Lecture 24 — Various meanings of "generable" and "ungenerable," "corruptible" and "incorruptible"

172 We must first distinguish the senses in which we use the words 'ungenerated' and 'generated', 'destructible' and 'indestructible'.

173 These have many meanings, and though it may make no difference to the argument, yet some confusion of mind must result from treating as uniform in its use a word which has several distinct applications. The character which is the ground of the predication will always remain obscure.

174 The word 'ungenerated' then is used in one sense whenever something now is which formerly was not, no process of becoming or change being involved. Such is the case, according to some, with contact and motion, since there is no process of coming to be in contact or in motion. It is used in another sense, when something which is capable of coming to be, with or without process, does not exist; such a thing is ungenerated in the sense that its generation is not a fact but a possibility. It is also applied where there is general impossibility of any generation such that the thing now is which then was not. And 'impossibility' has two uses: first, where it is untrue to say that the thing can ever come into being, and secondly, where it cannot do so easily, quickly, or well.

175 In the same way the word 'generated' is used, first, where what formerly was not afterwards is, whether a process of becoming was or was not involved, so long as that which then was not, now is; secondly, of anything capable of existing, 'capable' being defined with reference either to truth or to facility; thirdly, of anything to which the passage from not being to being belongs, whether already actual, if its existence is due to a past process of becoming, or not yet actual but only possible.

176 The uses of the words 'destructible' and 'indestructible' are similar. 'Destructible' is applied to that which formerly was and afterwards either is not or might not be, whether a period of being destroyed and changed intervenes or not; and sometimes we apply the word to that which a process of destruction may cause not to be; and also in a third sense, to that which is easily destructible, to the 'easily destroyed', so to speak.

177 Of the indestructible the same account holds good. It is either that which now is and now is not, without any process of destruction, like contact, which without being destroyed afterwards is not, though formerly it was; or that which is but might not be, or which will at some time not be, though it now is. For you exist now and so does the contact; yet both are destructible, because a time will come when it will not be true of you that you exist, nor of these things that they are in contact. Thirdly in its most proper use, it is that which is, but is incapable of any destruction such that the thing which now is later ceases to be or might cease to be; or again, that which has not yet been destroyed, but in the future may cease to be. For indestructible is also used of that which is destroyed with difficulty.

237. After discussing others' opinions about whether the world is generated and destructible [corruptible], the Philosopher here pursues this question according to his own opinion.

First he presents pre-notes needed in his investigation of the question;

secondly, he pursues the question, at having established these (L. 26; 281a28).

About the first he does two things:

first, he distinguishes various senses of the following words used in the question: namely, generated and ungenerated, destructible and indestructible;

secondly, he distinguishes various senses of certain words used in the definitions of the foregoing: namely, possible and impossible, at this being so** (L. 25; 281a1).

About the first he does two things:

first he reveals his intention;

secondly, he carries it out, at the word 'ungenerated' (280b6; [239]).

About the first he does two things.

First he reveals his intention (280b1) and says that in investigating the foregoing question it is first of all necessary to distinguish the various ways in which things are said to be generable and ungenerable, destructible and indestructible.

238. Secondly, at these have many meanings (280b2) he reveals the reason for his intention and says that when things are said in a number of ways, it sometimes happens that this multiplicity produces no difference with regard to the argument proposed, i.e., when a particular word is restricted to one meaning in the course of the argument. But when a particular word is used with different meanings, such a multiplicity does make a difference. Even where there is no difference as to the argument, the intellect of the hearer becomes confused, if someone uses a word which can be distinguished in many ways as though it could not—for when someone uses a word of multiple meaning, it is not evident according to which signified essence the conclusion occurs.

239. Then, at the word 'ungenerated' (280b6), he distinguishes the aforesaid words:

first, ungenerated and generated;

secondly, destructible and indestructible, at the uses of the words 'destructible' (280b20; [243]).

About the first he does two things:

first he distinguishes the word ungenerated;

secondly, the word generated, at in the same way (280b14; [241]).

He declares first (280b6) that this word ungenerated is used in three ways.

The first of these is when something is called "ungenerated" which now exists but previously did not, yet this occurs without its having been begotten or transmuted. Some give the example of being touched or moved: for they assert that contact and motion are not generated. And this was proved in Physics V because, since generation is a kind of motion or transmutation, if motion were generated, it would follow that there would be a change of a change. Consequently, contact and motion, although they begin to be, are called "ungenerated," because they are not generated and are not apt to be generated.

In a second way something is said to be "ungenerated," if it is able to either come to be or not come to be and still it has not yet come to be. For example, a man to be born tomorrow is able, as far as the future is concerned, to come to be and not come to be, and yet he is said to be "ungenerated," because he has not yet been born. For "ungenerated," in the sense of not generated, can be applied similarly to what is able to come to be, because it is not yet generated, and to what is not able to be generated.

In a third way something is said to be "ungenerated," when it is entirely impossible for it, through generation or any other way, to come into existence as being able either to exist or not exist. In this sense the word "ungenerated" describes things that cannot be or things that cannot not be. Now this third way is distinguished into two other ways, for there are two ways in which something is "impossible" to be or become: first, absolutely, when it is in no sense true to say that this may at some time come to be; secondly, when a thing is described as impossible to come about because it is not easy for it to come about, either because it does not come about quickly or because its coming into existence cannot be conveniently managed, as when we say that bad iron is not easy to fashion.

240. In order to understand these three ways it should be noted that generation has the common note of something's beginning to exist, and also implies a definite way of existing, namely, through transformation. Therefore the negation implied by the word ungenerated may either negate both, namely, both a beginning and the way of beginning, or it can negate only the way of beginning. And both can occur in two ways: in one way in the sphere of act, and in the other in the sphere of potency. Therefore, if the negation does not deny a beginning but merely the manner of beginning, we have the first meaning of the word according to which something is said to be "ungenerated," if it can begin to be but not through generation. But if it does not deny the possibility but merely the actual state, for example, because it can begin to be and can be generated, but has not yet begun to be or been generated, then it is the second sense of the word. But if it does not only deny the manner of its beginning, as in the first sense, or only the actual state of existence, as in the second sense, but both the manner of its beginning and the very beginning itself, both as to its actual state and even its possibility, then it is the third and most perfect sense, according to which something is said to be ungenerated in the strict and absolute sense. This sense, however, is still distinguished according to whether something is said to be "possible" either absolutely or in a qualified sense.

241. Then, at in the same way (280b14), he distinguishes the meanings of the word generated, and says that it is also in three senses that generated is used.

The first of these occurs if something previously did not exist and later began to exist, either through generation, as man, or without generation, as contact, provided that the thing described as generated is something that one time is not and later is.

In a second way, something is described as "generated," if it is possible for it to begin to exist, where possible refers either to the truth, i.e., to what can exist, or to what is easy, i.e., can easily be made to exist.

In the third way, something is described as "generated," if it can be the subject of generation and proceeds thus from non-existence to existence. In this third sense it makes no difference whether the thing has already begun to be, and this by being made, i.e., through the process of generation, or whether it has not yet begun to be, but may come to be through generation.

In keeping with what has been said, the notion of these ways is apparent. Because when something is called generated in the first sense, its actual inception is asserted but not a definite mode of inception that the word "generation" signifies. But in the second sense the possibility of inception is asserted without asserting the definite way it began, which sense is distinguished according to the way "potency" is distinguished. However, the third way asserts not only inception but a definite kind of inception. And this third way can be further distinguished into two: for it asserts either a definite kind of inception that is actual, as when something is already generated, or one that is potential, as indicating something is naturally apt to be generated.

242. Now if anyone rightly considers the senses he has set down of the word generated, he will see that they differ from the senses of ungenerated in two ways: first with respect to distinction, and, secondly, with respect to order. With respect to distinction: in distinguishing the senses of ungenerated, the denial of a definite kind of inception as possible was included under one sense and the denial of the same kind of inception as actual, was included under another sense—for in the first sense "ungenerated" referred to what could not begin to be through generation, but in the second it referred to what could begin to be through generation but had not yet been generated. But in regard to the denial of inception in common, both the possibility and the actuality of inception are included under the same sense—for the third sense of "ungenerated" referred to what has both not begun to be and cannot begin to be. But conversely, in the senses of generated it is on the part of a beginning in common that he distinguishes the modalities according to potency and act—for the first sense refers to what actually begins to be in any way whatever, while the second sense refers to what can begin in any way, although it has not yet begun. However, with regard to a definite kind of inception, the actuality and possibility are included under one mode—for in the third sense something is described as "generated" which either has been generated or can be generated. Thus it is plain that the last three senses are not exactly parallel to the first three, because what was distinguished in the first remains undistinguished in the second, and vice versa.

With respect to order these senses are different: For in presenting the modes of ungenerated, that which pertains to a definite kind of inception was placed before that which pertains to inception in common, whereas in presenting the modes of "generated," that which pertains to inception in common was mentioned first. And Aristotle had a subtle reason for so doing. For he wanted to list the imperfect senses first and the perfect ones last. Now denial and affirmation are related to the proper and to the common in different ways: for a denial of what is proper is imperfect, but a denial of what is common is perfect, because when the common is denied, the proper is denied. Consequently, the last sense of ungenerated is presented as the perfect sense, because it denies inception in general. And because the denial of a particular kind of inception is imperfect, he presents the partial modes as distinguished according to potency and act. But the affirming of what is proper is perfect, because in affirming what is proper that which is common is also affirmed, while the affirming of what is common is imperfect. Accordingly, the last sense of generated is presented as the perfect one, namely, when something begins to be through generation, and he includes under this sense, as under the perfect sense, both the possibility and the actuality. However, the senses pertaining to inception in general are presented first, as the imperfect senses: for a thing is not said to be "generated" in the perfect sense just because it has begun to be. For this reason he distinguished these modes, as partial, into one referring to possibility and another referring to actuality.

243. Then, at the uses of the words 'destructible' (280b20), he distinguishes the senses of destructible and indestructible:

First, destructible;

secondly, indestructible, at of the indestructible (280b25; [245]).

He says therefore first (280b20) that destructible and indestructible are also said in many senses, and he presents three senses of destructible. Now it should be noted that, just as generation implies inception in a definite way, so, too, destruction implies extinction in a definite way, namely, through transmutation. Consequently, the first sense of "destruction" is that of extinction in common without any distinction between possibility and actuality. And the reason for this order is the same as that used above for the word generated: just as a thing is not said perfectly to be "generated" just because it begins to be, so a thing is not said perfectly to be "destroyed" just because it ceases to be, nor "destructible" just because it can cease to be.

Therefore the first sense in which we describe something as "destructible" is when it previously existed but later it either is not, or is able not to be, whether this is due to perishing and transmutation, as a man is perishable, or not through perishing and transmutation, as contact and motion cease to be.

In the second sense we describe something as "destructible," if it can not be, i.e., able at some time to cease to be, on account of a specific way of ceasing to be.

In the third sense, something is said to be "destructible," because it is easily destroyed, and can be called euphtharton, i.e., well destructible.

244. It should be observed that although the senses of destructible agree with those of generated as far as the order is concerned for just as in the latter there is placed first inception in general, so here there is placed first destruction in general, there is a difference in the way their modes are distinguished. For there the modes were distinguished according to possibility and actuality, but here they are distinguished according to absolute, and perfect, possibility, which latter is the last, as the most perfect mode—for the most perfectly destructible is what is easily destroyed. The reason for this is that generated is said according to act, while destructible according to potency. Hence generated can refer to both actuality and possibility, but destructible to possibility only.

The reason he set down generated, which is according to act, and corruptible, which is according to potency, is this: Since generation is from non-being to being, and corruption from being to non-being, that which is generable is not yet a being, but only that which has been generated is; on the other hand, that which is corruptible is a being, but that which has been corrupted is no longer a being. Now the intention of the Philosopher is to discuss a question, not of non-beings but of beings. And that is why he employs the words generated and corruptible.

245. Then, at of the indestructible (280b25), he distinguishes the senses of indestructible. And he presents three senses.

The first of these denies a definite kind of extinguishing process, insofar as that is said to be indestructible which can cease to be in such a way that at one time it exists and later does not, but this without corruption. Examples are contact and motion which, after first existing do not later, but this is without their corruption, since things are subject neither to generation nor corruption. Consequently, this sense corresponds to the first sense of ungenerated.

In a second sense something is called "indestructible," when extinction in common is denied. And he says that "indestructible" in this sense refers to what is now a being and it is impossible for it later not to be a being, or not to be in the future. This kind of indestructibility does not belong to any thing that can cease to be through corruption. For you, who can cease to be through corruption, exist now, and so does contact, which can cease to be, but not by corruption — yet both of these are called "corruptible" in a certain way, since a time will come when it will not be true to say that you exist, or that this is in contact. And, therefore, that is most properly called "indestructible" which is, indeed, a being but cannot be destroyed in such a way that, while it is a being now, later it will not be, or is able not to be, and although not yet destroyed can, nevertheless, eventually become non-existent. What is not so constituted is properly called "indestructible."

In a third sense, something is called "indestructible" which is not destroyed easily. And this corresponds to the third sense of "destructible," just as the second corresponds to the second, and the first to the first.