Chapter 2 — Whether it is lawful for a religious to teach

Objections

Constant efforts have been made to hinder religious from becoming learned, and thereby to ensure their inability to teach.

Obj. 1: First, the words of our Lord, you are not to be called rabbi, for you have one teacher (Matt 23:8), have been quoted in defence of these measures. It has been maintained that as these words are a counsel to be observed by the perfect, religious, as professors of perfection, ought in deference to them to abstain from teaching.

Obj. 2: Second, St. Jerome has been brought forward as an advocate: the office of a monk is to mourn, not to teach. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 16, q. 1, ch. 4 (Friedberg, 1:762).) Likewise: the life of monks is one of subjection and discipline, not of teaching, nor ruling, nor of being pastors over others (Cont. Vigilant. 16, 1; 7, 1). (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 7, q. 1, ch. 45 (Friedberg, 1:585).) And thus, since canons regular and other religious are classed as monks (as it is stated in Extra, De postulando, Ex parte, (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii Papae IX), ed. Emil Friedberg, Corpus iuris canonici 2 (Leipzig: Bernhard Tauchnitz, 1881), bk. 1, tit. 37, ch. 2, 2:211 [Also called the Extra or Decretalium].) and Quod Dei timor (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii Papae IX), bk. 3, tit. 35, ch. 5 (Friedberg, 2:598).)), it follows that no religious can lawfully teach.

Obj. 3: It is further argued that teaching is contrary to the vow of a religious, whereby he renounces the world. Now, all that is in the world is the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes and the pride of life (1 John 2:16), by which we understand riches, pleasures, and honor. But teaching is considered to be an honor, which is proved by the Gloss upon the words of Matthew 4:5, he set him on the pinnacle. In Palestine, says the Gloss, the roofs were flat, and the doctors sat thereon, and spoke to the people. The devil seduced many of them with vainglory, for they were puffed up by the honor of teaching. (Glossa ordinaria 5, 83, at Matt. 4:5 (PL 114:85B).) On these words is based the conclusion that teaching is contrary to the vow of religious.

Obj. 4: Again, it is urged that religious are bound as stringently to practice perfect humility as they are obliged to observe perfect poverty. As their vow of poverty forbids them to possess anything of their own, so the humility to which they are bound does not permit them to enjoy any honor. Teaching is, as has been proved, an honor. It is consequently unlawful for religious to teach.

Obj. 5: Again, a passage from Dionysius (Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, 4), is quoted as a proof that religious ought not to teach. (The true text is in chapter 5. Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 5 (Patrologia Graeca [Migne], 3:499-530).) This writer divides the hierarchy into three classes: those who perform sacred functions, those who share in these functions, and those who merely receive the benefit of them. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 5, part 2 (PG 3:502D).) In the same chapter, he divides these functions likewise into three classes: namely, that of cleansing, which is the office of deacons; that of enlightening, which is the office of priests; and that of perfecting, which is the office of bishops. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 5.3 (PG 3:504A-B); sect. 6 (PG 3:505D-508A).) Those that receive the benefit of these sacred functions are also divided into three classes:

the first consists of the unclean, who are purified by the deacons;

the second is composed of the holy people of God, who are enlightened by priests;

and, the third class is formed by monks, who are of a higher rank than the other classes), and these are perfected by bishops. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 6.1-3 (PG 3:529D-532D).)

Hence the function of monks is to receive holiness, not to impart it to others. And as they who teach must instruct their pupils in sacred science, teaching is not the lawful work of monks.

Obj. 6: Again, the scholastic office is more remote from the monastic life than is the ecclesiastical. But we find that no one can exercise the priestly functions and persevere in the due observance of monastic rules (Decretals, XVI, q. 1). (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 16, q. 1, ch. 2 (Friedberg, 1:761).) Much less, then, can a monk devote himself to the scholastic office by teaching or listening.

Obj. 7: It is likewise supposed to be contrary to the doctrine of the apostles for religious to teach. For St. Paul says: but we will not boast beyond limit, but will keep to the limits God has apportioned us (2 Cor 10:13). On these words, the Gloss comments thus: we use power insofar as it has been given to us by the author of our being: but we do not go beyond the limit, or measure, of our power. (Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, at 2 Cor 10:13 (PL 192:68B).) The argument, drawn from these words, is that any religious, overstepping the measure of power assigned by the author of his rule, contravenes this apostolic doctrine. And since no religious order originally included teachers, no monk ought to be promoted to the scholastic office.

Further objections

Some enemies of religion, however, failing in their attempt to completely prevent religious from teaching, try to prove, that no religious community ought to have many teachers.

Obj. 1: In support of this theory they quote James 3:1: let not many of you become teachers, my brethren. These words the Gloss explains to mean: do not desire to have many teachers in the Church. (Glossa interlinearis, at Jas 3:1 (in Glossa ordinaria 6, 1283-4).) Now one community of religious is one Church. Hence there ought not to be many masters in a religious community.

Obj. 2: Again, St. Jerome writes thus to Rusticus: bees have one queen; cranes follow one leader; and further on: there is one captain to a vessel, and one lord in a house (Decretals, VII, q. 1). (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 7, q. 1, ch. 41 (Friedberg, 1:582), also found in Jerome, Epistle 125, para. 15 (CSEL 56:133; PL 22:1080).) Hence it is argued that in one community of religious there ought to be only one master.

Obj. 3: Again, when there are many religious communities, if each college has more than one teacher, there will be so many religious teachers that secular masters will be altogether shut out from the profession, from dearth of pupils. There ought also to be a definite number of teachers for every branch of learning, lest this great multiplicity of religious professors cause sacred science to be held in low esteem.

Response

I answer that, these advocates of half measures commit in reality as great an error as those who desire to see religious totally excluded from the office of teaching. For all who go astray and cannot keep on the beaten track of truth fall into the opposite error in their efforts to avoid one mistake. Thus Sabellius, striving to keep clear of the Arian heresy of dividing the divine essence, fell into the error of confusing the divine Persons, as St. Augustine remarks. (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence, bk. 2, ch. 23 (CSEL 42:291; PL 44:458).) Boethius also observes that Eutyches, although avoiding the Nestorian heresy of dividing the Person of Christ, fell into the error of teaching that in him there is unity of nature. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 5 (PL 64:1347C).) The same observation applies to Pelagius, to Manichaeus, and to other heretics. (Augustine, On Marriage and Concupiscence, 2.23 (CSEL 42:291-293; PL 44:458).) On this account St. Paul speaks of men of corrupt mind and counterfeit faith (2 Tim 3:8); and the Gloss says that such men do not stay in the faith, but walk round about it, never remaining on the mean line. (Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, at 2 Tim 3:8 (PL 192:376A).)

The passages quoted from the Decretals and the writings of the fathers against the right of religious to teach owe their origin to the following fact. There formerly existed among certain presumptuous monks a mistaken idea that because they were monks, they had a right to usurp the office of teachers, and this put the peace of the Church in tumult: certain monks, bearing no commission from their own bishop, come to Constantinople, and cause confusion to arise in the Church of that city (Decretals, XVI, q. 1*)*. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 17 (Friedberg, 1:765), an excerpt from the Council of Chalcedon, in Collectio canonum Isidoriana, canon 23 (PL 84:171A-B).) This statement is fully corroborated in ecclesiastical history. The Fathers used every effort, both by arguments and decrees, to suppress these presumptuous monks. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 17 (Friedberg, 1:765), from Council of Chalcedon, in Collectio canonum Isidoriana, canon 23 (PL 84:171A-B).)

But certain men of our own day, being ignorant and unstable, twist these decrees to their own destruction, as they do the other Scriptures (2 Pet 3:16). They thus fall into an opposite error to that which the Fathers strove to rectify. For it is now asserted by the enemies of religion that no religious has any right to exercise, or to undertake, the function of teaching; and that such an office ought not to be open to religious orders. We will produce proofs that such a conclusion is utterly unfounded. We will then proceed to confute the arguments adduced in its support.

First, we quote the authority of St. Jerome, who writes thus to Rusticus: lead such a life in your monastery that you may deserve to become a cleric. Learn, for a long time, that which you may teach hereafter (Decretals, XVI, q. 1). (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 16, q. 1, ch. 26 (Friedberg, 1:768) from Jerome, Epistle 125, para. 18 (CSEL 56:137; PL 22:1082).) Moreover, he continues in the following chapter: if the desire for the priesthood should attract you, learn what you can teach. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 16, q. 1, ch. 27 (Friedberg, 1:768) from Jerome, Epistle 125, para. 8 (CSEL 56:127; PL 22:1077).) From these words it is plain that monks may accept the office of teaching. The same fact is proved by the example of the saints, who taught while living in religious orders. We read in the history of the Church that St. Gregory of Nazianzen, a monk, was sent to Constantinople in order to teach Sacred Scripture. (William of Saint-Amoure, Collectiones catholicae et canonicae scripturae ad defensionem ecclesiasticae hierarchiae et ad instructionem et praeparationem simplicium fidelium Christi, in Opera omnia quae reperiri poterunt, ed. Joannes Alitophilius (Constance [Paris]: Alithophilos, 1632), distinction 4, p. 402.) St. John Damascene, likewise a monk, instructed his scholars not only in Scripture, but in liberal arts (De miraculis beatae Virginis). (William of Saint-Amoure, Collectiones catholicae et canonicae scripturae 4, 402; Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum historiale, bk. 17, ch. 103; also found as an excerpt in The Life of John Damascene: Various Lectures, ch. 10 (PG 94:497C-499A). Regarding De miraculis beatae Virginis, William of Saint-Amoure notes: "We have not seen this book, nor believe it to be authentic" (Collectiones catholicae et canonicae scripturae 4, 402).) St. Jerome also, although a monk, promises in his prologue to the Bible to instruct Paulinus (also a monk) in Sacred Scripture, and he exhorts him to its study. (Jerome, Epistle 53 (CSEL 54:442-465; PL 22:540-549).) We read likewise that St. Augustine, after he had founded the monastery in which he lived by the rule drawn up by the apostles, wrote books and instructed the unlearned. (Possidius, The Life of St. Augustine, ch. 5, ch. 7 (PL 32, 37, 39).) In fact, some of the greatest doctors of the Church—such as Sts. Gregory, Basil, Chrysostom, and many others—were religious.

Our Lord himself has set the same example. For, as we read: Jesus began to do and teach (Acts 1:1). The Gloss: Christ, by beginning to do and to teach, shows that a good teacher must do what he teaches. (Glossa ordinaria 6, 967, at Acts 1:1 (PL 114:425).) The Gospels contain not only doctrine, but likewise counsels. Therefore, he who not only instructs others in the Evangelical precepts, but likewise himself observes the counsels (as do religious) are the most fit exponents of the Scriptures.

Again, when a man dies, he passes away from the works belonging to the life which he quits. When he begins a new life, those works best beseem him which belong to the life on which he enters. Dionysius (Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, 2) shows that before baptism, whereby man receives divine life, he is incapable of any divine operation; for life must precede work. (Pseduo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 2.1 (PG 3:392B).) In like manner a religious, by his vows, dies to the world in order to live to God. Hence he is excluded from any share in secular business, such as commerce; but he is not forbidden to perform those divine functions which require for their exercise life in God. Among such offices is that of giving praise to God, which is only rightly done by those who have knowledge of sacred things, which comes about through teaching: the dead do not praise the Lord . . . but we who live will bless the Lord (Ps 113:17–18[115:25–26]), and thus religious are not excluded from teaching by their vow of religion.

Furthermore, being rendered by contemplation capable of understanding divine things, religious are certainly the most fit to impart them to others. Hence St. Gregory says: those who contemplate with undistracted mind drink in that knowledge, which they afterwards communicate to others when they are busied in speech (Moral. 6). (Gregory the Great, Morals 6.37.26 (CCSL 143; PL 75:761A).) Now religious are chiefly set apart for contemplation. Thus we see that by their vocation religious become more (rather than less) fit for teaching.

Again, it is ridiculous to assert that a man is rendered incapable of teaching because he has adopted a life which gives him more quiet and greater facility for study and learning, just as it is ridiculous to say that a person is debarred from running because he avoids the obstacles on his course. But religious, as we have already seen, renounce by their vows all those things that chiefly disquiet the human heart. They, therefore, are the men best adapted for study and for teaching. Write wisdom (divine wisdom, according to the Gloss (Glossa interlinearis, at Prov 7:3 (in Glossa ordinaria 3, 1632-1633).)) upon the tablets of your heart (Prov 7:3): that is, learn in your free time. The wisdom of the scribe depends on the opportunity of leisure; and he who has little business may become wise (Sir 38:25).

Again, St. Jerome teaches, in his Hebrew Questions on Genesis, that the poor of Christ have a special claim to the knowledge of the Scripture: they know that we are poor and lowly, and do not own property nor accept alms. They know likewise that none can possess the treasure of Christ—that is, the knowledge of the Scriptures—together with the riches of the world. (Jerome, Hebrew Questions on Genesis, prologue (CCSL 72; PL 23:936A).) But those who have knowledge of Scripture are competent to teach. Hence religious, who profess poverty, are peculiarly fitted to teach.

Again, we have already pointed out that religious orders may be founded to do any work of mercy. Now teaching is a work of mercy—thus it is numbered amongst the works of spiritual almsgiving. Therefore, a religious order may be instituted for the purpose of teaching.

Again, physical warfare, fought by bodily weapons, is farther from the idea of a religious order than is spiritual warfare, which uses spiritual weapons such as holy writings against heresy. It is of this spiritual armour that St. Paul says, the weapons of our warfare are not bodily, but have divine power to destroy strongholds (2 Cor 10:4). Moreover, certain religious orders exist in the Church for the purpose of defending her against her enemies by force of arms, although there is no dearth of secular princes who are her official champions. Why, then, may not orders be lawfully founded for the purpose of teaching, and thus of defending the Church against her enemies, although she has other defenders who are not religious?

Again, we must remember that he who is fit for a greater thing in which a lesser is included ought to be accounted fit for the lesser included in the greater one. Now a religious, even if he does not belong to an order founded for teaching, may be promoted to the office of a prelate (Decretals, XVI, 1, De monachis). (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 16, q. 1, ch. 31 sqq. (Friedberg, 1:769-770).) As, therefore, the office of prelate is greater than that of a doctor (which is exercised by the masters who hold professorships in the schools), and as a prelate is bound to be versed in sacred learning, it ought not to appear unseemly for a monk, by permission of lawful authority, to undertake the function of teaching.

Again, lesser goods may be sacrificed for greater ones, the Gloss remarks on the words, go and proclaim the kingdom of God (Luke 9:60); (Glossa ordinaria 5, 833 at Luke 9:60 (PL 114:283).) but the common welfare must always be preferred to any private advantage. Now while a monk is observing his rule in his cloister, he is working only for his personal advantage, that is, for his own salvation. When, however, he is instructing many, his efforts redound to the profit of the whole Church. Hence it is not unseemly for a religious to live outside his monastery, in order, by permission of lawful authority, to exercise the office of teaching.

Neither is it a valid objection to urge that monks ought not to act thus at present, while there is no dearth of secular teachers. For the common welfare ought not to be sought by any means that may be offered, but by the surest means possible. Now a plurality of teachers is greatly to the public advantage; for one will be well versed in subjects of which another is ignorant. Hence we read in Wisdom 6:24: a multitude of wise men is the salvation of the world. Moses cried out in his zeal for knowledge: would that all the Lord’s people were prophets (Num 11:29). The Gloss remarks upon his words that a faithful preacher would have all men utter the truth, which he himself does not suffice to declare. (Glossa ordinaria 1, 1239 at Num 11:29 (PL 113:401), from Gregory the Great, Morals 22.23.54 (CCSL 143A; PL 76:247C-D).) And below: he (namely, Moses) wished all men to prophesy; for he was not jealous of the gift bestowed upon him. (Glossa ordinaria 1, 1239 at Num 11:29 (PL 113:401), from Gregory the Great, Morals 22.23.54 (CCSL 143A; PL 76:247C-D).)

It matters little whether teaching be conveyed by the word of a master who is present, or by the writing of one who is absent. To quote St. Paul: what we say by letter when absent, we do when present (2 Cor 10:11). Now no one has seen the libraries of books composed by monks for the instruction of the Church doubts that they can teach by writing when absent. Therefore, it is lawful for them to teach by word when present.

Replies to objections

We will now proceed to the easy task of confuting the objections brought against the right of religious to teach.

Ad 1: The first objection, namely, that Our Lord gave a counsel to his disciples not to be masters, is misleading for several reasons.

First, because the works of supererogation (concerning which the counsels are given) are rewarded by a peculiar recompense: whatever more you spend, I will repay you (Luke 10:33), which the Gloss applies to the supererogation of the counsels. (Glossa ordinaria 5, 845 at Luke 10:33.) Hence it cannot be a counsel to abstain from works that are to be specially rewarded. Now teachers, like virgins, are promised a peculiar recompense. For we read in Daniel 12:3: those who instruct (that is, by word and example, as the Gloss explains (Glossa interlinearis, at Dan 12:3 (in Glossa ordinaria 4, 1677-1678).)) many to justice will be as stars for all eternity. It is just as unfitting to say that it is a counsel to refrain from the function of teaching as to say it is a matter of counsel to abstain from virginity, or from martyrdom.

Again, there cannot be a counsel which is contradicted either by another counsel or by a precept. But teaching is a matter both of precept and of counsel. For our Lord said: go, therefore, and teach all nations (Matt 28:19). St. Paul also writes: you who are spiritual should instruct him in a spirit of gentleness (Gal 6:1). Hence there can be no counsel forbidding us to teach.

Again, our Lord willed that his apostles should themselves observe his counsels, so that by their example others should be led to their observance. Hence St. Paul, giving the counsel of virginity, says: I wish that all were as I myself am (1 Cor 7:7). But the apostles certainly did not observe the so-called counsel not to teach. For they themselves were sent forth to teach over the whole world. Thus, there can be no counsel against teaching.

It is unreasonable to say that it is a counsel to abstain from those things that embrace the dignity of teaching. Solemnities pertaining to an office are not a cause of personal elation. Otherwise, all men would be bound to shun them, since it is the duty of all to avoid pride. External insignia merely demonstrate the exalted character of an office. Therefore, as it is not imperfect for a priest to sit above a deacon, or to wear costly vestments, it can certainly be no imperfection to use the insignia of the scholastic office. Our Lord said of the Pharisees, they love the place of honor at feasts (Matt. 23:6); but he did not (as the Gloss remarks) forbid masters to occupy the first seats; he merely reproved the desire to have or not to have them. (Glossa interlinearis, at Matt 23:6 (in Glossa ordinaria 5, 379-380).) It is truly absurd to say that, though it is not a counsel to refrain from teaching, it is a counsel to refuse the name of master. There cannot be a counsel or a precept regarding what is not in ourselves but in another. To teach or not to teach is our own concern, and we have shown that it is not a matter of counsel. But the fact that we are called master or doctor is no affair of ours. It regards those who give us these names. Therefore, to refrain from being called master cannot be a counsel.

Further, as names are used to mean certain things, it is foolish to say that a name is forbidden while the thing signified by it is allowed. Likewise, the observance of the counsels was primarily the duty of the apostles. It is only through their instrumentality that they are observed by any other persons. Now the name of master cannot be forbidden by any counsel, since the apostles called themselves both masters and teachers. I was appointed a preacher and apostle (I am telling the truth, I am not lying), a teacher of the Gentiles in faith and truth (1 Tim. 2:7). I was appointed a preacher and apostle and master (2 Tim. 1:11).

It remains to be considered that our Lord’s words: you are not to be called Rabbi (Matt 23:8), are not a counsel but a precept, by which all men are bound. He did not wish to forbid the office of teaching, but the sin of ambition. Neither, when he added, neither be called masters (Matt 23:10), did he forbid us to teach, nor yet to bear the name of master. What his words signify, according to the Gloss, is: do not desire to be called masters. (Glossa interlinearis, at Matt 23:10 (in Glossa ordinaria 5, 380).) He does not forbid all such desire, but only such as is inordinate, and therefore unlawful. This has been proved both by a foregoing quotation from the Gloss, (Glossa interlinearis, at Matt 23:6 (in Glossa ordinaria 5, 379-380).) and also by Christ’s words about the Pharisees, they love the place of honor at feasts (Matt 23:6). Nevertheless, these words may (says the Gloss) bear another interpretation. If our Lord forbids us to be called by the name of master and teacher, he equally prohibits our bearing the name of Father; for we have one Father who is in Heaven and one master, Christ. For God (as the Gloss says) is by nature both our Father and our master. (Glossa ordinaria 5, 380 at Matt 23:9 (PL 114:158).) A man may be called father to signify his tenderness, and master to denote the authority which he exercises. That which our Lord forbids is that to any man should be attributed either right over physical or spiritual life, or plenitude of wisdom. Hence the commentary of the Gloss on this prohibition of Christ is as follows: do not be called masters, as assuming to yourselves what is due to God. Do not you call others Rabbi, as paying to man divine homage. (Glossa interlinearis, at Matt 23:9 (in Glossa ordinaria 5, 379-380).)

And in another place we find the following commentary on the same passage: a man may be called father as a mark of respect to his age, but not to denote that he is the author of life. (Glossa ordinaria 5, 380 at Matt 23:9 (PL 114:158).) In the same way, a man may be addressed as master, meaning that he is united to the true master, and that we reverence him whose commission he holds. But if our Lord had absolutely forbidden the name of master to be given to men, either by counsel or precept, the Fathers of the Church would certainly not have allowed monastic superiors to be called abbots, a word equivalent to father. If the name father were forbidden, how could the Vicar of Christ, who ought to set an example of perfection, be called pope, or father? Again, both St. Augustine and St. Jerome frequently addressed bishops as popes or fathers. Hence it is the height of folly to pretend that the words, you are not to be called Rabbi, are to be understood as a counsel.

But, even granted that these words were intended by our Lord as a counsel, it does not follow that all such as are perfect would be bound to observe it. For those who make profession of the state of perfection are not under an obligation to obey all the counsels, but only such as they, by their vows, are bound to observe. Were it otherwise, the apostles, who were in the state of perfection, would have been bound to perform the work of supererogation which St. Paul practiced in taking no stipend from the churches in which he preached; and they would have sinned had they acted otherwise (1 Cor 9:15). Were all religious equally bound to observe every counsel, and to perform every work of supererogation, great confusion would ensue, and the distinctions which now differentiate the various orders would be abolished. Those who are in a state of perfection are not bound to observe all the counsels, but only those to which their vows oblige them.

Ad 2: The second objection, that the office of a religious is not to teach, but to mourn, carries no weight. St. Jerome meant, by the words quoted, that the chief duty of a monk, as a monk, is to do penance, not to teach. He thereby shows that a monk is not, by virtue of his profession, bound to teach; and he rebukes the presumption of those religious who claimed the function of teaching as their special prerogative. He writes in the same sense in his epistle to Vigilantius. But it does not by any means follow that although a monk has not the office of teaching, it may not at some future time be imposed upon him. It is not the duty of a subdeacon to read the Gospel, but that does not prove that this office will never fall to his share, as Gratian points out (Decretals, XVI, q. 1*, Superiori*): St. Jerome wished to emphasise the distinction between the person of a monk and that of a cleric, and to show that certain duties were peculiar to the office of each. One function belongs to a monk, as a monk; another to an ecclesiastic as an ecclesiastic. The duty peculiar to a monk, by reason of his state of life, is to mourn for his own sins and those of others. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 16, q. 1, post ch. 39, sect. 2 (Friedberg, 1:772).) The task especially allotted to an ecclesiastic is that of preaching to and instructing the people. This distinction appears still more clearly in another chapter of Gratian, in which he treats of the teaching conveyed by preaching, which is the special duty of prelates, not of scholastic teaching, in which they are not specially well practiced. Hence in raising this objection against the right of religious to teach, our adversaries are begging the question.

But, even supposing that it be not lawful for a monk to teach, that does not prove that it is not right for canons regular to teach; since these are counted as ecclesiastics. St. Augustine, in his sermon on the common life of clerics (quoted in Decretals, XII, q. 1, Nemo), says: he who possesses or desires to possess private property, and to live on his own means, virtually renounces his life with me, and is not a cleric. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 12, q. 1, ch. 10 (Friedberg, 1:680) from Augustine, Sermon 356, para. 14 (PL 39:1580).) This passage shows that those who lived under the rule of this saint, in the practice of poverty, were recognised as clerics. Although St. Augustine withdrew the assertion that no one was a cleric who retained private property, (Augustine, Sermon 355, para. 6 (PL 39:1572-73).) he never contradicted his words that those who lived under him without possessing anything of their own were clerics (see Decretals, XII, q. 1, Certe ego sum). (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 12, q. 1, ch. 18 (Friedberg, 1:683).)

When canons regular and monks are said to be equally counted as religious, it is to be understood that they are equal in observance of the points common to all religious orders: namely, the renunciation of private property, abstention from commerce or from legal business, and the like. Unless this be made clear, it might be thought that canons regular were bound to certain observances, such as abstaining from wearing linen apparel, to which monks are bound. Even if it be not lawful for monks to teach, this function is certainly permissible to religious belonging to orders instituted for the purpose, just as it is lawful for the Knights Templar to bear arms, although the use of armour is forbidden to monks.

Ad 3: The third objection, that the exercise of the teaching office is contrary to the religious vows, is, on several accounts, ill-founded.

Religious do not renounce the world in the sense that they can make no use of secular things. They renounce a worldly life, that is, they are not allowed, by their vows, to be employed in secular affairs. Even among men, living in the world, there are some who are not of the world, that is, who are disengaged from temporal interests. But religious do not act contrary to their vows, by making use of the riches or even, at times, of the pleasures of the world. Otherwise occasional feasting would for them be a mortal sin. Which is, of course, out of the question. If it be not against the religious vows to make use of secular riches or pleasure, why should it be contrary to these vows, to make use of worldly honor?

Again, not only religious, but all men are, in one sense, bound to renounce the world, as we learn from the words of St. John already quoted: if any one loves the world, love for the Father is not in him. For all that is in the world, the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes and the pride of life, is not of the Father but is of the world (1 John 2:15–16). The Gloss says that lovers of the world have nothing except these three things: namely, the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, from which sources spring every vice. (Glossa ordinaria 6, 1386 at 1 John 2:15-16 (PL 114:696).) Hence we see that it is not riches or pleasure simply which are said to belong to the world, but the inordinate desire for them; and that not honor, but ambition, is forbidden, not to religious alone, but to all mankind. The pride of life, says the Gloss, signifies worldly ambition. (Glossa ordinaria 6, 1386 at 1 John 2:15.) But even if honor be simply understood as belonging to the world, this would not be true of every kind of honor, but only of such as consists of worldly things. The honor of the priesthood cannot be said to belong to the world. Neither can the honor given to a teacher, when the teaching which is honored concerns spiritual things. Thus, if religious do not, by their vows, renounce the priesthood, they need not renounce the office of teaching.

Again, it is untrue to say that the act of teaching is an honor. It is the teacher’s office which is honorable. And, even if religious renounce all honors, they cannot renounce all honorable functions; otherwise, they would renounce all those works of mercy which are most deserving of honor. Honour is the reward of virtue (Ethics, 1). (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 4, ch. 8, 1123b35.) That the devil deceives some men and fills them with pride on account of their office as teachers is no more reason for refusing the work of teaching than it is for declining to do any virtuous actions. For as St. Augustine says: pride insinuates itself into good works to make them worthless. (Augustine, Regula ad servos Dei, para. 2 (PL 32:1379).)

Ad 4: The fourth objection, which asserts that religious profess perfect humility, is absolutely untrue. They make no vow of humility. Their vow is of obedience. Neither humility, nor any other virtue, is a matter of vow. Acts of virtue, being a matter of precept, are a necessity. Vows are only concerned with that which is voluntary. Again, no one can make a vow of perfect humility, or of perfect charity. For perfection is a gift of God; it does not depend upon our will.

Granted, however, that religious were bound to perfect humility, that would not hinder their receiving certain honors. The possession of property is certainly contrary to perfect poverty, but the acceptance of honors is not contrary to humility. For pride consists not in possessing honors, but in being unduly elated by them. Hence St. Bernard says, in his book On Consideration: (St. Bernard of Clairvaux, On Consideration, bk. 2, ch. 6, para. 13 (PL 182:750B).) there is no jewel brighter than humility, even in all the ornaments of the Supreme Pontiff, and he who is in a more exalted position than others, becomes, by humility, superior to himself. And in Sirach 3:20 we read: the greater you are, the more you should humble yourself in all things. Who would dare to say that St. Gregory became less humble by being promoted to the highest ecclesiastical honor? Moreover, as we have said, the function of teaching is not an honor. Therefore, objections brought against it on that ground are worthless.

Ad 5: The fifth objection brought against the right of religious to teach is that Dionysius distinguishes monks as apart from deacons, priests, and bishops. We know from ecclesiastical history that the monks of the primitive Church, until the time of Eusebius, Zozimus, and Siricius, were not clerics (Decretals, XVI, q. 1, Superiori). (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 16, q. 1, ch. 39, sect. 3 (Friedberg, 1:772).) Therefore, as it is of these monks that Dionysius speaks, we cannot, from his words, come to any conclusion about the monks who were bishops, priests, or deacons. Any difficulty on the point arises from misunderstanding of the words of Dionysius. This author calls the sacraments of the Church ‘sacred actions.’ Baptism he terms cleansing and illumination. Confirmation and the Eucharist he names perfection (Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, 4*.*). (Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 4 (PG 3:471-486); Also found more clearly in Pseudo-Dionysius, Ecclessiastical Hierarchy 5.3 (PG 3:504B).) Now it is not lawful for any, save bishops, priests or deacons, to perform these sacred functions. Teaching in the schools, however, is not one of the holy rites, or sacred actions, whereof he speaks; otherwise it could be undertaken by none save by a priest, or a deacon. Again, ordained monks can consecrate the Body of our Lord, a power pertaining to none but priests. Why then should they not exercise the function of teaching, for which no orders are required?

Ad 6: The sixth objection urges that, as no monk can be employed in ecclesiastical duties, and yet keep his monastic rule aright, much less can he combine the work of teaching with regular observance. Our answer is that, as we have already shown, this objection does not hold good with regard to the essentials of religious life. For these can be practiced by those who hold ecclesiastical office. As for such religious observances as silence, vigils, and the like, it is shown in another chapter that he who is obliged to serve daily in the ministry of the Church, practices the strictness of his monastic life. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 16, q. 1, ch. 2 (Friedberg, 1:762).) But it is not unseemly if anyone neglect regular observance for the sake of performing an action such as teaching, which is for the common good. Thus religious who are called to the office of prelates—sometimes while they are still in their monastery—accept a dispensation for such reason. There are also religious living in their cloister in strict observance, who exercise the function of teaching, because it is enjoined by their rule.

Ad 7: The seventh objection to the right of a religious to teach is that by so doing, he oversteps his measure, or, as the Gloss says, (Peter Lombard, Commentaries on the Psalms and St. Paul, at 2 Cor 10:13 (PL 192:69A).) goes further than is permitted to him. Now when we say that a thing is permitted, we mean that it is not forbidden by any law. Hence if a religious do something not prohibited by his rule, even though the thing be not mentioned in the rule, he does not overstep his measure. Otherwise, religious who live under a mitigated rule would have no right to undertake the customs and usages of a more perfect life. Such a prohibition would be opposed to the sentiments of St. Paul, who says that, forgetting the things that were behind, he stretched forth himself to those that were before (Phil 3:13). We must further remember that some religious are, by the rule of their order, destined for teaching. To them, of course, the foregoing objection cannot apply.

Replies to further objections

The suggestion that in one community of religious there ought not to be two teachers is manifestly unfair. Religious, as we have shown, are not less humble than are seculars; and their position in the office of teaching ought not to be worse than that of seculars. But, if the suggestion, to which we have alluded, were carried out in practice, religious would have far less chance of success in the profession of teaching than would be the case with seculars. For a whole multitude of religious would have no more opportunity of promotion to a professorship than any individual layman would have who studied alone.

Hence the progress of religious would be seriously impeded. We may compare their position to that of wrestlers, whose spirit in their match would be damped if the prize for which they strove were withdrawn. For, as Aristotle says: the bravest in the fight are those who despise cowardice, and honor courage (Ethics, 3). (Aristotle, Ethics 3.16, 1116a20.) In like manner, it is a hindrance to a student if the chance of a professorship, the prize for which he is working, be denied him.

It would be regarded as a penalty for some offence if a man who, by his learning, had gained a right to some scholastic post were not allowed to occupy it; and in the same way, a religious would be punished for being a religious were obstacles placed in the way of his gaining a professorship: and to punish men for doing good is iniquity.

Ad 1: To the first argument brought forward in support of this suggestion, it should be said that the authority of James 3:1: let not many of you become teachers, my brethren, applies as much to laymen as to religious. For in the New Testament, all Christians are called brethren; and the Church is called a society of Christians. Neither is a multitude of religious teachers more stringently forbidden by the authority cited than is a multiplicity of secular teachers. For, as St. Augustine says: by many teachers is meant teachers teaching contrary doctrines. Many who teach alike are but as one teacher. (Augustine, Retractions, Prologue, para. 2 (CCSL 57; CSEL 36:8-9; PL 32: 585).) Hence St. James’ prohibition is directed against divergence of doctrine, not against plurality of masters.

His words may also be understood in their literal sense, as meaning that discrimination must be exercised in the choice of teachers; that only such men must be chosen for this office as are discreet and well versed in the Scriptures. But, as the Gloss remarks, there are not many such to be found. (Glossa interlinearis, at Jas 3:1 (in Glossa ordinaria 6, 1283-1284).) In another passage, the Gloss says that they who are not learned in the word of faith should not be allowed to teach; lest true preachers be hindered in their work. (Glossa ordinaria 6, 1283 at Jas 3:1 (PL 114:671).)

Or, again, the words of St. James which have been quoted may apply to masters in the sense of prelates of the Church. For it is forbidden for one bishop to govern several churches, or for several bishops to rule over one church. Hence the Gloss says, (Glossa interlinearis, at Jas 3:1 (in Glossa ordinaria 6, 1283-1284).) do not desire to be masters, i.e. prelates (who alone are ecclesiastical masters) in many churches; or to have many masters in one church. For he who teaches in a community is not a master of a church, although the community to which he belongs may be called a church.

Ad 2: We can answer the second argument of our adversaries by saying that, although there be several masters in one community, they do not rule as a captain guides a ship, or a queen-bee reigns in a hive. Each master presides over his own school. Hence the words of St. Jerome cannot be understood in the sense in which our opponents use them. They only mean that there should not be many masters in the same school.

Ad 3: To the third argument brought against a multiplicity of religious teachers, we reply that the fact that there may be several religious houses, each containing many masters, does not debar laymen from the profession of teaching. There are not always in a community of religious enough men capable of teaching. Again, the fact that in any diocese there may be a sufficiency of teachers does not exclude seculars from this function. Religious and laymen ought to be judged on the same lines; and the most capable masters, be they secular or religious, ought to be selected without distinction of person. We need not fear that Sacred Scripture will fall into contempt on account of a multiplicity of teachers to expound them. There is more danger of this being the case when the professors of Scripture are few in number. Hence there is no reason why the number of teachers should be limited; or why, through fear of their being too many, men capable of teaching should be excluded from that office.