Lecture 8 — The perfection of the first substance

And its course of life is like the best which we enjoy for a short time. For it is always in that state, though this is impossible for us.

For its operation is also pleasure. This is why being awake, sensing, and understanding are most pleasant, and hopes and memories are pleasant because of them. Now, understanding in itself has to do with what is best in itself, and the highest type of understanding has to do with what is best in the highest degree.

And an intellect understands itself insofar as it takes on its intelligible object; for it becomes intelligible by attaining and understanding its object, such that an intellect and its intelligible object are the same.

For that which is receptive of something intelligible and of substance is an intellect, and it is actual when it possesses this.

Hence it is the latter rather than the former state which seems to constitute the divine state of intellect; and its act of understanding is the most pleasant and best. Therefore, if God is in that pleasurable state in which we sometimes are, this is wondrous. If he is in that state in a higher degree, this is even more wondrous; but he is in that state.

Life, then, also belongs to him, for intellectual activity is life, and God is that activity. And the essential activity of God is the life that is best and eternal. And we say that God is an animal, eternal and most excellent. Hence, life and continuous and eternal duration belong to God, for this is what God is.

And all those, such as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, who think (1075a36; [2644]) that the greatest good and excellence are not found in the principle—because they think that, while the principles of plants and animals are causes, it is in the things that come from these that goodness and perfection are found—are in error.

For seed comes from other things that are prior and perfect, and it is not seed that is first, but the perfect being. For example, one might say that the man is prior to the seed, not the man who comes from the seed, but another man from whom the seed comes (1049b17). Therefore, it is evident from what has been said that there is a substance that is eternal and immovable and separate from sensible things.

And it has been shown that this substance can have no magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible, for it causes motion for an infinite time, and nothing finite has an infinite power. And since every magnitude is either finite or infinite, this substance cannot have finite magnitude. And it cannot have infinite magnitude, because there is no infinite magnitude at all.

It has also been shown (1072a23) that it lacks potency and is unalterable, for all the other kinds of motion are subsequent to local motion. It is clear, then, that these things are of this sort.

2536. Here the Philosopher relates the primary being, which causes motion as something intelligible and something desirable, to that which understands and desires it. For if the first mover causes motion inasmuch as it is the first thing understood and desired, the first thing moved by it must understand and desire it. This is true according to the opinion of Aristotle inasmuch as he considered a heaven to be animated by a soul that understands and desires. In regard to this, he does three things.

First (1072b14; [2536]), he shows that pleasure naturally belongs to the soul of a heaven, which desires and understands, as a result of its understanding and desiring the first mover. He says that its course of life, namely, the pleasurable state of the thing understanding and desiring the first intelligible being, is like the best which we can enjoy for a short time. For that which understands and desires this being is always in such a pleasurable state, though it is impossible for us to always be in that state which is pleasant and best.

2537. For its operation (1072b16). Then he proves his statement. Pleasure attends the activity of the thing that understands and desires the first principle, for pleasure follows upon the operation connatural to anything that understands and desires, as is evident in Ethics 10. A sign of this is that pleasure is greatest when a person is awake and actually sensing and understanding. For intellect and sense in actual use are to intellect and sense in potential use as being awake is to being asleep. That these states are the most pleasant is clear from the fact that other states are pleasant only because of these, for hope and memory are pleasant inasmuch as they bring past or future pleasant activities into consciousness as present.

2538. Hence, since pleasure consists in the actual use of intellect and sense, it is evident that understanding, namely, the activity of the intellect as such, is concerned with what is best in itself. For an intelligible good surpasses a sensible good just as an unchangeable and universal good surpasses a changeable and particular good. It also follows that the pleasure experienced in intellectual activity is of a higher kind than that experienced in sensory activity. Hence, the best and most perfect intellectual activity is concerned with what is best in the highest degree, so that the greatest pleasure follows. Therefore, it is evident that the greatest pleasure is experienced in those intellectual activities by which the first mover is understood, who is also the first intelligible object.

2539. And an intellect (1072b19). Then he shows that the act of understanding and the pleasure found in the first intelligible object are even more perfect than those found in the thing that understands and desires it. He says that it is characteristic of an intellect to understand itself inasmuch as it takes on or conceives within itself some intelligible object, for an intellect becomes intelligible by reason of the fact that it apprehends something intelligible. Hence, since the intellect becomes intelligible by conceiving some intelligible object, it follows that the intellect and its intelligible object are the same.

2540. He explains how an intellect attains its intelligible object. For an intellect is related to an intelligible object as potency is to act, and as something perfectible to its perfection. And just as something perfectible is receptive of a perfection, so too an intellect is receptive of its intelligible object. Now, its proper intelligible object is substance, since the object of the intellect is a quiddity. Hence he says that the intellect is receptive of something intelligible and of substance. And since each thing becomes actual inasmuch as it attains its own perfection, it follows that the intellect becomes actual inasmuch as it receives its intelligible object. Now, to be intelligible is to be actual in the genus of intelligible things. And since each thing is active to the extent that it is actual, it follows that the intellect becomes active or operative, that is, understanding, to the extent that it attains its intelligible object.

2541. But it should be borne in mind that material substances are not actually intelligible, but only potentially, and they become actually intelligible by reason of the fact that the likenesses of them obtained by the sensory powers are made immaterial by the agent intellect. And these likenesses are not substances, but certain intelligible forms received into the possible intellect. But, according to Plato, the intelligible forms of material things are self-subsistent entities. Hence he claimed that our intellect becomes actually understanding by coming in contact with separate self-subsistent forms of this kind. But in Aristotle’s opinion, the intelligible forms of material things are not substances that subsist of themselves.

2542. Yet there is an intelligible substance that subsists of itself, and it is of this that he is now speaking. For the first mover must be a substance that is both understanding and intelligible. Hence it follows that the relationship between the intellect of the first sphere and the first intelligible substance, which causes motion, is similar to the relationship that the Platonists posited between our intellect and the separate intelligible forms, inasmuch as our intellect becomes actual by coming in contact with and participating in these forms, as Plato himself says. Hence the intellect of the first sphere becomes actually understanding through some kind of contact with the first intelligible substance.

2543. Further, since the cause of some attribute of a thing has that attribute in a higher degree, it follows that anything that is divine and noble (such as understanding and taking pleasure), which is found in the intellect having the contact, is found in a much higher degree in the first intelligible object with which it is in contact. Hence its intellectual activity is most pleasant and best. But the first intelligible object of this kind is God. Therefore, since the pleasure that we experience in understanding is the highest, although we can enjoy it only for a short time, then if God is always in that state in which we sometimes are, his happiness is wondrous. But if he is always in that state (which we enjoy for only a short time) in a higher degree, this is even more wondrous.

2544. Life, then, also belongs (1072b26). Third, since he has said that intellectual activity is proper to God, he shows how this applies to him. He says that God is life itself.

And he proves this as follows: intellectual activity, that is, understanding, is a kind of life, and it is the most perfect kind of life that there is. For according to what has been shown, act is more perfect than potency; therefore, an intellect that is actually understanding leads a more perfect life than one that is potentially understanding, just as being awake is more perfect than being asleep. But the primary being, God, is act itself, for his intellect is his intellectual activity; otherwise, he would be related to his intellectual activity as potency to act. Moreover, it has been shown (1072a23; [2517]) that his substance is act. Thus it follows that the very substance of God is life, and that his act is his life, and that it is the life that is best and eternal and subsists of itself. This is why common opinion holds that God is an animal that is eternal and best, for around us, life is clearly apparent only in animals, and therefore God is called an animal because life belongs to him. Hence, from what has been said, it is evident that life and continuous and eternal duration belong to God, because God is identical with his own eternal life; for he and his life are not different.

2545. And all those (1072b30). Then he rejects the opinion of those who attributed imperfection to the first principle. He says that the opinion of all those who claim that goodness and excellence are not found in the first principle are false. He cites as examples the Pythagoreans and Speusippus (1075a36; [2644]), who acted on the supposition that, while the principles of plants and animals are causes of goodness and perfection, goodness and perfection are not found in these principles, but in the things produced from them. Thus seeds, which are imperfect principles of plants and animals, come from other things that are prior and perfect.

2546. He rejects this opinion by disposing of the view which influenced these thinkers. For it is not seed that is first absolutely, but the perfect being. Hence, if someone says that the man is prior to the seed, it is not the man who is said to be born from the seed in question, but a different man from whom the seed comes. For it has been proved above (1071b22–1071b25; [2500–2503]) that act is prior absolutely to potency, though, in one and the same subject, potency is prior to act in the order of generation and of time.

2547. In view of the points established, he terminates his discussion by concluding that it is evident that there is a substance that is eternal and unchangeable and separate from sensible things.

2548. And it has been shown (1073a5). Then he proceeds to examine certain points which still remain to be considered about the above-mentioned substance.

First, he shows that it is incorporeal. He says that it has been proved in Physics 8 that this kind of substance can have no magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible.

2549. He briefly restates the proof, saying that a substance of this kind moves in infinite time, since the first mover is eternal, as he said above (1072b30; [2547]). And from this, it follows that its power is infinite. For we see that the more powerful any inferior mover is, the more capable it is of acting for a longer time. But nothing finite can have an infinite power. Hence, it follows that the above-mentioned substance is not finite in magnitude. Moreover, it cannot be infinite in magnitude because an infinite magnitude is impossible, as has been proved above (1073a5; [2548]). Therefore, since every magnitude is either finite or infinite, it follows that the above-mentioned substance lacks magnitude in every way.

2550. Moreover, the power of this substance is not said to be infinite in a privative sense, in the way that infinity pertains to quantity; but the term is used in a negative sense, namely, inasmuch as it is not limited to some definite effect. It cannot be said of a heavenly body, however, that its power is infinite even though it may move inferior bodies in an infinite time, because it causes motion only by being moved, and thus its influence is from the first mover. Nor can it be said that the power of a heavenly body is infinite even though it has being in infinite time, because it has no active power of being, but only the ability to receive. Hence its infinite duration points to the infinite power of an external principle. But, in order to receive indestructible existence from an infinite power, a heavenly body must not have any principle of destruction or any potency to non-existence.

2551. It has also been shown (1073a11). Second, since he has shown above (1072a23; [2517]) that the first mover is not moved with local motion, he next shows that it is not moved with the other kinds of motion. He says that it is also impossible for the first mover to be alterable, for it has been shown above (1072a23; [2517]) that it is not moved with local motion. But all other motions are subsequent to such motion, which pertains to place. Therefore, when the former is removed, so also must the latter be. Hence whatever is found to be moved with the other kinds of motion is moved with local motion.

2552. Last, he concludes that the things discussed above are evidently such as he has established them to be.