Chapter 1 — What is meant by religion, and in what its perfection consists

In order to understand the meaning of religion, we must know the etymology of the word. St. Augustine, in his book De vera religione, considers it to be derived from religare (to re-bind). (Augustine, De vera religione, ch. 55, para. 111 (CCSL 32; CSEL 77; PL 34:171).) One thing is bound to another when it is so joined to it that it cannot separate from it and unite itself to anything else. The word "re-binding," however, implies that one thing, though united to another, has begun to disconnect itself from that other in some degree. Now every creature originally existed in God rather than in itself. By creation, however, it came forth from God, and in a certain measure, it began to have an existence apart from him, in its essence. Hence every rational creature ought to be reunited to God, to whom it was united before it existed apart from him, even as to the place where the streams flow, there they flow again (Eccl 1:7). Therefore, St. Augustine says: religion reunites us to the one Almighty God (De vera religione). (Augustine, De vera religione, 55, 113 (CCSL 32; CSEL 77; PL 34:172).) We find the same idea expressed in the commentary of the Gloss on Romans 11:36: from him and through him and to him are all things. (Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, at Rom 11:36 (PL 191:1492D-1495D).)

The first bond whereby man is united to God is that of faith. For whoever would draw near to God must believe (Heb 11:6). Latria, which is the worship of God as the beginning of all things, is the duty of man in this life. Hence "religion" primarily and chiefly signifies latria, which renders worship to God by the expression of the true faith. St. Augustine makes the same observation in The City of God 10, where he says: religion signifies not worship of any kind, but the worship of God. (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 10, ch. 1, para. 3 (CCSL 47; CSEL 40.1:446; PL 41:278).) Cicero in his ancient Rhetoric gives almost the same definition of religion: religion is that which presents certain homage and ceremonies to a higher nature, which men call the divine nature. (ancient Rhetoric: Cicero, On Invention, in Cicero: On Invention, Best Kind of Orator, Topics, Loeb Classical Library 386, ed. T.E. Page, E. Capps, W.H. Rouse, L.A. Post, and E.H. Warmington, trans. H.M. Hubbell (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949), bk. 2, ch. 53, 161.) Hence all that belongs to the true faith and the homage of latria (which we owe to God) are the primary and chief elements of religion. But religion is affected in a secondary manner by everything through which we manifest our service to God. For, as St. Augustine says in his Enchiridion, God is worshipped not only by faith, but likewise by hope and charity. (Augustine, Enchiridion, ch. 3 (CCSL 46; PL 40:232).) Hence all offices of charity may be called works of religion. Hence James 1:27 says: religion that is pure and undefiled before God and the Father is this: to visit orphans and widows in their affliction, and to keep oneself unstained from the world.

Religion then bears a twofold meaning. Its first signification is that re-binding which the word implies, whereby a man unites himself to God by faith and fitting worship. Every Christian at his baptism is made partaker of the true religion when he renounces Satan and all his pomps.

The second meaning of religion is the obligation whereby a man binds himself to serve God in a peculiar manner, by specified works of charity and renunciation of the world. It is in this sense that we intend to use the word religion at present. Now, charity gives fitting homage to God by deeds of the active and contemplative life. And in the deeds of the active life, this is done in many ways according to the diverse duties of charity directed toward neighbors: and hence some religious orders, such as the monastic and hermetical, are instituted for the worship of God by contemplation, but others have been established to serve God in his members, by action. Such are the orders for assisting the sick, redeeming captives, and to similar works of mercy. There is no work of mercy for the performance of which a religious order may not be instituted, even though one be not as yet established for that specific purpose.

As by baptism man is reunited to God by the religion of faith, and dies to sin; so, by the vows of the religious life, he dies not only to sin, but also to the world, in order to live solely for God in that work in which he has dedicated himself to the divine service. (Cf. Gratian, Decretum, ed. Emil Friedberg, Corpus iuris canonici 1 (Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1879), P. 2, C. 16, q. 1, ch. 25, 1:767.) As the life of the soul is destroyed by sin, so likewise the service of Christ is hindered by worldly occupations. For as 2 Timothy 2:4 says: no soldier on service to God gets entangled in civilian pursuits. It is on this account that, by the vows of religion, sacrifice is made of all those things in which the heart of man is wont to be especially absorbed, and which are, consequently, his chief obstacles in the service of God.

That which first and chiefly engrosses man is marriage. Hence St. Paul writes: I want you to be free from anxieties. The unmarried man is anxious about the affairs of the Lord, how to please the Lord; but the married man is anxious about worldly affairs, how to please his wife, and his interests are divided (1 Cor 7:23).

The second thing that fills man’s heart is the possession of earthly riches: the cares of the world and the delight in riches choke the word, and it becomes unfruitful (Matt 13:22). Hence the Gloss, commenting on the words of Luke 8:14: as for what fell among the thorns, says, riches, although men seem to take pleasure in them, become as thorns to their possessors. They pierce the hearts of such as covetously desire and avariciously hoard them. (Glossa ordinaria 5, 809 at Luke 8:14 (PL 114:274A).)

The third thing on which man is inclined to center his heart is his own will. He who is his own master has the care of directing his life. Therefore, we are counselled to commit the disposal of ourselves to divine providence, casting all your anxieties on him, for he cares about you (1 Pet 5:7). Trust in the Lord with all your heart, and do not rely on your own insight (Prov. 3:5).

Hence perfect religion is consecrated to God by a three-fold vow: by the vow of chastity (whereby marriage is renounced), by the vow of poverty (whereby riches are sacrificed), and by the vow of obedience (whereby self-will is immolated).

By these three vows man offers to God the sacrifice of all that he possesses. By the vow of chastity, he offers his body: present your bodies as a living sacrifice (Rom 12:1). By the vow of poverty, he makes an offering to God of all his external possessions: that my oblation of my service for Jerusalem may be acceptable to the saints (Rom 15:31). By the vow of obedience, he offers to God the sacrifice of the spirit: the sacrifice acceptable to God is a broken spirit (Ps 50:19).

But these three vows are, in the sight of God, not only a sacrifice, but also a holocaust. This, in the Old Law, was the most acceptable form of sacrifice. St. Gregory says, when a man vows to God one part only of his possessions, he offers a sacrifice. When, however, he offers all that he has, all that he loves, and his entire life to the Almighty, he presents to him a holocaust (Homily 8, 2 on Ezekiel). (Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezekiel, bk. 2, homily 8, para. 16 (CCSL 142; PL 76:1037C).) Hence religion, understood in its secondary sense, insofar as it presents a sacrifice to God imitates religion taken in its primary sense.

There are some who renounce a part of the things which are sacrificed by the religious vows; but this partial renunciation is not perfect religion. The observances customary in religious orders are intended to be helps, either to the avoidance of what has been renounced by the vows, or to the accomplishment of the promises which religious make to God.

Hence we see that in a certain sense one religious order may be judged more perfect than another. The complete perfection of anything consists in its attainment of the end to which it is ordained. The perfection of a religious order chiefly depends upon two things.

First, it depends upon the purpose for which the order was instituted. That order is the most perfect which is destined to the noblest work. Thus a comparison may be made between the active and contemplative orders, according to the comparative utility and dignity of the active and contemplative life.

Second, a religious order is more or less perfect in proportion as it fulfils the end whereto it was instituted. It is not enough for an order to be established for a specific purpose unless its customs and observances are adapted to the attainment of that purpose. If two orders are founded for the sake of contemplation, the one in which a man is more free for contemplation ought to be judged as more perfect.

But because, in the words of St. Augustine: no one can begin a new life unless he repents of his old life, (Cf. Augustine, Sermon 351, ch. 2 (CCSL 41; PL 39:1537); Cf. Peter Lombard, Liber sententiarum, bk. 4, d. 16, ch. 4 (PL 192:563).) any religious order (in which a man begins to lead a new life) must be a state of penance whereby he may be purged of his old life. For this reason, a third comparison may be made between religious orders, so that the one wherein the most austerities and penitential exercises (such as fasts and poverty) are practiced is called the most perfect. But the first points which we have mentioned are the most essential to religious life. A conclusion as to the perfection of an order must therefore be based upon the perfection with which these points are observed. For perfection of religious life depends more upon interior justice than upon external abstinence. We see then what is the nature of the religious life, and in what religious perfection consists.

Our next task will be to repeat the arguments adduced by the adversaries of religion, and then to refute them. We shall proceed, therefore, in the following order.

First, we will enquire whether it be lawful for a religious to teach.

Second, whether a religious may lawfully belong to a college of secular teachers.

Third, whether a religious may lawfully preach and hear confessions, if he is not charged with the care of souls.

Fourth, whether a religious be bound to manual labor.

Fifth, whether a religious may lawfully renounce all that he possesses, retaining no property, either private or common

Sixth, whether a religious, especially one belonging to a mendicant order, may lawfully live on alms.