Article 8 — Whether Christ was able to merit in the first moment of his conception

Eighth, it is asked whether Christ was able to merit in the first moment of his conception. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 18, a. 3; ST III.34.3.)

Obj. 1: It seems not, for deliberation is required for merit; but deliberation requires time; therefore, Christ's soul was not able to merit in the first moment of its creation.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, merit and demerit both consist in an act of free choice; but an angel was not able to sin in the first moment of its creation, (Cf. articulus quintus reprobatus Parisiis anno 1241 (Chart. Univ. Paris. I, p. 171); Aquinas, In III Sent., d. 3, q. 2, a. 1.) for then he would be evil in the first moment of his creation, which is wrong; therefore, neither was Christ's soul able to merit in the first moment of its creation.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whenever there are two motions ordered to one another, it is impossible that both of them should terminate in the same instant; but the creation of Christ's soul and his movement of free choice are certain ordered motions, for the movement of free choice presupposes creation; therefore, it is impossible that the movement of free choice should terminate in the first instant in which creation terminates, namely, when the soul is first created.

Obj. 4: But one might say that Christ's soul was assisted in meriting in the first moment by grace.

On the contrary, no grace conferred upon a creature draws it outside the limits of that creature; but it belongs to the soul inasmuch as it is created that it not be able to have a motion of free choice in the first moment in which it exists, as is clear from the argument given; (Obj. 3.) therefore, it cannot be helped by grace to merit in the first moment.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, grace perfects the soul in the manner of a certain habit; but since a habit presupposes a power, it does not give to the soul the ability to simply do what it otherwise could not do, but rather, to be able to act in such a way as it otherwise could not act without a habit; therefore, if Christ's soul was not able to have the use of free choice in the first instant of his creation, it seems that grace did not bestow upon him that he should merit in the first instant.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, a point is to a line as an instant is to time; but according to the Philosopher in the Physics, (Aristotle, Physics 8:16, 262a12–b8.) whenever a mobile uses one point as two, namely as the beginning of one line and the end of another, an intermediary rest necessarily intervenes, as is clear in reciprocating motion; therefore, since that moment in which Christ's soul was created is taken as the end of creation and as the beginning of the movement of free choice, so that one moment is used as two; it seems that a middle time intervenes, and so Christ's soul did not merit in the first moment of its creation.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, nature is to an act of nature as grace is to an act of grace; therefore, by transposition, grace is to an act of nature as nature is to an act of grace: but nature is not capable of an act of grace; therefore, neither is grace capable of an act of nature; thus, it is not possible that Christ's soul had, by grace, an act in the first moment of his conception that belonged to him naturally, namely to choose.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, a form has three acts, for it gives existence, it distinguishes, and it orders to an end: however, these are ordered to one another in the same way as being, one, and goodness, for being results form the first act, one from the second, and goodness from the third; therefore, anything is a being before it is ordered to an end; however, Christ's soul was ordered to an end by a meritorious act; therefore, it is not possible that it merited in the first moment of its creation.

Obj. 9: Furthermore, merit consists in an act of virtue, which is perfected especially by choice, according to the Philosopher; (Aristotle, Ethics 8.13, 1163a22; ut dicitur supra: q. 22, a. 15.) but Christ's soul was not able to have an act of choice in the first moment of his creation, for choice presupposes counsel, since it is a desire for what has been previously deliberated, as it says in the Ethics; (Aristotle, Ethics 3.6, 1112a15.) however, counsel needs time, since it is a certain inquiry; therefore, Christ's soul was not able to merit in the first moment of its creation.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, weakness of the organs impedes the use of free choice, as is clear in newly born babies; but Christ assumed this weakness, as well as our other capabilities for suffering; therefore, Christ's soul did not merit in the first moment of its creation.

On the contrary (1), Christ was most perfect with respect to his soul in the moment of his creation; but a perfection that is according to both act and habit is greater than one which is according to habit alone; therefore, there were virtues in Christ in the first moment of his creation, not only according to habit but also according to act: however, the acts of the virtues are meritorious; therefore, Christ merited in the first moment of his creation.

Furthermore (2), Christ had enjoyment as a true possessor in the first moment of his creation; however, enjoyment is through an act of charity; therefore, he had an act of charity in the first moment of his creation; but an of charity in Christ was meritorious, and so the same conclusion as before.

But one might say (3) that the act of charity was not meritorious unless it was together with deliberation.

On the contrary, deliberation or counsel is not of the final end but of the things ordered to the end, as it says in the Ethics; (Aristotle, Ethics 3.5, 1112b11.) but a movement of charity is especially meritorious inasmuch as it tends toward the final end itself; therefore, it is not necessary for it to be meritorious that there be any comparison or deliberation.

But one might say (4) that the movement which is toward the final end is not meritorious except insofar as someone refers it to the end; and so there is a certain comparison there, which cannot happen in an instant.

On the contrary, the soul's intellectual part is more powerful in its own activity than the sensitive part; but one senses that one is sensing at the same time that one senses; therefore, at the same time that one's affection is borne toward God, one can make a comparison of this motion toward God himself, and so it is not necessary that this happen successively.

Furthermore (5), whoever understands something understands at the same time what pertains to the understanding of that thing; (Cf. Aristotle, Categories 7, 8a35.) as when someone understands animal at the same as he understands man; but one of two correlatives pertains to the understanding of the other; therefore, whoever understands one of two relatives immediately understands the other: thus, it is possible that in one and the same moment the mind should refer the movement of charity to God by comparing one to another, and so time is not needed there.

Furthermore (6), Anselm says (Cf. Anselm, Monologium, ch. 15 (PL 158:163C).) that whatever one understands to belong to perfection must all be attributed to Christ; but it pertains to perfection that it have a perfect activity in the first moment of its creation; therefore, this must be attributed to God.

Furthermore (7), Christ did not have any means to make progress with regard to the soul's merit; (Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezekiel, bk. 1, hom. 6, para. 8 (PL 76:832A); cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 3, d. 18, ch. 2.) but he would have had this if he did not merit in the first moment of his creation; therefore, the same as above.

Furthermore (8), the rational power in Christ was not less perfect than the natural power of another creature; but some power of another creature could have its own activity in the first moment in which it begins to exist; as is clear in a candle, which illuminate the air in the very instant that it is lit. Therefore, Christ's soul had an act of a rational power in the first instant of its creation; and so he was able to merit.

Furthermore (9), Gregory says in the Homily on Pentecost (Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, bk. 2, hom. 30 (PL 76:1221B).) that God's love is not lazy, for if it exists, it does great things; but if it ceases to act, it ceases to be love; but Christ had perfect charity in the first moment of his creation; therefore, there was also an act of love in him, and so there was merit in him in that moment.

Furthermore (10), what is afterwards by nature cannot be before in time, though perhaps simultaneous; but merit is before reward by nature; however, Christ had a reward in the first moment of his conception, for he was a true possessor; therefore, he at least had merit in that same moment.

I answer that it must be said that there are two opinions on this matter: for some say (For example, Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, part 3, n. 130, p. 183; Albert the Great, In III Sent., d. 18, a. 6; Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. 18, a. 1, q. 1.) that Christ did not merit in the first moment of his conception, but that he began to merit right after the first moment; but others say (For example, Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 3, d. 18, ch. 2.) that he also merited in the very first moment: and this opinion seems to be more reasonable, for whatever pertaining to spiritual perfection is possible for any creature is believed to have all been conferred upon Christ's soul in the first moment of his creation. But that there should not be merit in any moment can happen in two ways: in one way on the side of the one acting, and in another way on the side of the act. This can happen on the part of the one acting because of a defect in two capacities: namely one of grace, as when we say that someone cannot merit in that moment in which one sins mortally, for he does not have grace; and again from a defect of a natural faculty, as when a child cannot merit in the first moment in which he is conceived, since he does not have the use of free choice.

But neither of these can be affirmed in the current matter: for Christ had a faculty for grace in the first moment, namely by being full of grace, and also a faculty of nature, namely as having the use of free choice to the fullest; otherwise he would not be a possessor. Therefore, there was not anything on the part of the acting Christ by which he would be less able to merit in the first moment of his conception.

Similarly, neither is it the case on the part of the meritorious act. For it can happen in two ways that an act is not to be able to occur in any moment: in one way from the fact that there is succession in that act, and so it cannot be completed in a moment, just as local motion cannot exist in a moment; in a second way from the fact that an act presupposes things that cannot precede any determined moment; as when it cannot be the case that fire be in its own proper place in the first moment of its generation, if it is outside of its generated place, for it requires motion, which cannot exist before the first moment of generation. However, neither of these ways is impeded if Christ did not merit in the first moment. This is indeed the case first of all because the motion of free choice, in which merit consists, does not have succession, but is simple and instantaneous; but secondly, because nothing is required for the will's movement except an act of an apprehensive power, which motion exists in the same moment as the will's act, inasmuch as the perceived good moves the will. But the mover's motion and the mobile's motion are simultaneous. But in Christ, the apprehension of the good itself does not need any inquiry for there to be a sure judgment of the good, for Christ immediately had a true judgment of all things with respect to certitude.

Therefore, it is clear that nothing prevents Christ from meriting in the first moment; and so it must be granted that he merited in the first moment of his conception.

Reply Obj. 1: To the first it must be said that deliberation implies two things, namely the perception of reason with a certitude of judgment of that about which there is deliberation; and in this case it can exist in a moment in someone within whom there is no doubt about what is to be done; and this was the case in Christ. It can also mean discussion or inquiry, and in this sense it implies a discursion, hence, it cannot be in a moment. Christ did not need such a deliberation, for he was not doubtful of what was to be done.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that the will of a rational nature is naturally ordered to the good, but not to evil; and therefore, it can be borne toward the good in the first moment of its creation, unless something prevents it, however, not toward what is evil, to which it is not borne except by an error that interferes in its comparison or inquiry; hence, there is needed a time for comparing with what is evil, but not with what is good.

Reply Obj. 3: To the third it must be said that that argument follows for successive motions, but not for instantaneous ones; the reason for this is that whenever there are two ordered motions, the same instant that is the end of the first motion can be the beginning of the second, just as the local motion of fire begins in the same instant that its generation is completed outside of its natural place, unless there should be something preventing it. Therefore, if the beginning of the second motion and the end of that same motion are identical, as happens in instantaneous motions, then the end of the second motion occurs in the same moment as the end of the first motion, just as illumination and sight end in the same moment. But if the end of the second motion cannot exist in the same moment as the beginning of that same motion, as happens in all successive motions, then it will be impossible for the end of the second motion to be in the same moment as the end of the first motion. Therefore, since the movement of free choice is instantaneous, nothing prevents its end from being in the same moment as the end of creation.

Reply Obj. 4: The solution to the fourth is manifest from this; for it is not outside of the creature's capability that its instantaneous motion be completed in the first moment.

Reply Obj. 5: To the fifth it must be said that although the rational power can have its own activity in the first moment of its creation with respect to itself, yet if one should understand the power as joined to an organ not yet suitable for a perfect activity, it is impeded by the organ's defect such that it cannot have an activity: but this impediment was removed from Christ's soul by grace; and in this respect it was possible for him to act in the first moment.

Reply Obj. 6: To the sixth it must be said that a moment in time and a point in a magnitude are not similar cases with regard to the current matter; for a mobile cannot use the same point in a magnitude as two points except in the same species of motion; but a mobile can use the same moment of time as two moments even with respect to different species of motion. However, it is not possible that there be a continuous motion in the same species of motion, if one motion ends in act and the other begins in act; for then an intermediate rest would fall in between, and also time as a consequence.

However, it is possible that, in motions differing according to species, the end of one motion be simultaneous with the beginning of another, inasmuch as neither any order nor a continuity is required to exist between them, for both can exist at the same time; as for example, when something is moved it can become white at the same time; and its motion with respect to place can come to an end in the moment in which it begins to turn white.

But sometimes there is an order between the parts of the same motion, so that two of them cannot exist at the same time; hence, if both are taken in act, the end of one part does not exist at the same time as the beginning of the other. From this it is clear that to use one moment as two does not demand that there be an intermediate time, as is demanded when one point is used as two in local motion.

Reply Obj. 7: To the seventh it must be said that since grace is a perfection of nature, grace is not related to nature as nature is to grace. However, a transposed proportion does not hold in every case, but it does so in continuous or discrete measures.

Reply Obj. 8: To the eighth it must be said that that argument follows for the order of nature and not for the order of time, which is clear from the fact that in the same moment form gives existence, it orders, and it distinguishes.

Reply Obj. 9: To the ninth it must be said that counsel is needed for choice whenever someone is not sure about what to do; which does not hold in the case of Christ.

Reply Obj. 10: To the tenth it must be said that Christ did not assume a defect that was able to redound to an imperfection of grace and knowledge; however, an unsuitability of the organs for the soul's action is such a defect; hence, Christ did not assume this defect, rather, the organs were strengthened by grace so as to be suitable for the soul's activity, perhaps as it occurred in the state of innocence.

We grant the other arguments since they conclude to something true, although some of them do not do so in a sufficient manner.