Prologue

Lecture 1/a

Since we see every city existing as a community of some kind, and every community is instituted for the sake of some good (for everyone always works for the sake of what seems good to them) it is clear that every city aims at some good.

And the most governing community aims at the most governing good of all, and embraces all others. Now this is what is called the city, and the political union.

Anyone, therefore, who thinks that the political, the kingly, the economic and the despotic are the same does not speak well.

For they believe them to differ by multitude or fewness, but not in kind. For example, if over a few, it is a paterfamilias; if over more, it is economic; over a still larger number, it is political or kingly, as if there were no difference between a great household and a small city. And [they think] the difference between the political and the kingly is, when the one himself is foremost, it is kingly; when, according to a discipline's discourses, such a one is partly governor and subject, it is political.

Now these things are not true. And the things said will be clear to those inquiring according to the method of the subject. As in other areas, it is necessary to divide what is composite into what is not composite; for these are the smallest parts of the whole. So, also, considering those things from which the city is composed, we will see also about these things [i.e. the different kinds of rule] in what they differ from each other, and whether anything might be artfully grasped concerning each of the things that was said. For if anyone, from the beginning, will look to nascent things, then in the same way in other things and also in these, he will best contemplate both.

So first, it is necessary to combine what cannot exist without each other, namely, female and male, for the sake of generation. And this is not by choice, but as with the other animals and with plants, from a natural appetite to leave behind another like oneself.

And the natural governor and subject are for the sake of preservation. For that which can foresee by the mind is by nature the governor and master, and that which can enact this with its body is a subject, and by nature a slave. Hence the same thing is advantageous for both master and slave.

Now nature has distinguished between the female and the slave. For nature makes nothing as did the smith of the Delphian knife, from poverty, but for one thing; for every tool is best made when it is thus at the service of one, and not of many works.

But among barbarians, women and slaves are in the same order.

The reason is because they do not have a natural governor among them, but they are a union of slaves, male and female. Because of this, the poets say, It is fitting that Greeks should govern barbarians (Euripides, Iphigenia in Aulis, ln. 1400.); as though the nature of barbarian and slave were the same.

Out of these two communities comes the first home, and Hesiod is correct when he says poetically, First home and wife and an ox for the plough, (Hesiod, Works and Days, ln. 405.) for the ox stands in as a servant for the poor.

Therefore, the community constituted for every day, according to nature, is the home, which indeed Charondas called homosipyos [of one dish], but Epimenides of Ocres [sic] called homokapnos [of one smoke].

From several homes, the first union for the sake of non-daily use is the village.

And the village that seems most according to nature seems to be a neighborhood of homes, composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said to be suckled 'with the same milk.'

And because of this, cities were first ruled by kings, as tribes are still, from being subjected to a king; for every home is ruled by the eldest, which is why it happened in the neighborhoods on account of consanguinity. As Homer says: Each one gives law to his children and to his wives. (Homer, Odyssey, bk. 9, ln. 114.) For they lived dispersedly, as was the habit in ancient times.

Wherefore men say that the gods have a king, because they themselves either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For human beings project themselves not only upon the forms of the Gods, but also on their ways of life.

After these preliminary remarks, it should be understood that Aristotle introduces this book with a prologue in which he first clarifies the intention of this science;

and then he proceeds to clarify what he has proposed, at: quoniam autem manifestum ex quibus partibus.

Concerning the first point he does two things.

First, he shows the dignity of the city, which political science is about, from its end;

second, he compares the city to the other communities, at quicumque quidem igitur.

Concerning the first point he intends to prove two things.

The first is that the city is ordered to some good as to an end.

Second, that the good to which the city is ordered is the most governing of all human goods, at and the most governing community of all.

Concerning the first, he puts forward this kind of argument. Every community has been instituted for the sake of some good. But every city is some community, as we clearly see. Therefore every city has been instituted for the sake of some good. Since, then, the minor premise is evident, he proves the major like this: all men work on all things that they do for the sake of what seems good (it may either be truly good or not). But every community is instituted by someone working. Therefore all communities aim at some good, that is, they intend some good as an end.

Then, where he says and the most governing [community] of all, he shows that the good to which the city is ordered is the most governing among human goods, with the following reasoning. If every community is ordered to a good, it is necessary that the community that is the most governing would be the one that most intends the good that is the most governing good among all human goods. For the proportion between things that are each toward an end must follow the proportion between their ends. Moreover, he clarifies which community is the most governing by what he adds: and embraces all others. For a community is some whole, but in every whole is found an order such that the whole which contains another within itself is more governing—just as a wall is a certain whole, and because it is contained within the whole that is the house, it is clear that the house is the more governing whole. Likewise, the community which contains other communities is the more governing community. Moreover, it is clear that the city contains all other communities, because households and villages are bound together under the city, and in this way the political community itself is the most governing community. It is therefore the one that intends the most governing good among all human goods: for it intends the common good, which is better and more godlike than the good of one, as is said at the beginning of the Ethics.

Then, where he says quicumque quidem igitur, he compares the city to the other communities. Concerning this he does three things.

First, he puts forward the false opinion of some people.

Second, he shows how the falsity of the opinion that he put forward can be discovered, at, haec autem non sunt vera, etc.

Third, in the way mentioned, he puts forward the true comparison of the city to the other communities, at: necesse itaque primum combinare.

Concerning this he does two things.

First, he lays out a false opinion;

second, he introduces their reasoning, at: multitudine enim et paucitate, etc.

Concerning the first of these, one should consider that the community is of two sorts, clear to everyone: that of the city and that of the household. The city, moreover, is ruled by two sorts of rule: the political and the kingly. There is a kingly rule when he who is foremost in the city has a fullness of power. There is political rule, however, when he who is foremost in the city has power that is confined by the laws of the city. And likewise, the rule of the household has two sorts, that is, the economic and the despotic. For all who have slaves are called despots, but the one who acquires and organizes [the goods] of a family is called a manager. So a despotic rule is one where a master commands his slaves; an economic rule is one where someone organizes those who belong to the whole family, which encompasses not only slaves, but also many who are free. Now some people have maintained, though not well, that such rules are not different from each other, but are entirely the same.

Then, where he says multitudinem enim et paucitate, he posits their reasoning, which is as follows. Whatever differs only by multitude and fewness is not different in kind, because difference according to more and less does not make things vary in kind. But the aforementioned regimes differ only by multitude and fewness, which they used to explain like this: if a community which is ruled is of few people, as in a small household, he who is foremost is called the paterfamilias, to whom belongs a despotic mode of government. If, however, the community is of many people, such that it encompasses not only slaves but also many of the free, it is said that he who is foremost is an economic [ruler]. But if it is of still more people, it is thought to be not only of those who are of one household, but of one city, and then it is called a political—or kingly—rule.

Which, indeed, they used to say—as though a household differed from a city by nothing except greatness and smallness, so that a big household is a small city, and the converse. From what follows, it will be apparent that this is false. Likewise, they also used to posit that political and kingly rules differ only by multitude and fewness. For when a human being is foremost simply and according to all things, it is called a kingly rule. When, however, he is foremost according to the discipline's discourses, that is, according to the laws put in place through the discipline of politics, the rule is political, as though he were in part governor, namely, as regards those things that come under his power, and were in part subject, namely, in those things to which he is subjected by the laws. From all of this they concluded that none of the aforementioned rules—some of which belong to the city, some to the household—are different from each other in kind.

Then, where he says haec autem non sunt vera, he shows the method for displaying the falseness of the aforementioned opinions, and he says that those who spoke like this did not speak truly. And this will be clear if anyone wishes to inquire according to the proper method of the subject, that is, according to the art of considering such things, which will be put forth below. But the method of this art is the following: that just as with other objects, to have knowledge of a whole it is necessary to divide what is composite into to those things incomposite, that is, until we reach those things that cannot be divided, which are the smallest parts of the whole. For example, to know a sentence, it is necessary to divide the sentence into its letters, and to know a naturally mixed body, it is necessary to divide the body into its elements. In this way, if we were considering those things from which the city is composed, we would be able to see in the aforementioned regimes what each one is according to itself, and what makes each one differ from the others, and whether someone could consider each of these things artfully. For in all things we see it is thus: that if someone looks into affairs with respect to how they have arisen from their principle, he will best be able to contemplate the truth in them. And just as this is true in other affairs, so also is it true in these things about which we are inquiring. But with these words of the philosopher, we must consider that to have knowledge about composite things, the first work is to take the path of disentangling, namely, to divide what is composite into what cannot be divided. Afterward, indeed, it is necessary to take the path of composition, so that from principles now known that cannot be divided, we may discern the things that are caused by the principles.

Then, where he says necesse itaque primum combinare, using the method that was introduced, he lays out the true relation between the other communities and the city, and he does two things in this regard.

First, he deals with the other communities that are ordered toward the city;

and second, of the community of the city, at: quae autem ex pluribus vicis.

Concerning the first he does three things.

First, he puts forward the community of person to person;

second, he puts forward the community of the household, which entwines together several distinct unions of persons, at: ex his quidem igitur duabus.

Third, he puts forward the community of the village, which is from several multitudes, at: ex pluribus autem domibus.

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he puts forward two personal unions;

second, he compares these to each other, at: natura quidem igitur, etc.

Moreover, of the two personal unions, he first puts forward that of the male and female: and he says that because we must divide the city into its smallest parts, it is necessary to say that the first combination is of persons who cannot exist without each other, namely, male and female. For combining in this way is for the sake of generation, through which both males and females are produced--and from this it is evident that they are not able to exist without each other.

He shows why this combination is first by what he adds: and this is not by choice. Here one must consider that in the human being, there is something that is proper to him, namely, reason, whereby he is suited to act from counsel and by choice. One also finds in the human being something that is common both to him and to others, and generation is of this sort. Therefore, this is not suited for them by choice--that is, because he has rational choice--but it is suited for him for a reason common to both him and the animals and even the plants. For innate to all of these is the natural appetite to leave behind another thing such as themselves, so that in this way what cannot be preserved in the same individual may be preserved in species. Therefore, this sort of natural appetite is also in all other naturally corruptible things. But because living beings, namely plants and animals, have a specific method of generation, namely, that they generate from themselves, he therefore makes particular mention of plants and animals. For even in plants is found masculine and feminine force, but yoked together in the same individual, although in one there abounds more of one, in another of the other; such that we may thus imagine that a plant is at all times in the same state as the male and female at the time of intercourse.

Then, where he says and the natural governor, he sets out the second union of persons, namely of the governor and the subject: and even this union is from nature for the sake of preservation. For nature not only intends generation, but also that the thing generated be preserved. And that this happens, for men, through the union of the governor and the subject he shows through this: that the one is naturally governor and master who in his own understanding can foresee those things fitting for preservation--by pursuing what is beneficial, for instance, and shunning what is harmful. But he who by bodily fortitude can fulfill through work what the wise man foresaw through mind is naturally a subject and slave. From this it is clear that the same thing profits both for the sake of preservation, namely, that the former should govern and the latter be subject. For there are times when he who because of wisdom can foresee through mind would not be able to be preserved, since he lacks bodily fortitude, unless he had a slave who executed things; nor could he who abounds in bodily strength be preserved unless he were ruled by the prudence of another.

Then, where he says now nature has distinguished, he compares the aforementioned unions to each other: first, according to the truth; second, he excludes an error, at inter barbaros autem, etc. Therefore, he first concludes from what has been mentioned that a woman and a slave are naturally distinguished from each other. For the woman is naturally disposed for generating from another, but is not hard of body, which is required in a slave. And thus the two aforementioned unions differ from each other.

Moreover, he indicates the causes of these aforementioned distinctions from this: that nature does not make something in the way of those who manufactured from bronze (that is, from metal)** the Delphic knife**, from a sort of poverty. For among the Delphians there came to be some knives, of which one would be designed for several services--as if one knife should be for cutting, filing, and for other things of this sort. And this came to be because of the poor, who were not able to have several instruments. But nature does not make thus, so that one thing is ordered toward various offices; but it designs one thing for one office. And because of this, a woman is not designed by nature for slavery, but for generating; for all things best come to be when one instrument is at the service of only one work, and not many. But it should be understood that when this happens, an impediment occurs in one or both of two works for which the same instrument was dedicated--if, for instance, it were necessary for each work to be frequently exercised at the same time, though if the works are exercised in turns, no impediment follows--if one instrument were adapted [accommodo] for several works. Hence the tongue is fit for two works of nature, namely, for taste and speech, as is said in De Anima Bk. III. For these two works do not coincide with each other at the same time.

And indeed, all of these things fall close to the truth in some way. For in the name of “barbarian” is understood something foreign--and a human being can be called foreign either simply or in relation to another. Simply, indeed, someone seems foreign to the human family [genus] who lacks reason, according to which someone is called human; and therefore, they are named barbarians simply who lack reason either from the blows of the heavens--those cast into intemperate regions, such that they are dulled by the very disposition of the region, as is found with many people--or also because of some evil custom existing in certain lands, by which it comes about that human beings return to irrational and almost brutish ways. But it is clear that from the virtue of reason it follows that men are ruled by what is rationally right [rationabili iure], and that they are exercised in writing. Hence barbarism is fittingly revealed by this sign: that men either do not use laws or they use them irrationally: and similarly, that among some peoples there is not the exercise of writing. But he is called a foreigner in relation to another who cannot communicate with him. But human beings are most of all born to communicate with each other through discourse: and according to this, those who cannot understand one another’s discourse can be called barbarians in relation to each other. But the philosopher is speaking here about those who are barbarians simply speaking.

Then, where he says this is the cause, he indicates the cause of the aforementioned error, and says that the cause of it is because among the barbarians there is no natural government. For he said above that a natural governor is the one who is able to foresee with his mind, and the slave is the one who is able to execute with his body. But the barbarians are found for the most part to be hard of body and lacking in mind. And therefore among them there cannot be a natural order of government and subjection. But among them there comes to be a certain union of male and female slaves, that is, they generally make use of male and female slaves. And because there is no natural government among the barbarians, but only among those who abound in mind, because of this the poet says it is fitting that the Greeks who were gifted with wisdom should govern the barbarians: and thus it would be naturally the same to be barbarian and slave. But when the converse happens, what follows is perversion and a lack of order in the world, after the words of Solomon: I saw slaves on horses, and princes walking like slaves over the earth.

Then, where he says ex his quidem igitur etc., he determines the household community, which is constituted out of several personal unions. Concerning this he does three things.

First, he shows from what this community is constructed;

second, he shows what it exists for, at: in omnem quidem igitur, etc.;

third, he shows how those in this community are named, at: quos Charondas quidem etc.

Therefore, he says first that from the two aforementioned personal communities, one of which is for generation, the other for safety, is constituted the first household. For in a household there must be man and woman, master, and slave. And it is thence called the first household, because there is also another communion of persons which is found in a household, namely, of father and son—which is caused by the first. Whence the first two are the primordial [primordiales] ones. And to show this, he references the word of the poet Hesiod, who said that the household has these three: the master who projects [praeeminet] forward, and a woman and an ox for plowing. For in a poor household, an ox takes the place of a servant. For man uses an ox for executing some work, like a servant.

Then, where he says in omnem quidem igitur, etc., he shows what the community of the household is ordered toward. Here one must consider that every human union is for certain acts. Some human acts are daily, such as eating, warming by the fire, and others of this sort. Some, however, are not daily, such as selling, fighting, and others of this sort. Now it is natural for men to unite with each other in both kinds [genera] of work, helping each other. And therefore he says that the household is nothing other than some community according to nature constituted for everyday life, that is, for acts that have to be acted daily. And this is clear, consequently, through the name. For a certain man named Charondas named those who unite in the household homostitios, as if of one dish, because they unite through food. But a certain other named Epimenides, of the nation of Ocres, called them homocapnos, as if of one smoke, because they sit at the same fire.

Then, where he says ex pluribus autem domibus, etc., he lays out the third community, namely the village.

And first he shows from what this community [is made] and because of what.

Second, he shows that it is natural, at maxime autem videtur, etc.

Hence, he first says that the first union which is from several households is called a village: and it is said to be first to set it apart from the second, which is the city. But this community is not constituted for daily life as he said of the household, but is founded for the sake of employment that is not daily. For those who are neighbors do not unite with each other in the daily acts in which those who are of one household unite with each other, such as eating, sitting by the fire, and things of this sort: but they unite with each other in certain exterior acts that are not daily.

Then where he says maxime autem videtur, etc., he shows that the community of the village is natural.

And first he shows the proposition through reason.

Second, through a certain sign, at propter quod et primum, etc.

Hence, he says first that neighboring households, which is the village, seem to be according to nature most of all. For nothing is more natural among animals than producing [propago] many out of one, and this makes neighboring households. Indeed, some people call those who have neighborly households foster-brothers and children, that is, sons, and children of children, that is, grandchildren, such that we understand that neighboring households of this sort proceed out of this first: that multiplied sons and grandchildren instituted separate households, dwelling close to each other. Whence, since the multiplication of offspring is natural, it follows that the community of the village is natural.

Then, where he says propter quod et primum, etc., he clarifies the same thing through a sign.

And first, according to those things which we see in men.

Second, according to those things that were said about the gods, at et deos autem propter hoc, etc.

Therefore, he says first that because the village is constituted out of the multiplication of offspring, from this it proceeds that from its beginning [a principio], any city is ruled by a king. And up to this time, some peoples have a king, although different cities do not always have different kings. And this is because cities and peoples were instituted by those who were subject to a king. And how this sign corresponds to the aforementioned things he shows by what he says below: because every household is ruled by the one who is oldest, as sons are ruled by the father of the family. And from this it happens that even the whole neighborhood, which is instituted from blood relation, is ruled on account of kinship by someone who governed in kinship, just as a city is ruled by a king. Whence Homer said that each one institutes laws for his wife and children, just as the king in the city. But therefore, this rule proceeds from the household and the village to cities, because different villages are scattered into separate parts, as in the city. And therefore, of old, men dwelt scattered through villages, not yet gathered together into one city. Thus it is evident that the rule of a king over a city or people proceeds from the rule of the oldest in the household or village.

Then, where he says et deos autem, etc., he lays out another sign through what was said about the gods. And he says that because of the aforementioned things, all peoples used to say that their gods were ruled by some king, saying that Jove was the king of the gods. And this, because some men are still ruled by kings, but of old, almost all men were ruled by kings. And this was the first rule, as will be said later. But men, just as they make the appearance of the gods like themselves--that is, their forms--appraising that the gods are in the shape of certain men, so also they make the lives of the gods like their own, that is, their associations, deeming that they are associated in the manner that they see men are associated. Here Aristotle names as gods the substances separated from matter, according to the custom [mos] of the Platonists, created by the one, highest, and only God, to which substances the peoples erroneously annexed both the forms and the associations of men, as the philosopher here says.

Lecture 1/b

Now what comes to be out of several villages, all now having the end of self-sufficiency, is the complete community, the city; which is to say, consequently, that it is made for the sake of living, and exists for the sake of living well.

Because of this, every city is natural if, indeed, the first communities are; for it is their end, and nature is the end. For as each thing is in its completed generation, this we say to be the nature of each thing, whether human beings, horses, or the household.

Moreover, what something is for the sake of and is an end is the best, but self-sufficiency is an end and the best.

From this it is clear that the city is one of the things that is natural, and that man is by nature a civic animal. And he who is without a city by nature and not by fortune is either , is either crooked, or better than a man. Such is he whom Homer denounces: unsociable, lawless, evil. One with such a nature is like this and is bent on war, wishing to exist without any yoke, as do the wild birds.

Now, that man is more of a civic animal than the bees and all herd animals is very plain. For nature, as we say, makes nothing in vain, and only man has speech, beyond the animals; for the voice is, indeed, a sign of pleasure and sorrow, and because of this it exists among other animals; for their nature has reached the point at which it has the sense of sorrows and pleasures and they signify them to each other. But speech [exists] in showing the constructive and the harmful, and therefore, the just and the unjust; for among all the animals it is proper only to man to have a sense of good and evil, the just and the unjust, and the like. And union in such things produces the household and the city.

Accordingly, the city is before the household, and before each one of us; for it is necessary that the whole be before the part. For if the whole [body] is destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except equivocally, as we might speak of a stone hand; for it will be like this if decayed, since all things are defined by their work and their virtue. This is why it will no longer have the same existence and will not be called the same thing, but will be named equivocally. So therefore, that the city is natural and is prior to each individual is clear. For each individual is not self-sufficient separately, and likewise, the other parts maintain themselves with reference to the whole. But he who is unable to unite with others or requires nothing because he is self-sufficient is no part of the city because he is either a beast or a god.

Moreover, nature puts an impulse in everyone toward such a community. But he who first instituted it was the cause of the greatest of goods. For just as man, when perfected, is the best of the animals, so also when he is separated from law and justice, he is the worst of them all. For armed injustice is the cruellest, and man is born with weapons to be used by prudence and virtue, which he may use to great effect for contrary ends; because of this, without virtue, man is the most evil and savage of animals, bent on lust and the most rapacious greed. But justice is civic. For dike is the order of the civic community, and dike is the judgment of the just.

Quae autem ex pluribus vicis, etc. After the philosopher determines the communities ordered toward the city, he determines the community of the city itself. And it is divided into three parts.

First, he shows what kind of community the city is.

Second, he shows that it is natural, at propter quod omnis civitas, etc.

Third, he treats of the institution of the city at natura igitur quidem, etc.

Concerning the first, he shows the condition of the city with reference [quantum] to three things.

First he shows out of what the city [has been made]. Because just as the village is constituted out of several households, so also is the city out of several villages.

Second, he says that the city is the perfect community, which he proves from this: since every union among all men is ordered toward something necessary for life, that community will be perfected which is ordered toward this: that men sufficiently have whatever is necessary for life; but such is the community of the city. For it is from the rationale for the city that in it will be found everything that is sufficient for human life—as it also happens to be [in reality]. And because of this, it is put together out of several villages, in one of which is exercised the art of the smith, in another the art of the weaver, and thus for the others. Whence it is clear that the city is the perfect community.

Third, he shows what the city is ordered toward: for it is initially [primitus] made for the sake of living, namely, so that men might sufficiently find those things from which they are able to live: but from its existence, it emerges that men not only live, but that they live well, inasmuch as through the laws of the city, the life of men is ordered toward the virtues.

Then, where he says propter quod omnis civitas, etc., he shows that the community of the city is natural. Concerning this he does three things.

First he shows that the city is natural.

Second, that man is naturally a civic animal, at ex his igitur manifestum, etc.

Third, he shows what is prior [prius] according to nature, whether it is one man, or a household, or a city, at et prius itaque civitas, etc.

Concerning the first he lays out two reasons.

The first reason is this: the end of natural things is the nature of the things themselves. But the city is the end of the aforementioned communities, which have been shown to be natural. Therefore, the city is natural. And he proves that nature is the end of natural objects through this reasoning: We call that the nature of each things which happens [convenit] to it when its generation is perfected: just as the nature of man is what he has after the perfection of his generation: and likewise also for both a horse and a household--insofar as the nature of the household is understood as its own form. But the organization that an object has when its generation is perfected is the end of what was before the generation: therefore, that which is the end of those natural beginnings out of which something is generated is the nature of the thing. And so, since the city is generated from the aforementioned communities, which are natural, it will itself be natural.

He lays out the second reason, at adhuc quod cuius gratia, etc., which is this: That which is the best in each thing is its end, for the sake of which something comes to be. But to have sufficiency is the best thing: therefore it has the rationale of an end. And thus, since the city is the community that is self-sufficient for life, it is itself the end of the aforementioned communities. Whence it is evident that this second reason is introduced as a proof of the minor premise of the preceding line of reasoning.

Then, where he says ex hiis igitur manifestum, etc., he shows that man is naturally a civic animal.

And first he concludes this from the naturalness of the city.

Second, he proves this from man’s proper work, at quod autem civile, etc.

Concerning the first he makes two observations.

First, he shows what was proposed.

Second, he excludes a doubt, at et qui incivilis, etc.

He concludes, therefore, from the aforementioned things, that the city is of those things which are according to nature. And since the city is nothing but a gathering of men, it follows that man is a naturally civic animal.

But it is possible that doubt could come to someone from this: that those things which are according to nature are innate to everyone, but not all men are found to be city-dwellers. And therefore, to rule out [excludendam] this doubt, he accordingly says that some people are not civic because of fortune, for instance, because they are driven out [expulsi] of the city; or, because they are poor, they necessarily have to till the fields or tend animals. And this clarifies that it is not contrary to what was said--that man is naturally civic--because other natural things sometimes lack something on account of fortune: for example, when someone’s hand is amputated, or when he loses an eye. But if some man holds that he is not civic because of nature, he is necessarily either crooked, as when this happens from a corruption of human nature; or he is better than a man, inasmuch as he has a nature more perfected than other men commonly are, such that through himself he is able to be self-sufficient without the society of men. Such a thing was seen in John the Baptist, and in Blessed Anthony the hermit. For he cites the words of Homer, cursing a certain man who was not civic on account of crookedness. For he says about the man that he was un-sociable, because he could not be contained by the bond of friendship, and lawless, because he could not be contained under the yoke of the law, and evil, because he could not be contained under the rules of reason. And along with this, he who is of this sort according to nature will necessarily have in himself that which is bent on war, as though quarrelsome and existing without yoke. Just as we see that wild birds, which are not social, are grasping.

Then, where he says quod autem civile animal, etc., he proves from the proper work of man that he is a civic animal, moreso even than the bees, and than any herd animal, according to this reasoning: for we say that nature makes nothing in vain, because it always works toward a determinate end; hence, if nature bestows upon a sort of thing something that is ordered of itself toward some end, it follows that the end would be given to the thing by nature. For we see that although some other animals have a voice, only man, above the other animals, has speech. For although some animals utter human speech, they do not have the characteristic of speech, because they do not understand what they say, but utter such words from some use. Now there is a difference between speech and a simple voice. For voice is a sign of sadness and delight, and consequently, of the other feelings, such as anger and fear, which are all ordered toward delight and sadness, as is said in Ethics II. And therefore a voice is given to other animals, whose nature has reached this point: that they sense their pleasures and sorrows, and make signs of this to one another through certain natural voices, as the lion through his roar, the dog through his bark--in the place of which we have interjections.

But human speech makes signs about what is useful and what is harmful, from which it follows that it makes signs about what is just and unjust [iustum et iniustum]. For justice and injustice consist in this, that some people are equalized or not equalized regarding useful or harmful things. And therefore speech is characteristic of men: because it is characteristic of them, relative to other animals, that they have knowledge of good and evil, and so also of the unjust, and of the other things of this sort, signs of which can be made through discourse. Since, therefore, discourse was given to men by nature, and discourse is ordered to this, that men unite with one another in the useful and the harmful, the just and the unjust, and other things of this sort, it follows, since nature makes nothing in vain, that men naturally unite with each other in these things. But uniting in such things is what makes the household and the city. Therefore, man is naturally a domestic and civic animal.

Then, where he says et prius itaque civitas, etc., he shows from the aforementioned things that according to nature, the city is before the household, or even before one single man--and through this reasoning: it is necessary that the whole is before the part, in the order of nature and perfection. But this must be understood about a material part, not about a part of the species, as is shown in Metaphysics Bk. VII. And he proves this as follows: because when the whole man has been destroyed, there remains neither a foot nor a hand, except equivocally--in the way that a hand [made] of stones could be called a hand. And this is because such a part corrupts when the whole corrupts. Now what has been corrupted does not remain the same kind of thing, from which [kind] it takes up its defining rationale. Whence it is clear that the same rationale for its name does not remain, and so also the name is equivocally predicated. And that the part corrupts when the whole corrupts, he shows through this: that every part is defined by its work, and by the virtue through which it works--just as the definition of a foot is “an appended tool [membrum organicum] that has the virtue to walk.” And therefore, since [the part] no longer has such a virtue and work, it is not the same in kind, but is equivocally called a foot. And the same reasoning is given about other parts of this sort, which are called material parts, in whose definition is placed the whole, just as “circle” is placed within the definition of “semicircle” -- for a semicircle is the half-part of a circle. It is not so, however, with the parts of the kind that are placed in the definition of the whole, as the line is placed in the definition of the triangle.

So therefore, it is clear that the whole is naturally before the parts of matter, although parts are earlier in the order of generation. But individual men are related to the whole city as the parts of a man are to the man. Because just as the hand or the foot cannot exist without a man, neither can one man, through himself, be self-sufficient for living when separated from the city. Now if it happens that someone is not able to unite with the company of the city because of his crookedness, he is worse than a man, and is as if he were a beast. But if, indeed, he needs nothing, and it is as if he has self-sufficiency, and because of this he is not part of a city, he is better than a man. For he is like some God. It remains, therefore, from the aforementioned things, that the city is earlier according to nature than is a single man.

Then, where he says natura igitur quidem, etc., he deals with the institution of the city, concluding from the aforementioned things that there is within all men a certain natural innate impulse toward the community of the city, as there also is toward the virtues. But nevertheless, just as the virtues are acquired through human exercise, as is said in Ethics II, so also cities are instituted by human industry. Now he who first instituted the city was the cause, for men, of the greatest of goods.

For man is the best of animals if virtue is perfected in him, for which he has a natural inclination. But if he is without law and justice, man is the worst of all the animals--which is proved like this: because injustice is all the more cruel by however many weapons it has--that is, aids in evildoing. Now for man, according to his nature, are fit prudence and virtue, which are ordered of themselves toward good. But when man is wicked, he uses these things as if they were a sort of weapon for evildoing, just as when through his cleverness he thinks up various frauds, and through abstinence he becomes able to tolerate hunger and thirst, such that he can greatly persevere in wickedness--and similarly in other things. And hence it is that man without virtue, in the amount that his capacity for anger is corrupted, is most of all evil and wild, inasmuch as he is fierce and without affection. And in the amount that his capacity for desire is corrupted, he is the worst with regard to sexual matters, and regarding his greed for food. But man is led back to justice through civic order: which is clear from this, that with the same name, among the Greeks, were named the order of the civic community, and judgment of justice, that is, dike. Whence it is clear that he who instituted the city carried away from men that which was the worst, and led them back toward that which was the best according to justice and the virtues.