Article 2 — Whether habitual grace is required in order for human nature to be united to the Word in the person

Second, it is asked whether habitual grace is required in order for human nature to be united to the Word in the person. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 2, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 1–2; d. 13, q. 3, a. 1; ST III.2.10; III.6.6; Quodlibet, bk. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3; Compendium theologiae, ch. 214.)

Obj. 1: It seems not, for one must understand substance in the existence of an individual before any accident inhering in it; but human nature is constituted in the existence of an individual through the union of human nature with the same Word; therefore, since grace is an accident, it seems that one must understand the union of human nature with the Word before grace, and so grace is not required for the union.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, human nature is able to be assumed by the Word inasmuch as it is rational; but this is not granted to it by grace; therefore, grace does not dispose to the union.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the soul is infused in the body so that it might be perfected in it with knowledge and the virtues, as is clear from the Teacher in the Sentences; (It is actually Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 1, ch. 6; bk. 2, d. 2.) but Christ's soul is united to the Word before the body, otherwise it would follow that an individual was assumed, for the individual is constituted from the union of the soul with the body; therefore, one must first understand the union of Christ's soul with the Word before understanding the grace in it; and so grace does not dispose to the previously mentioned union.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, no intermediate accident falls in between the nature and the individual; but human nature is united to the Word as to an individual; therefore, grace does not enter in there, like a disposing medium.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, human nature is not only united to the Word according to the soul, but also according to the body; however, the body is not susceptible of grace; therefore, grace is not needed as an intermediate disposition for the union of human nature with the Word.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, as Augustine says in the Letter to Volusianus, (Augustine, Epistle 137, ch. 2; ch. 3, n. 7 (PL 33:519).) among things that are marvelously done the entire reason for the thing done is the power of the doer; but the union of human nature with the divine is beyond every marvelous thing done; therefore, one must not hold there to be any disposition on the part of the thing done, but the power of the doer suffices, and so an intermediate grace is not required.

On the contrary (1) is what Augustine says, (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 40 (PL 40:252).) that whatever belongs to the Son of God by nature belongs to the Son of man by grace; but to be God belongs to the Son of God by nature; therefore, it also belongs by grace to the Son of man; however, it belongs to him by union, therefore grace is required for union.

Furthermore (2), the union in the person is more excellent than a union by enjoyment; but grace is required for the second of these; and so also for the first.

I answer that it must be said that the fact that grace is required for the previously mentioned union can be understood in two ways: in one way in the manner of a principle causing the union, and in this way, holding that the union in Christ is caused by grace sounds like the heresy of Nestorius, (Cf. Boethius, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium (De duabus naturis),* ch. 4 (PL 64:1345C); according to Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 3.)* who held that the humanity of Christ is not united to the Word in any other way than with respect to the perfect likeness of grace. One can understand it in another way in the manner of a disposition; and this can be in two ways: either according to the manner of a necessary disposition or a congruous one; it is one of necessity in the way that rarity or else heat is a disposition for the form of fire, for matter cannot be the proper matter of fire unless it be understood with heat and rarity; but it is one of congruity in the way that beauty is a certain disposition for marriage.

Therefore, some say (Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, part 3, n. 60, p. 88; n. 96 (p. 139).) that habitual grace is a disposition in the manner of a necessity, making human nature able to be assumed. But this does not seem to be the case, for grace is more the end of the assumption than a disposition for the assumption; for Damascene says that Christ assumed human nature so that he might heal it, (Cf. John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 18 (PG 94:1072C).) which healing happens by grace; hence, Christ's habitual grace is understood more as an effect of union than as a preparation for union; and this is what is meant in John 1:14: we have seen him as the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth, as though the fullness of grace belonged to him from the fact that he is the only begotten of the Father through the union. Hence, habitual grace does not mean a disposition except in the manner of congruity; (Cf. Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. 2, a. 3, q. 2.) and habitual grace can be called the grace of union (terminus inde a Petro Lomb. in theologiam introductus. Cf. e. g. Lib. Sent., bk. 3, d. 10, ch. 2) in this manner, even though the grace of union is better and more fittingly (Cf. Albert the Great, In III Sent., d. 3, exposition of text; d. 4, a. 4 ad 3; d. 12, a. 8.) understood according to the intention of the saints (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 40 (PL 40:252; CCSL 46) according to Aquinas: In III Sent., d. 4, q. 3, a. 1, resp.; cf. Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 36 (PL 40:250; CCSL 46), On the Trinity, bk. 13, ch. 17 (PL 42:1031; CCSL 50A).) to be in the person of the Word, which was bestowed on human nature without any preceding merits. Habitual grace is not required for this as it is for fruition, which consists in an activity; for a habit is not a principle of existence but of an activity.

By this the solution to the objections is made manifest.