Prologue — Prologue

As the Philosopher teaches in Book II of the Physics, art imitates nature. The reason for this is that, as principles are related to each other, so proportionally are their works and effects related. Now the principle of those things that come to be from art is the human intellect, which is derived, after a sort of likeness, from the divine intellect, the principle of natural objects. From this, it is necessary both that art’s work imitate nature’s work, and that those things which exist by art imitate those which exist in nature. For if some instructor of some art were to effect some work of art, it would be necessary for the student, who takes up his art from it, to attend to the instructor's work, so that according to its likeness he might himself also work. And therefore, the human intellect—whose intelligible light is derived from the divine intellect—necessarily has to be informed, in those things that it makes, by looking into those things that are naturally made, so that it might work similarly.

And because of this, the Philosopher says that if art were to make those things which are of nature, it would work similarly to nature; and also the converse, that if nature were to make those things which are of art, it would make as art makes. But nature, of course, does not perfect those things which are art's, but only prepares principles, and, in some way, supplies art with an exemplar of how to do work. Now art is indeed able to look into those things which are of nature and use them to perfect its own proper work, but it is not able to perfect the things of nature. From this it is clear that human reason is only a knower of those things that exist by nature, but of those things that exist by art, it is both a knower and a maker. From this it follows that the human science which concerns natural objects must be speculative, but that which concerns objects made by human beings must be practical, or able to do work by imitating nature.

Now nature, in its work, proceeds from what is simple towards what is complex, such that in those things which come to be through the work of nature, what is most complex is perfect and whole and the end of the others, as is apparent in every whole with respect to its parts. So also the reason of human beings, when at work, proceeds from what is simple to what is complex as from the imperfect to the perfect.

Moreover, since human reason has to arrange not only those things that come into human use, but also human beings themselves, who are ruled by reason, in both cases it proceeds from simple things to something composed. It does this with those things that come into human use as when it builds a ship out of timber, and a house out of timber and stones; and with human beings themselves, as when it orders many human beings into one community. Of which communities, indeed—since there are various levels and orders—the last one is the community of the city, which is ordered toward the self-sufficiency of human life. So among all human communities it is the most perfected. And since what comes into human use is ordered to human beings as to an end—which end is more governing than those things which are toward the end—it is therefore necessary that this whole which is the city is more governing than all other wholes that can be known and constituted by human reason.

From these things that have been said about political doctrine, which Aristotle hands down in this book, four things may be gathered.

First, the necessity of this science. For to attain the perfection of human wisdom, which is called philosophy, it is necessary to hand down some doctrine about all things that can be known by reason. Since, therefore, this whole that is the city is subject to some judgment of reason, it was necessary, for the completion of philosophy, to hand down a doctrine about the city, which is named political science, that is, the science of civic affairs.

Second, we can gather the genus of this science. For since a practical science is distinguished from a speculative science in that the speculative is ordered only toward the knowledge of truth, but practical toward a work, it is necessary that this science be contained under practical philosophy, since the city is some whole which human reason is not only able to know about, but also to do work upon. Furthermore, since reason does work upon some things in the mode of manufacturing—when the work has gone over into external material, which properly belongs to the arts that are called mechanical, such as the smith and the shipwright and the like—but works upon other things in the mode of acting—when the work remains in the one who is at work, as when he takes counsel, chooses, wills, and other things of this sort which belong to moral science—it is therefore clear that political science, which studies the ordering of human beings, is not contained under the manufacturing sciences, which are the mechanical arts, but under the acting ones, which are the moral sciences.

Third, we are able to gather the dignity and order of political science with regard to all other practical sciences. For the city is most governing of those things that can be constituted by human reason, for all human communities exist in reference to it. Furthermore, every whole that is constituted through the mechanical arts from objects that have come into human use is ordered towards human beings as toward an end. Therefore, if a more governing science is that of the more noble and more perfected things, it is necessary that political science, among all the practical sciences, is a more governing science, and architectonic of all the others, inasmuch as it studies the last and perfect good in human affairs. And because of this, the philosopher says at the end of the Ethics X that the philosophy concerned with human affairs is perfected in political science.

Fourth, from what has been said we can gather the method and order of this sort of science. For just as the speculative sciences—which consider some whole—perfect the knowledge of the whole by clarifying the experiences and works of the whole, through a consideration of its parts and its principles, so also does this science deliver knowledge about the city by considering its principles and parts, thereby clarifying its parts and experiences and works. And because it is practical, it additionally clarifies how each particular can be perfected, as is necessary in all the practical sciences.