Article 13

In the thirteenth article, the question is raised whether God is neither able to move nor wills to some kind of body immediately.

The meaning of this question is not put forward in an explicit manner. For on the one hand, it is said that God is able to move every body immediately by his power and supreme will, (This is actually a reference to the 26th article found in De 30 articulos, which asks "an Deus possit movere aliquod corpus immediate ita quod movere quod est divisibile mensuratum tempus sit actio Dei." Knowledge of the contents of the previous work, which was written to the same lector is presupposed. See, Porro, Thomas Aquinas: A Historical and Philosophical Profile, 367 and Torrell, volume 1 of Saint Thomas Aquinas, The Person and His Work, 354.) which seems necessarily repugnant to the notion found here that he is not able to move a body immediately—unless, perhaps, the notion that God could "move some kind of body immediately" is understood as implying that God acts in such a way that his movement is divisible and measured by time. Now God neither wills nor is able to bring it about that his action which is his essence be divisible and measured by time. But when it is said, "God moves some kind of body," by this word, 'moves,' a divisible action that is measured by time is not implied, but rather a simple action that is his own essence. For not only God but even any intellect moves by command as was said above. (See article 3.) The command of an intellect, however, is nothing other than a concept ordered towards bringing about an effect. But the willing and understanding of God is nothing other than his essence. Accordingly, the action by which God created things and the action by which God is able to immediately move a body is nothing other than his understanding and his willing.