Article 3 — Whether the relations constitute and distinguish the persons or hypostases

The third point of inquiry is whether the relations constitute and distinguish the persons, that is, the hypostases. (Parallel texts: ST I.30.4; I.40.2; SCG IV.24; In I Sent. 26.2.2; Quodlibet IV, q. 4, a. 2. See below: q. 9, a. 4, ad 15.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that they do not. For Augustine says: every relative expression signifies something besides the relation expressed: thus a master is a man, a slave is a man. (Augustine, On the Trinity 7.1, para. 2 (PL 42:933–36).) Now, the persons in God are expressed relatively. Therefore, they are something besides the relative term; and consequently, they are not constituted by the relations, for if you remove that which constitutes a thing, it is no longer a thing.

Obj. 2: It will be replied that, in God, what there is besides the idea of paternity is the Father.

On the contrary, it is evident that “father” is also a relative term. If, then, through paternity being relative, the person must contain something besides paternity, then for the same reason besides being father, the person must contain something that is not relative.

Obj. 3: Augustine says that in no sense can the Father be referred to himself, but whatsoever is said of him is in relation to the Son. (Augustine, On the Trinity 7.1 (PL 42:931–36).) Thus, the same conclusion follows as before.

Obj. 4: One may reply that what the Father is besides the relation is the essence.

On the contrary, whatsoever is in a relative besides the relation is referred to the other thing by that relation, as may be seen from the examples which he gives; thus, man is related to servant by the relationship of dominion. Now, the essence in God is not related, since it neither begets nor is begotten. Therefore, this cannot be said of the essence, but only of the supposit of the relation, which begets or is begotten.

Obj. 5: A thing is considered in itself before we refer it to another. Now, nothing is constituted by that which comes after it in our consideration of it. Therefore, the hypostasis of the Father is not constituted by its relation to something else.

Obj. 6: In God, hypostases are more perfect than in human beings. But in us, properties neither constitute nor distinguish hypostases but are signs of distinction in hypostases that are already constituted. Therefore, neither in God do the relations, which are properties, constitute or distinguish the hypostases.

Obj. 7: Understanding the generating hypostasis is prior to the generation itself, since the generator is understood to be the principle of generation, and understanding generation is prior to understanding paternity, since relations follow actions or passions, as is said in Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a14–28.) Therefore, understanding the hypostasis of the Father is prior to understanding his paternity, and consequently the former is not constituted by the latter; and for the same reason, neither is the hypostasis of the Son by filiation.

Obj. 8: No form constitutes or distinguishes outside its own genus; thus, whiteness constitutes and distinguishes a white thing from a black thing as regards quality; likewise, length constitutes and differentiates a thing in the genus of quantity. Therefore, neither is relation constitutive or distinctive outside the genus of relation. But a hypostasis is signified within the genus of substance. Therefore, relation neither constitutes nor distinguishes the hypostasis.

Obj. 9: In God, relation is the divine essence; therefore, if it constitutes and distinguishes the hypostasis, this is either qua the divine substance or qua relation. Not, however, qua divine essence, because since this is common to the three persons, it cannot be the principle of their distinction, nor again qua relation, because relation does not signify anything self-subsistent, which is the meaning of the word hypostasis, but merely reference to another. Therefore, relation nowise distinguishes or constitutes the hypostasis.

Obj. 10: In God, nothing constitutes or distinguishes itself. Now, the relations are themselves the hypostases, for just as the divine nature and God do not differ, so neither do paternity and Father. Therefore, the relations neither constitute nor distinguish the hypostases.

Obj. 11: One should not ask how two things are distinguished unless they have something in common that is distinguished by something added in each of them; thus, animal is common to man and horse, and is distinguished as rational and irrational by the addition of differences; therefore, we may ask how man and horse differ. On the other hand, things which have nothing in common so as to be distinguished in the foregoing manner are distinct by themselves and not by any distinguishing principle. Now, two divine hypostases have nothing common but the essence, and this is not in any way distinguished by relations. Therefore, it should be said not that the hypostases are distinguished by the relations, but that they are distinct by their very selves.

Obj. 12: Nothing causes what it presupposes. But relation presupposes distinction, since thereby one thing is referred to another, and otherness implies distinction. Therefore, relation cannot be a principle of distinction.

Obj. 13: Richard of Saint Victor says that in the angels the hypostases are distinguished by quality alone, and in God by origin alone. (Richard of St. Victor, On the Trinity 4.15 (PL 196:939).) Now, origin differs from relation according to its idea, just as generation does from paternity. Therefore, the hypostases are distinguished not by relation but by origin.

Obj. 14: According to Damascene, the divine hypostases are distinguished by their properties. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 3.6–7 (PG 94:1001–12).) Now, it is the property of the Father that he begot the Son, according to Augustine, (Fulgentius, On the Faith, to Peter the Deacon 1.2 (PL 40:755–61).) and of the Son that he is born of the Father. Therefore, the Father and the Son are distinguished by generation and birth. But these denote origin; therefore, the Father and the Son are distinguished by origin and not by relation.

Obj. 15: There are some relations in God that neither constitute nor distinguish the hypostases, such as equality and likeness. Therefore, neither do the other relations, such as paternity and filiation, constitute and distinguish the hypostases.

On the contrary (1), Boethius says that in God relation alone multiplies the Trinity. (Boethius, On the Trinity 1.6 (PL 64:1255).) Now, multitude in the Trinity arises from constituted and distinct hypostases. Therefore, relation alone constitutes the persons and hypostases.

Furthermore (2), things are distinguished only by what is not predicated of them in common. Now, the relations alone are predicated of the divine persons individually and not in common, according to Augustine. (Augustine, On the Trinity 5.8 (PL 42:916).) Therefore, the persons and hypostases in God are distinguished by the relations alone.

I answer that there are two opinions on this question.

The first is that in God relations neither constitute nor distinguish the hypostases; rather, they show that they are constituted and distinct. In order to elucidate the point, it must be observed that this word, “hypostasis,” denotes an individual substance, that is, one that cannot be predicated of several things. Therefore, genera and species in the predicament of substance, such as man or animal, cannot be called hypostases, since they are predicated of several, while Socrates and Plato are called hypostases because they are each predicated of one only. Accordingly if, as Jews and pagans assert, there is no Trinity in God, there is no need to ask what constitutes or distinguishes the hypostasis since this is nothing but the divine essence. For by his own essence, God is something undivided in himself and distinct from all things that are not God.

Seeing, however, that the Catholic faith teaches that there is one essence in three persons, it is inconceivable that the divine essence distinguish and constitute the hypostasis in God. For we understand the divine nature as constituting God, and it is common to the three persons, and thus, it is signified as predicated of several and not as an incommunicable hypostasis. In like manner, nothing that is said of God absolutely can be understood as distinguishing and constituting the hypostases in the persons, since what is said of God absolutely is signified through the mode of essence.

Therefore, one must lay it down that what constitutes and distinguishes the hypostasis in the divine is what is primarily found not to be said of several, but rather what belongs to one alone.

Now, there are two such things: relation and origin, and generation and paternity (or birth and filiation), which, although they are in reality but one thing in God, differ nevertheless in account and in their mode of signification. According to understanding, the first of these is origin, for relation seems to follow origin.

Therefore, this opinion holds that the divine hypostases are constituted and distinguished by their origin, and this is indicated when we say A is from B, and from B is A; and that the relations of paternity and filiation follow in thought the constitution and distinction of the persons; and that through them the constitution and distinction of the hypostases is shown. Thus, the fact that one is called “Father” shows that another is from him, and the fact that one is called “Son” shows that he is from another. Nor does it follow from this opinion that the divine hypostases, if not distinguished by their relations, are distinguished through something absolute, since the origins themselves imply relation; for just as “father” is spoken of in reference to a son, so is “begetter” to one begotten.

Nevertheless, it seems that this opinion is void of foundation. For a thing may be understood to distinguish and constitute the hypostasis in two ways.

In one way, as that whereby it is formally constituted and distinguished; as a man is constituted by humanity, and Socrates by “Socrateity.”

Or in another way, as that whereby it is distinguished as though it were the way to distinction and constitution; as if we were to say that Socrates is a man by his generation, which is the way to the form by which he is constituted formally.

It is clear, then, that a thing’s origin cannot be understood as constituting and distinguishing except in reference to that which constitutes and distinguishes formally. For if humanity were not produced by generation, never would a man be constituted by generation. Consequently, it cannot be said that the hypostasis of the Son is constituted by its nativity except insofar as we take its nativity as terminating in something by which the hypostasis is formally constituted. Now, the relation in which nativity terminates is filiation.

Therefore, the hypostasis of the Son must be formally constituted and distinguished by filiation and not by its origin nor by the relation implied in the origin, since the relation implied in the origin (like even the origin itself) does not signify something as yet subsistent in the nature but as tending thereto. And since all hypostases of the same nature have the same account of constitution and distinction, it follows that in like manner, on the part of the Father, we must understand that the hypostasis of the Father is constituted and distinguished by paternity and not by the active generation, nor by the relation implied thereby.

This is the second opinion, namely, that the relations constitute and distinguish the persons and hypostases. And it may be explained as follows. As already proved, the paternity is the same thing as the divine essence, and likewise the Father is the same thing as God; therefore, paternity by constituting the Father constitutes God. And just as paternity, although it is the divine essence, is not common as the essence is, so too, although the Father is the very same thing as God, he is not common, as God is, but proper. Accordingly, God the Father as God is something common as having the divine nature, and as Father is something proper and distinct from the other persons. Hence, he is a hypostasis, which signifies that which subsists in a nature and is distinct from others. And in this way, paternity by constituting the Father constitutes the hypostasis.

Reply Obj. 1: The divine persons are something besides a relation, and this is the essence, which is not spoken of relatively. This is what Augustine means to say, as may be seen by studying his words carefully.

Reply Obj. 2–3: The second and third objections are granted.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the relation is not attributed to the essence through the mode of a formation of it, it is attributed to it through the mode of identification with it. For even if we do not say that the essence begets or is related, we do say that it itself is the generation and the relation. However, relative terms are said of the essential names signified in the concrete even by way of formation; for we say that God begets God and that God is related to God, inasmuch as the relation and the essence are understood as having a common supposit, as we have shown, although the essential names themselves are not distinct. Therefore, apart from the relative terms, the concrete essential names are understood as not distinct; they are spoken of relatively through the relations.

Reply Obj. 5: In each divine hypostasis, we speak of something that is absolute, which pertains to the essence, and in our mode of thinking it is prior to what we speak of relatively in the divine. Yet that which we speak of as absolute, since it is common, does not pertain to the distinction of the hypostases; whence it does not follow that we must conceive the hypostasis as distinct before we understand its relation.

Reply Obj. 6: In lower things, hypostases are distinct in essence, so the properties which result from the essence cannot be the principle of distinction, but rather are signs of the distinction. But the divine hypostases are nowise distinct in essence; therefore, the properties must be the principle of this distinction in them.

Reply Obj. 7: Two things are necessary for the account of a hypostasis.

First, it must be subsistent through itself and undivided in itself.

Second, it must be distinct from other hypostases of the same nature. If, however, there be no other hypostases of the same nature it will still be a hypostasis, as was Adam when there were not as yet other hypostases in human nature.

Hence, the generating hypostasis must always be understood before the generation, insofar as being one, it subsists in itself, but not as distinct from other hypostases of the same nature, if other hypostases of the same nature originate solely by this kind of generation; thus, Adam was not distinct from other hypostases of the same nature before the formation of the woman from his rib and the birth of his children. But in God the hypostases are not multiplied except by the procession of the other persons from one. Therefore, we understand the person of the Father as subsistent before we understand him as begetting, and not as distinct from the other hypostases of the same nature, which do not proceed unless we presuppose this generation. And although the divine relations constitute the hypostases, and thus make them subsistent, they do this inasmuch as they are the divine essence, because a relation as such neither has nor can give subsistence, for this belongs to a substance alone. On the other hand, relations as such do distinguish, for in this way they hold opposition. It follows, then, that the relation of paternity, inasmuch as it constitutes the hypostasis of the Father (which it does, as it is the same as the divine substance), is presupposed to generation, but inasmuch as it distinguishes, generation is presupposed to paternity. As regards the Son, there is no further difficulty, because according to thought birth precedes the hypostasis of the one born, for we conceive it as the way to it; for generation is the way to substance.

Reply Obj. 8: As we have already stated, in God relation is something besides relation, for it is God’s very substance in reality; therefore, it can constitute something subsistent and not merely something relative.

Reply Obj. 9: As already stated, relation as such distinguishes the hypostasis, while it constitutes the hypostasis insofar as it is the divine essence, and it does both inasmuch as it is both relation and divine essence.

Reply Obj. 10: In God, the abstract and the concrete do not differ in reality, since in God there is neither accident nor matter. Rather, they differ only in their mode of signification, due to which it follows that we understand the Godhead as constituting God and God as having the Godhead; the same applies to the paternity and the Father, for though they are in reality the same thing, they differ in their mode of signification.

Reply Obj. 11: Although in God nothing is common in reality save the one essence, a community according to account is noted in the divine persons in the fact that each is a supposit of the essence. This community is indicated in all the concrete essential names that signify the supposit in general: for instance, God is one who has the divine nature. Accordingly, this very fact of being a supposit of the divine nature is common to the three persons by a community of account, although the three persons are not one supposit but three, just as Socrates and Plato are two men although to be a man is common to them according to account. Now, a difference is sought not only in things that have something real in common but even in those that have something in common according to account.

Reply Obj. 12: Relation presupposes the distinction of the other genera, such as substance, quantity, and sometimes even of action and passion, whereas it does not presuppose, but rather causes, the distinction that is in reference to being-toward something; thus, the relation of double presupposes the diversity of the great and the small, but it does not presuppose, but rather causes, the difference of the double and the half. In God, however, there is no other distinction than one according to relation.

Reply Obj. 13: Richard says that the persons are distinct by their origin inasmuch as they are distinguished by relations of origin.

Reply Obj. 14: Augustine uses the words “begot the Son” and “is the Father” as having the same meaning; therefore, he sometimes uses “origin” for “relation.”

Reply Obj. 15: The relations of equality and likeness cannot cause a distinction of persons in God; rather do they presuppose it. Likeness is sameness of quality in things that differ, and equality is sameness of quantity in things that are distinct. Thus, it is clear that distinction of supposits is presupposed to both likeness and equality.