On Divine Things

On essential things

Question 1

On the knowledge of God

There were questions concerning divine things (Qq. 1–5.) and human things. (Qq. 6–12.)

About divine things it was asked:

first, concerning essential things; (Qq. 1–3.)

second, concerning personal things. (Qq. 4–5.)

About essential things it was asked:

first, concerning the knowledge of God; (Q. 1.)

second, concerning his power. (Qq. 2–3.)

Article 1

Whether in God there are many ideas

About the knowledge of God there was a question whether in God there are many ideas. And it seems that there are.

Obj. 1: For Augustine says in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions that God created singular things by their own proper intelligible notions, (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 46, para. 2 (PL 40:30; CCSL 44A:72).) and man by one intelligible notion, a horse by another intelligible notion; but the intelligible notions of things in the divine mind are called ideas, (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 46, para. 2 (PL 40:30; CCSL 44A:72–73).) as is clear through Augustine in the same place. Therefore, there are many ideas.

Obj. 2: According to this, there are some distinct things that God knows their distinction. Yet he knows their distinction in his own very self. Therefore, there are in God many and distinct ideas of distinct things.

On the contrary (3): Every name which is said in divine things is either essential, such as God, or personal, such as Father, or notional, such as generating. But this name “idea” is neither personal nor notional because it would not apply to the three persons. Therefore, it is an essential name; but nothing essential is multiplied in divine things. Therefore, we cannot say that in God there are many ideas.

I answer that plurality is twofold. One, indeed, is the plurality of things, and according to this there are not many ideas. For idea refers to the exemplar form, and there is one thing which is the exemplar of all, namely, the divine essence, which all things imitate inasmuch as they exist and are good. Whereas the other plurality is according to the character of understanding, and according to this there are many ideas. For although all things, inasmuch as they are, imitate the divine essence, nevertheless not by one and the same mode do all things imitate it, but in diverse ways and according to diverse grades. Thus, therefore, the divine essence, according to how it can be imitated in this way by this creature, is the proper intelligible notion and idea of this creature, and so too for others. Therefore, there are many ideas according to the divine essence as it is understood according to the various respects which things have towards it, imitating it in various ways.

Yet respects of this sort are understood not only by a created intellect, but also by the uncreated intellect of God himself: for God knows, and knew from eternity, that diverse creatures in diverse ways would imitate his essence. And according to this there were from eternity in the divine mind many ideas such as the proper intelligible notions understood by God. For this signifies the name of an idea, namely, for it to be the form understood by the agent whose likeness the exterior work intends to produce, just as a builder in his mind preconceives the form of a house, which is as though the idea of the house to be made in matter.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that Augustine understands that there is one and another intelligible notions according to the diversity of respects, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that, when it is said: according to this, things are distinct just as God knows their distinction, this speech is twofold. For that which is said, according to as God knows, can refer to divine knowledge on the part of the thing known or on the part of the knower. If on the part of the thing known, thus the speech is true: for there is the sense that in this mode things are distinct just as God knows that they are distinct. Whereas if it refers to knowledge on the part of the knower, this speech is false: for there will be the sense that things known have that mode of distinction in the divine intellect which they have in their very selves. This is false because in their very selves things are divided essentially, yet not in the divine intellect, just as also things in their very selves are materially, yet in the divine intellect immaterially. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names 7, para. 2 (PG 3:867–70).) And in this last sense the objection proceeds.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that that objection proceeds concerning real plurality: for such a plurality in essential names is not found, but only the plurality which is according to the character of intelligence.

Question 2

On the power of God

Then there were questions about things that pertain to the power of God;

and first, whether in God there is power;

second, concerning a certain effect of divine power, namely, whether waters are over the heavens;

third, to what the divine power can extend itself.

Article 1

Whether in God there is power

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that in God there is not power.

Obj. 1: Because, as the Philosopher says in the first book of the On the Heavens, power is the maximum of ability. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.25, 281a17–25; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, bk. 1, lect. 25, n. 249.) But the divine ability does not have a maximum since it is infinite. Therefore, in God there is not power.

On the contrary: Every immediate principle of activity is a power: for every activity proceeds from some power. But in God there is some immediate principle of activity, because God immediately works some things. Therefore, in God there is power.

I answer that power, however it is understood, signifies the fullness of ability, and hence it is that the power of anything is that which makes the one having it good and renders his work good, as is said in the second book of the Ethics: (Aristotle, Ethics 2.6, 1106a15–17.) for power is shown to be complete when both the agent is perfect and the action perfect. Therefore, since the ability of God is maximally complete, in God there is found the most power. Hence it is said in Wisdom 12:17: you show power, who are not believed consummate in power; and in Psalm 147 [146]:5: great is our Lord and great his power.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that sometimes powers are made known not through something predicated of power essentially, but through that to which the power is ordered; for from that thing it has its species. As Augustine says, faith is to believe that which you do not see: (Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 40, para. 9 (CCSL 36:355; PL 35:1690).) for to believe is not faith itself, but the act to which faith is ordered. And the Philosopher defines power in this way when he says that power is the maximum of ability, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.25, 281a17–25.) namely, because a thing’s power is applied in relation to the ultimate thing it can achieve, just as the power of a man who can bear one hundred pounds, as he says in the same place, does not consist in this: (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, bk. 2, lect. 6, n. 308; Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, bk. 1, lect. 37, n. 327.) that he bears ten, but in this: that he bears the most he can, namely, one hundred. Thus, therefore, the power of anything is not applied in one of those things which it can do, but with respect of the whole which it can do. Therefore, divine power cannot be applied to a single work of his, because no work of his is that which equals his power, such that God might not do more, but his power is applied to the whole of which he is able. Yet this is infinite, namely, because God can do infinite things, hence also the power of God is infinite; and this is ultimate to him: to be able to do infinite things, just as to a finite virtue to be able to do some determinate things is ultimate.

Article 2

On a certain effect of divine power

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that waters having the true species of elemental water exist above the heavens.

Obj. 1: For man is called a lesser world on account of the likeness which he has with the greater world. But we see that in the human body, the brain, which has the nature of water, is placed above the heart, which has the property of fire inasmuch as it is a font of natural heat. Therefore, also in the greater world, water is placed above the other elements. (Cf. Albert the Great, In II Sent., d.14 A, a. 1, 27:256a; Aquinas, In II Sent. 14.1.1, obj. 2.) And this reasoning seems to be Augustine’s in the eleventh book of On the City of God, where he says, concerning certain things, (In particular, concerning Porphyry’s book Against the Christians, according to Jean Pepin, Theologie cosmique et theologie chretienne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 418–61.) that by the weights of the elements they are moved and for this reason, they do not think that the fluid and heavy nature of the waters could be constituted in the superior places of the world, who according to their characters, if they had been able to make man, would not have placed mucus in the head, which in Greek is called phlegm and just as in the elements of our body obtains the place of waters. (Augustine, City of God 11.34 (CCSL 48:354; PL 41:348).)

On the contrary: The parts of the world are arranged in the best order according to their nature. But that which has the species of water is naturally heavy and so naturally settles under the light bodies: air and fire. Therefore, something having the true species of water does not exist above the heavens.

I answer that in Sacred Scripture, which cannot lie, it is said expressly that waters are above heaven. For it is said in Genesis 1:7 that he divided the waters which are under the firmament from the waters which are above the firmament; and in Psalm 148:4–5 it is said: may the waters which are above the heavens, praise the name of the Lord. And for this reason, just as Augustine says in the second book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis: in whatever way and whatever sort of waters are there, let us not doubt at all that they are there; surely the authority of Scripture is greater than every capacity of mankind. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.5, para. 9 (CSEL 28:39; PL 34:267).)

But, just as Augustine in the first book of the same work says: too ugly and pernicious and especially to beware of is that any infidel should hear that a Christian is mad speaking concerning these things (namely, natural things) as though according to Christian letters, such that, in whatever way it is said, he can scarcely contain his laughter observing him to err about the whole heaven. And it is not so disturbing that an erring man is derided, but that our authors are believed by those who are outside, to have thought such things and that with their great destruction, concerning whose salvation we busy ourselves, they are blamed and rejected as though unlearned. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 1.19, para. 39 (CSEL 28:28–29; PL 34:261).) And for this reason, just as he adds, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 1.20, para. 40 (CSEL 28:29–30; PL 34:261).) he posited manifold expositions on the words of Genesis in order for thus there to be received one exposition which would not be prejudiced against another exposition, which perhaps is better.

Thus, therefore, that which is said concerning the waters existing above the heavens can be understood in many ways.

One way is that by “firmament” or “heavens” we do not understand the firmament or heaven in which there are stars, but this air in which birds are said to fly, (Basil the Great, Homilies on the Six Days, homily 8, para. 3 (PG 29:170–71).) above which air waters are elevated as vapors and then rains are generated. (Cf. ST I.68.3, resp.) And concerning this exposition Augustine says in the second book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis: I judge this consideration . . . most worthy; for that which is said is not against the faith, and with promptness can be believed with the teaching posited. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.4, para. 7 (CSEL 28:37; PL 34:265); cf. ST I.68.1, resp.)

Yet if by “firmament” or “heavens” there is understood the firmament where stars are placed, thus it must be known that about this firmament there have been diverse opinions.

For certain men have posited that that firmament is composed of the four elements; which seems to have been posited by Empedocles. (Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 1, lect. 12, n. 186; cf. ST I.68.1, resp.; Aristotle, On the Soul 1.5, 410b4–7.) And according to this, nothing prohibits saying that elemental waters are above this starry heaven, as more simple things, and over these also fire from which it is called the empyrean heaven.

Yet the position of other men is that heaven either is of a fiery nature, just as Plato posited, (Augustine, City of God 8.11 (CCSL 47:228; PL 41:236); Plato, Timaeus 31b.) or it is not of the nature of the four elements, but having a higher nature, just as Aristotle posited. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.2–4, 268b11–271a33.) With either of these supposed, it seems unfitting for elementary water naturally to be disposed above that firmament. For now, just as Augustine says in the second book of On Genesis, it befits us to seek in what way God has instituted the natures of things, not what in them or out of them he wills to work unto a miracle of his power. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.1, para. 2 (CSEL 28:33; PL 34:263).) But nevertheless, we can posit some kind of waters above a firmament of this sort.

In one way, we can posit that by waters we should understand the whole of bodily matter, such as is understood in the beginning of Genesis, (Augustine, On Genesis against the Manichees 1.6, para. 12 (PL 34:179).) according to the exposition of Augustine. And for this reason, according to this understanding, that there are waters above the starry heavens is to say nothing else than that something of bodily matter exists above these heavens (and this also is not discordant with the sayings of modern philosophers, who posit above the eighth sphere, in which there are stars, another sphere, in which there is no star); (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary On the Heavens bk. 2, lect. 8, n. 368; bk. 2, lect. 17, n. 451; Peter of Abano, Lucidator dubitabilium astronomie, ed. Graziella Federici Vescovini (Padova: Esedra, 1988), diff. 3, 217, 219.) and Augustine posits this exposition in On Genesis against the Manichees. (Augustine, On Genesis against the Manichees 1.6, para. 12 (PL 34:179).)

In another way, it can be said that, just as the empyrean heaven is called fiery not because it has the species of fire, but on account of its splendor, (Cf. ST I.68.2, resp.; Glossa ordinaria, at Genesis 1:1, 1.4 (PL 113:68).) so also the waters above the heavens are called that not because they have the species of water, but because they have diaphaneity like unto water, so that thus the supreme heaven, which is called empyrean, is a splendid whole, and the second, which is called watery, is a diaphanous whole, and the third heaven, which is called starry, is partly lucid, partly diaphanous.

Thus, therefore, the truth of Sacred Scripture can be preserved in diverse ways according to whatever opinion. Hence the sense of Sacred Scripture must not be narrowed to any one of these.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that man is compared to the greater world in regard to something, namely, inasmuch as he consists of a bodily and spiritual nature, as does the whole universe. Nevertheless, he is not compared in regard to all things to the universe: for the order of parts in man is not according as their nature demands, but as the character of the end demands. For the heart is placed in the middle in order that from it the activities of life might be diffused easily through the whole body; yet the brain is placed in the highest place in order that animal activities, which are in some way perfected there, might not be impeded through diverse transmutations of the body. So too the order of human knowledge is not according to the natural order of knowable things, but as it comes to us. Yet Augustine does not introduce this by asserting, but by opposing these men who interpret the Scriptures perversely.

Question 3

To what the divine power can extend itself

Then we must consider to what the divine power can extend itself. And about this there were two questions:

first, whether God can reduce something to nothing;

second, if something were reduced to nothing, whether God could restore it the same in number.

Article 1

Whether God can reduce something to nothing

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that God can reduce something to nothing.

Obj. 1: For the distance of non-being to being is equal to that of being to non-being. But God can make something out of nothing. (Aquinas, Disputed Questions on the Power of God, q. 5, a. 3, obj. 15, ad 15.) Therefore, God can make nothing out of something.

On the contrary (2): God cannot be a defective cause. But a cause which makes something tend to non-being is a defective cause. Therefore, God cannot reduce something to nothing.

I answer that we can speak about the power of God in two ways: in one way, by considering his power absolutely; in another way, by considering it in relation to his wisdom or foreknowledge. (Cf. Aquinas, In III Sent. 1.2.3.)

Therefore, speaking absolutely of the power of God, thus God can reduce all creation into nothing. The reason for this is that creation is not only produced into being by God acting, but also is conserved in being through the action of God, according to Hebrews 1:3: carrying all things by the word of his power. Hence Augustine says, in the fourth book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, that if the power of God at some time were to cease from ruling those things which have been created, simultaneously also their species would cease, and every nature would perish. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 4.12, para. 22 (CSEL 28:108; PL 34:304).) Yet just as God acts by his own will and not by necessity of nature for the production of things, so also for their conservation. And for this reason, he can subtract his action from conserving them, and by this very thing all things would fall into nothing. (Cf. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 37, a. 1, q. 2, ad opp. 5, 2:866b.)

Whereas if we speak concerning the power of God in regard to his wisdom and foreknowledge, thus it cannot happen for things to be reduced to nothing, since the divine wisdom does not have this. For God created in order that all things would be (Wis 1:14), not in order that they would fall into nothing.

Reply Obj. 1: Therefore, we concede the first, insofar as it proceeds concerning absolute power.

Reply Obj. 2: To the second it must be said that something can be a cause of some defect in two ways.

One way is out of its proper intention, such as when someone by subtracting light causes darkness; (Cf. Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 37, a. 2, q. 1, opp. 2, ad opp. 2, 2:869–70; Aristotle, Physics 2.3, 195a11–15; Aquinas, In II Sent. 1.1.1, ad 2.) and in this way, it is not necessary for it to be a defective cause which causes the defect. Yet thus God can be the cause of some defect, either of blindness or of obduration, (Cf. ST I-II.79.3.) or even of annihilation, if he were to will.

In another way, something is a cause of a defect outside of intention, and thus it is always necessary for the cause of a defect to be defective, because from a defect of the agent it does not introduce the intended perfection in its effect; and thus, God in no way can be the cause of a defect or of something tending into non-being. (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 21 (CCSL 44A:26; PL 40:16).)

Article 2

If something were reduced to nothing, whether God could restore it the same in number

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that God cannot restore the same in number what has been reduced to nothing.

Obj. 1: For the Philosopher says in the second book of On Generation that those things whose substance is corrupted are not repeated the same in number. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.12, 338b11–19.) But for something reduced to nothing, the substance is corrupted. Therefore, they cannot be repeated the same in number.

On the contrary (2) is that Augustine says, in On the City of God 22: if human flesh had perished in all modes nor had any of its material remained in any hiding places of nature, the Omnipotent would restore it whence he willed. (Augustine, City of God 22.20, para. 2 (CCSL 48:840; PL 41:783).) But with no matter remaining from the thing corrupted, that which is corrupted is reduced to nothing. Therefore, God can restore the same in number what was reduced to nothing.

Furthermore (3): Difference is the cause of number, just as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 3.8 [81] (PG 94:1015).) But nothing does not make any difference because there are not species or differences of non-being, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Topics 4.6, 128b9; Physics 4.8, 215a9–11.) Therefore, that which is restored by God can be one and the same in number even though it had been reduced to nothing.

I answer that a certain difference must be attended to in these things which can be reduced to nothing.

For there are certain things whose unity has continuity of duration in its character, just as is clear in motion and time, (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 5.4, 228a20–b15.) and for this reason, the interruption of such things is directly contrary to their unity according to number. Whereas those things which imply a contradiction are not contained under the number of possible things for God, because they lack the character of being. And for this reason, if things of this sort are reduced to nothing, God cannot restore them the same in number: for this would be to make contradictories simultaneously to be true: for example, if an interrupted motion were one.

Whereas there are other things whose unity does not have continuity of duration in its character, such as the unity of permanent things, unless incidentally, inasmuch as their being is subject to motion. For thus also things of this sort are measured by time, and their being is one and continuous according to the unity and continuity of time. And because a natural agent cannot produce those things without motion, a natural agent cannot restore things of this sort the same in number if they are reduced to nothing or if their substance is corrupted. But God can restore things of this sort without motion because it is in his power to produce effects without mediating causes, and for this reason, he can restore those things the same in number even if they have collapsed to nothing.

Reply Obj. 1–2: Hence the response to the first and second is clear.

Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that nothing is not the difference of any being, but through this: when something is reduced to nothing, the continuation of being is interrupted which pertains to the unity of motion and of those things which follow upon motion.

On personal things which pertain to the person of the Son

Question 4

Regarding the divine nature of the Son

Then there were questions about personal things which pertain to the person of the Son:

and first, regarding the divine nature, (Q. 4.)

second, regarding the assumed nature. (Q. 5.)

About the first there were two questions:

first, whether the Father by the same word speaks himself and creation;

second, whether the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit by his sonship.

Article 1

Whether the Father by the same word speaks himself and creation

To the first we proceed thus. It seems that the Father does not speak himself and creation by the same word.

Obj. 1: For to speak himself applies only to the Father, as Augustine says in the seventh book of On the Trinity. (Augustine, On the Trinity 7.1 (CCSL 50:244–45; PL 42:933).) But to speak creation applies to the whole Trinity: for those things which involve respect to creation apply to the whole Trinity, as is clear through Dionysius in the second chapter of On the Divine Names. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names 2, para. 3 (PG 3:639); Aquinas, Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 2, lect. 1, n. 126.) Therefore, the Father does not speak himself and creation by the same word.

Obj. 2: Creation proceeds from God through the will. Yet the Son, who is the Word by which the Father speaks his own very self, proceeds from God naturally because, as Hilary says in the book On Synods: the will of God bears substance to all creatures; yet birth gave nature to the Son. (Hilary of Poitiers, On Synods 24.58 (PL 10:520).) Therefore, it is not the same word by which the Father speaks his own self and by which he speaks creation.

On the contrary is that Augustine says, in the second book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, that he spoke and they were made, that is, the Word was born, in whom there was that creation would be made. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 2.6, paras. 13–14 (CSEL 28:41–42; PL 34:268).) But the Word was born speaking his own very self. Therefore, the word by which he speaks himself and that by which he speaks creation is the same.

I answer that, just as Augustine says in the fifteenth book of On the Trinity, (Augustine, On the Trinity 15.10, paras. 19–15.11, para. 20 (CCSL 50:485, 487–88; PL 42:1071–73).) the Word of God is represented somehow through the word of our intellect, which is nothing else than a certain actual conception of our notion: for when we conceive what we know, by actually considering, this word is of our intellect, and this is what we signify by an exterior word. But because we not only conceive what we know habitually, with our mind active, but we are moved from one intelligible thing to another, hence it is that in us there is not only one mental word, but many, none of which is adequate to our knowledge. But God, whatever he knows, understands actually, and for this reason, in his mind word does not follow upon word. And just as by the same knowledge he knows himself and all other things, so also by the same word he expressed his own very self and all other things; nor would his Word be perfect, as Augustine says in the same book, if anything less were in his Word than in (Augustine, On the Trinity 15.14, para. 23 (CCSL 50:496; PL 42:1076).) his knowledge. Hence whatever the Father knows, he speaks the whole by his only Word.

And thus, it is necessary for the Word by which he speaks his own self and by which he speaks creation to be the same.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that to speak, properly understood, is to produce the Word, which applies to the Father alone. And for this reason, if to speak in divine things is properly understood, only the Father speaks, because he alone generates the Word. Nevertheless, by this Word there is expressed whatever the whole Trinity knows because there is one knowledge of the three persons. And out of this notion the Word imports a relation to creation, inasmuch as it is a certain expression of knowledge which the Father has commonly with the other persons concerning creation.

Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that a word and what is said by a word are different: for the word “stone” signifies a thing which is not a word, but a body. Hence nothing prohibits creation from proceeding from God through the will; yet the word by which creation is spoken is through nature.

Article 2

Whether the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit by his sonship

To the second we proceed thus. It seems that the Son is distinguished from the Holy Spirit by sonship.

Obj. 1: For the same thing constitutes something and distinguishes it from something else. But the person of the Son is constituted by sonship, which is his personal property, that is, which constitutes the person of the Son. Therefore, he is distinguished from the Holy Spirit by sonship.

On the contrary is that Boethius says in the book On the Trinity that only relation in divine things multiplies trinity; (Boethius, On the Trinity 6 (PL 64:1255).) and Anselm says in the book On the Procession of the Holy Spirit that the divine persons are distinguished only where there occurs opposition of relation. (Anselm of Canterbury, On the Procession of the Holy Spirit 2 (PL 158:288).) But the Son is not opposed relatively to the Holy Spirit by sonship, but only to the Father. Therefore, the Son is not distinguished by sonship from the Holy Spirit, but only from the Father.

I answer that the personal properties of divine things distinguish themselves just as substantial forms in natural things distinguish themselves into the species of things; nevertheless, insofar as examples from creatures are applied to God, they are not altogether similar.

Yet in natural things something is distinguished through its form from another in two ways.

In one way, this is according to the direct opposition of form to form, and in this way, each natural thing is distinguished from all species of its genus which do not have opposite forms, according to how a genus is divided by opposite differences; just as sapphire is distinguished by its form from all other species of stones.

In another way, a natural thing is distinguished through its form according to having and not having, and in this way, that which has some natural form is distinguished from all things not having that form; just as sapphire through its natural form is distinguished not only from other genera of stones, but from the species of animals and of plants.

Thus, therefore, it must be said that the Son is indeed distinguished from the Father according to the relative opposition of sonship to paternity, but from the Holy Spirit he is distinguished by sonship through this: that the Holy Spirit does not have sonship which the Son has.

Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.

Question 5

Regarding the assumed nature of the Son

Then there was a question concerning the Son in regard to the assumed nature.

Article 1

Whether the body of Christ affixed to the cross and lying in the tomb is one in number

And about this it was asked whether the body of Christ affixed to the cross and lying in the tomb is one in number. And it seems it is not.

Obj. 1: For whatever things differ in species differ in number. But the body of Christ hung upon the cross and lying in the tomb differ in species in the same way the dead and the living differ in species. Therefore, it is not one and the same in number.

On the contrary: Whatever things are one and the same in supposit or hypostasis are one and the same in number. But the body of Christ lying in the tomb and hung upon the cross is one and the same in supposit or hypostasis because the hypostasis of the Word of God never was separated from his body. (Cf. ST III.50.2.) Therefore, the body of Christ hung upon the cross and lying in the tomb is one and the same in number.

I answer that about this one must beware of two condemned heresies. One is of the Arians, who, since they posited that Christ did not have a soul but that the Word was for his body in place of a soul, consequently posited that the Word was separated from the body in death, just as is manifestly clear in a certain sermon of the Arians, against which Augustine disputes. (Augustine, Sermo Arianorum, para. 7 (PL 42:679); Against an Arian Sermon 9.7 (PL 42:689–90).) Whereas the other is the heresy of the Galanites, (Above: Quodlibet III*, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; Gratian, Decretum, Part 2, Cause 24, question 3, canon 39, para. 66, 1:1005; Isidore of Seville, Etymology 8.5, para. 67 (PL 82:304).)* which was condemned in the sixth synod, (Saint Sophronius, Synod Letter to Sergius, in the 6th ecumenical council (Constantinople III, 681 AD), 11, 13 (PG 87:3191).) who, since they posited one nature composed of divinity and humanity, posited that that nature was absolutely incorruptible, and thus posited that the body of Christ was absolutely incorruptible, not only by the corruption of decay, which the Catholic faith holds, according to Psalm 16 [15]:10: you shall not give your Holy One to see corruption, but also by the corruption which pertains to the character of death, which is impious, as is clear through Damascene in the third book. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 3.28 [or ch. 72] (PG 94:1099–1100).)

Thus, therefore, to exclude the first heresy, it is necessary to posit identity in regard to the supposit in the body of Christ hung upon the cross and that placed in the tomb. Whereas to exclude the second heresy, it is necessary to posit a true difference of death and of life. But because the first unity is greater than the second difference, it must be said that the body of Christ hung upon the cross and lying in the tomb is the same in number.

Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that that objection does not hold in the body of Christ on account of unity of hypostasis.