Lecture 3 — Characteristics of forms

The causes or principles of things, then, are three. Two of these are the pair of contraries, of which one is the formal determinant or species and the other the privation, and the third is matter.

It should be noted next that neither matter nor form comes to be, and I mean the last matter and form. For everything that changes something else changes it from something to something.

That by which it is changed is the first mover; that which is changed is the matter; and that to which it is changed is the form. Hence there will be an infinite regress if not only the bronze becomes round but also roundness itself or bronze comes to be. Therefore, there must be some stopping point.

Again, it should be noted that every substance comes to be from something having the same name, for both things that are by nature and other things are substances. For things come to be either by art or by nature or by luck or spontaneously. Art is a principle in another, but nature is a principle in the subject itself; for man begets man. The remaining causes are the privations of these.

There are three kinds of substance. First, there is matter, which is a particular thing in appearance, for whatever things are one by contact and not by natural union are matter and subject.

Second, there is the nature, which is a determinate thing inasmuch as it is a kind of positive state. Third, there is the singular thing which is composed of these, such as Socrates or Callias.

Now, in some cases the “this” does not exist apart from the composite substance—for example, the form of a house, unless it is the art. Nor is there generation and destruction of these forms, but it is in a different sense that house apart from matter, and health, and everything that comes to be by art, do and do not exist.

But if the “this” does exist apart from matter, it is only in the case of those things that are by nature.

Hence Plato was not wrong in saying that the forms are things that exist by nature, that is, if there are separate forms different from these other things, such as fire, flesh, and head.

For all of these are matter, and they are the ultimate matter of substance in the fullest sense.

Hence, efficient causes are causes as things that are prior to their effects, but those things that are causes in the sense of the formal determinant are simultaneous with their effects.

For it is when a man becomes healthy that health also exists, and the shape of the bronze sphere comes to be at the same time as the bronze sphere.

But whether any form continues to exist afterward requires investigation. For nothing prevents this from being so in certain cases, for example, if the soul is of this sort, not every soul but the intellectual (for perhaps it is impossible that every soul should continue to exist).

It is evident, then, that it is not necessary on these grounds that the ideas should exist; for man begets man, and the singular man begets a singular man. The same thing also holds true in the case of the arts; for the art of medicine is the formal determinant of health.

2441. Having stated his views about matter, the Philosopher now considers form, and in regard to this, he does two things.

First (1069b32; [2440]), he deals with form in itself;

second (1070a9; [2446]), with form in relation to the composite, at there are three kinds.

In regard to the first part, he does three things.

First, he points out that form is a principle. He says that there are three causes, or three principles, of changeable substances. Two of these are the pair of contraries: one is the species, or the form; the other the privation, which is in a sense a contrary; and the third is matter.

For it has been shown already (1069b3; [2428–29]) that, in every change, there must be a subject and two contraries, and therefore, these are required in the generation of substance.

2442. It should be noted (1069b35). Second, he shows that neither matter nor form is generated. He says that neither matter nor form comes to be, or is generated. But this must be understood of the last matter and the last form; for some matter is generated, namely, the subject of alteration, since it is a composite substance.

2443. That neither the last matter nor the last form is generated he proves thus. In every change, there must he some subject of the change, which is matter; and something by which it is changed, which is the principle imparting motion; and something to which it is changed, which is the species or form. Hence, if both the form and the matter are generated, such as if not only this whole, bronze sphere, is generated, but also the sphericity and the bronze, it follows that both form and matter have matter and form. Thus there will be an infinite regress in matters and forms. This is impossible. Hence, in the process of generation there must be some stopping point, so that the last matter and last form are not generated.

2444. Again, it should be noted (1070a4). Third, he points out that things acquire their form from agents like themselves. He says that every substance comes to be from an agent having the same name, that is, an agent similar in form. For all substances that are generated come to be either by nature or by art or by luck or spontaneously, namely, by chance (that is, they are not directly an object of design).

Art differs from nature, because art is a principle of action in something other than the thing moved, whereas nature is a principle of action and motion in the thing in which it is present. Now, things produced by art obviously come to be from something similar to themselves in form, for it is by means of the form of the house in his mind that the builder causes the house that exists in matter. The same thing is also apparent in the case of natural things, for man begets man.

However, this does not seem to be true in some cases, for some things are not generated by agents similar to themselves in species—for example, the heat found in lower bodies is generated by the sun, not by heat. Yet, while there is no likeness in species, there must still be some kind of likeness, even though it is an imperfect one, because the matter of lower bodies cannot acquire perfect likeness to a higher agent. And since this is true in the case of things that come to be both by art and by nature, it is evident that each thing is generated by its like.

2445. For the remaining causes, luck and chance, are defects and privations (as it were) of nature and of art. Luck is intellect producing an effect over and above the one at which it aims, and chance is nature producing an effect over and above the one at which it aims. Hence those things that come to be by luck and by chance are not similar to their agents in form, since luck and chance are not causes in the strict sense, but only accidentally. Therefore, in a sense, animals that are generated from decomposed matter seem to come into being by chance inasmuch as they are not generated by agents similar to themselves in species. Nor do they have a definite efficient cause in the realm of lower bodies, but only a higher efficient cause.

2446. There are three kinds (1070a9). Then he establishes what is true of form in relation to the composite substance, and in regard to this, he does three things.

First, he divides substance into matter, form, and the composite. He says that there are three kinds of substance.

First, according to appearances, matter seems to be substance and a determinate thing; and it was for this reason that the first natural philosophers claimed that matter alone is substance. They did this because they saw that, in the case of artifacts, which come to be by contact and not by natural union, only the matter or underlying subject seems to be substance, for artificial forms are accidents.

Second, the nature of a thing also seems to be substance and a determinate thing—the nature of a thing being that in which the process of natural generation is terminated, that is, the form, which is a kind of permanent state, as it were.

The third kind of substance is the composite of matter and form, such as singular things such as Callias and Socrates.

2447. Now, in some cases (1070a13). Second, he says that some forms evidently do not exist apart from the composite substance. For example, the form of a house does not exist apart from matter, for the form of a house is an accident, and the matter of a house is a substance, and an accident exists only in a substance.

2448. I say that this is true unless the form of the house should be taken as the art, that is, as existing in the mind of the artisan, for in this way, it does exist apart from matter. But there is neither generation nor destruction of these artificial forms as existing in the mind of the artisan, for the house that exists in the mind without matter, and health, and all things of this kind, begin to be and cease to be in a different way from those things that come to be by generation and destruction (namely, by teaching or by discovery).

2449. But, if any forms do exist apart from composite substances, this will be true of those natural forms which are substances. Hence Plato was not wrong in saying that the forms, that is, the separate forms, are things that exist by nature. But I say that he was correct not in an unqualified sense, but only if there are other forms that differ from sensible ones, such as flesh, head, and the like, which are the last matter of a particular composite substance, which is substance in the fullest sense.

2450. Hence, efficient causes (1070a21). Third, he shows that there are no universal forms apart from composite substances. In regard to this, he does two things.

First, he makes his purpose clear by differentiating between formal and efficient causes. He says that efficient causes are prior to their effects, and this must be so because efficient causes are the source of the motion which terminates in the thing made. But the formal cause, which is a cause in the sense of the intelligible structure of a thing, begins to be when the thing of which it is the form begins to be. For health begins to be when a man is healed, and the shape of a bronze sphere begins to be when the bronze sphere comes into being. It is evident, then, that forms are not separate from composite substances, for if they were separate, they would have to be eternal, since of such things there is directly neither generation nor destruction, as has been shown (1033a2, 1042a25; [1420, 1687]). Thus they would be prior to the substances of which they are the forms.

2451. But, even though forms are not prior to composite substances, it is still necessary to investigate whether any form remains after the composite substance has been destroyed. For nothing prevents some forms from continuing to exist after the composite ceases to exist. We might say that the soul is of this sort—not every soul, but only the intellective. For perhaps it is impossible that every soul should be such that it continues to exist after the body has been destroyed, because the other parts of the soul do not operate without bodily organs, whereas the intellect does not operate by way of a bodily organ. He says perhaps because it is not his present intention to demonstrate this point, but this belongs to the science that treats of the soul. And just as the parts of the soul other than the intellect do not continue to exist after the composite substance has been destroyed, in a similar fashion, neither do other forms of perishable things.

2452. Now, we should observe that it is Aristotle’s view regarding the intellective soul that it did not exist before the body, as Plato claimed, and also that it is not destroyed when the body is, as the ancient philosophers held, inasmuch as they failed to distinguish between intellect and sense. For he did not exclude the intellective soul from the generality of other forms as regards their not existing prior to composite substances, but only as regards their not continuing to exist after the composite substances have been destroyed.

2453. From this consideration, it is also evident that one cannot degrade the intellective soul as some men attempt to do, saying that the possible intellect alone or the agent intellect alone is imperishable. For these men claim not only that the intellect which they say is imperishable (whether it be the possible or the agent intellect) is a separate substance and thus not a form, but also that, if it is a form of the kind that remains after the body has perished, it must exist prior to the body. And in this respect, there would be no difference between those who hold that a separate intellect is the form of man and those who hold that separate forms are the forms of sensible things. This is the view which Aristotle aims to reject here.

2454. It is evident (1070a26). Second, he rejects the argument by which they maintained that there are separate ideas. For the Platonists said that it was necessary to posit ideas in order that particular things might be formed in likeness to them. But this is not necessary, for in the realm of lower bodies, one finds an adequate cause of the formation of everything that comes to be. For a natural agent produces something like itself. For man begets man, but it is not the universal man who begets a singular man, but the singular man begets a singular man. Hence it is not necessary to hold that there is a separate universal man by reason of which the singular man here receives, or shares in, the form of the species. The same thing is evident of those things that come to be by art, because the medical art is the formal determinant and likeness of health in the mind, as has also been shown above (1070a21; [2450]).