Article 1 — Whether the relations said of God from eternity that are indicated by the names “Father” and “Son” are real or only relations of account or reason

The first point of inquiry is whether the relations said of God from eternity that are indicated by the names “Father” and “Son” are real or only relations of account or reason. (Parallel texts: ST I.28.1, resp.; I.28.2; I.29.4, resp.; I.39.1; I.40.1; SCG IV.14; In I Sent. 26.2.1; 33.1.1; Quodlibet VI, q. 1; Compendium theologiae, cc. 53. See above: q. 2, a. 1, ad 3, ad 12. In regard to the translation of the word ratio, see the note at the beginning of q. 7, a. 11.)

Obj. 1: It would seem that they are not real. For according to Damascene, in the substantial Trinity one contemplates a common and single reality that is distinguished or diverse by our knowledge and understanding. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 1.2 (PG 94:791–94).) Now, the persons are distinct by their relations. Therefore, in God, the relations are merely ones of reason.

Obj. 2: Boethius says: relation in the Trinity of the Father to the Son and of both to the Holy Spirit is like the relation of the same to the same. (Boethius, On the Trinity 1.6 (PL 64:1255–56).) Now, a relation of identity is purely one of reason. Therefore, such are the relations of paternity and filiation.

Obj. 3: In God there is no real relation to the creature, because he produced creatures without any change in himself, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Trinity 5.16 (PL 42:922–24).) Now, much more true is it that the Father produced the Son and the Son proceeded from the Father without any change. Therefore, in God there is no real relation in the Father to the Son, or vice versa.

Obj. 4: Things that are not perfect, such as privation, matter, and movement, are not attributed to God. Now, of all things relation has the weakest being, so much so that some have reckoned it among the secondary things understood, according to the Commentator. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 11, comm. 19.) Therefore, there can be no relation in God.

Obj. 5: In creatures, there is always composition of the relation and its subject, for one thing cannot inhere to another without composition. Now, there can be no composition in God. Therefore, there cannot be real relation in him.

Obj. 6: Things that are most simple differ from one another by themselves. Now, the divine persons are most simple. Therefore, they differ by themselves and not by any relations; and consequently, there is no need of putting relations in God, since the only reason for doing so is to distinguish the persons.

Obj. 7: Just as the relations are properties of the divine persons, so are the absolute attributes properties of the essence. Now, the absolute attributes are in God only according to reason. Therefore, the relations in God are merely according to reason and not real.

Obj. 8: A perfect thing lacks nothing, as is said in Physics 3. (Aristotle, Physics 3.6, 207a8–15.) Now, the divine substance is most perfect and consequently lacks nothing that pertains to perfection. Therefore, there is no need to place relations in God.

Obj. 9: Seeing that God is the highest beginning and last end of realities, anything that is reducible to something previous cannot be in God but only those things to which others are reduced. For example, the movable is reducible to the immovable and the accidental to the essential; thus, God is not moved and nothing in him is accidental. Now, everything that denotes “to-another” being is reducible to absolute, what is “to-itself.” Therefore, in God, nothing is to-another, but all is spoken of as to-itself only.

Obj. 10: Through himself God exists of necessity. Now, everything that through itself exists of necessity is absolute, for the relative cannot exist without its correlative. But that which through itself exists of necessity does not cease to exist when something else is removed. Therefore, no real relation is in God.

Obj. 11: As stated in the preceding question, every real relation arises from some quantity or action or passion. (Q. 7, a. 9.) But there is no quantity in God, for in the words of Augustine, God is great without quantity. (Augustine, On the Trinity 5.1, para. 2 (PL 42:912).) Nor is there number in him, as Boethius says, from which relations could arise (although there is a number resulting from relations). (Boethius, On the Trinity 1.6 (PL 64:1254–56).) Hence, if there be real relations in God, they must be attributed to him in respect of some action of his. This cannot be, however, in respect of the action by which he brings creatures into being, since in the preceding question it was proved that there is no real relation in God to creatures. (Q. 7, a. 10.) Nor again in respect of a personal action ascribed to God, such as generation, for seeing that in God to beget belongs to a distinct hypostasis, and distinction arises only from relation, it will be necessary for the relation to precede such an action; and thus, it cannot result from it. Accordingly, we must conclude that if any real relation in God arises from his action, it must be consequent upon his eternal or essential action of understanding or willing. But even this is impossible, since such an action results in the relation between the one who understands and the thing understood, and such a relation in God cannot be real, or else in God he who understands and what he understands would be really distinct—which is clearly false, since each is predicated of each person, for not only does the Father understand but so do the Son and the Holy Spirit; and likewise, each of them is understood. Therefore, it seems that no real relation is in God.

Obj. 12: Man’s natural reason can attain to the knowledge of the divine mind, for it has been demonstrated by philosophers that God is an intelligence. If, then, real relations, which in God are said to distinguish the persons, arise from the action of the intellect, it would seem possible for human reason to discover the Trinity of persons, and this would no longer be an article of faith. For faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not (Heb 11:1).

Obj. 13: Relative opposition is divided against other kinds of opposition, and the latter cannot be ascribed to God. Neither, therefore, can relative opposition.

On the contrary (1), Boethius says that relation alone multiplies the Trinity. (Boethius, On the Trinity 1.6 (PL 64:1255).) Now, this multiplication is not merely according to reason but is according to reality, for as Augustine says, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three realities. (Augustine, On the Trinity 1.4 (PL 42:824).) Therefore, the relations in God are not merely relations of reason but relations of reality.

Furthermore (2), that which is real is constituted by something real. Now, the relations in God are properties which constitute the persons; and “person” signifies something real. Therefore, the divine relations also must be real.

Furthermore (3), generation is more perfect in God than in creatures. Now, in creatures generation produces a real relation, namely, that of father and son. Therefore, a fortiori relations in God are real.

I answer that those who follow the teaching of the Catholic faith must hold that the relations in God are real. For the Catholic faith teaches that there are in God three persons of one essence. Now, every number results from some kind of distinction; therefore, in God there must be some distinction not only in respect of creatures, who differ from him in nature, but also in respect of someone subsisting in the divine nature.

But this distinction cannot regard anything absolute, since whatsoever is predicated of God absolutely denotes the divine essence; whence it would follow that the divine persons differ essentially, which is the heresy of Arius. It follows, then, that the divine persons are distinct only by their relations.

Now, this distinction cannot be merely one of reason, because things that are only distinct by reason or account (See note at the beginning of q. 7, a. 11.) can be predicated of one another; thus, we say that the beginning is the end because one point in reality is both beginning and end [of a line], although they differ in account. Hence, it would follow that the Father is the Son and the Son the Father, because seeing that names are given in order to signify the accounts of names, it would follow that the divine persons differ only in name, which is the heresy of Sabellius. (Sabellianism is the heresy of modalism propagated by Sabellius (fl. ca. 215 AD), condemned by Pope Dionysius of Alexandria, in the year 260 AD. Sabellianism may also come under the name of Monarchianism or Patripassianism.)

It remains thus to be said that the relations in God are something real: how this may be, we must endeavor to discover by following the statements of holy men, although reason is unable to reach this fully.

We must observe, then, that since a real relation cannot be conceived unless it arise from quantity or from action or passion, it follows that we must posit relation in God according to one of these modes.

Now, in God there cannot be quantity, either continuous or discrete, nor anything bearing a likeness to quantity—except the multitude that relation makes, which presupposes relation, and the unity that belongs to the essence, the consequent relation of which is not real but merely a relation of reason, like the relation implied in the word “same,” as we have stated in the preceding question. (Q. 7, a. 11.)

It follows, then, that we ascribe to God the relation that arises from action—not indeed the action that passes into something passive, since nothing is passive in God, in whom there is no matter, and there is no relation in God to what is outside him, as we have proved. (Q. 7, a. 10.)

Consequently, real relation in God must follow the action that remains in the agent, and in God these are understanding and willing. For sensing, through being accomplished through of a corporeal organ, cannot be attributed to God, who is wholly incorporeal. For this reason, Dionysius says that in God, fatherhood is perfected, that is, not corporeally or materially but intelligibly. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Divine Names 2.8 (PG 3:645–46).) Now, the one who understands may have an order to four things in understanding: namely, to the reality understood, to the intelligible species by which his intelligence is made actual, to his act of understanding, and to his intellectual conception.

This conception in fact differs from the other three things.

It differs from the reality understood because the latter is sometimes outside the intellect whereas the intellectual conception is only within the intellect. Moreover, the intellectual conception is ordered to the reality understood as to its end, inasmuch as the intellect forms its conception of the reality that it may know the reality understood.

It differs from the intelligible species because the latter, which makes the intellect actual, is considered as the principle of the intellect’s action, since every agent acts insofar as it is in act, and it becomes actual by a form, which is necessary as a principle of action.

And it differs from the act of the intellect because it is considered as the terminus of the action and, as it were, something effected thereby. For the intellect by its action forms a definition of the reality, or even an affirmative or negative proposition.

Now, this intellectual conception in us is called properly a “word,” because this is what is signified by the exterior word. For the external vocal sound signifies neither the intellect itself, nor the intelligible species, nor the act of the intellect, but rather the conception of the intellect by means of which it is carried to the reality.

Accordingly, this conception or word, by which our intellect understands a reality distinct from itself, originates from another and represents another. It originates from the intellect through the intellect’s own act, and it is the likeness of the reality understood. Now, when the intellect understands itself, this same word or conception is a progeny and likeness of itself, that is of the intellect understanding its very self. And this happens because the effect is like its cause in respect of its form, and the form of the intellect is the reality understood. Therefore, the word that originates from the intellect is the likeness of the reality understood, whether this be the intellect itself or something else.

And this word of our intellect is extrinsic to the existence of the intellect itself (for it is not of its essence but, as it were, a passion of it), yet it is not extrinsic to the intellect’s very act of intelligence, since the understanding cannot itself be completed without the aforesaid word.

If, then, there is an intellect whose act of understanding is its own existence, it follows that this word is not extrinsic to the existence of that intellect, even as it is not extrinsic to its act of understanding. Such is the divine intellect, since in God to be and to understand are the same thing. Therefore, his word is not outside his essence, but is coessential with it.

Accordingly, in God we find the origin of someone from someone else, namely, a word and one sending forth the word, with the unity of essence preserved. For whenever one thing is the origin of another, there must be a real relation—either only on the part of that which originates, when it does not receive the same nature that its principle has (as is apparent in the creature’s origination from God), or on the part of both, namely, when that which originates attains the nature of its own principle (as is apparent in the generation of human beings, where a real relation is in both the father and the son). Now, in the divine, the Word is coessential with its principle, as we have shown. It follows, then, that in God there is a real relation both on the part of the Word and on the part of the one bringing forth the Word.

Reply Obj. 1: In the divine persons, the unity is in the essential reality, but there is a distinction in reason, that is, in relation, which does not differ from the essence really, but only in reason, as we shall make clear further on.

Reply Obj. 2: Relation in the divine persons bears a certain likeness to the relation of identity if we consider the unity of essence, while if we consider the origin of one from another in the same nature, we must conclude that these relations are real.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as God does not change in the production of his creature, so is he not changed in the production of his Word. Yet the creature does not attain to the divine essence and nature; therefore, the divine essence is not communicated to the creature. For this reason, a relation of God to the creature does not arise on account of anything in God, but only with respect to something arising on the part of the creature. On the other hand, the Word is produced as coessential with God himself; therefore, God is related to his Word in respect of something in God and not only with respect to something on the part of the Word. For then is there a real relation on one side and not on the other, when the cause of the relation is on one side and not on the other; for instance, the relation between the knowable object and knowledge results from the act of the knower and not from anything that he may know.

Reply Obj. 4: Relation has the feeblest existence if this belongs to it alone; yet it is not so in God, for in him relation has no other existence than that of the substance, as we shall make clear further on in the next article. (Q. 8, a. 2.) Hence, the argument fails.

Reply Obj. 5: This argument considers a real relation whose existence is distinct from the existence of the substance in which it exists. But this is not so in the case in point, as we shall show further on.

Reply Obj. 6: Since the divine persons are distinguished by their relations, they do not differ otherwise than by themselves, for the relations are the subsisting persons themselves, as we shall make clear below. (Q. 8, a. 4.)

Reply Obj. 7: The essential attributes which are properties of the essence are in God really and not according to reason. For God’s goodness is something real and so is his wisdom and so forth, although they do not differ from his essence otherwise than by account, and the same applies to the relations, as we shall prove further on.

Reply Obj. 8: God’s substance would be imperfect were there anything in it distinct from it. But in God, relation is his substance, as we shall make clear further on; therefore, the objection fails.

Reply Obj. 9: The movable and the accidental are reducible to something prior, as the imperfect to the perfect. For an accident is imperfect, and likewise movement is the act of the imperfect. But relation sometimes follows from the perfection of a thing, as in the case of the intellect, since it follows the operation, which is its perfection. Hence, the divine perfection does not hinder us from ascribing relations to God, as it forbids us to ascribe movement and accident to him.

Reply Obj. 10: That which necessarily exists through itself is not related to anything extraneous, but nothing prevents it from being related to something within it. Therefore, because it is not said to be necessary through another, it is said to be necessary through itself.

Reply Obj. 11: Real relation in God follows the action of his intellect, but it does not do so such that a real relation were understood to belong to the one who understands toward what he understands, but rather as toward his word; for the word and not the thing understood proceeds from him who understands.

Reply Obj. 12: Although natural reason is able to succeed in proving that God is an intellect, it is not able to discover adequately his mode of understanding. Just as we are able to know that God is but not what he is, so too we are able to know that God understands but not in what manner he understands. Now, to understand by conceiving a word belongs to the mode of understanding; therefore, reason cannot prove this adequately. But it can form a kind of conjecture by comparison with what takes place in us.

Reply Obj. 13: In other kinds of opposition, one of the extremes is always by way of being imperfect or non-existent, or with something of non-entity; for a negation is a non-being and privation is a certain negation, and of two contraries one always includes a privation. Hence, other kinds of opposition cannot be in God, while relative opposition can because on neither side does it imply imperfection.