On Human Things

On man, as regards nature

Question 6

Regarding the soul

Then there were questions concerning man, regarding nature, (Qq. 6–8.) grace, (Qq. 9–19.) and fault. (Qq. 20–23.)

About the first, there were three questions:

first, regarding the soul; (Q. 6.)

second, concerning the knowledge of the soul; (Q. 7.)

third, concerning the effect of knowledge. (Q. 8.)

About the soul, there were two questions.

Article 1

Whether the soul perfects the body immediately or with corporeity mediating

First, whether the soul perfects the body immediately, or with corporeity mediating.

I answer that in no body is there another form of the body besides the substantial form.

The reason for this is threefold. The first is because, if there are many forms, there will not be substantial form following, which makes it exist simply, but only accidental form, which makes it exist particularly.

Likewise, if thus, the acquisition of substantial form will not be generation simply.

Likewise, because a composition of soul and body would not be one thing simply, but two things simply and one incidentally.

If corporeity is said to be the form of a body, corporeity is said in two ways: sometimes as three dimensions, and this is not substantial form, but an accident; sometimes it is said as a certain form from which there comes forth the triple dimension, and this is not other than specific form.

Article 2

Whether the soul is from the parent

Second, whether the soul is from the parent.

I answer that Augustine does not determine this question, but leaves it indeterminate (it is determined by the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, but that book is not Augustine’s, but Gennadius’s); (Cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 9; Gennadius of Marseilles, Book of Ecclesiastical Dogmas 14 (PL 58:984; 42:1216); Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 10.21 (CSEL 28:325; PL 34:425).) Gregory also does not wish to determine it. (Gregory the Great, Register of the Epistles 9.148 (CCSL 140:703; PL 77:989–90).)

Nevertheless, it must be believed that it is not.

And there is the one reason of the Philosopher, in the book On Animals, namely, that it is impossible for a bodily power to produce that which exceeds the body. (Cf. Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 2.3, 736a24–b29.) Yet the power of seed is a bodily power.

There is another reason in the seventh book of the Metaphysics, for certain men have posited that natural forms are out of creation. For when the matter of air receives the form of fire, either it was in it, and thus there it is hiding; or not, and therefore it is made newly, not out of something, but out of nothing, and therefore it is created. The Philosopher solves this, (Aquinas is here depending more on Averroes; see Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 7, 1034a30–b7, comm. 31.) since form is not made, just as neither is being nor having existence made in themselves, but rather, the composite is made, because it has subsisting existence.

If, therefore, there is some form which subsists in itself, such a thing is made in itself. Yet the soul has existence in itself subsisting, and it remains when the body has corrupted. And thus, it is necessary for it to have its own being made.

Question 7

On the knowledge of man

Article 1

Whether the human intellect knows singulars

Then there was a question concerning the knowledge of man, whether the human intellect knows singulars.

I answer that something is known in two ways: directly and indirectly, namely, reflexively.

Yet there is a difference between the human intellect and the divine intellect because the human does not know the singular directly, but the divine does. For knowledge is made through a likeness of the thing known in the one knowing, and this is in our intellect through abstraction from individuating conditions and from matter. And for this reason, since right knowledge is through the species, it only knows the universal directly. Yet the divine intellect knows not through a likeness received from a thing, but through extension of its own essence unto things, and this likeness, namely, the divine essence, is in God an express likeness of all which is in the thing. And for this reason, it knows directly whatever is in the thing, even that which pertains to individual matter.

But the Philosopher asks: if the intellect is separated, how does it know those things which are in matter? He says that it is necessary that it knows these either in the one way, just as separate form is known by the intellect and conjoined to matter through the imagination, or in the other way, namely, through extension, inasmuch as it is conjoined to an image, which represents phantasms to it, and thus it knows indirectly. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429b10–17.)

Question 8

On the effect of knowledge

Then there were questions concerning the effect of knowledge.

Article 1

Whether the habits of acquired knowledge remain after this life

And first whether the habits of acquired knowledge remain after this life.

I answer that there is a double opinion about this.

Certain men say that they do not, following Avicenna, in the sixth book in Of Natural Things, who posits that acquired species only remain in the potential intellect as long as it understands. (Avicenna, Book on the Soul 5.6, pp. 146–48; cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 50.1.2, resp., ad 5.) This is false. For the potential intellect receives and retains species according to its own mode. Hence, since it is immobile, as it is immaterial and incorruptible, it receives intelligible species according to its own mode, and they never recede from thence. And that they are there even while it does not understand actually is clear in the third book of On the Soul, where it is said that they are in the soul otherwise than while it understands actually, namely, by habit. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429b5–9; cf. above: Quodlibet III, q. 9, a. 1, resp.)

And thus, I say that they remain, whether in the damned or in the blessed, but these habits of knowledge are destroyed as regards the mode of knowledge, because here it always understands by turning to phantasms, on account of the body. And not only on account of this do we need phantasms, but unto using species of this sort. And that mode will not be there, because it will not turn to phantasms.

Article 2

Whether human words have power to move brutes such as serpents

Second, whether human words have power to move brutes such as serpents. (Cf. ST II-II.96.4, obj. 2, ad 2; cf. Psalm 58:4–5 (57:5–6).)

I answer that something can have some power both according to its proper nature and according to the power of a superior cause. For example, a mixture composed of elements has power from the nature of the elements according to the motion of the predominant element; (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 17, n. 459.) it has another power from the heavenly body, just as that steel attracts iron, which is not reducible to an elemental power.

Some men, (Al-Kindi, De radiis.) therefore, say that not only natural bodies, but also artificial ones obtain some powers from the impression of the heavenly bodies, for example images or figures made under a fixed constellation. And, if this is true, namely, that over artificial things there is a power of this sort impressed, it can also be said that words uttered in a fixed time have the efficacy of moving.

But this is not true. For in natural things, all things which have some power from a heavenly body have that as a result of some form, hence nothing acts unto a species unless by the power of a heavenly body. (Aristotle, Physics 2.2, 194b13.) And thus, form is in each thing before the power unto such things. Therefore, with the former removed, the latter is removed. If, therefore, powers of this sort are attributed to some things, it is necessary for them to be rooted in some form. Yet artificial forms are only certain figures. And for this reason, it is false that words also have some power of this sort from a heavenly body.

But if they have any, they have this from an unclean spirit, which mixes itself with the words of men in order to deceive, according to Augustine. (Augustine, On the City of God 10.11 (CCSL 47:285–86; PL 41:289–90).) Hence sometimes they use fabulous and false and vain words, in which they mix themselves unto fooling men. Hence are all those frivolous and superstitious things, and astronomical images, in which, although there is not present any express invocation of demons, nevertheless there is a certain tacit consent there.

Nevertheless, if someone says the words of God and holy words without change and fraud, but with a good and divine intention, this is not an incantation but a prayer. Nevertheless, Chrysostom in his commentary on Matthew, at there: (Pseudo-Chrysostom, Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum, homily 43, on Matthew 23:5 (PG 56:878–79).) they widen the phylacteries, reproves those who hang the words of the Gospel on their neck, since the power of the Gospel is not in figures of letters, but in faith. Nevertheless, I do not damn those who wear the Gospel upon themselves out of devotion, because Cecilia wore the Gospel of Christ always on her breast. (Responsory for Matins on the feast of St. Cecilia, in Liturgia O.P., cod. Roma Arch. Gen. O.P., 14, L. 1, f. 132v.) Nevertheless, this was without some addition either of words or of characters or of other suspect things.

On man, as regards grace

On sacraments

On the sacraments of grace

Question 9

On baptism

Then there were questions concerning man as regards grace. And about this there were three questions:

first, concerning sacraments; (Qq. 9–12.)

second, concerning virtues; (Qq. 13–15.)

third, concerning offices. (Qq. 16–19.)

Concerning the first, there were three questions:

first, concerning the sacraments of grace; (Qq. 9–10.)

second, concerning the effect of the sacraments; (Q. 11.)

third, concerning the unity of the Church. (Q. 12.)

Concerning the sacraments of grace, there were two questions:

first, concerning baptism; (Q. 9.)

second, concerning penance. (Q. 10.)

Article 1

Whether water has power to cleanse

Concerning the first, there is a question whether water has power to cleanse, that is, whether it cleanses by its own power, or by concomitant power.

I answer that the opinion in things of this sort is twofold, not only concerning water, but also concerning all the sacraments of the Church.

For certain men (William of Auvergne (Guillelmus Alvernus), On the Sacraments, in Opera omnia 1, ed. F. Hotot (Orléans-Paris, 1674; reprinted Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1963), De sacramento baptismi, ch. 10, 418; cf. Bonaventure, In III Sent., d. 40, dub. 3, 3:895–96.) say that the sacraments do not have power or strength of operating in the soul, but only outside, and concomitant divine power makes that effect. And they introduce the example of Bernard: (Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermon on the Lord’s Supper, in Bernardi opera, ed. J. Leclercq and H.M. Rochais (Rome: Editiones Cistercienses, 1968), para. 2, 5:68–69 (PL 183:271); cf. Albert the Great, De sacramentis, tr. 1, q. 1; In IV Sent., d. 1 B, a. 5, 29:14; Aquinas, In IV Sent. 1.1.4, qa. 1, obj. 1.) when there is some bishop who invests someone with a prebend through a ring, the ring is not the cause of the prebend, but a sign.

But this is not well said, because thus there would not be any prerogative of the sacraments of the New Law over the Old, because even in those a power, co-assisting the faith of believers in Christ to come, justified.

And for this reason, it must be said that the sacraments have in themselves the power of justifying, and producing the other effects unto which they are ordered, and they are not simply a sign. Hence Augustine: what is so great of the power of water, that it should touch the body and wash the heart? (Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tr. 80, para. 3 (CCSL 36:529; PL 35:1840).)

Nevertheless, it must be known that power is twofold, namely, proper and instrumental, just as is clear in a saw. Thus also the sacraments have instrumental power for a spiritual effect because when a sacrament is presented with divine invocation, it effects this effect. And this is fitting because the Word, through which all the sacraments have power, had flesh and was the Word of God, and, just as the flesh of Christ had instrumental power unto making miracles on account of its continuation unto the Word, so too the sacraments through continuation unto Christ crucified and having suffered . . .

Question 10

On penance

Then there were questions concerning penance.

Article 1

Whether one not having the care of souls can absolve in the forum of confession

And first, whether one not having the care of souls can absolve in the forum of confession.

I answer that it is otherwise in the sacrament of penance than in certain other sacraments. For in certain ones he who has been ordained can thereby induce the effect of the sacrament in every case, namely, in those where the effect of the sacraments is a thing existing outside the sacrament. Hence a degraded priest and an excommunicated one, even if he sins, nevertheless consecrates and baptizes, and similarly a bishop consecrates ordinands, because he confers the character. Yet in penance there is not impressed a character nor an effect besides the justification of the penitent, which can only be done through judiciary power. Yet one not having the care of souls does not have this power.

Article 2

Whether it is licit in any circumstance to reveal a confession

Second, whether it is licit in any circumstance to reveal a confession.

I answer that it is not, neither by word nor by situation nor by nod nor by some sign, (Cf. above: Quodlibet V, q. 7, a. 1, resp.; Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 5, tit. 38, c. 12, 2:888.) and to act against this is sacrilege. For thus there is in the sacraments of the New Law that they effect what they figure. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 4, d. 4, ch. 1, para. 2, p. 252 (PL 192:846).) Yet the effect of penance is the hiding of sins from the eyes of God punishing, and this hiding is signified through the secret of confession. And for this reason, just as he would profane the sacrament who would attempt to confect the body and blood of Christ from something other than bread and wine, so would one be sacrilegious who reveals sins.

Article 3

Whether it is licit to desire the episcopacy

Third, whether it is licit to desire the episcopacy.

I answer that to desire the prelacy happens in two ways: either on account of necessity urging, or not urging.

In the first way, it happens in two ways, either when it is imposed by a superior, or when someone is not found who wishes to undergo the burden of the prelacy. With such necessity existing, it is meritorious to desire. Hence in Isaiah 6:8: whom shall I send and who shall go for us?, he responds: behold, I, send me. Nevertheless, he called himself unworthy before.

In the second way, namely, when necessity does not urge, it is not licit, because he cannot lack either the vice of injustice, if he prefers himself, although lesser, to those greater than him, or the vice of presumption, if he considers himself sufficient to be preferred to others. Hence Chrysostom says that to desire ecclesiastical primacies is neither just nor useful, (Pseudo-Chrysostom, Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum, homily 35, on Matthew 20:25 (PG 56:830).) commenting upon that: kings of the Gentiles (Luke 22:25).

On the effect of the sacraments

Question 11

On the effect of the sacraments

Article 1

Whether compaternity is caused by the preambles to the sacraments

Then there was a question concerning the effect of the sacraments, whether compaternity (Compaternity is the relationship contracted between the godfather and the biological father of the same person. See In IV Sent. 42.1.3, qa. 3, resp.; Suppl., q. 56, a. 5, resp.) is caused by the preambles to the sacraments, for example by catechesis and things of this sort. And it seems that it is.

Obj. 1: For a certain decretal says that from the first nourishment of salt (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 4, tit. 11, c. 5, “Contracto,” 2:694–95; Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 30, q. 1, c. 1, 1:1096.) she cannot be made a wife. Therefore, compaternity is contracted there.

Obj. 2: A catechumen is reckoned a Christian. But he who gives Christianity is made a compater; therefore, compaternity is contracted there.

I answer that certain men says that all those sacramentals suffice to cause compaternity. (Hugh of Pisa (Huguccio), according to the Gloss on the Decretal and Henry of Segusio (Hostiensis).) Certain men say it is only contracted by three things, namely, catechesis, baptism, and confirmation. (Joannes Bassianus (Bazianus), teacher of Bologna law (1197); Alan Anglicus, teacher of Bologna law (1208); and his student William Naso (1234), according to Hostiensis. Aquinas rejects this opinion: In IV Sent. 42.1.2.) But to me it seems that it is only contracted in two, namely, in baptism and confirmation, (According to Hostiensis, it is the opinion of Damasus (magister of the decrees of Bologna, 13th century), Lawrence of Spain, and Tancred of Bologna, with whom Geoffrey, Raymond of Peñafort, and Hostiensis agree. See In IV Sent. 42.1.2.) because compaternity is a certain likeness of paternity, yet paternity is only made in generation, and for this reason, only in those sacraments in which there is a certain spiritual generation is compaternity contracted, which impedes matrimony.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that those things are not to be understood separately, but are to be understood collectively and simultaneously, because he who is present in all of those is made a comparent.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that a catechumen is called a Christian through faith, not through baptism, which he has not yet received, and the person gives Christianity who gives the sacrament of baptism.

On the unity of the Church

Question 12

On the unity of the Church

Article 1

Whether there is one Church which was in the beginning at the time of the Apostles and which is now

Then there was a question whether there is one Church which was in the beginning at the time of the Apostles and which is now. And it seems that there is not.

Obj. 1: Because now it does not use the same rules: for then prelates were without gold and silver in their money belts. (Matthew 10:9.)

Obj. 2: It is not read that Christ and the Apostles had fortresses. Yet now the Church has them.

On the contrary: The last chapter of Matthew: behold I am with you even unto the consummation of the world (Matt 28:20). Yet this is not understood just about the Apostles, because they all have died and still the world is not consummated.

I answer that the Church which was then and which is now is the same in number, because there is the same faith and the same sacraments of faith, the same authority, and the same profession. Hence the Apostle says: is Christ divided? (1 Cor 1:13). Surely he is not.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the words of Matthew are expounded in three ways. (Aquinas, Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, ch. 10, lect. 1.)

Hilary and Ambrose expound according to the mystical sense, saying: do not carry gold (Matt 10:9), (Luke 10:4.) that is, may you sell nothing in spiritual ministries for gold; (Hilary of Poitiers, On Matthew 10.5 (SC 254:220; PL 9:968; CSEL 17); Ambrose, On Paradise, ch. 13 (PL 14:308C; CSEL 32.1).) not two tunics (Matt 10:10), that is, may you not have a double mind. (Jerome, On Matthew 1, on Matthew 10:10 (CCSL 77:67; PL 26:63); Augustine, Consensus of the Evangelists 2.30, paras. 75–76 (CSEL 43:180; PL 34:1114–15).)

Others expound according to the letter. And one exposition is Augustine’s, who says that those words are not said as a precept, but as permission, such that he who does not observe it does not sin and he who observes it does better; (Augustine, Consensus of the Evangelists 2.30, paras. 73–76 (CSEL 43:177–81; PL 34:1113–15).) thus, the sense is: do not carry, that is, when you go unto preaching may you not be solicitous concerning expenses, because they are due to you from the people, for worthy is the laborer (Matt 10:10); as if he were to say: for this reason, I permit you not to carry, because you are worthy to receive from others, to whom you preach. Paul did not observe it, and, nevertheless, he did not act against this rule, but went above and beyond.

Another exposition is of other saints, (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew, ch. 10, lect. 1, nn. 823–26.) who say that these things were said as a precept, but this precept was given not to be always observed, but only during the first mission. For he sent them twice, namely, before the Passion to the Jews, and after the Resurrection to the Gentiles. In the first he said to them: into the way of the Gentiles may you not depart (Matt 10:5), in the second he said: teach all nations (Matt 28:19); (Cf. Jerome, On Matthew 1, on Matthew 10:5–6 (CCSL 77:65; PL 26:61–62).) in the first he mandated that they observe the aforesaid things, yet not in the second.

And the reason for this is that in the first they are sent only to the Jews, among whom the custom was that their teachers were sustained by them (Cf. Jerome, Against Jovinian 1.26 (PL:23:245; CPL 0610:257).) and for this reason, without scandal they could receive and use the power conceded to them. Whereas amongst the Gentiles there was not a custom of this sort, because among them there were not preachers of this sort, and for this reason, it would have been a scandal for them and it would have seemed to them that the Apostles were preaching for profit. (Cf. Jerome, On Matthew 1, on Matthew 10:9–10 (CCSL 77:66; PL 26:62); John Chrysostom, On Matthew, homily 32 [33], para. 4, on Matthew 10:9–10 (PG 57:382).) And for this reason, Paul did not observe this precept among the Gentiles. And for this reason, the Lord in the second mission said: now he who has a money bag, let him take it and likewise his satchel (Luke 22:36).

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that Augustine responds in an epistle against the Donatists, and it is said upon that Psalm: why do the nations rage (Ps 2:1). (Augustine, Letter 93 [48], 3.9 (CSEL 34:453–54; PL 33:325); Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 23, q. 4, c. 41, “Non invenitur,” 1:921–22.) For he distinguishes the diverse times of the Church: for there was the time when kings stood against Christ (Ps 2:2), and in that time not only did they not give to the faithful, but they even killed them. Whereas another time is now, when the kings understand and educated serve the Lord Jesus Christ in fear (Ps 2:11). And for this reason, in that time the kings are vassals of the Church. And for this reason, there is another state of the Church now and then. Nevertheless, there is not another Church.

On the virtues

On truth

Question 13

On truth

Then there were questions concerning virtues:

and first, concerning a certain intellectual virtue, namely, truth; (Q. 13.)

second, concerning the moral virtues. (Qq. 14–15.)

Concerning truth, there were two questions:

first, concerning the fortitude of truth;

second, concerning the confirmation of truth which is through oath.

Article 1

Whether truth is stronger than wine, king, and woman

About the first, there was a question whether truth is stronger than wine, king, and woman.

Obj. 1: And it seems that wine is stronger, because it changes man most greatly.

Obj. 2: Likewise, it seems that the king is stronger, because he compels man to do what is most difficult, namely, that a man expose himself to the danger of death.

Obj. 3: Likewise, it seems that it is woman, because she dominates even kings.

On the contrary: Esdras 3:12: truth is stronger.

I answer that this is the question debated by the youths in Esdras.

Therefore, it must be known that, if we were to consider those four according to themselves, namely, wine, king, woman, and truth, they are not comparable, because they are not of one genus. Nevertheless, if they were considered in comparison to some effect, they would assemble unto one genus, and thus they can be compared. Yet this effect in which they come together and can be compared is the change of the human heart. Therefore, we must see which of these more changes the heart of man.

It must be known, therefore, that a certain changeable thing of man is bodily, and another is animal; and this is twofold, namely, sensitive and intellective. The intellective also is twofold, namely, practical and speculative. Yet amongst those which pertain to things naturally changeable according to a disposition of the body, wine has excellence, which makes through talents to speak. (Ezra 3:21.) Among those which pertain to changing the sensitive appetite, delight is more excellent, especially about sexual intercourse, and thus woman is stronger. Likewise, in practical matters and in human things which man can make, a king has the greatest power. In speculative matters truth is highest and most powerful. Now, however, bodily powers are subjected to animal powers, animal powers to intellectual ones, and amongst intellectual the practical to the speculative, and for this reason, truth is, simply speaking, worthier and more excellent and stronger.

Article 2

Whether one who learns of a remedy, under oath of not communicating it, is held to observe the oath

Second, there is a question whether one who learns of a remedy, (Here Aquinas uses the word experimentum as a proper word for medicine, which has the same meaning as a “remedy” (cf. s.c.) or “cure” (cf. end of response), which each physician finds in his own experience.) under oath of not communicating it, is held to observe the oath. And it seems that he is.

Obj. 1: Because one thus obligated ought not to do anything which inclines (Cf. above: Quodlibet V, q. 13, a. 1, resp.) unto the detriment of the one who gave or taught. Yet this would be if he were to communicate to others.

Obj. 2: Not to communicate such a remedy does not incline unto the detriment of anyone’s eternal salvation. Therefore, since he is not held to communicate it to another, one thus obligated ought not to communicate it.

On the contrary: Not to communicate a healthful remedy or any good thing is against charity.

I answer that it must be said one way here simply speaking, and otherwise in a particular case.

Simply speaking, he is not held, but he acts badly by swearing: for an oath not only loses power when the oath is illicit, but he swears an oath by swearing. For an oath obligating ought to have judgment, justice, and truth (Jer 4:2). (Cf. above: Quodlibet V, q. 13, a. 1, resp.) But if at some time I swear something which is licit for me not to do, for example not to go to church, it is not licit to swear. For, granted that it is licit for me at some time not to do or to dismiss a good of the sort such as to go to church, nevertheless it is not licit for me to introduce an oath and to secure my mind unto not doing some good, because this is to act against the Holy Spirit. And for this reason, an oath against everything which is of the genus of good things is illicit and must not be observed.

Nevertheless, in a particular case he is held to observe it: for example, if a qualified doctor were present and were prepared to use that remedy for the bodily health of others.

Reply Obj. 1–2: And thus, the solution to the objections is clear.

On the moral virtues

Question 14

On the virtues themselves

Then there were questions concerning the moral virtues:

and first, concerning the virtues themselves; (Q. 14.)

second, specially concerning a certain act of justice, namely, restitution. (Q. 15.)

Article 1

Whether the moral virtues are connected

About the first there was a question whether the moral virtues are connected. And it seems that they are not.

Obj. 1: Because they are acquired through acts, which are divided and distinct. (Cf. Albert the Great, In III Sent., d. 36, a. 1, s.c. 2, 29:666a.) Therefore, one virtue can be acquired without the others.

Obj. 2: Augustine says: he says nothing against the divine essence, who says that he who has one does not have all. (Augustine, Letter 167, 3.10 (CSEL 44:596; PL 33:736–37).)

Obj. 3: Virtues are had out of custom, which requires time.

I answer that, according to all the saints and philosophers, yes they are. (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, tract. 40, ch. 2, 3:768–73.)

And, speaking about virtues in common, a twofold reason is given by diverse men, according to how they speak diversely concerning the virtues: for the cardinal virtues are understood in two ways by some men.

For certain men (Cf. Alexander of Hales, Gloss on III Sent., d. 33, 386–87; Philip the Chancellor, Summa de Bono, ed. N. Wicki, Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi: Opera philosophica mediae aetatis selecta 1 (Bern: Francke, 1985), 754–55, 1071–72; Albert the Great, De bono, tr. 1, q. 6, a. 2.) say that the virtues are certain general modes which are required in every virtue, for example that fortitude is any firmness of mind in any matters, temperance is moderation of mind in all matters, and thus concerning the others. And according to those men it is necessary that the virtues be connected, because those general modes are required in every virtue. As well, if something of these is lacking, there is not any virtue: for if temperance does not have rectitude, which is justice, or does not have firmness of mind, which is fortitude, and so on for the others, there is no virtue. And Augustine explains this mode in the third book of On the Trinity, (Augustine, On the Trinity 6.4, para. 6 (CCSL 50:233–34; PL 42:927).) and the Master in the third book of the Sentences. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 3, d. 36, ch. 3, para. 3, p. 203 (PL 192:830).)

Yet other men understand the distinction of these virtues according to determinate matter, such as Aristotle and the Peripatetics. (Aristotle, Ethics 2–6.) Hence prudence according to the Philosopher is not right reason in all things, but only in doable things. Similarly, justice does not name rectitude of mind about the adequation of all things, (Cf. Aquinas, In III Sent. 28.1.6, ad 4; 33.3.4, ad 1.) but only about exchanges and distributions and human actions which are unto another. Fortitude also names firmness of mind not about all things, but about those things in which it is most difficult to have a strong mind, namely, about the dangers which are in wars; whereas temperance is about those things in which it is most difficult to moderate the mind, namely, about delights of taste and touch, which are the greatest delights, not in any other desires such as of knowledge or of money. Yet speaking in that way about the virtues, the moral virtues are also connected. The reason for this connection is understood according to the Philosopher on the part of prudence, (Aristotle, Ethics 6.12–13, 1144a11–1145a2.) because no virtue can be had without prudence and it is impossible to have prudence without the moral virtues. The reason for this is that prudence is nothing other than right reason of doable things. It is impossible to have right reason about something unless out of right reason about the principles. Yet the principles of doable things are the ends of the virtues, and about the ends of the virtues no one conducts himself well unless through the habit of that virtue. And thus, it is necessary for prudence to have with it the other moral virtues. Similarly, the others cannot be had without prudence: someone can have a natural inclination unto the act of some virtue without prudence, and as much as he has a greater inclination without the habit of virtue, so much worse is he and so much more can he stumble without prudence, (Aristotle, Ethics 6.13, 1144b10–12.) just as is clear concerning a man who has natural fortitude without discretion and prudence. And for this reason, Gregory says: the other virtues, unless they should do those things which they do prudently, and so on. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 2.46.71 (CCSL 143:101; PL 75:588).)

There is also another reason of connection in the gratuitous virtues, namely, on account of charity, in which they are connected, because he who has charity has all the gracious virtues, and, similarly, he who has one, has charity.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that acts are not divided according to the Stoics, (Cf. Alexander of Hales, Gloss on III Sent., d. 33, 386–87; Philip the Chancellor, Summa de Bono, 754–55, 1071–72; Albert the Great, De bono, tr. 1, q. 6, a. 2.) because there cannot be an act of temperance without an act of fortitude, nor an act of fortitude unless with an act of temperance.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that this is said because it is not proven through the authority of the Bible.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that they are not called moral from custom, but from behavior. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, bk. 2, lect. 1, nn. 247–49.) And, given that they lack time, nevertheless you will not have virtue unless you are prudent.

Question 15

On restitution

Then there were questions concerning restitution, which is an act of justice. And about this, there were three questions:

first, concerning those men who on account of factions are in exile from cities;

second, concerning him who acquires something by prescription for a long time in bad faith;

third, concerning him who consumes another’s property.

Article 1

Whether those expelled on account of their factions can demand their goods from those who remain in the city

About the first there is a question whether those expelled on account of their factions can demand back their goods from those who remain in the city. And it seems that they cannot.

Obj. 1: Because many of those in the city were not at fault for their expulsion, and thus some would be punished for the fault of another.

Obj. 2: The expelled were against the faction of the Church, and thus it was a just war. Therefore, the action is against them, and thus their losses must not be restored to them.

Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Politics 3.2, 1276b1–15.) when the order of a city is changed, there does not remain the same city. But when dominion and leadership are changed, the order is changed, and thus there is not the same city. Therefore, the expelled do not belong henceforth to the city which was there before. Therefore, the citizens are not held unto restitution.

On the contrary: He who is despoiled by a robber can demand back and receive those things taken from him; therefore, the same applies to those expelled.

I answer that either they were expelled justly, namely, on account of their fault, and thus they cannot demand back what was lost; or they were expelled unjustly, that is, without fault and without the due order of justice, and thus they can demand back. Yet if they have a superior, they should ask through the superior to have these things restored to them; yet if they do not have a superior, they themselves can, if they are able, regain them.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that someone is not punished thus for the sin of another, but for his own, because the leaders do all things by the authority and the favor of the people, and thus the people in favoring the leaders were at fault. Besides, that is understood concerning spiritual punishment, by which no one is punished without his own proper fault. It is not concerning temporal or bodily punishment, by which one is frequently punished for another.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that inasmuch as they act justly, they are for the Church; inasmuch as unjustly, they are against the Church.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that, if they are the same persons, it is clear that they are held; if others, they are altogether not held.

Article 2

Whether he who acquires by prescription in bad faith is held to restitution

Second, there is a question whether he who acquires by prescription in bad faith is held unto restitution. And it seems that he is not.

Obj. 1: Because the law says that even he who prescribes in bad faith acquires dominion.

On the contrary: A decretal says that he is held, and he does not acquire dominion. (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 2, tit. 26, cc. 5, 20, 2:383, 393.)

I answer that about this there is contrariety of civil and canon law, (Cf. Hostiensis, Summa aurea (Lugduni: 1556), bk. 2, “De prescriptionibus rerum immobilium,” f. 168ra.) because according to civil law such prescription holds; according to canon law such a prescription cannot. And the reason for this contrariety is that the end which the civil legislator intends is one thing, namely, to preserve and make peace amongst citizens, which would be impeded if the prescription were not to run: for whoever would wish, could come and say: “that was mine,” at whatever time. Yet the end of canon law tends unto the quiet of the Church and the salvation of souls; yet no one in sin can be saved nor repent concerning another’s loss unless he makes recompense.

And for this reason, it must be said that, if someone acquires by prescription and possesses in good faith, he is not held unto restitution, even if he knows that it was another’s after the prescription, (Cf. Raymond of Peñafort, Summa de penitentia, bk. 2, tit. 5, para. 33, 507–10; Hostiensis, Summa aurea, bk. 2, “De prescriptionibus rerum immobilium,” f. 168rb–va.) because the law can punish someone for sin and negligence in its matter and give and concede that to another. But he who acquires by prescription in bad faith is held to amend and make satisfaction by restoring the loss which he inflicted upon another.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that it is true that all things belong to the princes for governing, not for retaining for themselves or for giving to others. And, if any laws are such, they are tyrannical and do not absolve from conscience, but from the judicial forum and violence.

Article 3

Whether he who consumes another’s property is held to restitution

Third there is a question whether he who consumes another’s property is held unto restitution. And it seems that he is not.

Obj. 1: Because he whose property it had been has an action against the consumer, (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 4, tract. 11, ch. 6, q. 2, a. 4, s.c., 4:300.) understand: if the law has a case in prescription.

On the contrary: That man possessed another’s property in bad faith, which he consumed.

I answer that he is held. The reason for this is that any man is held to do justice to another. Yet justice consists in a certain equality, hence unless equality is reintegrated, someone cannot be just. Yet it was inequality that he consumed property not his own; and for this reason, it is necessary for him to restore it.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, although he does not have an action against him who consumed according to civil law, nevertheless he has one according to divine law, (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 4, tract. 11, ch. 6, q. 2, a. 4, s.c., 4:301.) the end of which is the salvation of souls, and for this reason, it is repugnant to it.

On offices

Question 16

On the office of expositors of Sacred Scripture

Then there are four questions concerning offices:

first, concerning the office of expositors of Sacred Scripture; (Q. 16.)

second, concerning the office of preachers; (Q. 17.)

third, concerning the office of confessors; (Q. 18.)

fourth, concerning the office of vicars. (Q. 19.)

Article 1

Whether all things which the holy teachers have said are from the Holy Spirit

About the first, there was a question whether all things which the holy teachers have said are from the Holy Spirit. And it seems that they are not.

Obj. 1: Because in their sayings there are some false things: for they are sometimes discordant in their expositions. Yet what is dissimilar or dissonant cannot be true, because both parts of a contradiction cannot be true.

On the contrary: The same thing makes something for an end and leads through to that end. But the end of Scripture, which is from the Holy Spirit, is the education of men. Yet this education of men from the Scriptures can only be through the expositions of the saints. Therefore, the expositions of the saints are from the Holy Spirit.

I answer that by the same Spirit the Scriptures are exposited and interpreted. Hence it is said in 1 Corinthians 2:14–15: animal man does not perceive those things which are of God . . . , yet spiritual; and especially as regards those things which are of faith, because faith is a gift of God. And for this reason, the interpretation of speeches is numbered among the other gifts of the Holy Spirit in 1 Corinthians 12:10.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that graces freely given are not habits, but are certain motions from the Holy Spirit. Otherwise, if they were habits, a prophet would have a revelation whenever he wished through the gift of prophecy, which is false. And for this reason, concerning some occult revelations, sometimes the mind is touched by the Holy Spirit and sometimes not, but somehow they are hidden from them. Hence Elisha said, in 2 Kings 4:27: and the Lord concealed from me. Sometimes also they say certain things from their own selves, just as is clear concerning Nathan, who counseled David that he would build a temple, yet afterwards, was reproved by the Lord and as though retracting, he prohibited this for David on the part of God. Nevertheless, this must be held: that whatever is contained in Sacred Scripture is true; he who would think otherwise against this would be a heretic. Yet the expositors on other things, which are not of faith, have said many things out of their own speech, and for this reason, in these they could have erred. Nevertheless, the sayings of the expositors do not induce necessity so that it is necessary to believe them, but only canonical Scripture, which is in the Old and the New Testament.

Question 17

On the office of preachers

Then there were questions concerning preachers. And about this two things were asked.

Article 1

Whether someone can preach by his own authority, such that it would be licit to preach without the license of the prelate

First, whether someone can preach by his own authority, such that it would be licit to preach without the license of the prelate. And it seems that he can.

Obj. 1: Because to preach is to do the good of another; but we ought to work good unto all (Gal 6:10).

Obj. 2: It is said in Sirach 17:12: God mandated to each one concerning his neighbor.

On the contrary: Romans 10:15: how shall they preach, unless they are sent?

I answer that no one, however great his knowledge or however great his holiness, can preach unless sent by God or by a prelate, because an agent is raised to act only over the due matter supplied. (Cf. SCG II.16.) Yet preaching is exhortation and doctrine, and if it be public, this is to the whole Church. Yet the whole Church and the public care of the Church is committed to prelates. And for this reason, no one ought to exercise some function which requires public authority unless by the authority of a prelate.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that for any man it is licit to do good proportionate to himself, yet not any good whatsoever.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that God commanded a neighbor to be admonished by a private and familiar admonition. (Cf. ST II-II.177.2.)

Article 2

Whether someone prohibited by a secular prince should abandon preaching

Second, whether someone prohibited by a secular prince should abandon preaching. And it seems that he should not.

Obj. 1: Matthew 10:28: do not fear those who kill the body, which is said to preachers. Therefore, they should not abandon preaching from fear of princes.

Obj. 2: Acts 5:29: it is necessary to obey God rather than men. But God commands prelates especially that they should preach: preach the word (2 Tim 4:2).

Obj. 3: No one should obey another in that in which the one commanding sins. But a prince sins by prohibiting this.

On the contrary (1): Because you have rejected the kingdom of God (Acts 13:46).

Furthermore (2): If you should be persecuted in one city, flee into another (Matt 10:23).

I answer that here there is needed a twofold distinction.

Because, when someone is prohibited to preach, either he is prohibited only by a tyrant, or simultaneously by a tyrant and the people. If in the first way, since there are some of the multitude who wish to hear, preaching must not be abandoned. However, it must be moderated as to time and place such that a preacher is not impeded for fear of the tyrant. And at any time even then it would be licit to preach secretly through homes, just as is read to have been done by the Apostles. (Acts 5:42; 20:20.) If in the second way, then the preacher ought to cede and flee unto other places, according to the mandate of the Lord. And this also Gregory says in the Dialogue: (Gregory the Great, Dialogues 2.3 (PL 66:138–39; SC 260:146, 148).) that, when all are evil and hardened, he ought to say to them that saying of the Apostle: because you have rejected from yourselves the kingdom of God (Acts 13:46).

Another distinction must be had here, because a preacher either has the care of souls or not, that is, either he preaches out of necessity of office or by his own will. If in the first way, he should not abandon the flock even on account of danger of death, provided that he can do something good by remaining with the flock. If thus in the second way, even if he could bear fruit there among such men, he is not held to pursue this, nor to lay down his soul, unless in a certain case, for example if someone would wish to corrupt the faith. And then where the faith would be endangered, he is held to lay down his soul for his brothers, because this is in a precept in such a case. Yet if such a case is not imminent, thus it is in a counsel, because all counsels in a certain case are in a precept.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that God commands preaching, nevertheless ordinately and in that way in which it is useful for the salvation of souls.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that what is according to God should not be abandoned from fear of death. Rather, it is not wise for someone to put himself in danger without cause and necessity.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that it is false. For, according to Augustine, sometimes the general sins by commanding that which a devoted soldier does not sin by obeying, especially if it is not clear to the soldier that it is a sin. (Augustine, Against Faustus the Manichee 22.75 (CSEL 25:673; PL 42:448).)

Article 3

Whether it is licit for preachers to receive alms from usurers

Third, whether it is licit for preachers to receive alms from usurers. And it seems that it is.

Obj. 1: 1 Corinthians 9:11: (Cf. above: Quodlibet VII, q. 7, a. 2, resp.) if we sow spiritual things in you.

Obj. 2: Natural law holds that man lives from his own labor: for worthy is the worker (Matt 10:10); (Luke 10:7; cf. 1 Timothy 5:18.) for this is conceded to man by the Creator: in the sweat of your face (Gen 3:19).

On the contrary: Usurers have nothing except what is another’s.

I answer that, speaking in general, alms cannot be made from robbery, usury, and things of this sort. Isaiah 61:8 says: I hate robbery as a holocaust. Nevertheless, it is licit in a special case for preachers who preach to receive from usurers and admonish them to make restitution; and this is one reason. Another is when they do not have other means whence they may live, and in extreme necessity all things are common, (Cf. above: Quodlibet V, q. 9, a. 1, obj. 1.) and it is licit to receive from all for sustenance and necessity.

Question 18

On the office of confessors

Article 1

Whether someone can hear confessions from an indulgence of the lord pope without the permission of his own prelate

Then there was a question concerning the office of confessors, whether someone can hear confession from an indulgence of the lord pope without the permission of his own prelate. And it seems that he cannot.

Obj. 1: Because everyone is held to confess to his proper priest; therefore, he cannot hear the confession. (Canon 21 of the 4th Lateran Council in 1215; cf. Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 5, tit. 38, c. 12, “Omnis utriusque sexus,” 2:887.)

Obj. 2: The pope prejudices no one on account of any indulgence. (Cf. Glossa ordinaria in Decretales Gregorii IX, bk. 5, tit. 38, c. 12, “Alieno sacerdoti” (ed. Venice, 1591), 1323a; Aquinas, In IV Sent. 17.3.3, qa. 5, obj. 1.)

On the contrary: The pope is over all. Therefore, to whom he wills, and what and how much as he wills, he can commit and indulge.

I answer that certain men say that every priest can absolve whomever from whatever sin, and, although he does not do well by absolving, nevertheless the man is absolved. (Cf. Raymond of Peñafort, Summa de penitentia, bk. 3, tit. 34, para. 15, 812; Hostiensis, Summa aurea, bk. 5, “De penitentiis et remissionibus,” 405rb.) And the reasoning of these men was that there is given to the priest in his ordination simultaneously the power of consecrating the body of Christ and the power of the keys, and for this reason, just as he can consecrate any host, so he can absolve whomever.

But this is erroneous because no one can absolve by his own proper authority except him who is subject to himself in some way, because acts are done in their proper matter, (Aquinas, In II Sent. 30.1.1, s.c. 2; cf. Aristotle, Physics 2.2, 194b8–9; On the Soul 2.2, 414a25–27.) and sacramental absolution has judgment annexed. And this, namely, judgment, is only in subjects and inferiors. Therefore, he who does not have a subject cannot absolve. And thus, jurisdiction gives the matter determined to the priest. (Cf. Albert the Great, In IV Sent., d. 18, a. 2, 29:767a.) Yet it is otherwise concerning a host, which is determinate matter. Therefore, he to whom no care is committed has the key bound, as the jurists says, (Cf. Raymond of Peñafort, Summa de penitentia, bk. 3, tit. 34, para. 15, 812; Hostiensis, Summa aurea, bk. 5, “De penitentiis et remissionibus,” 405rb.) namely, because he does not have matter at all.

Other men say that no one can, even by the authority of a superior prelate, absolve the subject of an inferior prelate against that one’s will: for example, he cannot absolve someone by the authority of the bishop against the will of the parish priest.

This also is erroneous because for absolving there is required sacerdotal power and jurisdiction. Yet the bishop has immediate jurisdiction over all. Hence a bishop can hear the confessions of all, even against the will of a parish priest, and similarly also he to whom the bishop commits this, and much more if the pope commits it. Nevertheless, an archbishop, because he does not have immediate jurisdiction over all of his arch-episcopacy except out of appeal, cannot give to someone the license or authority of hearing confessions against the will of the bishop and of the diocesan suffragan.

Reply Obj. 1: It is clear through those things which have been said, because the bishop and the pope are more powerful than a priest.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that this is not unto prejudice, but unto help, because to hear confessions was not established unto the favor of priests; otherwise, the faithful really would be servants, if on account of the honor of priests it were necessary to confess sins. Rather, this was introduced for the salvation of souls.

Question 19

On the office of vicars

Article 1

Whether a vicar of some place can commit his power to another

Then there was a question concerning the office of vicars, whether a vicar of some place can commit his power to another. And it seems that he can.

Obj. 1: Because an effect which has the power of the cause can do whatever the cause can do.

On the contrary (2): This seems contrary to that saying of Proverbs 27:23: diligently recognize the face of your cattle.

I answer that he who is constituted as vicar cannot commit his whole power, but he can commit a part, because the intention of the one committing is so that it may be accomplished according to how that one to whom he commits it is able, and perhaps such a man cannot do the whole which is committed to him, and for this reason, he can commit something to another.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that an effect does not always have the whole power of the cause, unless he were < . . . > a bishop.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that he does this very thing in order that he might know the face of the cattle.

On man, as regards fault

On sins

On original sin

Question 20

On original sin

Then there were questions concerning what pertains to fault:

and first, concerning sins; (Qq. 20–22.)

second, concerning punishments. (Q. 23.)

Concerning the first, there were two questions:

first, concerning what pertains to the original fault; (Q. 20.)

second, to actual fault. (Qq. 21–22.)

Article 1

Whether it is transferred through the transfer of seed

Concerning original sin there was a question whether it is transferred through the transfer of seed.

I answer that it is, because original sin is the sin of nature and it only touches a person inasmuch as it is in such a nature. Yet the whole human nature is just as one man; (Porphyry, Isagogue 6.21; cf. SCG IV.52.) therefore, wherever that nature is discovered, there is the sin of nature, which is original sin.

(Note that striking has the character of fault not inasmuch as it is of this hand, but inasmuch as it is done by a principle of the will.) (This is a fragment of the example that Aquinas often used on this question. Cf. SCG IV.52; ST I-II.81.1.)

On actual sin

Question 21

On the sin of thought

Then there was a question concerning actual sin. And first, there were two questions concerning the sin of thought.

Article 1

Whether consent to pleasure is mortal sin

First, whether consent to pleasure is mortal sin.

I answer that this is not asked about consent to the pleasure of an act, because this plainly is mortal, but concerning consent to an act of thought only, such as when someone thinks about the pleasure of fornication and is delighted and this thought pleases him. There is, therefore, a twofold thought of pleasure: either on account of that very thought, or on account of the thing thought of. The first is when someone thinks about a triangle or about the wars of the king, not on account of the king, but on account of that thought. The second is when I am delighted thinking about a friend on his own account, who is made present for me through thought and in thought. Thus, therefore, thought can be thought as delighting precisely as it is thought, and thus it is not sin, such as if I ought to tell about fornication and there occur beautiful ways and I am delighted. Yet if thought is delighting on account of the thing thought, it is impossible for this to be except for love of fornication, and for this reason, to consent to it is to consent to the love and to the use of an illicit thing, and for this reason, it is mortal sin.

Article 2

On suspicion

Second, concerning suspicion, whether it is mortal sin. It seems that it is.

Obj. 1: For such men the Lord threatens, in Isaiah 5:20: woe to you who call evil good, and good evil.

On the contrary: Upon that verse: do not judge before the time (1 Cor 4:5), the Gloss says that it is venial sin. (Glossa ordinaria, at 1 Corinthians 4:5, 6.226 (PL 191:1566; 114:525); cf. Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 90, para. 2 (CCSL 36:551–52; PL 35:1859).)

I answer that in those things which are mortal sin out of their genus, imperfect motions are not mortal sin, but venial. For adultery is mortal, namely, when there is complete will, yet not when it is incomplete; for not every motion of concupiscence is mortal sin. Yet judgment is twofold, namely, concerning things and concerning persons. Judgment concerning things is always mortal sin: for example, to say that to give alms is evil. Yet judgment concerning persons, although sometimes it may be false, nevertheless is not always sin, unless when it is altogether rash. Hence Augustine on the sermon of the Lord on the mount: if we err in judgment of persons, let us not err in judgment of things. (Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 90, para. 2 (CCSL 36:551–52; PL 35:1859).) But when out of a light matter judgment proceeds firm in heart, sometimes it is mortal, because it is with contempt of neighbor.

Yet suspicion is something imperfect in the genus of judgment, (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, bk. 6, lect. 3, n. 1143; Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, bk. 1, lect. 1, n. 5.) and for this reason, it is an imperfect motion, and for this reason, it is not mortal out of its genus, although if it is done out of hatred it will be mortal sometimes.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that he who calls good evil, and so on, does not suspect, but judges, and for this reason, he sins mortally.

Question 22

On the sin of deed

Then there were three questions concerning the sin of deed.

Article 1

Whether it is licit to use lots, especially in the opening of books

First, whether it is licit to use lots, especially in the openings of books.

I answer that a lot properly is a judgment which is sought out of something done by a man for inquiring into the occult. Yet I say, “done by a man” (because to seek from things done by others is not a lot, but either augury or something else), as when someone acts as the geomantics (Cf. Albert the Great, Book of Minerals 2.3.3; SCG III.154.) and with small dice and concerning straws and in the opening of books.

Yet these things are done for three ends: either for inquiring into the will, or for consulting about the doubtful, or for divining. And thus, there are three kinds of lots: namely, lots for the sake of distribution, lots for consultation, and lots of divination.

Some men do these things as though committing to fortune, such as when it does not seem that someone ought to go, (Cf. Augustine, Letter 228, para. 12 (CSEL 57:494–95; PL 33:1018).) we place a lot as to who ought to go; and this sometimes is vain. Some men do so with the intention of seeking out the judgment of some matter, such as certain men who inquire into the judgment of the stars, < . . . >, such as geomantics, who say that according to the motion of heaven the hand is moved; and thus, it is sin. Some men intend to know the judgment of the devil, (Cf. Albert the Great, Book of Minerals 2.3.3; SCG III.154.) such as Nebuchadnezzar, (Aquinas says the contrary: SCG III.154; cf. In IV Sent. 17.1.1, qa. 1, obj. 2; 46.2.3, qa. 2, ad 5; Commentary on Isaiah, ch. 14.) and this is sacrilege. Some men intend to know divine judgment; and thus, it is not always sin.

And thus, a lot of divination has four grades; and in the first mode sometimes there is light sin or no sin; in the second mode there is sin, and also in the third. But in the fourth there is not always sin, except when someone does this not by necessity, because thus it is to tempt God (2 Chron 20:12: since we are ignorant what to do); or it is when done without due devotion, as Bede says; (Bede, Exposition of the Acts of the Apostles 1.26 (CCSL 121:14–15; PL 92:945); cf. Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 26, q. 2, c. 4, 1:1021.) or when someone converts sacred things into temporal things, such as when he opens books for temporal things; or when it concerns that which is above us, such as when some men do not agree in ecclesiastical elections, and for this reason, they use lots, because this is to do injury to the Holy Spirit, who is believed firmly to be in the Church or in colleges. Nevertheless, in the election of secular powers nothing prohibits using lots.

Article 2

On the retention of superfluities

Second, concerning the retention of superfluities, whether he sins who does not give for God what he has as superfluous.

Obj. 1: For Augustine says that he who retains. (Cf. above: Quodlibet VI, q. 7, a. 1, ad 1–4; Quodlibet VIII, q. 6, a. 2; Augustine, The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount 1.19–20 (CCSL 35:67–76; PL 34:1257–63); Enarrationes in Psalmos, at Psalm 9:17, para. 33 (CCSL 38:73; PL 36:129).)

< . . . >

Article 3

On perplexity

Third, concerning perplexity, whether someone can be perplexed.

< . . . >

On punishments

Question 23

On punishments

Then there were questions concerning punishments.

Article 1

On temporal punishment

And first, concerning temporal punishment, whether any religious ought to be expelled for a sin concerning religion, if he is prepared to be corrected and to undergo punishment.

I answer that the Apostle says: remove evil from yourselves (1 Cor 5:13); a little leaven corrupts (1 Cor 5:6). (Cf. Galatians 5:9.)

Someone may be removed through bodily punishment, and thus even someone who wishes to repent however much is clearly removed, just as a murderer is hanged however much he may repent. Or, someone may be removed through spiritual punishment, and this the Church only does if someone is obstinate. And the reason for this is that through bodily punishment there is removed something temporal, which can be recompensed through something else more good. But a spiritual good which is lost cannot be recompensed, and for this reason, religion ought not to inflict such a punishment, as long as he wills to be corrected; and just as there is excommunication in the Church, so there is expulsion from religion. And for this reason, it must be said that no one is to be expelled except for obstinacy, but is to be sequestered in another way, in prison or another way.

Article 2

On eternal punishment

Second, concerning eternal punishment, whether a soul separated from the body naturally suffers from bodily fire.

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