Lecture 21 — Outside the heaven there is no place, time etc., consequent upon sensible bodies

146 It is therefore evident that there is also no place or void or time outside the heaven.

147 For in every place body can be present;

148 and void is said to be that in which the presence of body, though not actual, is possible;

149 and time is the number of movement. But in the absence of natural body there is no movement, and outside the heaven, as we have shown, body neither exists nor can come to exist.

150 It is clear then that there is neither place, nor void, nor time, outside the heaven.

151 Hence whatever is there, is of such a nature as not to occupy any place, nor does time age it; nor is there any change in any of the things which lie beyond the outermost motion;

152 they continue through their entire duration unalterable and unmodified, living the best and most selfsufficient of lives.

153 As a matter of fact, this word 'duration' possessed a divine significance for the ancients, for the fulfilment which includes the period of life of any creature, outside of which no natural development can fall, has been called its duration. On the same principle the fulfilment of the whole heaven, the fulfilment which includes all time and infinity, is 'duration'—a name based upon the fact that it is always—duration immortal and divine.

154 From it derive the being and life which other things, some more or less articulately but others feebly, enjoy.

155 So, too, in its discussions concerning the divine, popular philosophy often propounds the view that whatever is divine, whatever is primary and supreme, is necessarily unchangeable. This fact confirms what we have said.

156 For there is nothing else stronger than it to move it—since that would mean more divine—

157 and it has no defect and lacks none of its proper excellences.

158 Its unceasing movement, then, is also reasonable, since everything ceases to move when it comes to its proper place, but the body whose path is the circle has one and the same place for starting-point and goal.

207. After showing that there neither is, nor can be, any sensible body outside the heaven, the Philosopher here shows that outside the heaven there is none of the things that follow upon sensible bodies.

First he proves the proposition;

secondly, he describes the things that do exist outside the heaven, at hence whatever is there (279a18; [213]).

About the first he does three things:

first, he proposes what he intends;

secondly, he proves the proposition, at for in every place (279a12; [208]);

thirdly, he draws the intended conclusion, at it is clear then (279a17; [212]).

He says therefore first (279a11) that with the proof that outside the heaven there is no sensible body, it is also manifest that outside the heaven there is neither place nor void nor time—for these three things were discussed as being concomitants of natural bodies in Physics IV.

208. Then, at for in every place (279a12), he proves the proposition.

First, as to place: in every place it is possible for a body to exist, otherwise it would be in vain. But outside the heaven it is not possible for any body to exist, as was proved. Therefore, outside the heaven there is no place.

Secondly, at and void (279a13) he proves that outside the heaven there is not a void: those who posit a void define it to be a place in which a body is not existing but can exist. But outside the heaven it is not possible for a body to exist, as has been shown. Therefore, outside the heaven there is not a void.

209. But it should be noted that the Stoics posited an infinite void, in one part of which the world exists. Consequently, according to them, there is a void outside the heaven. They wanted to prove this with the following fantasy: If someone were on the extreme circumference of the heaven, he could either extend his hand beyond or not. If not, then it is being impeded by something existing beyond. The same question will return regarding that thing existing beyond, if anyone could, while on the extremity, reach out his hand beyond. Consequently we must go on infinitely, or come to an extreme body beyond which a man existing there could reach out his hand. In that case it follows that beyond that a body could exist and does not. Hence there will be a void beyond.

To this Alexander responds that the position is impossible. For since the body of the heaven cannot undergo anything, it cannot receive anything extraneous. Hence, if from this impossible assumption, something against the thesis follows, one should pay it no heed. But this answer does not seem to be sufficient — since the impossibility of this position is not on the part of something outside the heaven but on the part of the heaven itself. But now we are dealing with what is outside the heaven. Hence it is the same argument if the whole universe were the earth, on whose boundary a man could exist. Consequently, we must state otherwise, just as he says, that a man situated on the extreme circumference could not extend his hand beyond, not because of something outside impeding it, but because it is of the very nature of all natural bodies that they be contained within the extreme circumference of the heaven—otherwise the heaven would not be the universe. Hence if there were a body not depending on the body of the heaven as on a container, there would be nothing to prevent it from existing outside the heaven, as in the case of the spiritual substances, as will be said below.

210. But that there is no void outside the heaven Alexander proves on the ground that such a void is either finite or infinite: If finite, then it is terminated somewhere and the same question will return: Could a person extend his hand beyond that? If it is infinite, it will be capable of receiving an infinite body: then either that power of the void will be in vain or it will be necessary to posit an infinite body capable of being received into the void of the infinite. Likewise, if there is a void outside the world, the world will be related to each part of the void in exactly the same way, because in a void there are no differences. Consequently, this part of the void in which the world exists is not its proper place. Therefore there is no cause why it should remain in this part of the void. But if the world is in motion, it will not be moved to one part rather than to another, because in the void there are no differences. Therefore, it will be moved in every direction; and thus the world will be torn asunder.

211. Thirdly, at and time is (279a14) he proves that outside the heaven there is no time. For time is the number of motion, as is plain in Physics IV. But motion cannot exist without a natural body, and a natural body neither exists nor can exist outside the heaven, as has been proved. Therefore, outside the heaven there neither is, nor can be, time.

212. Then, at it is clear then (279a17), he draws the conclusion intended, and concludes that it is manifest from the foregoing that outside the whole heaven there is neither place nor void nor time.

213. Then, at hence whatever is there (279a18) he describes what type of things are outside the heaven. About this he does two things:

first he concludes their condition from the foregoing;

secondly, he shows the same from common opinion, at so, too, in its discussions (279a30; [217]).

About the first he does two things:

first he removes from them the condition of things that exist here;

secondly, he describes their proper condition, at they continue through their entire duration unalterable (279a20; [214]).

He says therefore first (279a18) that because there is no place outside the heaven, it follows that things by nature apt to be there do not exist in place. And Alexander says that this can be understood about the heaven itself, which is not in place as a whole but with respect to its parts, as is proved in Physics IV. Again, because time does not exist beyond the heaven, it follows that they do not exist in time; consequently, time does not make them grow old. And this, too, according to Alexander, can belong to the heaven, which, indeed, is not in time in the sense that to be in time consists in being measured by some part of time, as is said in Physics IV. Not only do such beings not grow old in time, but no change affects those things which lie beyond the outermost motion [lationem], i.e., beyond the local motion of light bodies — for he is accustomed to call rectilinear motion latio.

But it does not seem to be true that no change affects heavenly bodies, since they are moved locally, unless perhaps we limit "change" to one affecting the substance. But this seems to be a forced explanation, since the Philosopher excludes all change universally. Likewise, it cannot be properly said that the heaven is there, i.e., outside the heaven. Consequently, it is better to understand his words as applying to God and separated substances which plainly are not contained by time, nor place, since they are separated from all magnitude and motion. Such substances are said to be there, i.e., outside the heaven, not as in a place, but as not contained nor included under the containment of bodily things, and as exceeding all of corporeal nature. It is such beings that the expression befits, namely, that they undergo no change; because they lie beyond the extreme motion, namely, that of the farthest sphere, which is ordered as extrinsic to and containing all change.

214. Then, at they continue through their entire duration unalterable (279a20) he explains the qualities of these beings.

First he describes their condition;

secondly, he explains a word he used, at as a matter of fact, this word (279a22; [215]);

thirdly, he shows the influence of these beings on others, at from it derive (279a28; [216]).

He says therefore first (279a20) that those beings which are outside the heaven are unalterable and wholly impassible. They lead the best of lives, inasmuch as their life is not mingled with matter as is the life of corporeal beings. They also have a life that is most self-sufficient, inasmuch as they do not need anything in order to conserve their life or to perform the works of life, They have a life, too, which is not temporal but in total eternity.

Now, among the qualities here listed some can be attributed to heavenly bodies—for example, that they are impassible and unalterable. But the other two cannot belong to them, even if they are alive. For they do not have the best life, since their life would be one resulting from the union of a soul to a celestial body; neither do they have a most self-sufficient life, since they attain their good through motion, as will be said in book II.

215. Then, at as a matter of fact, this word (279a22) he explains the word eternal which he had used. And he says that the ancients pronounced this word as divine, i.e., as befitting divine things. Now this word has two meanings. In one way it is used in a qualified sense as meaning the eternity or age of a thing: for in Greek the same word signifies both. He says, therefore, that the eternity or age of a thing is called an end, i.e., a certain terminal measure which contains the time of any thing's life, in such a way that no time of the life belonging to the thing according to nature exists outside that end or measure. It is like saying that the span of 100 years is the "age" or "eternity" of a man. In another way "eternity" is used in an absolute sense as comprehending and containing all duration. And this is what he says, namely, that according to the same notion, eternity is called the end of the entire heaven, i.e., it is the span containing the entire duration of the heaven, i.e., the span of all of time. In this sense, eternity refers to a certain perfection which contains all time and the entire infinitude of duration—not as though this eternity is stretched out according to the succession of past and future, as in the case of any span of time, because such succession follows upon motion, whereas the things he described as having life in eternity are completely immobile, but this eternity is a whole existing all at once and comprehending all time and all infinitude. The Greek word is derived from the words for always existing. Such an end, which is called "eternal" is immortal, because that life is not ended by death, and "divine," because it is beyond all matter, quantity, and motion.

216. Then, at from it derive (279a28) he shows the influence of these things on others. Now it is manifest that from what is most perfect there is a flowing to others that are less perfect, just as heat flows from fire to other things that are less hot, as is said in Metaphysics II. Hence, since those beings possess the best and most self-sufficient life and eternal existence, it is from them that existence and life are communicated to other things. But not equally to all; rather, to some more luminously, i.e., more evidently and more perfectly, namely, to those that have individual eternal existence and to those that have rational life; to others more darkly, i.e., in a lesser and more imperfect way, namely, to those things that are eternal, not in the same individuals, but according to sameness of species, and which have sense or nutritive life.

217. Then, at so, too, in its discussions (279a30) he manifests what he had said about the condition of the aforesaid beings that exist outside the heaven.

First he proposes what he intends;

secondly, he presents reasons, at for there is nothing else (279a33; [218]).

With respect to the first (279a30) it should be known that among the philosophers there were two kinds of teachings. For there were some which from the very beginning were proposed according to the order of doctrine to the multitude and these were called "encyclia"; others were more subtle, and were proposed to the more advanced hearers and were called "syntagmatica," i.e., co-ordinal, or "acromatica," i.e., hearable, teachings. The dogmas of the philosophers are called "philosophemata." He says, therefore, that in the "encyclic" [or popular] philosophic discussions concerning divine things the philosophers very often in their arguments showed that everything divine must be untransmutable, as not subject to motion, and first, as not subject to time, and highest, as not contained by place. And they called every separated substance divine. And this confirms what has been said about such beings.

218. Then, at for there is nothing else (279a33) he gives reasons to manifest what he had said, namely, that the first and highest is untransmutable.

First he manifests the proposition;

secondly, he draws a conclusion, at its unceasing movement, then (279b1; [220]).

In regard to the first he gives two arguments, the first of which is as follows: what is always causing motion and acting is better than what is moved and acted upon. But there is nothing better than the first and highest divinity, so as to be able to move it, because such a mover would be more divine. Therefore, the first divine being is not moved, since whatever is moved must be moved by another, as is proved in Physics VII and VIII.

219. The second argument is at and it has no defect (279a35): Whatever is moved is moved either to avoid an evil or acquire a good. But what is first has no evil to avoid and lacks no good that it could acquire, because it is most perfect. Therefore, the first is not moved. The argument could also be presented in the following way: Whatever is moved is moved either to better or to worse. But neither of these can belong to God according to what is said here. Therefore, God, is in no way moved. And one should note that this second argument may be introduced to show that he is not moved by himself.

220. Then, at its unceasing movement, then (279b1) from the foregoing he draws a conclusion. And he says it reasonably, i.e., probably, follows that that first mover of the first mobile acts with unceasable motion. For whatever things, after having been moved, rest, these do so when they reach their appropriate place, as is clear in heavy and light bodies. But this cannot be said of the first mobile which is moved circularly, because where its motion starts is the same as where it ends. Therefore, the first mobile is moved by the first mover with an unceasing motion. And it should be noted that this argument does not conclude of necessity. For it can be said that the motion of the heaven does not cease, not on account of the nature of the place, but on account of the will of the mover. Therefore, he does not present this as a necessary, but as a probable, conclusion.