On Things above Man

On God

Question 1

Regarding the existence of God

There were questions concerning things which are above man (Qq. 1–5.) and concerning human things. (Qq. 6–23.)

About the first, there were questions concerning God, (Qq. 1–3.) angels, (Q. 4.) and heaven. (Q. 5.)

About the first, there was a question concerning God in regard to his existence, (Q. 1.) his power, (Q. 2.) and his predestination. (Q. 3.)

Article 1

Whether in God there is only one existence, namely, essential, or besides that there is also in God personal existence

About the first there was a question whether in God there is only one existence, namely, essential, or besides that there is also in God personal existence. And it seems that there is.

Obj. 1: For the Father is one existence, the Son another existence, and the Holy Spirit another existence. But essential existence is not one thing and another. Therefore, there is more than one existence in God.

Obj. 2: It is proper to form for it to give existence. (Cf. Boethius, On the Trinity 2 (PL 64:1250).) But in divine matters there are three personal properties, which occupy the place of form. Therefore, there is more than one existence in God.

On the contrary, Augustine says there is only one existence in divine matters. (Cf. Augustine, On the Trinity 6.4.6 (CCSL 50:234; PL 42:927).)

I answer that the truth of the faith holds that in divine matters the only distinction is that which is according to opposed relations. Yet relation, just as also any form, has existence out of comparison unto that in which it is. Hence the existence of sonship is through comparison to the subject in which it is. Yet relation in divine matters is not distinguished by that in which it exists or in which it is, because it is this very thing which is related. But it is distinguished only on the part of that to which it is opposed, and on the part of this there is not considered an existence of relation, but distinction and its opposites. And for this reason, there is in God only one existence, namely, essential.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that existence is said in two ways: for sometimes existence is the same as the act of a being. Yet sometimes it signifies the composition of an enunciation, and thus it signifies the act of an intellect. It is understood in this way, not the first way, when it is said that there is one existence of the Father and another of the Son.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that paternity, like any form, makes existence, namely, makes the Father, who is the divine existence, and makes only one existence inasmuch as paternity makes existence.

Question 2

Regarding the power of God

Then there were questions concerning the power of God:

and first, whether God can make contradictories exist simultaneously;

second, whether he can make things infinite in act.

Article 1

Whether God can make contradictories exist simultaneously

I answer that to the first it must be said no. And this does not imply an imperfection of power in God, but because this does not have the nature of the possible. For every active power produces an effect similar to itself; (Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 30, n. 658.) yet everything which acts, acts inasmuch as it is a being in act. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Sense and What is Sensed, tr. 1, lect. 16, nn. 138–39.) Therefore, the effect of an agent is a being in act. Therefore, whatever is repugnant to that which exists in act is repugnant to active power: which would be, if contradictories were to exist simultaneously.

Article 2

Whether he can make things infinite in act

To the second it must be said that at first glance it could be suspected that it would be impossible for something to be infinite in act, because it would follow that such a thing is equal to God. But this does not follow, because something infinite in all ways is not equated with something infinite in one way. Supposing that there was fire infinite in magnitude, it would not be equal to God, because, although the fire is infinite in quantity, nevertheless it is something finite in species, while God is infinite in all ways.

When, therefore, it is asked whether it is possible for God to make something infinite in act, it must be said that it is not. For something is repugnant to the power of an intelligent agent in two ways. One way is because it is repugnant to its power. Another way is because it is repugnant to the way it acts. In the first way it is not repugnant to the power of God absolutely, because it does not involve a contradiction. But, if the way by which God acts is considered, it is not possible: for God acts through his intellect and through the Word, which is formative of all things. Hence it is necessary for all things which he does to be formed. Yet the infinite is understood as matter without form, for the infinite maintains itself on the part of matter. (Cf. above: Quodlibet IX, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; Aristotle, Physics 3.6, 206b14–15; 207a21–22; 3.7, 207b35–208a1.) If, therefore, God were to do this, it would follow that the work of God would be something unformed, and this is repugnant to that through which he acts and to his way of acting, because he does all things through his Word, by which all things are formed.

Question 3

Regarding predestination

Article 1

Whether predestination is certain

Then there was a question concerning whether predestination is certain. And it seems that it is not.

Obj. 1: Because it is possible for one predestined to be damned, such as Peter if he had died at once when he sinned by denying Christ.

Obj. 2: Whereas if you say that the aforesaid saying is true of what is said, whereas not of reality, (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 40, ch. 1, para. 3, p. 285 (PL 192:631); William of Auvergne, On the World, bk. 1, part 3, ch. 15; William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 1, tract. 9, cc. 2–3, 1:180, 195.) then to the contrary: that holds places amongst separable forms; but predestination is an inseparable form. (Cf. Alexander of Hales, Summa fratris Alexandri, arg. 3, 1:271a; Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 40, a. 14, obj. 1, 26:323a.)

I answer that predestination is a certain part of divine providence. Yet providence means the direction of some things unto the end, (Cf. above: Quodlibet XI, q. 3, a. 1, resp.; Alexander of Hales, Gloss on I Sent., d. 40, para. 5, 1:402; Aquinas, In I Sent. 40.2.1, obj. 7.) and this presupposes knowledge and will. Thus, therefore, predestination has certitude on the part of the knowledge of God, which cannot be deceived, and on the part of the will of God, which something cannot resist, and on the part of providence, which by a most certain mode leads unto the end, since God is most wise.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that predestination has certitude, yet, nevertheless, it is not necessary for one predestined to be saved, rather it remains contingent. For it has been said that predestination has certitude from knowledge, will, and providence, but none of those impedes contingency: not knowledge, because the knowledge of God is of future things just as in the present, and according to this they are determinate; not will, because the will of God is the principle of the whole of being. Therefore, it does not fall under the nature of contingency or necessity, but these flow out and are ordered from the will of God, and thus the will of God itself makes certain things to be contingent by preparing contingent causes for those things which he wills to be contingent (and, similarly, necessary causes for necessary things and effects). And thus, the will of God is always fulfilled. Nevertheless, some things do not happen by necessity, but by that mode by which he wills them to be, and he wills that they should be contingently. Nor does providence impede contingency, because it does not remove contingency. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, bk. 1, lect. 14, nn. 195–99; above: Quodlibet XI, q. 3, a. 1, resp.)

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the distinction is good. (Cf. Aquinas, In I Sent. 38.1.5, ad 6.) But unto the objection concerning forms, it must be said that it is otherwise concerning real forms and concerning predicates, which imply something pertaining to the act of reason. Because in the first, namely, real forms, if in them such a distinction ought to have a place, it is necessary for separation to be there between the thing and the consideration; in the second ones this is not required, but it is necessary for that thing to fall under this consideration. (Cf. Aquinas, In I Sent. 38.1.5; ST I.14.14, ad 3.) And thus, I say that that predestined one can be considered either as in himself or as related to the divine knowledge, (Cf. Albert the Great, In I Sent., d. 40, a. 14, ad 1, 26:323b; Aquinas, In III Sent. 7.3.1, ad 1.) and thus in one way there is attributed to him that he can be damned, and in the other way, not.

Article 2

On fate

Then there was a question concerning fate, whether all things are subject to fate.

I answer that it is necessary to know first what fate is, and thus afterwards the proposition will be obvious.

We see that many things happen contingently, (Cf. SCG III.93.) and for this reason, it was at one time doubtful whether those things which happen variably and inordinately are reduced to some ordering cause.

And those who say they are not, say that fate is nothing, as does Cicero. (Cf. ST I.116.1; Augustine, City of God 5.9 (CCSL 47:136–40; PL 41:148–52); Cicero, Concerning Divination, bk. 2.)

Certain men say that they are reduced to some superior cause and notion, and those named it fate from for, faris, (“I speak,” “you speak”), (Augustine, City of God 5.9, para. 3 (CCSL 47:138; PL 41:150).) as though all these things should be pre-spoken by a certain superior cause.

But of these there is a threefold opinion.

For certain men reduced these things unto a certain series of causes which they call fate, such as the Stoics, who say there is nothing which does not have a cause, and with a cause posited it is necessary to posit an effect. (Augustine, City of God 5.8 (CCSL 47:136; PL 41:148); cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, bk. 1, lect. 14.) If, therefore, such or such an effect comes to be or is, it has a cause, and this cause has another cause, and so on from thence. For instance, someone was killed at night because he left his house. Why did he leave his house? Because he was thirsty. Why this? Because he ate salty things. And thus, because he ate salty things, out of necessity he died.

Aristotle responds by denying the first two things: first, that not everything done has a cause, but only that which is done essentially. For that I should be killed when I go out is incidental. Second, he says that not always, with a cause posited, is an effect posited, because it can be impeded, and for this reason, a series of causes does not follow nor does it stand.

Other men reduce these things unto another cause, namely, the incorporeal heavens, from whose necessity they say that all things happen. Hence they say that fate is nothing else than the power of the position of the stars. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, bk. 1, lect. 14, n. 189.) Yet this opinion is doubly false: first as regards human things, which come forth by the intellect which, since it is an incorporeal power, does not lie under the action of some body. And to posit that the soul lies under the power of the heavenly bodies is nothing else than to posit that intellect does not differ from sense, as the Philosopher says in the second book of the On the Soul, at the end. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.3, 427a21–26.) Nevertheless, incidentally and occasionally the soul is subject to heaven, inasmuch as the intellect is affected through the passion of the body, nevertheless not out of necessity is it moved by it. The second is because many things in natural things happen which do not happen out of the necessity of heaven, but incidentally, and do not have a cause.

Other men reduce all these things unto a super-celestial cause, (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, bk. 1, lect. 14, n. 189.) namely, unto the providence of God, by which all things are predetermined and ordered. And according to those men, fate will be a certain effect of providence because providence is nothing else than the account of the order of things as it is in the divine mind, whereas fate is the explication of that order as it is in things. Hence Boethius: fate is an immobile disposition inhering in mobile things. (Cf. Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy 4.6 (CCSL 94:80; PL 63:815).)

Therefore, by understanding fate thus, it can be said that all things are subject to fate. Hence it is said on Hosea 2:16: he shall not call me Baalim any longer, but my husband, that both are the same, but God refuses this because Baalim was the name of a certain god of the Gentiles. (Glossa ordinaria, at Hosea 2:16, 4.1715; see also: PL 25:838–39.) And for this reason, the names of the Gentiles must be avoided, with whom it is not fitting to have common names. (Aquinas, Commentary on Boethius’s De Trinitate, q. 2, a. 3, obj. 6; Quodlibet X, q. 7, a. 1, resp.; cf. Glossa ordinaria, at 2 John 1:10, 6.1424 (PL 114:695); Bede, Commentary on the Seven Catholic Epistles (CCSL 121:330–31; PL 93:122).) And for this reason, Augustine says: if anyone in this way should understand fate, let him keep his opinion, let him correct his tongue, (Augustine, City of God 5.1 (CCSL 47:128; PL 41:141).) so that he might not say fate, but the providence of God.

On angels

Question 4

On angels

Then there were questions concerning angels. And about this two things were asked.

Article 1

Whether the existence of an angel is an accident of it

First, whether the existence of an angel is an accident of it. And it seems that it is not.

Obj. 1: Because accident is understood in the existence of something preexisting. Yet an angel does not preexist existence itself.

On the contrary: Hilary says thus. (Hilary of Poitiers, On the Trinity 7.11 (CCSL 62:271; PL 10:208).)

I answer that the opinion of Avicenna was that one and being are always accidental predicates. (Avicenna, Metaphysics of The Healing 3.2–6, pp. 107–49; cf. Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 4, comm. 3; above: Quodlibet X, q. 1, a. 1, resp.) Yet this is not true, because one, according to how it is interchangeable with being, (Cf. above: Quodlibet VI, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.2, 1003b22–25; 10.2, 1054a13–19; Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures: A Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorius, ch. 4 (PL 64:1346).) signifies the substance of a thing, and similarly being itself. But one, according to how it is the principle of number, signifies an accident.

Therefore, it must be known that each thing which is in potency and in act is made actual through this: that it participates in a superior act. Yet something is made maximally actual by participating in the first likeness and pure act. Yet the first act is to subsist in itself. Hence each thing receives completion by participating in existence. Hence existence is the completion of every form because it is completed through having existence, and it has existence when it is actual. And thus, no form exists unless through existence.

And thus, I say that the substantial existence of a thing is not an accident, but the actuality of every existing form, whether without matter or with matter. And because it is the completion of all things, hence it is that the proper effect of God is existence, and no cause gives existence unless inasmuch as it participates in the divine activity. And thus, properly speaking, it is not an accident.

Reply Sed Contra: And unto that which Hilary says, I say that accident is said broadly as everything which is not a part of the essence, and thus is existence in created things because in God alone is existence his essence.

Article 2

Whether the devil knows the thoughts of men

Second it was asked whether the devil knows the thoughts of men.

I answer that to know the thoughts of the heart can happen in two ways: in and of themselves, and by some effect.

In the first way, this belongs to God alone: Jeremiah 17:9: depraved is the heart of man and inscrutable. Hence neither do angels know them thus. The reason for this is threefold.

One is on account of the debility of being which thoughts have, since the grade in which things are in the mind is scarcely above the grade in which something exists in potency. (Aquinas, In I Sent. 36.2.4, ad 2; cf. Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 2, a. 5; Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.4, 1027b33–1028a2; Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics 6, text. 8.)

Another reason is because that which is in the power of some cause cannot be known unless by a cause which is born to move it. Yet God alone moves the will. Since, therefore, all thoughts depend upon the will just as upon their cause, God alone knows them.

Another reason is because angels know those things which they know naturally through species naturally introduced, and these are the species of natural things, yet not of thoughts, because these are not reduced unto a natural cause or do not pertain to the knowledge of natural things.

Nevertheless, they know thoughts through the effects of thoughts, just as man also does. Nevertheless, they know effects more subtly which are caused out of thoughts: for according to thoughts man is affected by some passion and through these the heart is moved, and angels know those motions more subtly than we. And thus, they know something concerning the thoughts of the heart. And Augustine says this in the book On the Divinations of Demons, (Augustine, On the Divinations of Demons 5.9 (CSEL 41:608; PL 40:586).) granted elsewhere he says that to determine (Augustine, Retractions 2.30 (CCSL 57:114; PL 32:643).) such knowledge in them would be presumptuous.

On heaven

Question 5

On heaven

Then there were questions concerning heaven. And about this two things were asked.

Article 1

Whether heaven or the world is eternal

First, whether heaven or the world is eternal.

I answer that it is not, but that the world began is of the number of those things which fall under faith, not under demonstration. For those things which depend upon the simple will of God can be and not be. And unto this: that they exist, there is no necessity on the part of God. Yet the divine goodness, which is the end of things, can be thus if the world should not be just as if it should be.

Article 2

Whether heaven is animate

Second it was asked whether heaven is animate.

I answer that the doctors of the Church have thought diversely about this: for Jerome in his commentary on Ecclesiastes says that the sun is animate; (Jerome, Commentary on Ecclesiastes 1.6 (CCSL 72:255; PL 23:1016); Glossa ordinaria, at Ecclesiastes 1:6, 3.1753–54 (PL 113:1117).) Damascene denies this. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 20, para. 11 [2.6] (PG 94:886).) And this difference in opinion exists also among the philosophers: for Plato (Cf. Augustine, City of God 13.16 (CCSL 48:397–98; PL 41:387–89); Boethius, Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge 2.5, 3.4, 4.6–7 (CSEL 48:184, 209, 257, 259; PL 64:91–92, 102–4, 122–24).) and Aristotle (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.2, 285a29–31; cf. Averroes, On the Heavens 2, text. 13.) posit that the celestial bodies are animate; Anaxagoras did not, and for this reason, it is read that he was killed. (Cf. Augustine, City of God 18.41, para. 2 (CCSL 48:636; PL 41:601).)

Yet I say, according to Augustine, in the second book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, that it does not matter for the faith whether it is thus or otherwise. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.18 (CSEL 28:62; PL 34:279–80).) Hence he does not determine this in the Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, adding that, (Cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions On the Power of God, q. 6, a. 6.) if we posit that the celestial bodies are animate, not for this reason will there be in judgment three orders of those to be judged, namely, of angels and of men and of the souls of the heavens, because those souls are computed with the angels. (Augustine, Enchiridion 15.58, para. 23 (CCSL 46:80–81; PL 40:259–60).) And it seems that he who made the preface had thought this, when he says: heavens and the powers of the heavens. (Common Preface 2, Salvation through Christ, Ms. Roma Arch. Gen. O.P., 14, L. 1, f. 403v.)

And for this reason, it is clear . . .