasmuch as certain primary truths — which may be naturally known of God and the soul, and of the relations of the soul with God, and of man with man; that is, certain truths discoverable also in the order of nature by reason or by philosophy — are taken up into and incorporated with the revelation of God, the Church, therefore, possesses the first principles of rational philosophy and of natural ethics, both for individuals and for society. And, inasmuch as these principles are the great regulating truths of philosophy and natural morality, including natural politics, the Church has ' a voice, a testimony, and a jurisdiction within these provinces of natural knowledge. I do not affirm the

Church to be a philosophical authority, but I may affirm it to be a witness in philosophy. Much more when we come to treat of Christian philosophy or the TheodicaBa, or Christian morals and Christian politics; for these are no more than the truths of nature grafted upon the stock of revelation, and elevated to a supernatural perfection. To exclude the discernment and voice of the Church from philosophy and politics, is to degrade both by reducing them to the natural order. First, it pollards them; and next, it deprives them of the corroboration of a higher evidence. Against this the whole array of Catholic theologians and philosophers has always contended. They have maintained that the tradition of theological and ethical knowledge is divinely preserved, and has a unity in itself; that there is a true traditive philosophy running down in the same channel with the divine tradition of faith, recognised by faith, known by the light of nature, and guarded by the circle of supernatural truths by which faith has surrounded it. In saying this, I am not extending the infallibility of the Church to philosophical or political questions apart from their contact with revelation; but affirming only that the radical truths of the natural order have become rooted in the substance of faith, and are guaranteed to us by the witness and custody of the Church. So likewise, as the laws of Christian civilisation are the laws of natural morality elevated by the Christian law, which is expounded and applied by the Church, there is a tradition both of private and public ethics — or, in other words, of morality and jurisprudence — which forms the basis of all personal duty, and of all political justice. In this, again, the Church has a discernment, and therefore a voice. A distribution of labour in the cultivation of all provinces of truth is prudent and intelligible. A division of authority and an exclusion of the Church from science is not only a dismemberment of the kingdom of truth, but a forcible rending of certain truths from their highest evidence. Witness the treatment of the question whether the existence of God can be proved and whether God can be known by natural reason in the hands of those who turn their backs upon the tradition of evidence in the universal Church. Unless revelation be an illusion, the voice of the Church must be heard in these higher provinces of human knowledge. " Newton," as Dr. Newman says, " cannot dispense with the metaphysician, nor the metaphysician with us." Into cosmogony the Church must enter by the doctrine of creation; into natural theology, by the doctrine of the existence and perfections of God;

into ethics, by the doctrine of the cardinal virtues; into politics, by the indissolubility of marriage, the root of human society, as divorce is its dissolution. And by this interpenetration and interweaving of its teaching the Church binds all sciences to itself. They meet in it as in their proper centre. As the sovereign power which runs into all provinces unites them in one empire, so the voice and witness of the Church unites and binds all sciences in one.

(It is the parcelling and morselling out of science, and this disintegration of the tradition of truth, which has reduced the intellectual culture of England to its present fragmentary and contentious state. Not only errors are generated, but truths are set in opposition; science and revelation are supposed to be at variance, and revelation to be the weaker side of human knowledge.

'The Church has an infallible knowledge of the original revelation. Its definitions of Divine Faith fall within this limit; but its infallible judgments reach beyond it. The Church possesses a knowledge of truth which belongs also to the natural order. The existence of God — His power, goodness, and perfections — the moral law written in the conscience — are truths of the natural order which are declared also by revelation, and recorded in Holy Scripture.

These truths the Church knows by a twofold light — by the supernatural light of revelation, and by the natural light which all men possess. In the Church this natural light is concentrated as in a focus. The great endowment of common sense — that is, the communis sensus generis humani, the maximum of light and evidence for certain truths of the natural order — resides eminently in the collective intelligence of the Church; that is to say, in the intelligence of the faithful, which is the seat of its passive infallibility, and in the intelligence of the pastors, or the Magisterium Ecclesice, which is the organ of its active infallibility. That two and two make four, is not more evident to the Catholic Church than to the rest of mankind, to S. Thomas or S. Bonaventura, than to Spinosa and Comte. But that God exists, and that man is responsible, because free, are moral truths, and for the perception of moral truths, even of the natural order, a moral discernment is needed; and the moral discernment of the Church, even of natural truths, is, I maintain, incomparably higher than the moral discernment of the mass of mankind, by virtue of its elevation to greater purity and conformity to the laws of nature itself.¹

nature and perfections, the radiance which surrounds " the Father of lights, in whom is no change, neither shadow of vicissitude." Springing from this central science flow the sciences of the works of God, in nature and in grace; and under the former fall not only the physical sciences, but those which relate to man and action — as morals, politics, and history. Now, the revelation God has given us rests for its centre upon God Himself, but in its course describes a circumference within which many truths of the natural order relating both to the world and to man are included. These the Church knows, not only by natural light, but by Divine revelation, ajid declares by Divine assistance. But these primary truths of the natural order are axioms and principles of the sciences within which they properly fall; and these truths of philosophy belong also to the domain of faith. The same truths are the object of faith and of science; they are the links which couple these sciences to revelation. How, then, can these sciences be separated from their relation to revealed truth without a false procedure? No Catholic could so separate them, for these truths enter within the dogma of faith. No Christian who believes in Holy Scripture could do so, for they are included in Holy Writ. No mere philosopher could do so, for thereby he would discard and perhaps place himself in opposition and discord with the maximum of evidence which is attainable on these primary verities, and therefore with the common sense not only of Christendom, but of mankind. In this I am not advocating a mixture or confusion of religion and philosophy, — which, as Lord Bacon says in his work " De Augmentis Scientiarum," will undoubtedly make an heretical religion, and an imaginary and fabulous philosophy,— but affirming that certain primary truths of both physical and ethical philosophy are delivered to us by revelation, and that we cannot neglect them as our starting-points in such sciences without a false procedure and a palpable forfeiture of truth. Such verities are, for instance, the existence of God, the creation of the world, the freedom of the will, the moral office of the conscience, and the like. Lord Bacon says again, (i There may be veins and lines, but not sections or separations," in the great continent of Truth. All truths alike are susceptible of scientific method, and all of a religious treatment. The father of modern philosophy, as men of our day call him, so severe and imperious in maintaining the distinct province and process of science, is not the less peremptory and absolute as to the unity of all truth and the vital relation of all true science to the Divine philosophy of revelation.'

We are as little dazzled by the intellectual development of the Anticatholic science as by the pretensions of modern democracy. We see both going to pieces before our eyes. And ex parte intellectus et ex parte voluntatis we submit ourselves to the Church of God, the mother and mistress of Christian science and Christian society, as our only guide and only redemption from the aberrations which spring from the reason, and the confusions which spring from the will of man.

Footnotes

1. The highest object of human science is God; and theology, properly so called, is the science of His ↩