Article 3 — Whether God can annihilate a creature

The third point of inquiry is whether God can annihilate a creature. (Parallel texts: ST I.104.3; I.9.2; On Truth, q. 5, a. 2, ad 6; Quodlibet IV, q. 3, a. 1.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that he cannot. For Augustine says, in Eighty-Three Different Questions, that God does not cause things to tend to non-existence. (Augustine, Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 21 (PL 40:16).) But this would be the case were he to annihilate a creature. Therefore, God cannot annihilate a creature.

Obj. 2: Corruptible creatures, whose existence is weaker than that of others, do not cease to exist save through the action of some agent cause, for example, a fire is extinguished by something acting contrary to it. Much less, therefore, can other creatures cease to exist otherwise than through some action. If, then, God were to annihilate a creature, this would not be except through some action. But this cannot be done through an action, since every action, proceeding as it does from an actual being, must terminate in an actual being, because every maker produces its like. Now, an action by which an actual being is produced in no way annihilates. Therefore, God cannot annihilate a thing.

Obj. 3: Whatsoever exists accidentally is traced back to what exists through itself. Now, no active cause produces defect and corruption save accidentally, since nothing acts without intending a good, according to Dionysius; (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 4.19–32 (PG 3:715–34).) this is why even fire destroying water does not intend the privation of the form of water, but rather to introduce its own proper form into the matter. Therefore, defect cannot be caused by an agent without some perfection being caused at the same time. Now, where a perfection is produced, there is not annihilation. Therefore, God cannot annihilate a thing.

Obj. 4: Nothing acts except for an end, since the end moves the efficient cause. Now, the end of God’s action is his own goodness; and this indeed can exist in the production of things, whereby things attain likenesses of the divine goodness; but this is not so in annihilation, whereby something annihilated would utterly withdraw from likeness to God. Therefore, God cannot annihilate a thing.

Obj. 5: So long as the cause remains, its effect must remain also. For if this were not necessary, it would be possible, given a cause, for its effect to be or not to be; and then it would need something else to determine its being, and thus, the cause would not suffice for the existence of its effect. But God is the sufficient cause of things. Therefore, as long as God exists, things must remain in existence. Now, God cannot prevent his own remaining in existence. Therefore, he cannot reduce creatures to non-existence.

Obj. 6: It will be said that God would not be the actual cause if things were to be annihilated.

On the contrary, God’s action is his being; this is also why Augustine says that we exist insofar as God exists. (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine 1.32 (PL 34:32).) Now, his own existence was never new to him. Therefore, he never ceases to act and will always be an actual cause.

Obj. 7: God cannot act against common conceptions of the mind; for example, he cannot make it so that the whole is not greater than its part. Now, it is a common conception of the mind, among the wise, that the rational soul has a continuous being. Therefore, God cannot cause it to be annihilated.

Obj. 8: The Commentator says, on Metaphysics 11, that if a thing in itself is capable of being or not being, it cannot acquire from another a necessity of being. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 11; cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.7, 1072b3–14.) Therefore, whatever creatures have necessary being do not have the capacity for being and not being. Now, such are all incorruptible things, for example, incorporeal substances and heavenly bodies. Therefore, in none of these is there the possibility of not being. Therefore, if they be left to themselves through God withdrawing his action from them, they will not cease to exist; and thus, it seems that God cannot annihilate them.

Obj. 9: The thing received in something does not remove the potency of the recipient, but it is able to perfect it. If, then, there is a thing that has the possibility of not being, it cannot receive anything that will remove this possibility; and consequently, a thing that in itself contains the possibility of not existing cannot receive from anything else the necessity of existing.

Obj. 10: Things according to which certain things are diversified in genus belong to a thing’s essence, for the genus is part of the definition. Now, certain things differ in genus according to being corruptible or incorruptible, as is clear from Metaphysics 10. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.10, 1058b26–1059a14.) Therefore, everlastingness or incorruptibility is part of such things’ essence. Now, God cannot deprive a thing of what belongs to its essence; for he cannot make a man not to be an animal while remaining a man. Therefore, he cannot cause incorruptible things not to last forever, and thus, he cannot reduce them to nothing.

Obj. 11: A corruptible thing can never be changed so as to become incorruptible according to its own nature (for the incorruptibility of bodies rising from the dead is not something of nature, but of glory); and this is because corruptible and incorruptible differ in genus, as stated above. Now, if a thing that is in itself capable of not existing could be made by something else to exist of necessity, a corruptible thing might be changed into an incorruptible one. Therefore, a thing which is in itself capable of not existing cannot possibly acquire a necessity of existing from another, and so we come to the same conclusion as above.

Obj. 12: If creatures have no necessity except insofar as they depend on God, and if they depend on God insofar as he is their cause, they will not have necessity except through the mode that belongs to the causality whereby God is their cause. Now, God is the cause of things not of necessity but by his will, as we have proved above. (Q. 3, a. 15.) Therefore, necessity in things will be such as it is in things that are caused by a will. Now, things effected by a will are not necessary simply and absolutely; rather, their necessity is only conditional, inasmuch as the will is not determined by necessity to one effect. It follows, then, that in things nothing is absolutely necessary, but only conditionally, just as it is necessary that Socrates move if he runs, or walk if he wishes to walk and is not prevented from so doing. Thus, it seems to follow that no creature is simply incorruptible, and that all are corruptible, which is incongruous.

Obj. 13: Just as God is the highest good, so is he the most perfect being. Now, inasmuch as he is the highest good, it is incongruous for him to be the cause of the evil of fault. Therefore, inasmuch as he is the most perfect being, it is incongruous for him to be able to cause the annihilation of things.

Obj. 14: Augustine says that God is so good that he would never allow evil to be done, were he not so powerful that he could elicit some good from any evil whatsoever. (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity 1.11 (PL 40:236).) But if creatures were to be annihilated, no good would be elicited from that. Therefore, God cannot allow creatures to return to nothingness.

Obj. 15: The distance from nothing to being is no less than from being to nothing. Now, it belongs to an infinite power to produce a being from nothing, on account of the infinite distance. Therefore, only an infinite power can reduce a being to nothing. But no creature has an infinite power. Hence, if we take away the action of the Creator, a creature cannot be reduced to nothing; and yet, only on the supposition that God’s action be removed was it said that he can annihilate things. Therefore, in no way can God reduce creatures to nothing.

On the contrary (1), Origen says in On First Principles: that which was given can be taken away and lost. (Origen, On First Principles 1.3, paras. 7–8.) Now, creatures were given existence by God. Therefore, it can be taken from them, so that God can reduce them to nothing.

Furthermore (2), that which depends on God’s simple will can also cease if it be God’s will. Now, the creature’s whole being depends on God’s simple will, since he is the cause of things by his will and not by natural necessity. Therefore, if it be his will, creatures can be annihilated.

Furthermore (3), God is not more indebted to creatures after they begin to exist than he was before they began to exist. Now, before creatures began to exist, he could, without prejudice to his goodness, abstain from bringing them into being, since his goodness in no way depends on creatures. Therefore, without prejudice to his goodness, God can withdraw his action from creatures, with the result (as proved above) that they would cease to exist. (Q. 5, a. 2.) Therefore, God can annihilate creatures.

Furthermore (4), as we have proved, God by the same action has produced things in existence and keeps them in existence. (Q. 5, a. 1.) Now, God was able not to produce creatures in existence. Therefore, for the same reason, he can annihilate them.

I answer that in things made by God, something is said to be possible in two ways.

First, with regard to a power of the agent alone; for example, before the world came to be, it was possible for the world to exist, not through a potency of the creature (which did not exist), but only through the power of God, who was able to bring the world into being.

Second, with regard to a power that is within the things made; for example, it is possible for a composite body to be corrupted.

Accordingly, if we consider the possibility of non-existence on the side of the things made, there have been two opinions on this point. Avicenna held that all things except God have in themselves a possibility of being and of non-being. (Avicenna, The Metaphysics of the Healing 8.6.) For, seeing that being is something besides the essence of every created thing, the very nature of a created thing considered in itself is capable of being, while it only has necessity of being from another whose nature is its own being, and which, therefore, by itself exists of necessity; and this is God.

On the other hand, the Commentator holds a contrary opinion, namely, that certain things were created in whose nature there is no possibility of non-being; for a thing that has in its own nature a possibility of non-being cannot acquire everlastingness from without, so as to become by its own nature everlasting. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 11, comm. 41; On the Substance of the Sphere.) And the latter opinion seems more reasonable. For the potential for being and non-being does not belong to a thing save by reason of its matter, which is pure potency. And matter too, since it cannot exist without form, cannot be in potency to non-being save as, while existing under one form, it is in potency to another form.

Accordingly, it may happen in two ways that a thing’s nature does not include the possibility of non-being.

First, in that some thing is only a form subsisting in its own being, such as incorporeal substances, which are entirely immaterial. For if a form, through being in matter, is the principle of existence in material things, and a material thing cannot cease to exist save by losing its form, it follows that, when the form itself subsists in its own being, it can in no way cease to exist, just as neither can existence be separated from its very self.

Second, in that the matter has no potency in respect of another form, but rather the whole possibility of the matter is determined to one form, as is the case with the heavenly bodies, in which there is no contrariety of forms.

Accordingly, a possibility of non-being is in the nature of those things alone whose matter is subject to contrariety; to other things by their nature belongs necessary existence, all possibility of nonexistence being removed by their nature. And yet, this does not imply that their necessity of existence is not from God, since one necessary thing may cause another, as is said in Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.5, 1015b1–15.) For the created nature itself to which everlastingness belongs is caused by God. Moreover, in those things that contain a possibility of non-being the matter remains; but forms, just as they are led out into act from the potency of matter in the generation of things, so too, in corruption, they are reduced from act to what they are in potency. It follows, then, that in the whole of created nature there is no potency whereby something is capable of tending to nonexistence.

If, on the other hand, we return to the power of God, the Maker of things, we must observe that a thing is said to be impossible to God in two ways.

First, in that it is impossible in itself, because it is not naturally apt to be subject to any power; for example, things that involve a contradiction.

Second, in that the opposite of that thing is necessary; and this occurs in two ways with respect to an agent.

First, on the part of a natural active power, which is determined to one thing; for example, the power of a hot thing is determined to heating. In this way, God the Father begets the Son necessarily and cannot but beget him.

Second, on the part of the ultimate end, to which everything tends of necessity. For example, man necessarily wills happiness, and it is impossible for him to will misery; and likewise, God necessarily wills his own goodness, and it is impossible for him to will things that are incompatible with his goodness; for example, we say that it is impossible for God to lie or to wish to lie.

Now, the simple non-existence of creatures is not in itself impossible as involving a contradiction (otherwise they would have existed from eternity, and this is because they are not their own being), as is the case when one says, “the creature does not exist at all.” The opposite of the predicate would be included in the definition, as if one said, “man is not a rational animal”; for such things imply a contradiction and are impossible in themselves. Likewise, God does not produce creatures by natural necessity, as though his power were determined to the existence of creatures, as we have proved above. (Q. 3, a. 15; q. 5, a. 3.) Likewise, God’s goodness does not depend on creatures, as though it could not exist without them, seeing that nothing is added to the divine goodness by creatures.

It remains, then, that it is not impossible for God to reduce things to non-being, since he is not under the necessity of giving them being, except on the presupposition of his own ordination and foreknowledge, in that he has ordained and foreknew that he would keep things in existence forever.

Reply Obj. 1: If God were to reduce creatures to nothing, he would not be the cause of their tendency to non-existence; for it would result not from his causing non-existence in them, but from his ceasing to give them existence.

Reply Obj. 2: Corruptible things cease to exist insofar as their matter receives another form, with which its previous form was incompatible; therefore, their corruption requires the action of a certain agent by which the new form is brought forth from potency to act. But if God were to annihilate a thing, there would be no need for any action, and it would suffice if God were to withdraw the action by which he gives things existence, just as the absence of the illuminating action of the sun causes the absence of light in the air.

Reply Obj. 3: This argument would avail if God could by some action annihilate things, but this is not so; rather would it occur by ceasing from action.

Reply Obj. 4: Where there is no action we need not require an end. But seeing that even cessation from action cannot be in God save through his will, which is not but for the end, it might be possible to ascribe an end even in the very annihilation of things, such that, just as in the production of things the end was the manifestation of God’s abundant goodness, so too in the annihilation of things the end could be the sufficiency of his goodness, seeing that it is so self-sufficing as to need nothing from without.

Reply Obj. 5: The effect both follows its cause and derives its mode from the cause; therefore, effects consequent upon the will proceed from the will at the time appointed by the will, and not necessarily as soon as the will exists. And thus, since creatures proceed from God by his will, they have existence at the time wherein God wills that they exist, not necessarily whenever God’s will exists; otherwise, they would have existed from eternity.

Reply Obj. 6: In the action by which God made things, two things may be considered: namely, the very substance of the activity, and its order to its effect. The substance of that action, since it is the divine essence, is eternal and cannot but be, whereas the order to its effect depends on the divine will; for every action of a maker produces its effect according to the exigency of the principle of that action, for fire heats according to the measure of its heat. Therefore, seeing that God’s will is the principle of the things made by him, his action bears an order to his effects to the degree that his will determines it. Hence, though God’s action cannot cease according to its own substance, its order to his effects could cease, if he so willed.

Reply Obj. 7: A common conception of the mind is one whose opposite involves a contradiction; for instance, “every whole is greater than its part,” because it is contrary to the account of a whole that it be not greater than its part. Now, it is not contrary to a common conception of the mind that a rational soul cease to exist, as we have already made clear; but it is a common conception of the mind that the nature of the rational soul be incorruptible. But if God were to reduce a human soul to nothing, this would not be through some potency toward non-existence that is within the nature of the rational soul, as was said.

Reply Obj. 8: A thing whose nature contains the possibility of non-existence does not acquire from an external source the necessity of being, such that this necessity be contained in its nature; for this would involve a contradiction, namely, the possibility of a nature’s nonexistence together with the necessity of its existence. But there is nothing to prevent its acquiring incorruptibility by grace or glory. For example, through the power of the soul adhering to its principle, Adam’s body was in a way incorruptible through the grace of innocence, and the bodies of the risen will be incorruptible through glory. On the other hand, a nature which does not include the possibility of non-existence is not prevented from acquiring from another source the necessity of existence, since whatsoever perfection it has, it has from another; therefore, if its cause withdraw its action, it would cease to exist, not on account of some potency to non-existence that is within it, but on account of God’s power to cease giving existence.

Reply Obj. 9: Things that are incorruptible by nature are not to be supposed, as the objection supposes, to have beforehand a potency to non-existence, which potency is removed by something received from God; and this is clear from things said. But in things that are incorruptible by grace, there underlies in their very nature a possibility of non-existence; yet, this is entirely pressed back by grace from the power of God.

Reply Obj. 10: If by ceasing to uphold them God were to reduce incorruptible creatures to nothing, he would not by so doing deprive their nature of its everlastingness, as though the nature would remain without being everlasting; rather, their whole nature would cease to exist through their cause ceasing to influence them.

Reply Obj. 11: That which is by nature corruptible cannot be changed so as to become naturally incorruptible, and vice versa, although that which is corruptible by nature could become everlasting by the addition of glory. Yet, it does not follow from this that one must assert that certain corruptible things become naturally incorruptible, since without their cause ceasing, they would cease to exist.

Reply Obj. 12: Although incorruptible creatures depend on God’s will, which can either give or not give them existence, nevertheless, by that same will, they attain an absolute necessity of existence insofar as they are caused in a nature wherein there is no possibility for non-existence; for every creature is such as God willed it to be, as Hilary says in On the Synods. (Hilary of Poitiers, On Synods 24.58 (PL 10:520).)

Reply Obj. 13: Although God is able to reduce creatures to nothing, he cannot, as long as they continue to exist, cease to be the cause of their existence. Now, he is their cause both as their efficient cause and as their end. Accordingly, just as he cannot cause an existing creature not to remain in existence due to him, so too he cannot cause that creature not to be ordered to his goodness. Therefore, since the evil of fault removes the order of which he is the end, inasmuch as sin is aversion from the unchangeable good, it follows that God cannot be the cause of the evil of fault, although he can be the cause of annihilation, by ceasing altogether to uphold a creature.

Reply Obj. 14: Augustine is speaking of the evil of fault, and even if he were referring to the evil of punishment, the annihilation of things would be no evil; for every evil, since it is a privation, is founded in a good, as Augustine says. (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity 1.11 (PL 40:236).) Hence, just as there was no evil before things were created, so neither would there be any evil were God to annihilate all things.

Reply Obj. 15: No creature has the power either of making something from nothing or of reducing a thing to nothing. However, the fact that if God ceased to uphold creatures, they would return to nothing, is not due to the creature’s action, but to its defect, as is clear from things said before.