Article 4 — Whether this term “person” signifies something relative or something absolute in God

The fourth point of inquiry is whether this term “person” signifies something relative or something absolute in God. (Parallel texts: ST I.29.4; In I Sent. 23.3; 26.1.1.)

Obj. 1: And it seems that it signifies something absolute. For Augustine says, when John states (1 John 5:7. There continues to be debate about the authenticity of this version of the verse. Cf. H. Simon, Praelectiones Biblicae, Nov. Test. (Marietti, 1948), vol. 2, n. 336.) that there are three who bear witness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit, if it be asked, ‘three what?’ the answer is, ‘three persons’. (Augustine, On the Trinity 7.4 (PL 42:939–42).) Now, the query “what?” asks for the essence. Therefore, in God, “person” signifies the essence.

Obj. 2: Augustine says in the same book that in God to be and to be a person are the same thing. (Augustine, On the Trinity 7.6, para. 11 (PL 42:943).) Now, in God, “to be” denotes the essence and not a relation. Therefore, “person” does so also.

Obj. 3: Augustine says in the same place: person is predicated of the Father absolutely not with respect to the Son or the Holy Spirit: just as he is called God, great, good, or just absolutely. (Augustine, On the Trinity 7.6, para. 11 (PL 42:943).) Now, all these denote the essence and not a relation. Therefore, person does so also.

Obj. 4: Augustine says in the same place that, although the term ‘essence’ is common to them, namely, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, such that each one is called the essence, yet the term ‘person’ is common to them. (Augustine, On the Trinity 7.4, para. 8 (PL 42:941).) But relation in God is not common but distinctive. Therefore, person does not signify relation in God.

Obj. 5: It will be replied that, in God, person is common logically and not really.

On the contrary, there are no universals in God; hence, in the same book Augustine rejects the opinion of those who said that the essence in God is like a genus or species, and person like a species or individual. (Augustine, On the Trinity 7.6, para. 11 (PL 42:943–45).) Now, that which is common logically and not really is common after the manner of a universal. Hence, in God, person is common not merely in account but really, such that it cannot signify a relation.

Obj. 6: A term does not signify things of different genera, except equivocally; thus, “acute” is applied equivocally to the sense of taste and to a mathematical figure. Now, it is evident that “person” does not signify a relation in angels and man, but something absolute. Therefore, if it signifies a relation in God, it will be employed equivocally.

Obj. 7: That which is accidental to the reality signified by a term is outside the term’s signification; thus, “white,” which is accidental to man, is outside the signification of “man.” Now, the thing signified by the word “person” is an individual substance of rational nature, since, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 4, the account that the name signifies is its definition, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.4, 1006a32–b13, 1007a33–b18.) and it is accidental to such a substance that it be related to something else. Therefore, relation is beside the signification of the word “person.”

Obj. 8: It is inconceivable that any term be predicated of a thing to which the reality signified by that term is understood not to belong; thus, if we understand that a certain thing is not a rational animal, it is inconceivable that such a thing be a man. Now, Jews and pagans acknowledge God to be a person, yet they do not acknowledge relations in him, while we ascribe them to him, according to faith. Therefore, “person” does not signify these relations in God.

Obj. 9: But to this it will be replied that Jews and pagans err in their views about God, and thus we cannot argue from their opinion.

On the contrary, neither an erroneous opinion nor truth itself can change the signification of a word. Therefore, if the word “person” does not signify relation in the opinion of those who err about God, neither will it do so with those who think aright about him.

Obj. 10: According to the Philosopher, vocal words are signs of ideas. (Aristotle, On Interpretation 1.1, 16a3–8.) Now, the idea conceived of the word “person” is the idea of a first substance. Therefore, this word “person” signifies a first substance, than which nothing is more absolute, since it is self-existent. Therefore, the word person does not signify a relation but something absolute.

Obj. 11: But to this, it may be replied that the word “person” signifies a relation through the mode of substance.

On the contrary, this is an immediate proposition: “no relation is a substance,” just as this: “no quantity is a substance,” according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.4, 73a34–b15; 1.15, 79a36–b20.) If, then, the word “person” signifies the substance, as we have already proved, it cannot possibly signify a relation.

Obj. 12: Opposite terms cannot be true of the same thing. Now, existence through oneself and existence toward another are opposite. If, then, “person” signifies substance, which is a being through itself, it cannot signify toward-something.

Obj. 13: A term that signifies a relation is referred to something that it consignifies, for instance, master and servant. Now, it is clear that this term “person” has no reference to something else. Therefore, it does not signify a relation but something absolute.

Obj. 14: “Person” is said as it were one through itself (per se una). Now, unity in God pertains to the essence. Therefore, “person” signifies essence and not relation.

Obj. 15: To this it will be replied that this word signifies one distinct thing, and since distinction in God arises from relation, person must signify relation.

On the contrary, the Son and Holy Spirit are said to be distinguished according to the mode of their origin, because the Son proceeds by way of the intellect, as Word, and the Holy Spirit by way of the will, as Love. Therefore, distinction in God is not through the relations alone; and consequently, it does not follow that “person” signifies relation.

Obj. 16: If relation causes distinction in God, while a person is something distinct without causing distinction, relation cannot be signified by the word “person.”

Obj. 17: The relations in God are said to be properties, while “person” signifies something underlying a property. Therefore, it does not signify relation.

Obj. 18: There are four relations in God: paternity, filiation, procession, common spiration; for innascibility, which is the fifth notion, is not a relation. But the word “person” signifies none of these, because if it signified paternity, it would not be said of the Son; if it signified filiation, it would not be said of the Father; if it signified the procession of the Holy Spirit, it would be said neither of the Father nor of the Son; and if it signified the common spiration, it would not be said of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the word “person” does not signify relation.

On the contrary (1), Boethius says that every term that refers to the persons signifies relation. (Boethius, On the Trinity 5–6 (PL 64:1254–56).) Now, no term refers to the persons more than does “person” itself. Therefore, the word “person” signifies relation.

Furthermore (2), in God, under “person” are included the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But these names signify relation. Therefore, “person” does also.

Furthermore (3), nothing absolute is distinguished in God. But person is distinguished. Therefore, it is not absolute but relative.

I answer that the term “person,” in common with the absolute names of God, is predicated of each person, and does not, according to the name, refer to anything else; and in common with the names signifying relation, it is divided and predicated in the plural. Therefore, it would seem that “person” admits of both significations, that of the absolute and the relative. But how the name “person” can admit of both significations has been explained in various ways by different people.

For some say that “person” signifies both, but equivocally. They assert that in and of itself it expresses the essence absolutely, both in the singular and in the plural, like the name “God,” or “good,” or “great”; but owing to the insufficiency of names employed in speaking of God, the holy fathers in the Council of Nicaea accommodated the term “person” so that it could be employed sometimes for the relative, especially in the plural, as when we say that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three persons, or with the addition of a disjunctive term, as when we say: “the person of the Father is one, the Son another,” or “the Son is distinct from the Father in person.” However, when it is predicated in the singular absolutely, it may equally signify the essence or the relation, as when we say: “the Father is a person,” or “the Son is a person.” This appears to be the opinion of the Master in Sentences I. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 25 (PL 192:587–91); cf. above, q. 1, a. 1, ad 6.)

But this does not seem to be a satisfactory explanation. For it was not without reason taken from the proper signification of the word, that the holy fathers, inspired by God, found this term to express a profession of the true faith—and all the more, seeing that they would have provided an occasion for error in affirming three persons if the word “person” signified the essence absolutely.

Therefore, others have said that it expresses at the same time essence and relation, but not equally: the one directly and the other indirectly. Some of them maintained that it expresses the essence directly and the relation indirectly, while others took the contrary view.

Yet neither opinion solves the difficulty, for if it signifies the essence directly, it should not be predicated in the plural, and if it signifies the relation directly, it should not be predicated in reference to itself, nor of each person.

Hence, others have said that it signifies both directly, and some of them said that it signifies equally both essence and relation, and neither more than the other.

But this is unintelligible, since that which does not signify one thing signifies nothing; therefore, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 4, every term signifies one thing in one sense. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.2, 1003b22–1004a9.)

Hence, others have said that it signifies relation in reference to the absolute. But it is difficult to see how this is possible, inasmuch as relations do not determine the essence in God.

And so others have said that it does not signify the absolute, that is, the substance which is essence, but that which is hypostasis, since this is determined by a relation. This is indeed true, but it does not make us any wiser, seeing that the meaning of hypostasis or subsistence is less clear than that of person.

Accordingly, to elucidate the matter, it must be noted that, according to the Philosopher, the proper account of a term is what the name signifies. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.2, 1004a22–34.) Now, that to which a name is attributed, if it is taken directly under the reality signified by name, as the determined under the indeterminate, that is said to be supposed by the name; but if it is not directly taken under the reality of the name, it is said to be coupled with it. Thus, “animal” signifies a sensible animate substance, and “white” signifies a color that dilates sight, while “man” is included directly in the account of animal as the determinate under the indeterminate. For man is a sensible animate substance with a certain sort of soul, that is, a rational one, whereas man is not directly included under white, since white is outside his essence. Hence, man is supposed to the term “animal,” but is coupled with the term “white.”

And since that which is supposed under a common denomination is related to the common as the determinate to the indeterminate, that which was supposed becomes the thing signified, with the determination added to the common term; for “rational animal” signifies a man.

But we must observe that a thing is signified in two ways, formally and materially.

Formally, a term signifies that which it was chiefly intended to signify, and this is the account of the term; thus, the term “man” signifies something composed of a body and a rational soul.

Materially, a term signifies that in which that account is preserved; thus, the name “man” signifies something that has a heart, brain, and such parts without which the body cannot be ensouled with a rational soul.

Accordingly, we reply that the term “person,” taken in a general way, signifies nothing else but an individual substance of a rational nature. And since under “individual substance of rational nature” is contained individual substance—that is, incommunicable and distinct from others, whether of God, of man, or of angels—it follows that “divine person” must signify something subsistent and distinct in the divine nature, just as a “human person” signifies something subsistent and distinct in human nature; and this is the formal signification of “person,” whether divine or human.

Since, however, that which is distinct and subsistent in human nature is nothing else than something individualized and differentiated from others by individual matter, it follows that this is the material signification when we speak of a human person.

But the only thing that is distinct and incommunicable in the divine nature is relation, since all that is absolute is common and undivided in God. Now, in God, relation is the same in reality as the essence. And as in God the essence is identical with the one who has the essence (for example, Godhead is identical with God), so also is relation the same as the one who is related. Consequently, the relation is the same as that which is distinct and subsists in the divine nature.

It is evident, then, that “person” commonly speaking signifies an individual substance of rational nature, while “divine person” in its formal signification denotes a distinct thing subsisting in the divine nature. And seeing that this can be nothing else but the relation or the relative, it follows that in its material signification it denotes the relation or the relative. Hence, it may be said that it signifies a relation by the mode of substance, not the substance that is essence but that is hypostasis, just as it also signifies a relation not as a relation but as relative: that is, as signified by the “Father” and not as signified by “paternity.” For in this way, the signified relation is included indirectly in the signification of the divine person, which is nothing other than something distinct by a relation and subsistent in the divine essence.

Reply Obj. 1: “What?” asks for not only the essence but also sometimes even the supposit, as for instance: “what swims in the sea?” “A fish.” And so the answer to “what?” is through the word “person.”

Reply Obj. 2: It is on account of the mode of signification of this word “person,” that Augustine says: in God to be and to be a person are the same. (Augustine, On the Trinity 7.6, para. 11 (PL 42:943).) For it does not signify through the mode of relation, as “Father” and “Son” do.

Reply Obj. 3: It is due to the formal signification of “person” that it is predicated absolutely and without reference to another.

Reply Obj. 4: In God, essence is common in reality, but person is common only according to account, like the word “relation.”

Reply Obj. 5: In God, there are no differences of being, since there is but one being in him. Now, this is incompatible with the account of the universal; therefore, it is not universal here, although it is one in account and not in reality here.

Reply Obj. 6: The fact that “person” designates one thing in God and another in man must be referred to a difference in supposition more than in the signification of the common word “person.” And equivocation arises from a difference in signification, not in supposition.

Reply Obj. 7: Although relation is accidental to the common signification of “person,” it is not accidental to the divine person, as we have shown above.

Reply Obj. 8: This argument considers the formal and not the material signification of the term.

Reply Obj. 9: And the same answer applies to the ninth objection.

Reply Obj. 10: A first substance is said to be absolute as being independent of another. In God, however, the relative term does not exclude the absolute that depends on another, but the absolute that is not related to another.

Reply Obj. 11: This proposition, “no relation is a substance,” is self-evident if it refers to relation and substance that are in a genus. God, however, is not confined within the limits of a genus but contains in himself the perfections of all genera. Therefore, relation and substance are not distinct in him in reality.

Reply Obj. 12: Self-existent is opposed to non-self-existent and not to that which is related to another.

Reply Obj. 13: The “person,” according to the name, does not refer to a relation, except on account of its mode of signification.

Reply Obj. 14: In God, “one” is common to essence and relation; thus, we say that the essence is one, and that the Father is one.

Reply Obj. 15: It may be that the diversity of these modes of procession, by which the Son is said to proceed by way of intellect and the Holy Spirit by way of will, does not suffice for a personal distinction between the Holy Spirit and the Son, since in God will and intellect are not really distinct. If, however, it be granted that this suffices to make a distinction between them, it is clear that each is distinct from the Father by a relation, in that one of them proceeds from the Father by generation, the other by spiration, and these relations constitute their persons.

Reply Obj. 16: Just as relation signifies as distinguishing in God, so is that which is related signified as distinguished. Now, in God, the relation and the relative are not distinct, as neither are the essence and that which is; hence, in God, that which distinguishes and that which is distinguished do not differ.

Reply Obj. 17: In God, a property is not an accident but in reality is the same as the thing whose property it is, although it differs therefrom according to our mode of understanding. Accordingly, “person” does not signify relation as a property but as the thing subsisting under the property and essence.

Reply Obj. 18: Although there cannot be a universal without singulars, it can be understood apart from them and consequently be so signified. Hence, it follows that if there are no singulars, there is no universal. But it does not follow that if no singular is understood or signified, the universal is not understood or signified. For the word “man” does not signify some individual man but only man in general; and in like manner, the word “person,” although it does not signify paternity or filiation or common spiration or procession, nevertheless does signify relation in general (in the way already explained), even as the word “relation” does in its own particular way.