Article 3 — Whether there can be a person in God

The third point of inquiry is whether there can be a person in God. (Parallel texts: ST I.29.3; In I Sent. 23.2.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that there cannot be. For according to Boethius, the word “person” is taken from “personating,” for those wearing masks in comedies and tragedies were called “persons” because they personated something. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures 3 (PL 64:1343).) But it is unbecoming for God to wear a mask, except perhaps metaphorically speaking. Therefore, the term “person” should not be applied to God, except perhaps metaphorically.

Obj. 2: As Damascene says, it is impossible for us to know what any of the things are which we ascribe to God insofar as they belong to him. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 1.1–2, 1.4 (PG 94:789–94, 798–800).) Yet we do know what a person is, by the above-given definition. (Q. 9, a. 2.) Therefore, “person” is not applicable to God, at least in the sense of the aforesaid definition.

Obj. 3: God is not in a genus, because, since he is infinite, he cannot be confined within the limits of any genus. Now, “person” signifies something in the genus of substance. Therefore, “person” is not to be applied to God.

Obj. 4: There is no composition in God. But “person” signifies something composite, for an individual of human nature, which is a person, is most composite; also, the parts of the definition of person show that person is a composite thing. Therefore, there is no person in God.

Obj. 5: There is no matter in God. But matter is the principle of individuation. Since, then, a person is an individual substance, the term cannot be applied to God.

Obj. 6: Every person is a subsistence. But God cannot be called a subsistence, for he is not subject to anything. Therefore, he is not a person.

Obj. 7: Person is contained under hypostasis. Now, there cannot be a hypostasis in God, since there are no accidents in him, and hypostasis denotes the subject of an accident, as stated above. (Q. 9, a. 1.) Therefore, there is no person in God.

The contrary is plain from the authority of Athanasius in the Creed, quicumque vult, etc., (Athanasius, Athanasian Creed (PG 28:1581–1603); cf. above, q. 2, a. 5, obj. 1.) and of Augustine in On the Trinity 7, (Augustine, On the Trinity 7.6 (PL 42:943–46).) and from the general usage of the Church, which, being taught by the Holy Spirit, cannot err.

I answer that, as stated above, “person” denotes a certain nature with a certain mode of existence. Now, the nature which “person” includes in its signification is of all natures the most dignified, namely, that nature which is intellectual in regard to its genus. Likewise, the mode of existence signified by the word “person” is most dignified, namely, that something exists through itself.

Since, then, whatsoever is most dignified in created things should be attributed to God, it is becoming that the word “person” should be attributed to God, like the other terms that are said of God properly.

Reply Obj. 1: Two things must be considered in a name: that which it is intended to signify and that from which it is taken for the purpose of signification. For a name is often given to signify a certain reality based on some accident or action or effect of that reality; and yet these are not what are principally signified by the name, but rather the very substance of the reality. Thus, the word lapis (“stone”) is taken from laesio pedis (“hurting of the foot”), yet it does not signify this but rather a body wherein such an accident is frequently found, so that laesio pedis belongs to the etymology of the word lapis rather than to its signification.

Accordingly, when it is not the intended signification of a term that is appropriate to God but some property by way of likeness, then such a term is applied to God metaphorically. Thus, God is called a “lion” not because the nature of that animal belongs to God but on account of the strength that is found in a lion. When, however, that which the term signifies does belong to God, it is applied to God in its proper sense, for instance, good, wise, and the like—even though sometimes that based on which such terms are taken does not belong to God. Thus, although to personate—the way one wearing a mask does, on which is based the term “person”—does not belong to God, yet that which the word signifies, namely, that which subsists in an intellectual nature, does belong to God; and for this reason, the term “person” is ascribed to God in its proper sense.

Reply Obj. 2: Both the word “person” and the definition of person given above—if rightly understood—befit God, yet not so as to be a definition of God, since there is more in God than is signified by the term. Hence, the account of the term does not define what God is.

Reply Obj. 3: Although God is not in the genus of substance as a species, he belongs to the genus of substance as a principle of the genus.

Reply Obj. 4: It is accidental to person as such that it be composite, because the complement or perfection required for the account of a person is not found at once in one simple thing; rather, it requires a unification of many, as is manifest in men. But in God, together with supreme simplicity, there is supreme perfection; therefore, in him, there is person without composition. As to the parts which combine to make the definition of person, they do not argue composition in person except in material substances; and individual, being a negation, does not imply composition through its being added to substance. Hence, the only composition that remains is that of individual with substance, that is, hypostasis to the nature, which two in immaterial substances are absolutely one and the same thing.

Reply Obj. 5: In material things, whose forms are not self-subsistent but adherent to matter, the principle of individuation must be from matter, while immaterial forms, being self-subsistent, are individualized by themselves; for from the very fact that a thing is self-subsistent, it cannot be predicated of several. Consequently, there is no reason why there should not be an individual substance and a person in immaterial things.

Reply Obj. 6: Although there is no composition in God, by reason whereof we might be able to understand subjection of one thing to another in him; nevertheless, according to our intellect, we consider his being apart from his substance as subject to his existence, such that it is said to subsist under this. Or one might say that being-under—based on which the word “subsisting” is used—does not belong to God, yet to exist through himself—which the word signifies—does belong to him.

Reply Obj. 7: Though there are no accidents in God, there are personal properties of which the hypostases are the subjects.