Lecture 29 — Imagination: what it is not

Concerning understanding, since it is one thing and sensation another, and of this, imagination seems to be one thing and opinion another, let us settle first what imagination is and then speak of the other matter.

If, then, imagination is that by which we say that some phantasm arises within us, it follows (if we are not speaking metaphorically) that it is one of the powers or dispositions in virtue of which we discern and pronounce either falsely or truly. Such powers are sensation, opinion, knowledge, understanding.

That it is not sensation, then, is evident. For sensation is either in potency or in act: the power of sight or the seeing. But appearances occur when neither of these is present, as when we dream.

Further, sensation is always found in all animals, but this is not so with imagination.

But if they were the same in act, it would happen that imagination was present in all beasts. But this apparently is not so: e.g., in the ant, the bee, the worm.

Again, sensations are always true, but many phantasms are false.

Again, we do not say, when we are functioning accurately with regard to sense-objects, that it seems to us to be a man; we say this rather when our sensation is indistinct, in which case it may be true or false.

And, as we said before, such visions appear to men in their sleep.

And it is certainly not one of the things that are always truthful, such as knowledge or understanding; for imagination can be true or false.

It remains, therefore, to consider whether it is opinion, for opinion can be either true or false. But belief follows immediately on opinion, for one never finds a man not believing the opinion that seems to him to be true. But there is no such thing as belief amongst beasts, although there is imagination in many.

Further, belief follows all opinion and is due to conviction, which in turn is due to reasoning. Now, imagination is found in some beasts, but reason is found in none.

It is therefore evident, on these grounds, that neither opinion accompanying sensation, nor through sensation, nor a combination of opinion and sensation, will constitute imagination.

And it is clear that opinion would have the same objects as sensation. I mean, that an imagining of white would be a combination of the sensed white and the opinion that it is white. For it would not be produced by an opinion of white and a sensation of good. To imagine, then, would be having an opinion of the same thing as what one senses—not accidentally.

False appearances, however, are possible even while one holds a true opinion, such as that the sun seems to be a foot across yet is believed to be greater than the inhabited world.

Therefore, it comes about either that one discards the true opinion which one held, the thing itself remaining, and one neither forgets nor ceases to hold it. Or, if one still retains it, the same thing must be both true and false. But it becomes false if there is an unnoticed transformation in the facts. Imagination, therefore, is neither one of these, nor constituted from these.

637. Concerning understanding (427b27). After saying that imagination is not the same as opinion, he begins to examine it in itself.

First, he states the question to be treated;

second, he pursues it, at if then (428a1; [638]).

We have seen, he says, that understanding differs from sensation, and that opinion pertains to the former, but imagining to the latter; (Lect. 28, nn. 630–31.) and now, having finished with the senses, it will be convenient to discuss imagination before tackling the other problems touching the intellect and opinion. (Bk. 3, lect. 1.)

638. Then, at if, then (428a1), he begins to treat of imagination. And about this he does two things.

First, he shows that the imagination is not any of those manifest powers or dispositions by which we discern or judge things to be true or false.

Second, at but since it can happen (428b10; [655]), he shows what in fact the imagination is.

The former section subdivides into three.

First, he enumerates our various powers or modes of discernment;

second, he shows that imagination is not one of these, at that it is not sensation (428a5; [641]);

and third, that it is not even a combination of any of them, at it is, therefore, evident (428a24; [651]).

First, then, he observes that if it is through imagination that we say that some phantasm or appearance (unless the term “imagination” is taken metaphorically) arises within us, imagination necessarily seems to be one of those cognitive dispositions or powers by which one thing is discerned from another or by which we speak truly or falsely, that is, we err or we do not err. (That is, for something to appear is to discern it and to say either the true or the false.) Now, there seem to be four powers or dispositions from which such discernment or speaking of the true and false proceeds: sensation, understanding, science, and opinion. Imagination, then, seems to be one of these four.

639. Aristotle mentions these four as being already familiar. Other things that seem to pertain to cognition were still, at the time he was writing, not defined with certainty. But having already distinguished sensation from the intellect, he can enumerate here three others distinct from sense: understanding, opinion, and science. (Lect. 28, nn. 630–31.) Nor is he, apparently, taking “understanding” here as a power (i.e., the intellect); else it would not be set apart from science and opinion, which both belong to the intellectual power. But “understanding” means here the certain apprehension, without inquiry, that makes some things known to us, such as the first principles; “science,” on the other hand, means knowledge about those things about which we become certain through the investigation of reason, and “opinion” for knowledge of those things about which we do not have a certain judgment.

640. And in calling imagination one of these dispositions or powers, he implies that among these there is something as a potency and something as a habit. Moreover, we can know that only these principles of apprehension were recognized by the ancients, based on the opinion of Plato that was presented above in the first book; for he reduced only these four to numbers—understanding to one, science to two, opinion to three, sense to four. (Bk. 1, lect. 4, n. 51.)

641. Next, when he says, that it is not (428a5), he distinguishes imagination from all the above four:

first of all, from sensation;

second, from understanding and science, at and it is certainly not (428a16; [648]);

and third, from opinion, at it remains, therefore, to consider (428a18; [649]).

About the first, he does three things.

First, he shows that imagination is not one of the senses, either potentially or actually. For appearances occur during sleep. This cannot be due to any sense as in potency, in which state the senses are aware of nothing at all; nor to any sense as in act, for in sleep the senses are not in act. Therefore, imagination is neither a sense in potency nor a sense in act.

642. Second, at further (428a8), he shows that imagination is not a sense in potency. And he argues as follows. Sensation in potency is always found in animals, but this is not always so with imagination, since things do not always appear to an animal. Therefore, imagination is not a sense in potency.

643. Third, at but if (428a9), he shows imagination is not the senses as in act, and he gives four reasons for this.

The first of which is that actual sensing is found in all beasts, that is, irrational animals; therefore if actual sensation were the same thing as imagination, this would be found in all irrational animals, which in fact is not true; for the ant, the bee, and the worm do not have imagination. Therefore, imagination is not a sense in act.

644. But note that all animals have imagination in some measure, but the incomplete animals have an undetermined imagination, as the Philosopher will explain later. (Bk. 3, lect. 10, nn. 838–39.) And this does not seem to be true for the ant and bee, in whose activities it is clear there is much prudence. But one should note that the ant and the bee perform the works of prudence by a natural inclination, not from their having a determined imagination and one distinct from sensation. For they only imagine so long as they are being moved by the sensible object. But the fact that they work for the sake of an end, as though providing for the future, does not arise because they have some imagination of that future; rather, they imagine their present activities, which are themselves ordered to the end due to the natural inclination more than due to any apprehension. On the other hand, the Philosopher says that those animals have imagination to whom something appears to them, in the imagination, even when they are not actually sensing it.

645. The second argument begins at again, sensations (428a11). The senses in the act of sensing are always true; for they cannot err about their proper objects. But phantasms are very often false, for things for the most part do not correspond to our imagination. Therefore, the imagination is distinct from every sense as in act.

646. The third argument comes at again, we do not say (428a12). When we are active with certainty with regard to sense-objects in act, that is, in sensing them, we never say, for example, that it seems to us to be a man. We say this rather when our sensation is indistinct, as when we see things at a distance or in the dark. And in which case the actual sensation is either true or false. (For as regards the accidentally sensible, man being an example of this, the sense is not always true; rather, sometimes it is deceived.) He adds this in order to show the affinity between imagination, which is sometimes true, sometimes false, and obscure sensations. For when it is clear that we are imagining something, we say that this appears to be a man and not that it is for certain a man. Therefore, imagination is distinct from any sense as in act.

647. He gives the fourth reason at and, as we said before (428a15). Phantasms appear during sleep when the senses are not in act. Therefore, a phantasm is not an actual sensation.

648. Next, when he says, and it is certainly (428a16), he shows the difference between imagination and both understanding and science. Understanding bears upon first principles, and science upon conclusions acquired through demonstration; and these are always true. But imagination is sometimes false; therefore imagination is neither understanding nor science.

649. Then, at it remains (428a18), he shows that imagination is not opinion, which it might seem to be, for opinion too is sometimes false, like imagination. He shows this by two arguments.

First, the result of opinion is belief, for it does not seem to happen that someone should not believe his opinions. And thus, since no beast has belief, there will be no opinion amongst beasts. But many beasts, as he has said, have imagination. Therefore, imagination is not opinion.

650. He gives the second argument, at further, belief. Belief follows all opinion (428a22), as we have said, because everyone believes what he opines. And the state of being persuaded is the outcome of belief; for we believe those things of which we are persuaded. Now, persuasion is always accompanied by reasoning (according to the order of inference, since someone is persuaded of something through some argument); hence, from first to last, reasoning goes along with opinion. But while some beasts have imaginations, none of them have reason. Imagination, then, is distinct from opinion. Obviously, this argument confirms what the previous one assumes, that is, that beasts do not have belief.

651. Then, at it is therefore evident (428a24), he shows that imagination is not a combination of any of the things mentioned above, and more particularly, that it is not, as it might rather plausibly seem to be, a combination of sensation and opinion. And here he does three things.

First, he states his conclusion as a further inference from what has been said: since imagination is neither one of the senses nor opinion, it is therefore evident that it can be neither opinion accompanying sensation—that is, an opinion essentially, but with a concomitant sensation—nor opinion through sensation—that is, an opinion essentially, but caused by sensation—nor a combination of opinion and sensation, as though both were of its essence. He does not say that imagination is not sensation plus opinion, because it has apparently more to do with opinion, which can be false, than with sensation, which is always true.

652. Second, at and it is clear (428a27), he shows what the term “opinion” would mean if it were true that imagination were a blend of sensation and opinion. For since an imagination is always of some one and the same thing, it is clear that the opinion that is conjoined with sensation, which is the imagination, would have the same objects as sensation.

It is as if one were to say, for example, that imagination is a certain combination of the sensed white and the opinion of the same thing; for it could not be a combination of an opinion of white and a sense of good, for then it would not be an imagination of one and the same thing. Then, if an imagination comes from a blending of opinion and sensation, then to imagine something in imagination must be nothing other than to have an opinion of the same thing as what one senses, in itself and not accidentally.

653. Third, at false appearances (428b2), he refutes the above hypothesis. For sometimes certain false appearances can arise from imagination, which is based on sensation, and about these things and the same realities a man holds a true opinion. Thus, it appears, according to our senses, that the sun measures only one foot across, which is false, yet by our true opinion we believe that it is greater than the inhabited world, that is, than the whole of our earth. Yet therefore, if the false appearance itself is the same thing as an opinion conjoined to sensation, one of two consequences must follow.

The first is that in the act of conjoining opinion and sensation we reject the true opinion which one held before, while the thing itself, of which we form our opinion, remains, that is, stays the same; and we who reject the opinion do not forget nor cease to be persuaded of that true opinion. But this is impossible; for there are only three ways in which a true opinion, once held, can be lost:

first, when the reality itself changes—as when we truly opine that Socrates is seated while he is seated, but if, when he ceases to sit, we retain that opinion, it changes from being a true opinion to being false;

second, when we cease to hold an opinion we once held because we forget it;

and third, when we cease to hold an opinion we once held because, for some new reason, we cease from thinking it to be true.

It is impossible to lose an opinion if none of these conditions is realized; and yet this is what the first alternative involves.

654. And there is only one other conceivable alternative, which is that the true opinion is retained along with the false appearance; and if the appearance itself is the opinion itself (which one must say if imagination is opinion), the same appearance is both true and false. But if it becomes false and is no longer true, then a transformation in the facts, that is, an alteration from what was before, must be hidden from him who holds the opinion; otherwise, were it not hidden from him, when the reality changes he would change his opinion, so his opinion would not be false. He adds this to explain his earlier remark about the reality remaining the same.

And his conclusion is that imagination is neither (428b2) one of the aforesaid four, nor any combination of them.