Lecture 13 — Sense-objects in general

In treating of each sense, we must first discuss sense-objects. We speak of a sense-object in three ways: two of which we say are sensed through themselves, but one accidentally. Of the two former, one is proper to each sense, the other common to all.

Now, I call the proper object of a sense that which does not fall within the ambit of another sense and about which it cannot err, as sight is of color, and hearing of sound, and taste of flavor, while touch has several different objects.

Each particular sense can discern these objects and it is not deceived; thus, sight does not err as to color, nor hearing as to sound, though it might err about what is colored, or where it is, or about what is giving forth a sound. This, then, is what is meant by the proper objects of each sense.

Now, the common sense-objects are movement, rest, number, shape, magnitude. Such things are proper to no one sense but are common to all; thus a certain movement is sensible both by touch and by sight. These, then, are through themselves objects of sensation.

However, that is said to be a sense-object accidentally, for example, if the white thing is the son of Diares. For this is sensed accidentally because what is sensed is accidental to the white. Whence the sense is unaffected by that sensible object as such. Of things that are sensible through themselves, the proper objects are sensible properly speaking and to these the substance of each sense is naturally adapted.

383. In treating of each sense (418a7). Having explained how the sense powers are related to their objects, the Philosopher now begins his examination of sensible objects and sense powers. This inquiry divides into two parts.

The first part is concerned with the sense-objects.

The second, starting at it must be taken universally (424a17; [386]), is concerned with the sense powers.

The first part again divides into two.

First, he distinguishes the proper sense-objects from the rest.

And second, at that of which there is sight (418a26; [399]), he examines the proper objects of each sense.

About the first, he does two things:

first, he makes a division of the sense-objects;

second, at now, I call that the proper object (418a11; [384]), he explains the members of this division.

Beginning, then, he observes that before we determine what a sense is, we first must discuss sense-objects, for objects are prior to their powers. Now, the term, “sensible,” or, “sense-object,” is used in three ways: in one way accidentally, and in two ways through itself; and of the latter, we use one in referring to the objects proper to each sense, and the other in referring to objects that are sensed commonly by all the senses.

384. Then, at now, I call that (418a11), he explains the members of the division, and first, what he means by a proper sense-object. He says that he means by this term what is so sensed by one sense that it cannot be sensed by another sense, and about which it cannot err; thus, it is proper to sight to know color; to hearing, to know sound; to taste, to know flavor or savor. Touch, however, has several objects proper to itself—hot and cold, wet and dry, heavy and light, etc. Each sense can discern the objects proper to itself and is not deceived about these, for example, sight is not deceived that this is such and such a color, nor is hearing deceived about sound.

385. Though a sense can be deceived both about objects only accidentally sensible and about the common objects. For example, sight is deceived if a man wanted to discern by sight what is colored, or where it is; and likewise he is deceived if he wanted to discern by hearing alone what was causing a sound. Such, then, are the proper objects of each sense.

386. Next, at now, the common sense-objects (418a17), he says, touching the second member of the division, that the common sense-objects are five: movement, rest, number, shape, and magnitude. These are proper to no one sense but are common to all. This we must not take so as to mean that all these are common to all the senses, but that some of them, that is, number, movement, and rest, are common to all. But touch and sight perceive all five. It is clear, then, what are through themselves objects of sensation.

387. Then, at however, that is said to be a sense-object accidentally (418a20), he takes the third member of the division. We might, he says, call Diares or Socrates a sense-object accidentally because each happens to be white, for that is sensed accidentally which happens to (or is accidental to) what is sensed through itself. It is accidental to the white thing, which is sensed through itself, that it should be Diares; hence Diares is a sense-object accidentally. Whence the sense is unaffected by this man as such. While it is true, however, that both common and proper sense-objects are all sensible through themselves, yet the proper objects are sensible properly speaking through themselves, for the very substance and definition of each sense consists in its being naturally fitted to be acted upon by this sort of sensible object. For the account of each and every power consists in an orientation to a proper object.

388. A difficulty arises here about the distinction between common and accidental sense-objects.

For just as the latter are apprehended only insofar as the proper objects are apprehended, so too, the same is true of the common sense-objects: the eye would never apprehend magnitude or shape if it did not apprehend what is colored. It would seem, then, that the common sense-objects are also accidental sense-objects.

389. Now, there are some who base the distinction between common and accidental sense-objects upon two reasons.

First, they say that the common sense-objects are proper to the common sense, as the proper sense-objects are proper to the individual senses.

Second, that the proper sense-objects are inseparable from the common sense-objects, but not from the accidental sense-objects.

390. But both answers are inadequate.

The first is based on the fallacy that these common sense-objects are the proper object of the common sense. For, as we shall see later, the common sense is the power at which the modifications affecting all the particular senses terminate; hence it is impossible that it have as its proper object anything that is not an object of a proper sense. (Lect. 25, nn. 575–78; lect. 27, nn. 601–14.) Rather, in reference to those very modifications of the proper senses, coming from their objects, the common sense has certain proper activities that the proper senses themselves cannot have; for example, it perceives the senses’ modifications themselves and it discerns between the sense-objects of the diverse senses. For it is by the common sense that we perceive our seeing and we distinguish between the white and the sweet.

391. Moreover, even if it were granted that the common sense-objects were proper to the common sense, this would not prevent their being the accidental sense-objects of the proper senses. For we are still studying the sense-objects in relation to the proper senses; for the common sense has not yet been elucidated. As we shall see later, the proper object of an interior power may happen to be accidentally sensible. Nor is this strange; for even as regards the exterior senses, what is through itself sensible for one of these exterior senses is accidentally sensible relative to another, just as the sweet is accidentally visible.

392. The second reason is also inadequate. For it is irrelevant to what is sensible accidentally whether what underlies a sensible quality underlies it through itself or not. For no one, for instance, would maintain that fire, which is properly speaking the underlying of heat, is through itself an object of touch.

393. So we must respond in another way, by saying that we have seen (Bk. 1, lect. 12, n. 183; bk. 2, lect. 10, nn. 350–51.) that sensing is a being acted upon and a being altered in some way. Whatever, then, makes a difference within the undergoing itself or alteration of the sense has, through itself, an orientation to the sense, and it is called “sensible through itself.” But whatever makes no difference as regards the modification of the sense is called an “sensible accidentally.” Hence, the Philosopher says explicitly that the sense is unaffected by the accidental object as such.

394. Now, something can make a difference in the modification of the sense in two ways.

One way is with respect to the very species of agent, and in this way things sensible through themselves make a modification of the sense, inasmuch as this is a color, whereas that is a sound, this is white, that is black. For the very species of the things acting in sensation are the proper sense-objects, to which the sensitive power has a natural aptitude, and on account of this the senses are divided in reference to some difference of these sense-objects.

On the other hand, some things make a difference in the modification of the senses not according to the species of the agent, but according to the mode of the action. For sensible qualities move the senses corporeally and positionally, so they move them in different ways inasmuch as they are in a bigger or a smaller body, and insofar as they are in diverse positions, that is, near or far, or together or apart. And it is in this way that the common sensibles make a difference in the modification of the senses. For obviously magnitude and position vary for all five of these. And not being oriented to the senses as species of things that act on them, they do not properly differentiate the sense powers, but they remain common to several powers at once.

395. Having seen how we should speak of things sensible through themselves, both common and proper, it remains to be seen for what reason anything is said to be a sensible accidentally.

Therefore one should note that for an object to be a sense-object accidentally, it must first be connected accidentally with what is a sense-object through itself; for example, a man may happen to be white, or a white thing happen to be sweet.

Second, it must be apprehended by the one sensing; for if something were connected with the sense-object while hidden from the one sensing, it could not be said to be sensed accidentally. But this implies that it is known through itself by some other cognitive power belonging to the one sensing it.

Now, this latter power must be either another sense, or the intellect, or the cogitative power or estimative power. But by “another sense,” I mean as when we say that the sweet is accidentally visible inasmuch as a white thing, apprehended by sight, happens to be sweet, whereas the sweet is through itself apprehended by taste.

396. But, speaking precisely, this is not universally accidentally a sense-object; rather, it is accidentally visible, but it is sensible through itself.

Therefore, what is not known by any proper sense is apprehended by the intellect, if it be a universal; still, not everything that can be apprehended by intellect in a sensed thing can be called a “sense-object accidentally,” but only what is intellectually apprehended immediately at the presence of the sensed reality. Thus, as soon as I see anyone talking or moving himself, I apprehend his life through my intellect, whence I can say that I see him live.

But if this is apprehended in an individual, as when, seeing a colored thing, I perceive this particular man or this beast, then in fact the apprehension arises in a man through the cogitative power, which is also called “particular reason,” because it collects the intentions of individuals, just as universal reason collects the accounts of universals.

397. Nevertheless, this capacity is in the sensitive part of the soul, for the sensitive power at its highest—in man, in whom the sense power is joined to the intellectual—has a certain share in the intellectual power. But the irrational animals’ apprehension of individualized intentions occurs through a natural estimation, in virtue of which a sheep recognizes its offspring by sight, or hearing, or something of that sort.

398. Nonetheless the cogitative power and the estimative power are oriented in different ways relative to this. The cogitative apprehends the individual as existing under a common nature, and this is because it is united to intellect in one and the same subject. Hence it knows this man insofar as he is this man, and this tree as it is this tree; but the estimative power does not apprehend any individual insofar as it is under a common nature, but only insofar as it is the terminus or principle of some action or passion. For example, a sheep knows this lamb, not insofar as it is this lamb, but insofar as it is able to be suckled by it, and this grass insofar as it is its food. Hence, those individual things to which its action or passion does not extend it does not apprehend at all by its natural estimation. For natural estimation is given to animals so that they might be ordered in their own proper seeking and avoiding actions and passions.