Article 9

In the ninth article, the question is raised whether the angels can be said to be the makers of all naturally composed bodies—whether of men or of others—since to cause something is to make from something.

One can find fault in this opinion because we usually use the word 'making' in works of art and not in works of nature. For it is not customarily said that a father makes a son. Accordingly, in the sixth book of the Ethics, the Philosopher speaks in this way when he says that art is right reason about makeable things. Considering the matter in this way, it seems unfitting to say angels or celestial bodies make human bodies or other composite bodies that have been generated naturally. For we make things according to the disposition of our judgment, such as works of art. But the works of nature are not subject to [our] judgment about natural causes because they follow the necessity of the natural order and are subject to the judgment of God, who is the institutor of nature. Accordingly, natural effects are usually attributed to God. Nevertheless, the word 'to make' is found attributed to natural causes inasmuch as it is customary to say that 'every agent makes something like to itself' just as fire is said to make [something] hot. (As Thomas explains, calefacere (to heat) is derived from the words 'hot' (calidus) and 'to make' (facere).) And according to this way of speaking, one can say celestial bodies and even angels make lower composite bodies. In such things, however, the common use of speech usually ought to be followed because, according to the Philosopher, words should be used in their more common signification (See De Veritate, q. 17 a. 1 c., which says the same while citing Aristotle's Topics.) and it seems vain to contend about words when the reality is agreed upon.