Article 1 — Whether things are preserved in their being by God, or, if all God’s action were circumscribed, they would remain in being by themselves

The first point of inquiry is whether things are preserved in their being by God, or whether, if all God’s action were circumscribed, they would remain in being by themselves. (Parallel texts: ST I.104.1; SCG III.65, 94; Commentary on the Gospel of John, ch. 5, lect. 1‒2; Commentary on Hebrews, ch. 1, lect. 1.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that the latter is the case. For it is written: God’s works are perfect (Deut 32:4). Accordingly, it is argued thus: a perfect thing is that which lacks nothing, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Physics 3.6, 207a8.) Now, a thing lacks something in its very being if it cannot exist without an external agent. Such a thing, therefore, is not perfect, and consequently, the works of God are not such.

Obj. 2: It may be said that God’s works are not perfect simply speaking, but only with respect to their own nature.

On the contrary, a thing is perfect as to its nature if it has all that its nature is capable of having. Now, whatsoever has all that its nature is capable of having is able to continue in existence, even if God cease to preserve it from without. If, then, some creatures are perfect in their own nature, they can continue to exist without God keeping them in existence. The middle premise is proved thus: by preserving a thing, God does something; hence, it is said in John 5:17: my Father works even till now, and I work, (Cf. Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 10.1–10 (PL 34:407–15).) as Augustine says. But when an agent works, the effect receives something. Therefore, as long as God preserves things, the things preserved always receive something from God, and thus, whatsoever needs to be preserved does not yet have all that it is capable of having.

Obj. 3: A thing is not perfect unless it fulfills its purpose. Now, the principles of a thing are intended for the purpose of preserving the thing in being. If, then, the created principles of things are unable to keep things in existence, it follows that they are imperfect and so are not God’s works, which is absurd.

Obj. 4: God is the cause of things as an efficient cause. Now, the effect remains when the action of the efficient cause ceases; for example, the builder ceases to act yet the house remains, the flame that caused the fire may cease to burn yet the fire caused by it continues. Therefore, even if God’s actions cease altogether, creatures can continue to exist.

Obj. 5: But someone will say that lower agents are the causes of things coming to be, but not of their being; this is why the existence of an effect remains when the causes of its coming to be have been removed. But God is the cause of things not only in their coming to be, but also in their being. Therefore, things cannot continue to exist if the divine action ceases.

On the contrary, every thing generated has being by its own form. If, then, the lower generating causes do not cause being, they will not be causes of forms; and consequently, forms that are in matter are not produced by forms in matter, which is contrary to the opinion of the Philosopher, who asserts that the form that is in this flesh and bones is produced by a form that is in that flesh and bones; (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.8, 1034a1–8.) rather, it will follow that forms in matter are produced by forms without matter, which was Plato’s view, or by the giver of forms, as Avicenna contended. (Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing 9.4–5.)

Obj. 6: Things whose being is in coming to be cannot continue after the agent has ceased to act, as is clear in motion and a contest and the like, whereas those things whose being is in established being can continue even after the agent has been removed. Therefore, Augustine says: by the presence of light the air has not been made luminous, but it becomes luminous, for if it had been made such, it would not become such, and if the light were removed it would remain luminous. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 8.12 (PL 34:383).) Now, there are many creatures whose being is not in coming to be, but in established being, as is clear with the angels and even all bodies. Therefore, creatures can remain in existence after God has ceased to act.

Obj. 7: Lower generating causes, as proved above, cause the existence of the things they generate—not, however, as principal and first causes, but as secondary causes. Now, the first cause of existence, which is God, does not give the things he produces the beginning of existence except through the mediating secondary causes mentioned. Therefore, neither does he give them continuance of existence, since one and the same thing derives both being and continuance of being from the same cause. Therefore, things generated are kept in existence by their essential principles themselves when secondary agent causes cease, and consequently, even when the first cause, namely God, ceases acting.

Obj. 8: If a thing cease to exist, this is either because of its matter or because it is produced from nothing. But matter is not a cause of corruption except through being subject to contrariety, and matter subject to contrariety is not in all created things. Therefore, those things in which there is no matter subject to contrariety, such as the heavenly bodies and angels, cannot cease to exist by reason of matter. Nor can they cease to exist through being produced from nothing, since nothing follows from nothing, and nothing does nothing, and consequently, it does not corrupt a thing. Therefore, if all divine action were to cease, such things would not cease to exist.

Obj. 9: The form begins to be in matter in the last instant of a thing’s becoming, when the thing is no longer in coming to be but is established in being. Now, in Avicenna’s opinion, the forms of generated things are inserted in matter by an active intelligence, which is the giver of forms. (Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing 9.4–5.) Therefore, that intelligence is the cause of being and not only of coming to be; and thus, by its action things can be kept in existence, even apart from God’s action.

Obj. 10: The substantial form also is a cause of existence. Therefore, if the cause of a thing’s existence also keeps it in existence, it follows that the form of a thing suffices to keep it in existence.

Obj. 11: A thing is kept in existence by its matter inasmuch as this upholds the form. Now, according to the Philosopher, matter is ungenerated and incorruptible, and thus, it is not caused by any cause; and therefore, it remains even when all action of an efficient cause ceases. (Aristotle, Physics 1.9, 192a19–b5; On the Heavens 1.20, 278b35–279a10.) Therefore, it will be possible for things to remain in existence after the action of the first efficient cause, namely God, has ceased.

Obj. 12: It is written: look upon all the works of the Most High. Two and two, and one against another (Sir 33:15). Now, some of God’s works are found to need his act of preservation. Therefore, there is also found the opposite among God’s works, that is, some that do not need God’s preservation.

Obj. 13: A natural appetite cannot be pointless and in vain. Now, everything naturally desires the preservation of its own existence. Therefore, a thing is able to remain in existence by its very self, else its natural appetite would be vain.

Obj. 14: Augustine says that God makes each thing good, and all things together very good, (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity 1.10 (PL 40:236).) for which reason it is written: God saw all the things that he had made and they were very good (Gen 1:31). Accordingly, the universe of created things is very good, and the best of all, since best produces best, according to Plato in Timaeus. (Plato, Timaeus 30a–b.) Now, it is better not to need something exterior for one’s preservation in existence than to need it. Therefore, the universe of created things needs nothing exterior to keep it in existence.

Obj. 15: Beatitude is something created in the nature of the blessed. Now, beatitude is a state rendered perfect by the accumulation of all goods, according to Boethius, (Boethius, On the Consolation of Philosophy 3.2 (CSEL 67:47; PL 63:723–31).) and this must include one’s own continuance in existence, which is one of the greatest goods. Therefore, there is a creature that can of itself remain in existence.

Obj. 16: Augustine says that God so governs things by his providence that he allows them to exercise their own proper movements. (Augustine, City of God 7.30 (PL 41:219–20).) Now, the proper movement of nature, being from nothing, is to tend toward nothing. Therefore, God allows the nature that comes from nothing to return to nothing; and consequently, he does not keep things in existence.

Obj. 17: A recipient that is contrary to what it has received does not preserve it but rather destroys it. For we observe that things that are received by natural things acting by violence on their contraries do remain for a brief time after the natural agents have ceased to act; thus, after the fire has ceased to act, heat remains in the water heated for a brief time. Now, God’s effects are received not in a contrary, but in nothing, since he is the author of the whole substance of a thing. Much more, then, will the divine effects remain, be it only for a brief time, after God’s action has ceased.

Obj. 18: Form is the principle of knowledge, activity, and existence. Now, a form without assistance from without can be a principle of activity and knowledge. Therefore, it can also be a principle of existence, and thus, when all divine action ceases, things can be kept in existence by their form.

On the contrary (1), it is written: upholding all things by the word of his power, and the Gloss remarks even as all things were created by him, so by him are they preserved unchangeable (Heb 1:3). (Glossa ordinaria 6, 794–95, at Hebrews 1:3 (PL 114:643–44).)

Furthermore (2), Augustine says: the might of the Creator and the power of the omnipotent is the cause of existence in every creature; and if the ruling power of God were withdrawn from his creatures, their form would at once cease and all nature would collapse; and further on: the world would not stand for one instant if God withdrew his support. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 4.12 (PL 34:304).)

Furthermore (3), Gregory says that all things would fall into nothingness were they not upheld by the hand of the omnipotent. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 6.15, 16.37 (PL 75:738, 1143–44).)

Furthermore (4), in The Book of Causes, it is said: every intelligence derives its fixity, that is, its stability and essence, from that goodness which is the first cause. (The Book of Causes, Proposition 9.) Much more, therefore, are other creatures not fixed in existence save by God.

I answer that, without any doubt whatever, it must be admitted that things are preserved in existence by God, and that they would instantly return to nothing were God to abandon them. The reason for this may be expressed as follows. An effect must depend on its cause. For this belongs to the account of cause and effect, and is manifestly apparent in formal and material causes. For on the removal of any of its material or formal causes, a thing at once ceases to exist, because such principles enter into the thing’s essence.

However, the same judgment should be made of efficient causes and formal or material causes. For an efficient cause is a thing’s cause insofar as it induces the form or disposes the matter. Therefore, a thing depends equally on its efficient cause, its matter, and its form, since through one of them it depends on the other. Now, as to final causes, the same must be said of them as of efficient causes, because the end is a cause only insofar as it moves the efficient cause to act; for it is first not in existence, but only in intention. Consequently also, there is no action where there is no final cause, as is clear in Metaphysics 3. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 3.2, 996a23–b7.)

Accordingly, the existence of a thing made depends on its efficient cause inasmuch as it depends on the very form of the thing made. Now, there can be an efficient cause on which the form of the thing made does not depend through itself and according to the account of form, but only accidentally; for example, the form of a generated fire does not depend on the generating fire through itself and according to the account of its species, seeing that it occupies the same degree in the order of things, nor is the form of fire differently in the generated and in the generating fire; rather, it is distinguished therefrom only by material division, that is, insofar as it is different matter. Therefore, since the generated fire has its form from some cause, this same form must depend on some higher principle that is the cause of that very form through itself and in respect of the proper account of the species.

Now, seeing that, speaking essentially, the existence of a form in matter implies no movement or change, except perhaps accidentally, and since no bodies act unless moved, as the Philosopher shows, it follows of necessity that the principle on which the form depends through itself must be an incorporeal principle; for the effect depends on its agent cause through the action of some principle. And if a corporeal principle be in some way the cause of a form, this is due to its acting in the power of an incorporeal principle, as its instrument. In fact, this is necessary in order that the form begin to exist, inasmuch as a form does not begin to exist otherwise than in matter; for matter standing in just any state cannot be subject to a form, since the proper act must be in its proper matter.

When, therefore, matter is in a disposition unsuitable to some form, it cannot through itself attain that form from an incorporeal principle on which the form depends through itself; whence there must be something to transmute the matter, and this will be some corporeal agent, whose action consists in moving something. This corporeal agent acts in the power of the incorporeal principle, and its action is determined to this form inasmuch as this form is in the corporeal agent, either actually (as in universal agents) or virtually (as in equivocal agents).

Accordingly, these lower corporeal agents are not the cause of the forms in things made, except to the extent of their causality in transmuting matter, since they do not act except by transmuting, as stated above, (Q. 3, aa. 7–8.) and this is by transmuting matter and bringing out the form from the potency of matter. Hence, the form of the thing generated depends naturally on the generator, insofar as it is brought out from the potency of matter, but not as to its absolute existence.

And, therefore, when the action of the generator ceases, the bringing forth of the form from potency into actuality, that is, the coming to be of the thing generated, ceases, whereas the forms themselves, whereby the things generated have existence, do not cease. Hence, the existence of the things generated, but not their coming to be, remains after the action of the generator has ceased. On the other hand, if there are certain forms that do not exist in matter, such as intellectual substances, or that exist in matter in no way indisposed to their form, such as the heavenly bodies, wherein there are no contrary dispositions, they must proceed from a principle that is an incorporeal agent that does not act by movement, nor do they depend on something for their coming to be without also depending on it also for their being.

Therefore, just as when the action of an efficient cause that acts by movement ceases, at that very instant the coming to be of the things generated ceases, so too when the action of an incorporeal agent ceases, the very existence of things created by it ceases. Now, this incorporeal agent by whom all things, both corporeal and incorporeal, are created is God (as we have proved above (Q. 3, aa. 5–6, 8.)), from whom things derive not only their form but also their matter. And as to the question at issue, it makes no difference whether they were all made by him immediately or in a certain order, as certain philosophers have maintained. We conclude, then, that with the cessation of the divine activity, at the same instant all things would fall into nothingness, as we have proved by the authorities quoted in the arguments on the contrary.

Reply Obj. 1: God’s creatures are perfect in their own nature and in their own order, but their perfection requires among other things that they be kept in existence by God.

Reply Obj. 2: God does not create things by one action and preserve them by another. For the existence of enduring things is not divisible, except accidentally insofar as it is subject to some movement; but according to itself, it exists in an instant. Therefore, God’s action, which is through itself the cause of a thing’s existence, is not distinct according to what makes the principle of being and the continuance of that being.

Reply Obj. 3: As long as the essential principles of things exist, so long do those things continue to exist; but those very principles would cease to be, were the divine action to cease.

Reply Obj. 4: These lower agents cause things as to their coming to be, but not as to their existence, speaking essentially. But God is through himself the cause of existence; therefore, the comparison fails. Hence, Augustine says: when a man is building a house and goes away, the building remains after he has ceased to work and gone: whereas the world would not stand for a single instant if God withdrew his support. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 4.12 (PL 34:303–6).)

Reply Obj. 5: Inasmuch as corporeal agents do not act except by transmuting, and as nothing is transmuted except by reason of matter, the causality of corporeal agents cannot extend beyond things that in some way are in matter. Because the Platonists and Avicenna denied that forms are led out from the potency of matter, they were obliged to hold that natural agents merely dispose matter, and that the form is induced by a separated principle. On the other hand, if we hold that substantial forms are led out from the potency of matter, following Aristotle’s thought, natural agents will be the cause not only of the dispositions of matter but also of substantial forms, at least in regard to their being led out from the potency of matter into act, as stated above; (Q. 3, aa. 9, 11.) and consequently, they are principles of existence as far as its inception into being, but not as far as being itself, absolutely.

Reply Obj. 6: Some of the forms that begin to exist in matter through the action of a corporeal agent are, when produced according to the perfect account of their species and according to perfect being in matter, like even the form of their generator, in that the matter does not retain contrary principles, and such forms remain after the action of their generator until the time of their corruption. Other forms, however, when produced are according to the perfect account of the species but not according to perfect being in matter; for example, heat in hot water has the perfect species of heat but not perfect being, which depends on the application of the form to the matter, inasmuch as within the matter there remains a form contrary to that quality. And forms of this sort can remain for a short time after the action of the agent but are prevented from remaining for long by the contrary principle that is in the matter. Again, other forms when produced in matter both according to an imperfect species and according to imperfect being, for example, the light produced in the air by a luminous body; for light in the air is not a perfect natural form as light is in the luminous body, but rather is there after the mode of an intention. Hence, just as a man’s likeness does not remain in a mirror save as long as the mirror is in front of him, even so neither does light remain in the air when the luminous body is no longer present. For such intentions depend on the natural forms of bodies through themselves and not merely accidentally; and therefore they no longer remain in existence after the action of the agents has ceased. Therefore, such things are said to be “in coming to be” on account of the imperfection of their own being, while perfected creatures are not said to be “in coming to be” on account of the imperfection of their own being, even though the action of God their Maker remains unfailingly.

Reply Obj. 7: The action of a corporeal agent does not extend beyond movement, and therefore it is the instrument of the first agent, in the leading out of forms from potency to actuality, which leading out is by movement, but not in their preservation, except insofar as through some movement matter is made to retain dispositions that render it appropriate to the form; for in this way the lower bodies are kept in existence through the movement of the heavenly bodies.

Reply Obj. 8: If the divine action were to cease, the creature also would cease to exist, not through the presence of a contrary in its matter—since that would cease to exist at the same time as the matter—but because the creature is made from nothing; and yet, not in the sense that nothingness does something toward the corruption, but that it does not act toward its preservation.

Reply Obj. 9: Even the giver of forms, if we suppose with Avicenna that it is something apart from God, must cease to exist if God, who is its own cause, ceases to act.

Reply Obj. 10: The form also would cease to exist if the aforesaid action were to cease, so that it could not be its principle of existence.

Reply Obj. 11: Matter is said to be ungenerated because it does not come into existence through a generation; yet, this does not exclude its being from God, seeing that every imperfect thing must originate from a perfect one.

Reply Obj. 12: In God’s works, the presence of one contradictory does not argue the presence of its opposite (for then it would follow that since some of his works are created, there must be some that are not created), although this is true if we apply it to other kinds of opposition. But the things to which the objection refers are in contradictory opposition to each other; therefore, the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 13: It is true that everything naturally desires its own preservation, yet not that it is preserved by itself, but by its own cause.

Reply Obj. 14: The universe of created things is not the best thing simply speaking, but in the genus of created things; whence nothing prevents something from being better.

Reply Obj. 15: The goods, the accumulation of which makes the state of beatitude perfect, have their source in the creature’s union with its cause, since the beatitude of the rational creature consists in the very enjoyment of God.

Reply Obj. 16: Properly speaking, a tendency to nothingness is not a movement of nature, which always has a tendency to the good; rather, it is a defect of nature, so that the argument is based on a false supposition.

Reply Obj. 17: A violent agent that produces a violent impression is the cause of that impression as to its coming to be, and not simply as to its being, as explained above. (Q. 5, a. 1, ad 6.) Therefore, as soon as the agent ceases to act, the impression may last for a brief time, but not for long, on account of its imperfection.

Reply Obj. 18: Just as a form cannot be a principle of existence unless we presuppose some previous principle, so too neither can it be a principle of activity, since God works in everything, as we have shown above, (Q. 3, a. 6.) nor even of knowledge, since all knowledge derives from the uncreated light.