On Human Things
On grace
Question 6
On grace
Then there were questions concerning human things.
And first, concerning grace; (Q. 6.)
second, concerning the sacraments of grace; (Q. 7.)
third, concerning human acts. (Qq. 8–11. Q. 12, on precepts, is treated apart from this division.)
Article 1
Whether God always makes new grace
About the first it was asked whether God always makes new grace. And it seems that he does.
Obj. 1: For Augustine, in the eighth book of On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, compares the infusion of grace to illumination: just as, he says, the air with light present has not been made lucid, but is made, because, if it had been made, it would not be made, but, even with light absent, it would remain lucid, thus man, with God present to him, is illuminated, yet with him absent, he is darkened continually, from which he is departed not by intervals of places, but by aversion of will. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis 8.12, para. 26 (CSEL 28:250; PL 34:383).) But the sun always makes new light in the air. Therefore, God always makes new grace in the soul.
On the contrary: The being of a nobler creature is nobler. But grace is the noblest creature because it is the perfection of rational created nature. Therefore, its being is noblest. Therefore, it does not endure only for a moment, and thus God does not always make new grace.
I answer that action is twofold. There are certain things, indeed, which are made with motion. And such an action is always with some renewal because it is always in motion that something is made, and something ceases to be inasmuch as it approaches the end and recedes from the end. And on account of this the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the Physics that in every motion there is somehow to be made and to be corrupted. (Aristotle, Physics 8.3, 254a11–14.)
Yet another action is without motion through the simple communication of form, namely, inasmuch as an agent imprints its likeness upon a disposed recipient. And such an action in the beginning indeed is with renewal, according as a form is newly acquired in a subject, but the continuation of this action, just as it has no motion joined to it but simple influx or communication, so also has no renewal.
And in this way, grace is caused by God in the soul. Hence it must be said that, as long as grace endures in the soul, God is working in the soul, causing it. Nevertheless, this is not such that he always makes new grace and that in each single moment the grace existing before is corrupted, but because he always works in the soul the same grace which he first infuses, conserving it. This, indeed, is difficult to understand for those not able to abstract their consideration from actions which are with motion, in which something always is renewed, as has been said. (Cf. the beginning of this response.)
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that light always is made in the air because it is always conserved by the action of the illuminating sun. It is not that there is always made one light and another. (Aquinas, In II Sent. 15.3.1, ad 4.)
On the sacraments of grace
Question 7
On the sacraments of grace
Then there were questions concerning the sacraments of grace:
and first, concerning the sacrament of penance, whether fault is remitted through the absolution of the priest;
second, concerning the sacrament of matrimony, whether a man can receive the cross if he fears for the incontinence of his wife who is unable to follow her husband.
Article 1
On the sacrament of penance
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that fault is remitted through the absolution of the priest.
Obj. 1: For Hugh of St. Victor says in the book On the Sacraments that the sentence of heaven follows the sentence of Peter. (Hugh of Saint Victor, On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith 2.14.8 (PL 176:566B–C).) But the sentence of heaven concerns the remission of fault. Therefore, the remission of fault follows the sentence of Peter, which is of the priest absolving.
Obj. 2: The sacraments are medicines against sins. But wounds or sicknesses are healed through medicine. Therefore, the sickness or wound of sin is healed through the sacrament of penance. But the sacrament of penance is consummated in this: that the priest says: I absolve you, just as the sacrament of baptism in this: that he says: I baptize you. (Aquinas, On the Form of Absolution, cc. 1–2.) Therefore, fault is forgiven through the absolution of the priest.
On the contrary (3) is that sin is forgiven through contrition alone, according to Psalm 32 [31]:5: I have said I shall confess against myself my injustices to the Lord and you have remitted the impiety of my sin. But contrition precedes the absolution of the priest because the priest should not absolve someone unless he reckons him contrite. Therefore, the remission of fault precedes the absolution of the priest. Therefore, fault is not remitted through the absolution of the priest. (Cf. Aquinas, In IV Sent. 17.3.5, qa. 1, obj. 1.)
I answer that the sacraments work in two ways: in one way, according as they are actually administered; in another way, according as they are desired. This is because the sacraments work as instruments of divine mercy justifying, yet to gaze into the heart of man belongs to God, according to 1 Samuel 16:7: men see those things which appear, yet God looks into the heart. And for this reason, although natural things do not act unless applied in presence, nevertheless sacraments act even according as they are in intention. But they induce a fuller sacramental effect when they are presented actually.
This is clear in baptism: for a catechumen, if he is an adult and desires baptism, already has attained the effect of baptism as regards the cleansing from sin and the attainment of grace, which is the proper effect of God. But when he receives baptism actually, he attains certain fuller sacramental effects because he receives the character and the remission of the whole punishment. Nevertheless, if there were anyone who had not desired baptism before he was actually baptized, such as is clear especially in children, simultaneously he receives through baptism grace remitting fault and every other effect of the sacrament. And this also would happen in an adult if simultaneously when he was baptized he were to begin to desire baptism.
And it is the same also in the sacrament of penance, which is consummated in the dispensation of the minister absolving. For when someone actually is absolved, he attains fully the effect of the sacrament. But, if before he is absolved, he desires this sacrament, namely, when he proposes to subject himself to the keys of the Church, the power of the keys is already working in him, and he attains the remission of fault. Nevertheless, if someone during absolution itself begins to be crushed and to desire the keys of the Church, in the absolution of the priest itself fault would be dismissed for him through grace, which is infused in this sacrament just as in the other sacraments of the New Law. Hence sometimes it happens that some men not perfectly contrite attain the grace of contrition by the power of the keys while they do not now place an obstacle to the Holy Spirit. And it is the same with the other sacraments of the New Law, in which grace is conferred.
Nevertheless, there seems to be a difference between baptism and penance because the sacrament of penance is always administered to adults, in whom contrition generally precedes the time of confession and absolution, yet baptism many times is conferred on children, in whom the intention of baptism does not precede. Yet it would appear altogether similar if baptism were also always administered to adults.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the word of Hugh must not be understood as though the sentence of Peter in the priest absolving precedes in time the sentence of heaven, that is, of God, remitting fault, but because the sentence of God approves the sentence of Peter.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that sacramental medicine works not only when actually applied, but also when desired. And for this reason, the healing of the wound sometimes precedes sacramental absolution.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that never can there be true contrition without desire for the keys of the Church, however much there is sorrow concerning past sin and the intention of abstaining in the future, and for this reason, fault is remitted in contrition.
Article 2
On the sacrament of matrimony
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that a man can receive the cross unto crossing beyond the sea with his wife unwilling, even if he fears for her incontinence.
Obj. 1: For a man should not neglect his own salvation for another’s salvation. But a man procures his own salvation through this: that he is signed with the cross, attaining a full remission of sins. Therefore, he should not neglect this in order to provide for the salvation of his wife.
On the contrary is that Augustine says: if you abstain without the will of your wife, you grant her the license of fornication*, and her sin shall be imputed to your abstinence*. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 27, q. 2, c. 24, 1:1070; John Chrysostom, Homilies on Psalm 50, homily 1 (PG 55:574; Clavis Patrum Graecorum [CPG], n. 4544).) But by receiving the cross, he is impeded from rendering the debt. Therefore, it seems that the sin of his wife, if she does not contain herself, is imputed to the husband.
I answer that things which are of necessity must not be neglected on account of those things which are of one’s own will. Hence also the Lord, in Matthew 15, blames the Pharisees, who taught people to neglect the mandate concerning the honor of parents so that some voluntary oblations would be offered to God. (Matthew 15:5–6.) Yet out of necessity it is imminent for a man to bear the care of his wife because the man is head of the woman (1 Cor 11:3). But to receive the cross unto journeying is subject to his own will. Hence, if his wife is such a one who cannot follow on account of some legitimate impediment, and there is fear over her incontinence, he must decide not to receive the cross and dismiss his wife. Yet it is otherwise if his wife proposes to contain herself voluntarily, or if she desires or is able to follow her husband.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that this also pertains to the man’s own salvation: that he bear the care concerning the salvation of his wife, who is committed to the rule of her husband.
Concerning human acts
On human acts pertaining to prelates
Question 8
On human acts pertaining to prelates
Then there were questions concerning human acts;
and first, concerning acts pertaining to prelates; (Q. 8.)
second, concerning acts which can pertain to all. (Qq. 9–11.)
It pertains to prelates to command, to dispense by precept, to excommunicate those rebelling against precepts, and to confer ecclesiastical benefices. Hence about the first, there were four questions:
first, concerning obedience to the precepts of prelates, namely, whether a religious is held to obey his prelate commanding him by virtue of obedience that he reveal to him the hidden crime of a brother;
second, about dispensation, whether the pope can dispense in bigamy;
third, about excommunication, whether someone is held to avoid those excommunicates concerning whose excommunication even amongst experts there is a diverse sentence, with certain ones saying that they are excommunicated and others that they are not;
fourth, about the distribution of benefices, whether a prelate of a church licitly can give a benefice to his relative who appears suitable if another more suitable man should be available to him with equal facility.
Article 1
On obedience to the precepts of prelates
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a subject is not held to obey his prelate commanding the revelation of a hidden crime.
Obj. 1: For no one is held to obey someone in something not placed under his judgment. But hidden things are not placed under human judgment, but divine judgment only. (Cf. Gratian, Decretum, P. 1, D. 32, c. 11, 1:120; Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 5, tit. 3, cc. 33–34, 2:763.) Therefore, about their revelation no one is held to obey a prelate commanding.
On the contrary is that a prelate in chapter can command to religious what a secular or ecclesiastical judge can demand concerning an oath. But sometimes a secular or ecclesiastical judge demands an oath from someone that he reveal what he knows concerning something hidden, as a certain decretal says concerning purgations. (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 5, tit. 1, c. 17, 2:739; bk. 5, tit. 34, “De purgatione canonica,” 2:869–77.) Therefore, for the same reason a prelate in chapter can command religious by virtue of obedience to tell him if they know anything about a hidden crime.
I answer that sin can be hidden in two ways. (Cf. William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 3, 1:1041.)
One way is absolutely, namely, such that it in no way comes to the notice of many, and such a sin harms only the one doing it. And for this reason, he who knows such a hidden sin of a brother should intend only this: that he should procure the salvation of his sinning brother. Hence the order of fraternal correction is instituted by the Lord, (Matthew 18:15–17.) so that first, indeed, someone should correct a brother sinning hiddenly between himself and him only, afterwards he should summon two or three witnesses, and then finally, if he is not corrected, he should tell the Church. If a prelate commands against this order that the hidden sin of a brother should be told to him, the prelate must not be obeyed, and he sins by commanding because it is necessary to obey God rather than men (Acts 5:29).
Yet if the sin of a brother is not hidden to such a degree that through some suspicions it would not come to the notice of the multitude, and hence the scandal of many would arise, now the sin harms not only him, but many. And because the good of the multitude is preferred to the good of the one, for this reason, the prelate should investigate the truth concerning the deed so that he might assuage the scandal of the multitude either through the punishment of the sinner or through his excuse. And for this reason, in such a case, he can command one knowing the crime of a brother that he should tell it, and the one commanded is held to obey the prelate. For since it is not an entirely hidden crime, it pertains to the judgment of the prelate. And about this situation the decretal speaks, yet not the first.
Reply Obj. 1: Hence the response to the objections is clear.
Article 2
About dispensation
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that the pope cannot dispense with the irregularity of bigamy.
Obj. 1: For man cannot dispense what are instituted divinely, as Bernard says in the book On Dispensation and Precept. (Bernard of Clairvaux, On Dispensation and Precept, ch. 3, para. 6, 3:257–58 (PL 182:864).) But the doctrine of the Apostle, which contains that a bigamist should not be promoted, as is clear in 1 Timothy 3:2 and in Titus 1:6, is divinely promulgated, according to that saying of the Apostle: can it be that you seek a proof of him who speaks in me, Christ? (2 Cor 13:3). Therefore, the pope cannot dispense with bigamists.
On the contrary is that in the Decretum (D. 50), it is said that the pope dispensed with a certain bigamist. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 1, D. 50, c. 56, 1:199.)
I answer that the pope has plenitude of power in the Church, namely, such that whatever things are instituted through the Church or the prelates of the Church are dispensable by the pope: for these are said to be of human law or positive law. Whereas he cannot dispense those which are of divine law or of natural law, because those have efficacy from their divine institution. Yet the divine law is that which pertains to the New or Old Law. But this is the difference between the two laws: that the Old Law determined many things both in ceremonial precepts pertaining to the cult of God and also in judicial precepts pertaining to conserving justice between men. But the New Law, which is the law of liberty, (Epistula Jacobi [Apocryphon of James] 1.25, 2.12.) does not have determinations of this sort. But it is content with moral precepts of the natural law and articles of faith and sacraments of grace, hence also it is called the law of faith and the law of grace on account of the determination of the articles of faith and the efficacy of the sacraments. Whereas the rest of the things which must be determined, which pertain to the determination of human judgments or to the determination of the divine cult, Christ, who is the giver of the New Law, has entrusted freely to prelates of the Church and to princes of the Christian people. Hence all determinations of this sort pertain to human law, in which the pope can dispense. Whereas only in these things which are of the law of nature and in the articles of faith and the sacraments of the New Law can he not dispense: for to be able to do this would not be for truth, but against truth. (Cf. 2 Cor 13:8.)
Yet it is clear that for a bigamist not to be promoted neither is of the law of nature nor pertains to the articles of faith nor also is of necessity of sacrament (which is clear out of this: that if a bigamist is ordained, he receives the sacrament of orders), but this pertains to the determination of divine cult. Hence the pope can dispense this, although he should not dispense unless for a great and evident cause, just as also he could dispense that some priest not dressed in sacred vestments would consecrate the body of Christ. And the same reasoning applies to all other things of this sort which have proceeded out of human institution.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the Apostle has proposed some things in two ways in his doctrine: certain things, indeed, such as promulgating the divine law, such as that had in Galatians 5:2: if you are circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing, and many other things of this sort, and in this the pope cannot dispense. Whereas he established some things by his proper authority: for he says in 1 Corinthians 11:34: the rest, when I should come, I shall dispose; and below, in 1 Corinthians 16:1, he mandated that the collections which are made unto the holy ones should be made on the first day of the week (1 Cor 16:2), which does not pertain to divine law. Similarly, that which he says about not promoting a bigamist is not of divine law, but an institution of human authority divinely conceded to him.
Article 3
About excommunication
To the third we proceed thus. It seems that the excommunicated about whose excommunication the wise have different opinions should not be avoided.
Obj. 1: For, according to the laws, a bishop cannot remove a benefice which he has granted to a cleric without fault. (Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 5, tit. 1, c. 12, 2:735.) But no less is the communion of the faithful due to any faithful than a benefice is due to a cleric conferred upon him by the bishop. Therefore, neither must the communion of the faithful be subtracted from someone without fault. But when it is doubted whether a cause is present, (Cf. above: Quodlibet II, q. 8, a. 2, ad 2.) the mind of a good man should be more prompt to interpret it in the best way. (Cf. above: Quodlibet II, q. 5, a. 2, s.c. 2; Marcus Tullius Cicero, Oration for Lucius Murena 31.64; Augustine, The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount 2.18, para. 59 (CCSL 35:154; PL 34:1293–94).) Therefore, from the fact there is doubt about the excommunication of some, someone should rather maintain they are not excommunicated, and thus he should not avoid them.
On the contrary is that, if someone struck in war dies, if it is not known who struck him, on account of the doubt any man who took part in the war is considered irregular according to the laws. (Cf. Raymond of Peñafort, Summa de penitentia, ed. Javier Ochoa Sanz and Luis Diez Garcia (Rome: Commentarium pro religiosis, 1975), bk. 2, tit. 1, “De homicidio,” 448–49; Gratian, Decretum, P. 1, D. 51, c. 4, 1:204.) Therefore, by a similar principle it seems that, from there being a doubt regarding whether some are excommunicated, on account of greater caution they must be avoided.
I answer that a doubt concerning the excommunication of some men either precedes the sentence of the judges or follows.
If it precedes, for example when it has not yet been declared through the consensus of the judges that they are excommunicated, they must not be avoided until it should be terminated by a settled judgment. For in this case it is true that we ought to interpret in the best way. Hence also in Deuteronomy 17:8–10 it is said: if you should observe that a judgment before you is difficult and ambiguous . . . and of the judges within your gates you should see that words vary . . . you shall come unto the priests . . . and unto the judge . . . and you shall ask from them . . . and you shall do whatever they should say.
But, if it is ambiguous after the concurring determination of the judges, the sentence of the judges must stand, for two reasons. First, indeed, because judges more solicitously sifting the case can perceive the truth more fully, even if they are less expert than others who are consulted perfunctorily and extraordinarily. Second, because it would be to the great harm of the common utility of the man’s state if the sentence were not to stand, and any man for his pleasure would wish to heap calumny upon a sentence since then the litigations would be interminable. And for this reason, in such a case, the sentence of the judges must stand, unless perhaps it is suspended through appeal.
Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
Article 4
About the distribution of benefices
To the fourth we proceed thus. It seems that a prelate of a church cannot commit the care of the church to his relative, even though suitable, with a better man passed over.
Obj. 1: A father seeks for his daughter a bridegroom as greatly suitable as he is able, and a bridegroom for his bride seeks the most faithful guard he can. (Perhaps this is a reference to the soldier who, in the year 1250 AD, when King Louis was captured, guarded Queen Margaret in Damietta, as John Joinville relates: Histoire de saint Louis, ed. Natalis de Wailly (Paris: Libratrie de L. Hachette et C, 1906), ch. 88, para. 397, 166.) But a greater prelate is compared to a church subject to him either just as a father to his daughter or just as a bridegroom to his bride. Therefore, as best he can, he ought to provide a suitable person for it.
Obj. 2: John the Evangelist was most suitable, and nevertheless, because he was a relative of Christ according to the flesh, Christ preferred Peter to him in the rule of the Church. Therefore, a prelate also, if he has a relative equally suitable, should not make provision for him in a church more than for another equally suitable person. Therefore, much less should one do so if he is less suitable.
On the contrary is that according to the right order of charity a man should love more those connected to himself. But those whom from charity we love more, we should make greater provision whence their merit should grow. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethics 9.8, 1169a32–34.) Since, therefore, from a good dispensation of a church the merit of someone who administers well grows, it seems that a prelate should provide more for his own than for outsiders, even if they are less suitable.
I answer that it must be said otherwise for a relative of a prelate equally suitable and for one less suitable.
For if he is equally suitable, the prelate can prefer his relative (unless, perhaps, scandal would arise from this, or some men would thence receive a bad example, such that it could be presumed that probably other prelates would be led by this example to give to their relatives, even those less worthy). And this is because nothing thereby is lost for the utility of a church when provision is made for one equally suitable, granted that this provision is of this sort to satisfy a natural love, one which is not contrary to charity but rather is informed by charity. And this is signified in Genesis 47:6 where Pharaoh says to Joseph concerning his brothers: if you know industrious men amongst these, constitute them as masters of my cattle.
Whereas if the relative of a prelate is less suitable, he should not put him in charge of the care of a church with a better man passed over, for a twofold reason. First, indeed, because this seems to be against the fidelity which the Lord requires in a good dispenser: (Cf. Luke 12:42.) for he would not do the business of some lord faithfully who could make his lot better if he were to neglect this in order to satisfy his relatives. Second, because this seems to pertain to the receiving of persons, which consists in this: that someone receives for a cause the condition of a person which does not apply to the business, just as if someone were to give a sentence for someone because he is rich and not because he has justice, which is a condition applying to the business. Yet to be a relative is not some condition pertaining to the care of a church, which is not obtained by the right of blood but by divine gift. Yet it would be a condition applying to the business of the dispensation of patrimonial goods. Hence, if a bishop concerning patrimonial goods provides more to his less suitable relative, this is not the receiving of persons. But if by reason of consanguinity he should provide more for him in the patrimony of the Crucified, he would not lack the vice of the reception of persons. Augustine says this must be dispensed in ecclesiastical grades, expounding that which is had in James 2:1: do not have the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ in the receiving of persons. (Glossa ordinaria, at James 2:1–3, 6.1275 (PL 114:673); Augustine, Letter 167, para. 18 (CSEL 44:605; PL 33:740); Bede, Commentary on the Seven Catholic Epistles (CCSL 121:193).) Jerome also says, and there is had in c. 8, q. 1: an outsider out of another tribe is elected by Moses . . . in order that it might signify that the leadership over the people must not be deferred to blood, but to life. And now we discern that many do this thing for a benefice, that they should not seek to erect those as columns in the Church whom they know to be more beneficial to the Church, but whom either they love, or whose allegiances are enticed. (Jerome, On the Letter to Titus 1.5 (PL 26:562B); Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 8, q. 1, c. 6, 1:591.)
On acts which can pertain to all men
Regarding the intellective power
Question 9
Regarding the intellective power
Then there were questions concerning acts which can pertain to all men;
and first, concerning acts pertaining to the intellective power; (Q. 9.)
second, concerning acts pertaining to the appetitive power. (Qq. 10–11.)
About the first, there were three questions:
first, whether someone can without sin desire to know the magic sciences;
second, whether a statement which once is true always is true;
third, whether a master in determining theological questions ought to use reason or authority more.
Article 1
Whether someone can without sin desire to know the magic sciences
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a man can without sin desire to know the magic sciences.
Obj. 1: For it is not sin to desire that through which the intellect of man is placed in the best condition. But through any science the intellect of man is placed in the best condition because the true is the good of the intellect, as is said in the sixth book of the Ethics. (Aristotle, Ethics 6.1, 1139a27–28.) Yet science is of true things. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 2.19, 101b5–8.) Therefore, man licitly can desire to know any science, and thus without sin man can desire to know the magic sciences.
On the contrary (2): Prohibition only concerns the illicit. But the magic sciences are prohibited. Therefore, it is illicit to desire to know them.
I answer that a human act can be called good in two ways: in one way, from its genus; in another way, from its circumstances.
From its genus, it is said to be a good act from this: that it deals with due matter. Yet the due matter of the appetite is the good. Hence to desire any good is good in genus. Yet every science or whatever knowledge is something good (otherwise God, in whom there is nothing of evil, would not have every science, both of good things and of evil). Hence to desire any science or the knowledge of any things, whether good or evil, is good in genus.
But nevertheless, it can be good or evil according to various additional circumstances. And the intended end especially makes a difference. For if someone desires to know the magic sciences in order that he might use them, it is evil. Yet if someone desires to know them in order to confound and reprove them, thus it is good and licit. Similarly, the condition of a person makes a difference, or even the manner of desiring: for if someone so desires to know sciences of this sort that he prefers their knowledge to other more useful things, the desire is inordinate; and similarly, if there is such a person to whom it does not pertain to know this, he desires this inordinately.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that every science places the intellect in some good of it because every true thing is a certain good of the intellect. But not every science places the intellect in its best condition, but only that which is about the first truth. Nor also is it true that the magic arts are sciences, but rather they are certain deceits of demons. (However, their deceits can nevertheless be true. See above response.)
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that arts of this sort are prohibited as regards their use. Whereas if also their study were prohibited for anyone on account of the danger of using them, then it would be evil because prohibited.
Article 2
Whether a statement which once is true, always is true
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that it is not necessary that a statement which once is true, always is true.
Obj. 1: For if this were true in other statements, for the same reason this would be true in statements concerning the future; but in those this is not true because, as the Philosopher says in the second book of On Generation: he who is about to walk, shall not walk. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.11, 337b7.) Therefore, it is not necessary that a statement which once is true, always is true.
Obj. 2: If the parts are the same, the whole also is the same; but the parts of a statement are predicate and subject and composition. (Cf. SCG I.36.) Therefore, it is the same statement with the same predicate and subject and composition existing. But with the same statement existing in such a way, it happens that it is sometimes true and sometimes false, just as this statement: Socrates is sitting, is true with him sitting and false with him not sitting, according to that saying of the Philosopher in the Categories: out of this: that a thing is or is not, speech is true or false. (Aristotle, Categories 5, 4b8–10; 12, 14b21–22.) Therefore, a statement which once is true, is not on account of this always true.
On the contrary (3): Those statements: “Socrates is running,” and: “Socrates ran,” and: “Socrates shall run,” only differ in connoting different times. But different connotations do not remove identity of name, for the same name is said to be through all cases both in singular and in plural number. Therefore also, the aforesaid three statements are one statement. But if one of these once is true, it is always necessary that any one of these is true because if once it is true that Socrates is running, before it was true that Socrates would run, and afterwards it will be true that Socrates ran. Therefore, if some statement once is true, it is always true.
I answer that the power of this doubt consists in needing to know whether it is the same statement which concerns the present, the past, and the future. For if this is true, the consequence will be that a statement which once is true, always will be true, although perhaps this can have some doubt about a statement concerning a future contingent; but this is of a higher inquiry. (Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, bk. 1, lect. 13–14.) Whereas if there are diverse statements concerning the present, the past, and the future (yet the same statement applies to the present, in whatever way a thing should have itself), it is clear that the same statement sometimes is true, sometimes false, according to how the Philosopher says in the Categories that the same speech and opinion sometimes is true, sometimes false. (Aristotle, Categories 5, 4a36–b2.)
To prove this, it must be known that according to the Philosopher in the first book of On Interpretation, three certain things are found through an order: for voices are signs of understandings, yet understandings are likenesses of things. (Aristotle, On Interpretation 1.1, 16a3–8.) Yet it is clear that unity or diversity of significative voice does not depend upon the unity or diversity of the thing signified, otherwise there would not be any equivocal name. For according to this, if there are diverse things, there would be diverse names and not the same name. Therefore, unity or diversity of significative voice, whether complex or not, depends upon the unity or diversity of the voice or understanding, one of which, namely, the voice, is a sign and not signified only, yet the understanding is sign and signified just as the thing. Therefore, a name or statement can be distinct, either on account of diversity of voice only, just as there is in synonyms in which there is a diverse voice but altogether the same signified, or also with diversity of voice there can be diversity of understandings, whether on account of diversity of the thing understood, or on account of diversity of the mode of understanding. And this happens whenever there is diversity of connotation, which follows the diverse mode of understanding one and the same thing. This is especially apparent in time, which through itself is mixed with the activity of the human intellect of compounding and dividing, as is said in the third book of On the Soul. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.1, 430a31–b1.)
And for this reason, it must be said that it is not the same statement that Socrates is sitting and Socrates sat or shall sit. But that Socrates is sitting is the same statement because it is the same voice and the same mode of signifying. And for this reason, it is clear that the same statement can sometimes be true, sometimes false.
Reply Obj. 1–2: Hence we concede the first two.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that diversity of connotation removes identity of name, so much so that the obliques, according to the Philosopher, are not names. Nevertheless, they are called one name, not absolutely, but inasmuch as they come together in one order of declension. (Aristotle, On Interpretation 1.2, 16a33–b1.)
Article 3
Whether a master in determining theological questions ought more to use reason or authority
To the third we proceed thus. It seems that a master determining theological questions more ought to use authorities than reasons.
Obj. 1: For in any science the best questions are determined through the first principles of that science. But the first principles of the theological science are the articles of faith, which are made known to us through authorities. Therefore, theological questions especially must be determined through authorities.
On the contrary is that it is said in Titus 1:9: in order that he might be powerful to exhort in sound doctrine and to refute those contradicting. But those contradicting are better refuted by reasons than authorities. Therefore, it is more necessary to determine questions through reasons than through authorities.
I answer that any act must be executed according to how it accords to its end. Yet disputation can be ordered to a twofold end. (Cf. Humbert of Rome, Commentary on the Rule of St. Augustine, ed. Joachim Berthier (Rome: Typis A. Befani, 1888), cc. 153, 464, 466, 470.)
For a certain disputation is ordered to removing a doubt whether it be so, and in such a theological disputation especially, authorities must be used which those disputing accept. For example, if disputing with Jews, it is necessary to introduce authorities of the Old Testament; if with Manichees, who reject the Old Testament, it is necessary to use only the authorities of the New Testament; yet if with schismatics, who accept the Old and the New Testament, yet not the doctrine of our holy ones, such as are the Greeks, it is necessary to dispute with them out of the authorities of the New and the Old Testament and of those teachers whom they accept; yet if they accept no authority, it is necessary to flee to natural reasons to convince them.
Whereas a certain disputation is in the magisterial schools, not for removing error, but for instructing the hearers in order that they might be led to the understanding of the truth which they believe, (Cf. Aquinas, In III Sent. 23.2.2, qa. 1, ad 2; ST II-II.181.3, ad 2.) and then it is necessary to lean on reasons investigating the root of the truth and making one know how what is said is true. Otherwise, if a master determines a question with bare authorities, a certain hearer will be made certain that it is such, but will acquire nothing of science or understanding but will depart empty.
Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
Regarding the appetitive power
On goods
Question 10
On martyrdom
Then there were questions concerning things pertaining to the appetitive power;
and first, concerning goods; (Q. 10.)
second, concerning evils. (Q. 11.)
About the first, there were two questions concerning martyrdom:
first, whether someone without perfect charity can offer himself to martyrdom;
second, whether to endure martyrdom for Christ is in a precept.
Article 1
Whether someone without perfect charity can offer himself to martyrdom
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that someone without perfect charity can offer himself to martyrdom.
Obj. 1: Because, on Psalm 119 [118]:127: for this reason, I have loved your mandates over gold and topaz, the Gloss says that the smallest charity more loves the law of God than . . . a thousand gold and silver pieces, and for the same reason, more than all temporal things. (Glossa ordinaria and interlinearis, at Psalm 118:72, 3.1372 (PL 191:1079; 113:1041); Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, at Psalm 118:72, sermon 17, para. 10 (CCSL 40:1722; PL 37:1550).) But that which we love less we offer for that which we love more. Therefore, someone who has the smallest charity can offer both all temporal things and even his very own life for Christ.
On the contrary: If someone without perfect charity can offer himself to martyrdom, therefore for the same reason he could endure martyrdom without perfect charity. But this seems to be false, according to John 15:13: greater charity no one has, than that he should lay down his soul for his friends. Therefore, someone without perfect charity cannot offer himself to martyrdom.
I answer that in the works of the virtues two things must be attended to, namely, that which is done and the mode of doing. Yet it happens that the same deed which is done according to some perfect virtue is also done not only by someone who has little virtue, but even by someone who does not have virtue, just as someone not having justice can do some just work. But, if we attend to the manner of doing, that man who does not have virtue cannot work just as that man who has it, nor that man who has little virtue just as that man who has great virtue, who works easily and promptly and delightfully, which someone who lacks virtue or who has little virtue does not do in the same way. (Aristotle, Ethics 1.8, 1099a7–21; 2.4, 1105a28–b9; 5.9, 1137a4–9; Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, bk. 5, lect. 15, nn. 1074–75.)
Thus, therefore, it must be said that not only perfect charity, but even imperfect can do this work of offering oneself to martyrdom or even to suffer martyrdom. What is more, this can be done even by that man who lacks charity, according to that saying of the Apostle: if I should hand over my body such that I should burn, yet I should not have charity, it profits me nothing (1 Cor 13:3). But perfect charity does this promptly and delightfully, just as is clear concerning Lawrence and Vincent, who in torments showed hilarity. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Second Letter to the Corinthians, ch. 8, lect. 1, n. 282.) Yet imperfect charity, or also he who lacks charity, cannot do this.
Reply Obj. 1: And through this the response to the objections is clear.
Article 2
Whether to endure martyrdom for Christ is in a precept
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that to suffer martyrdom on account of Christ is not in a precept.
Obj. 1: For it seems less that a man should give his own things than that he should lay down his own proper body, as Gregory says in that homily, I am the good pastor. (Gregory the Great, On the Gospels, bk. 1, homily 14, on John 10:11–16 (PL 76:1127).) But to dismiss all one’s things on account of Christ does not fall under a precept, but under a counsel. Therefore, to expose one’s body to martyrdom also does not fall under a precept.
On the contrary is that Augustine says, in the thirteenth book of On the City of God: then it was said to man: you shall die, if you should sin; now it is said to a martyr: die, lest you sin. (Augustine, City of God 13.4 (CCSL 48:388; PL 41:379).) But what is necessary for us to do lest we sin falls under a precept. Therefore, to expose one’s body to martyrdom falls under a precept.
I answer that something falls under a precept in two ways: in one way, absolutely; in another way, according to preparation of mind. (Cf. below: Quodlibet VI, q. 7, a. 1, ad 1–2; On the Perfection of the Spiritual Life, cc. 21, 27.) For because a precept implies the character of something due, something absolutely falls under a precept which is due on account of some preexisting thing, such as the precept concerning the honoring of parents or concerning loving God. But sometimes it happens that that which makes something due has not yet preceded, but can occur: hence this falls under a precept not absolutely, but according to preparation of mind, namely, such that a man has a mind prepared to do what is rendered due for any reason that occurs. And in this way, Augustine expounds those precepts of the Lord posited in Matthew 5:39: if anyone should strike you on one cheek, offer to him also the other; namely, because if it were necessary and the salvation of others were to demand this, a man ought to be prepared to do this. (Cf. below: Quodlibet VI, q. 7, a. 1, ad 1; Augustine, The Lord’s Sermon on the Mount 1.19–20 (CCSL 35:67–76; PL 34:1257–63).)
And through this mode to endure martyrdom on account of Christ falls under a precept, namely, because a man ought to have a mind prepared to permit himself to be killed before denying Christ or sinning mortally. And thus, to forsake one’s own goods also falls under a precept because the mind of a Christian ought to be prepared more to endure the robbery of his goods than to deny Christ or to sin mortally. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Hebrews, on Hebrews 10:34, ch. 10, lect. 4, n. 539.)
On evils
Question 11
On first movements
Then there were questions concerning evils, namely, concerning first movements. About this there were two questions:
first, whether first movements are always sins;
second, whether in infidels they are mortal sins.
Article 1
Whether first movements are always sins
To the first we proceed thus. It seems that a first movement is always sin.
Obj. 1: For the Master says in the twenty-first distinction of the second book of the Sentences that temptation from the flesh is not able to be without sin. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 29, ch. 6, para. 3, p. 437 (PL 192:720).) But whenever there is a first movement, there is temptation from the flesh. Therefore, a first movement cannot be without sin.
On the contrary (2) is that on Romans 6:12: therefore, let not sin reign in your mortal body, the Gloss says: it does not prohibit concupiscence, (Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 6:12, 6.83 (PL 191:1407; 114:488–89).) which cannot be avoided. But that which cannot be avoided is not sin. (Augustine, On Free Will 3.18, para. 50 (CCSL 29:304; PL 32:1295); William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 2, tract. 15, ch. 2, q. 1, 2.2:526.) Therefore, concupiscence, which is the first movement, is not sin.
I answer that movement involves a certain inclination towards an end, which inclination indeed pertains to appetite in human acts. Yet there is in man a threefold appetite: one indeed natural, according to which the appetitive power pertains to the vegetative soul just as also the digestive power and the expulsive and the retentive; (Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed 1.71; John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 30; Avicenna, Book on the Soul 1.5, p. 101; Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, ed. G. Verbeke and J.R. Moncho (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), 22, p. 105; Galen, On Complexions, Galenus Latinus 1 (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1976), 104.) the second appetite is of sensuality, which is moved according to the apprehension of sense; the third appetite is of the will, which is moved according to the judgment of reason.
Yet sin which has the character of fault, concerning which we now speak, cannot be except in a voluntary act, namely, one which is somehow in the power of the one sinning.
Yet an act of the natural appetite is not subject to the command of reason, just as neither an act of the other potencies of the vegetative soul, and for this reason, fault cannot consist in an act of such an appetite, just as there is not fault in man’s hunger or thirst. And the same must be said in other things of this sort.
But an act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason because reason coming before it can command it or even impede it, and thus such a motion can already have the character of fault. And, if there follows a judgment of reason, it could also be mortal sin, just as also the movement of the exterior members commanded by reason. Yet if a judgment of reason comes before, it is indeed sin if it tends to something illicit because it was in the power of man to contain it; nevertheless, it is venial sin and most light, as is clear through Augustine, in the twelfth book of On the Trinity. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 2, d. 24, ch. 9, para. 3, p. 457 (PL 192:704–5); Augustine, On the Trinity 12.10, para. 15; 12.12, para. 18 (CCSL 50:369, 372; PL 42:1006, 1008).) And this is called a first movement of sin.
Yet the movement of the superior appetite, that is, of the will, following a judgment of reason, already can be mortal sin.
Reply Obj. 1: Therefore, we concede the first.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that concupiscence cannot be avoided such that no movement of concupiscence would arise because, while one is resisted, another rises up. Nevertheless, they can each be avoided, and thus each has something of the character of sin, although it does not have the character of perfect sin, which is mortal sin.
Article 2
Whether in infidels they are mortal sins
To the second we proceed thus. It seems that first movements in infidels are mortal sins.
Obj. 1: Because, just as Anselm says in the book On Grace and Free Will: damnation follows those who are not in Christ Jesus if they should feel concupiscence, even if they should not consent. (Anselm of Canterbury, On the Harmony of Foreknowledge and Predestination and the Grace of God with Free Choice (De concordia), q. 3, ch. 7 (PL 158:530).) But to feel concupiscence is to have the first movement of concupiscence. Therefore, infidels, who are not in Christ Jesus, sin mortally according to the first movements because damnation is not due except to mortal sin.
Obj. 2: Any man should have original justice, through which concupiscence was repressed. (Cf. Anselm of Canterbury, De concordia, q. 3, ch. 7 (PL 158:530).) But any movement of concupiscence is against this due thing. Therefore, any movement of concupiscence is mortal sin: for everything which is against what is due has the character of mortal sin.
On the contrary: As much as a grade is higher, so much is the fall graver; (A proverb: cf. Hans Walther, Proverbia sententiaeque Latinitatis Medii Aevi (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1966), 4:23589; Humbert of Rome, Commentary on the Rule of St. Augustine, ed. Joachim Berthier (Rome: Typis A. Befani, 1888), ch. 180, 1:550.) but the grade of the faithful is higher than the grade of the infidel. Since, therefore, the first movements of the faithful are not mortal sins, much less the first movements of infidels.
I answer that a first movement, just as has been said, (Cf. above: q. 11, a. 1, resp.) is a movement of sensuality coming before the deliberation of reason. Yet it pertains to the same nature of sensuality and of reason for the movement of sensuality which is without the deliberation of reason to not be able to be mortal sin, because mortal sin is that which consists in aversion from God, to whom man cannot be converted unless through reason. Consequently, aversion from God, which constitutes mortal sin, cannot be unless in reason, as is clear through Augustine in the twelfth book of On the Trinity. (Augustine, On the Trinity 12.12 (CCSL 50:371–73; PL 42:1007–8).)
And for this reason, it must be said that the first movements of infidels are not mortal sins, but venial.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that the saying of Anselm depends upon the word of the Apostle, who concludes in Romans 8:1 that nothing is of damnation for these who are in Christ Jesus, who do not walk according to the flesh. Therefore, it seems that for these who are not in Christ Jesus there is something of damnation even if they do not walk according to the flesh, consenting to movements of the flesh. Otherwise, these who are in Christ Jesus would have nothing more than others. Therefore, there is something of damnation for these not in Christ Jesus if they feel the movement of the flesh, even though they do not consent.
That this, indeed, somehow must be understood is apparent from the progression of the Apostle. For he had said before that in these who are in Christ Jesus the reparation of grace is begun as regards the mind, although not as regards the flesh. For he had said before: therefore I myself with my mind indeed serve the law of God, yet with my flesh the law of sin (Rom 7:25), namely, on account of the law of the stimulant to sin (fomes), which still remains in the members of the body. Therefore, lest these who are in Christ Jesus would seem still to be subject to the former damnation on account of the movements of the stimulant, the Apostle concludes that there is nothing of damnation for these who are in Christ Jesus if they do not walk according to the flesh, because the damnation of original sin is absolved through the grace of Christ although the stimulant of sin remain in act. Whereas they do not incur the damnation of actual sin because they do not walk according to the flesh. Yet in infidels original sin remains not only in act, but also in guilt, and for this reason, there is for them something of damnation on the part of original sin, yet not on the part of actual sin if they should not consent to the concupiscences. From this, therefore, it does not follow that in infidels the first movement induces the damnation of mortal sin, but there follows that it should have the damnation of original sin annexed.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that the debt of original justice pertains to the very person of the infidel by reason of the human nature which he has derived from the first parent, upon whom original justice was bestowed. For this reason, that which pertains to a defect of original justice pertains to the sin of nature, namely, to original sin, yet not to actual sin, of which sort is mortal sin.
On precepts
Question 12
On precepts
Article 1
Whether boys not practiced in keeping the precepts should be received, or obligated by vow or by oath, or allured by benefices to the entrance of religion
The question is whether boys not practiced in keeping the precepts should be received, or obligated by vow or by oath, or allured by benefices to the entrance of religion. And it seems they should not.
Obj. 1: For the perfection of the counsels, to which religions are ordered, has assumed its beginning from Christ. But Christ first gave a counsel of perfection to an adolescent who had observed the precepts, as is clear in Matthew 19. (Matthew 19:16–21.) Therefore, only those who are practiced in keeping the precepts should be obligated or received into religion. (Cf. above: Quodlibet III, q. 5, a. 3, obj. 1.)
Obj. 2: Gregory says in his commentary on Ezekiel: no one suddenly is made highest, but anyone begins in a good way of life by the smallest things, in order that he might arrive unto great ones. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezekiel the Prophet, bk. 2, homily 3, para. 3 (CCSL 142:238; PL 76:959); cf. Morals on the Book of Job 22.19, para. 45 (CCSL 143A:1125; PL 76:240); John Peckham, “On Child Oblates,” Archivum Franciscanum historicum (AFH) 8 (1915): arg. 23, ad 23, 418, 437.) But the counsels are great, which pertain to the perfection of life, yet the precepts are lesser, which pertain to common justice. (Cf. below: q. 12, a. 2, obj. 2.) Therefore, boys should be practiced in keeping the precepts before they are induced to the counsels.
Obj. 3: In Exodus 21:33–34 it is said: if anyone should open a cistern . . . and an ox or ass should fall in it, let the lord of the cistern render the price of the beasts. But that man who induces to religion some child not yet practiced in keeping the precepts, in a certain way opens for him a cistern because generally such ones entering religion leave and fall into desperation, (Cf. above: Quodlibet III, q. 5, a. 1, obj. 3–5.) as though into a certain spiritual cistern. Therefore, it seems that this is imputed as sin to that man who induces him.
Obj. 4: That which is expedient for the common utility must not be removed. But it is expedient for the common utility that men use their own liberty to do good. Therefore, such liberty must not be removed from anyone through the obligation of a vow or oath. (John Peckham, “On Child Oblates,” AFH 8 (1915): arg. 32, 419.)
Obj. 5: Blessed Benedict, venerable institutor of monks, established in his rule that for those coming into religion there must not be granted an easy entrance, but it must be proven whether the spirit is from God. (Benedict, The Rule of Saint Benedict 58 (CSEL 75; PL 66:803).) Therefore, much less must any be allured by gifts and benefices. (Cf. Gerard of Abbeville, “Duplex quaestio,” in Antonianum 22 (1938): q. 1, 195–97; John Peckham, “On Child Oblates,” AFH 8 (1915): arg. 31, 419, 424.)
Obj. 6: Gregory says, (Gregory the Great, Register of the Epistles 5.58 (CCSL 140:356; PL 77:792–94).) and it is had in the Decretum (D. 48): we know that built walls do not first receive the weight of beams, unless they should be dried from the humor of their newness, lest, if they should receive the weights before they should be made solid, they would demolish the whole construction unto the earth. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 1, D. 48, c. 2, 1:174; cf. Aquinas, Refutation of Teaching that Deters from Religious Life, ch. 2.) But boys who are not yet practiced in keeping the precepts are as though walls not yet dried. Therefore, beams must not be imposed upon them, that is, the heavy institutes of religion.
Obj. 7: The state of religion is a state of penance. (Cf. above: Quodlibet III, q. 5, a. 3, resp.) But boys are excepted from every coercion of penance, as is said in the Decretum, “On Penance,” (D. 4). (Gratian, Decretum, P. 3, “Concerning Consecration,” D. 4, c. 118, 1:1398.) Therefore, they should not be induced into religion.
Obj. 8: Just as it is said in the Decretum: that which anyone neither chooses nor elects, certainly he does not love, and that which he does not love, he spurns easily (C. 20, q. 3). (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 20, q. 3, c. 4, 1:850.) But before they are practiced, boys do not have firm choice; therefore, neither do they have firm love. Easily, therefore, will they spurn religion if at such an age they are induced into religion.
Obj. 9: In Proverbs 13:11 it is said: substance hastened shall be diminished. But it seems to be excessive haste that someone not yet practiced in keeping the precepts should fly to the counsels. Therefore, it seems that their spiritual substance would be diminished easily. Therefore, boys should not be induced unto religion.
Obj. 10: No lesser care ought to be given to the entrance of religion than to the reception of an order. But in orders those who have not received minor orders are prohibited to approach major orders. Therefore, no one should cross over to the observance of the counsels in religion unless he has first observed the precepts.
Obj. 11: Two things are necessary for man, namely, to understand the true and to work the good. But in understanding the true, someone is reputed stupid who would cross over to more difficult things before understanding lighter things. Therefore, in the activity of good, it is stupid for someone to cross over to the counsels before he is practiced in the precepts.
Obj. 12: To anyone living in religion it is befitting to take care of others or at least of one’s own self. But among these chosen for some ecclesiastical care it is necessary to choose the better men. Therefore, it is necessary to choose the better men among those who are assumed unto religion. Yet these are the ones practiced in keeping the precepts. Therefore, it is these such men that ought to be induced to religion.
Obj. 13: That which is in itself good, if an occasion of sin should be taken up from it, it must be cast away; thus, Hezekiah burned the bronze serpent which Moses made at the command of the Lord for healing the sons of Israel, as is said in Numbers 21:19, because out of this came an occasion of idolatry. Similarly, although a blessing is good according to itself, nevertheless it is blameworthy if a lesser blesses with a greater present. Since, therefore, any men not practiced in keeping the precepts might take up an occasion of sin from the entrance of religion, withdrawing from it, even though religion is good according to itself, nevertheless it seems that to induce unpracticed men of this sort unto religion must be avoided.
Obj. 14: Gregory says, (Gregory the Great, Register of the Epistles 9.219 (CCSL 140:787).) which is recorded in the Decretum (D. 48): he desires a fall, who seeks ascent unto the precipice of the highest place with grades neglected through abrupt ways. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 1, D. 48, c. 2, 1:174; cf. Aquinas, Refutation of Teaching that Deters from Religious Life, ch. 2.) But to proceed to the counsels without having observed the precepts is to neglect a grade. Therefore, it seems that this is to seek a fall, and thus no boys ought to be induced to this.
Obj. 15: Damascene says in the second book that it is not useful that one existing as inexpert and unproven should enjoy incorruption, in order that he might not fall into pride and the judgment of the devil. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith 2.44 [30] (PG 94:978).) Therefore, for the same reason it is not useful for those unproven and unpracticed in the precepts to be assumed into the state of contemplation, to which religion is ordered.
Obj. 16: Gregory says in the sixth book of the Morals on the Book of Job: after the embraces of Leah Jacob arrived unto Rachel, because anyone perfect beforehand is joined unto the fecundity of the active life and afterwards is united unto the rest of the contemplative. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 6.37, para. 61 (CCSL 143A:330; PL 75:764).) But the active life consists in the observance of the precepts, yet the state of religion pertains to the contemplative life. Therefore, no boys should be induced to religion before they are practiced in keeping the precepts. (Cf. Aquinas, Refutation of Teaching that Deters from Religious Life, ch. 2, obj. 7.)
Obj. 17: No promise must be made whose loosing is not licit. But to loose something for someone for the entrance of religion is not licit: we never read that the disciples of the Lord or those converted by their ministry had provoked anyone unto the worship of God by any intervention of a gift (C. 1, q. 2). (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 1, q. 2, c. 2, 1:408; cf. Aquinas, Refutation of Teaching that Deters from Religious Life, ch. 11, obj. 6.) Therefore, none should be allured by promises unto religion.
Obj. 18: No one who is not practiced in arms, according to the laws, is to be admitted in a bodily military. (Justinian I, Codicem Iustinianum, ed. Theodor Mommsen and Paul Krueger, Corpus Juris Civilis (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1892) 12.43 [44], “De tironibus,” 2:477.) But religion is a state of spiritual military. (The whole Christian life is a state of spiritual warfare: cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Job, ch. 7, lect. 1, n. 122.) Therefore, none should be received in religion unless first practiced in the precepts as though in certain spiritual arms. (Gerard of Abbeville, “Duplex quaestio,” q. 2, 200; John Peckham, “On Child Oblates,” AFH 8 (1915): arg. 23, 418.)
Obj. 19: He who cannot obligate himself to less cannot obligate himself to more unless it is necessary. But a boy before his fourteenth year cannot obligate himself to matrimony, which is less. (Aquinas, In IV Sent. 27.2.2; Liber extravagantium decretalium (Decretales Gregorii IX), bk. 4, tit. 2, cc. 3, 10, 2:673, 676.) Therefore, much less can he obligate himself to religion. (Cf. John Peckham, “On Child Oblates,” AFH 8 (1915): arg. 11–12, s.c. 2, 416, 420.)
Obj. 20: It is read in Mark 5:19 that the Lord did not permit the cured demoniac to enter the boat with him, which boat signifies the cross and religion. Yet the cured demoniac signifies men converted from sins. Therefore, converted sinners must not be received at once unto religion before they are practiced in keeping the precepts.
Obj. 21: We ought to have the fruits of good works when we exit from Egypt, as a certain gloss on Exodus 12 says. (Glossa ordinaria, at Exodus 15:17, 1.625–26 (PL 113:231).) But to exit from Egypt is to exit from the world by entering religion. Therefore, those who desire to enter religion ought first to have the fruit of good works through the observance of the precepts.
Obj. 22: Augustine says in the book On the Sermon on the Mount that all presumption is to be punished. (Augustine, On the Sermon on the Mount 1.1, para. 3 (CCSL 35:3; PL 34:1231).) But it seems a great presumption that anyone desires to ascend to the hill of the counsels without yet having observed the precepts. Therefore, such are to be punished and not encouraged to enter into religion.
Obj. 23: Augustine says in the same book that greater things to greaters and lesser things to lessers (Augustine, On the Sermon on the Mount 1.1, para. 2 (CCSL 35:2; PL 34:1231).) must be presented. But the counsels are greater things. Therefore, they must not be presented to unpracticed boys, and thus boys not yet practiced in keeping the precepts must not be drawn unto religion. (Cf. John Peckham, “On Child Oblates,” AFH 8 (1915): arg. 16, 417.)
On the contrary (1) is what is said in the Decretum: if in whatever, and below: there could be license for parents reasonably to hand over their sons to religion not more than beyond the fourteenth year of his age; whereas afterwards, either with the will of their parents, or if there should be a solitary vow of their devotion, it shall be licit for sons to assume the cult of religion (C. 20, q. 2). (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 20, q. 2, c. 1, 1:847.) But after the thirteenth year they are not immediately men practiced in keeping the precepts. Therefore, boys could enter religion before they are practiced in keeping the precepts.
Furthermore (2): It is greater for someone to take up the rule of himself and others than to be received in religion, in which he lives under the rule of another. But Solomon still being a boy took up the rule of himself and others, hence it is said in 1 Chronicles 29:1: David the king spoke unto the whole church: God chooses Solomon my son still a boy and tender. Therefore, much more can boys not practiced in keeping the precepts be received or induced into religion.
Furthermore (3): A vow is not illicit whereby men are not rendered guilty if they pay it. But, just as Ambrose says, those women who have vowed continence in girlish years are not constituted guilty if they discharge the vow. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 32, q. 2, cc. 13–14, 1:1124.) Therefore, it is not illicit for some men to be bound in boyish years by a vow unto religion.
Furthermore (4): Nothing is illicit through which someone is not drawn away from the good. But he who is provoked to better things is not drawn away from the good. Therefore, since the state of religion is better, in which the counsels are observed, than the state of secular life, in which simply the precepts are observed, it seems that it is not illicit to induce boys into religion by vow or by oath or even by benefices before they are practiced in keeping the precepts.
Furthermore (5): In the Decretum, it is said: firm then shall be the profession of virginity, out of which adult age already has begun to be, and which is accustomed to be regarded as apt for nuptials (C. 20, q. 1). (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 20, q. 1, c. 1, 1:843.) But not at once in this age are men or women practiced in keeping the precepts. Therefore, before some are practiced in keeping in the precepts, they can be bound licitly to religion even by vow or by oath.
Furthermore (6): If such an obligation were illicit, namely, whereby boys not exercised in the precepts are obligated by vow or by oath to religion, either this would be because it is evil according to itself or because it is prohibited. But it is not evil according to itself, because thus the execution or fulfillment of the promise would be worse and perseverance worst, the contrary of which we see, because those fulfilling those things which they had promised in boyish years and persevering in these promises are commended especially. Similarly, such an obligation is not illicit due to it being prohibited. For it is not prohibited by the Old Law: for it is said in Numbers 30:4–6: a woman, if any should vow and should bind herself by oath, who is in the house of her father and still in girlish age, if her father should know the vow which she has promised and the oath by which she has obligated her soul and should keep silent, he shall be guilty of the vow: whatever she promised or swore, she shall complete by work; yet if . . . as he should have heard, her father should contradict her, both her vow and her oath shall be null nor shall she be held guilty for her solemn promise, by this: that her father should have contradicted her. Similarly, it is not prohibited by the law of the canons, because in a decree of Pope Leo this same authority is introduced. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 32, q. 2, cc. 11–15, 1:1123–24.) Similarly, it is not prohibited by the law of the Gospel, which especially induces men to withdraw from the world and follow after the works of perfection. Therefore, it is licit to obligate boys not yet practiced in keeping the precepts by vow or by oath to religion.
I answer that what here is introduced for the question is not doubtful, except that certain men striving for contention try to obscure the truth. Hence here the words which Augustine says in the second book of On the City of God have a place: because that illness of foolish souls is greater and more foul, by which their irrational motions, even after reason fully rendered . . . , or by excessive blindness, by which clear things are not discerned . . . are not borne, and that, namely, blindness, just as . . . they defend the truth, the necessity of saying generally clear things is made more copious, just as we offer . . . things to be considered to those not looking, but in a certain mode things to be touched to those stroking. And nevertheless, what shall be the end of disputing . . . , if we reckon . . . that it must be responded to those responding? For those who either cannot understand what is said, or are so hard by adversity of mind that, even if they should understand, they should not obey, respond . . . and speak iniquity and are indefatigably vain. Whose contrary sayings if so often we should will to refute, as often as with resolute brow they should establish not to think about what they say, while in whatever mode they contradict our disputations, how infinite and distressful and unfruitful you see it is. (Augustine, City of God 2.1 (CCSL 47:35; PL 41:47).)
Therefore, this manner should be observed so that the truth clearly and as though palpably will be shown, and if any things are said to the contrary which do not have any weight, they should be spurned, lest it always be necessary to replicate the same things uselessly. But if anyone wishes to say the contrary, let him write what he says (Cf. Nicolas of Lisieux, De perfectione et excellencia status clericorum, bk. 1, ch. 5 (Ms. Paris Sorbonne 228, f. 221ra).) in order that other intelligent men might be able to judge whether he teaches the truth.
First, therefore, in order to strike down each objection about the proposed question, it must be considered that for boys, even below the age of puberty, to be received into religion is not evil according to itself; nay, rather, it is expedient and fruitful because that which we are accustomed to from boyhood we always hold more perfectly and more firmly, according to Proverbs 22:6: an adolescent on the way, even when he should grow old, shall not withdraw from it. (Cf. John Peckham, “On Child Oblates,” AFH 8 (1915): s.c. 2, 420.) And for this reason, the Apostles instituted that boys, even infants, would be received into the Christian religion in order that, nourished in it, they would adhere to it more firmly and more perfectly. And this is what Dionysius says in the last chapter of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy: according to holy law infants consummated unto a holy habit shall have a custom, removed from every error and free from an unclean life; this came unto mind for our divine leaders, that is, the Apostles, and it was seen to receive infants. (Pseudo-Dionysius, The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 7.11 (PG 3:567).) Yet much more does the Christian life exceed the life of infidels than the life of religious the life of seculars, especially since in the primitive Church all Christians possessed the most perfect state of religion, according to Acts 4:32: of the multitude of believers there was one heart and one soul, nor did any of them say that the things which he possessed were his own, but all things were common for those, unto whose example of life all religions are instituted. And for this reason, the institutors of religions were moved to receive infants in religion, for the same reason for which the Apostles did likewise, as is clear concerning blessed Benedict who, as is read in the second book of the Dialogues, received the twelve-year-old Maurus and the seven-year-old Placidus to be nourished in religion. (Gregory the Great, Dialogues [bk. 2 in Life of St. Benedict] 2.3 (PL 66:140; SC 260:150).)
And nevertheless, a certain difference must be noted. For boys before the years of puberty out of natural law are under the care of their parents, on account of this: (Cf. above: Quodlibet II, q. 4, a. 2, resp.) that they suffer a defect of discretion, according to which discretion they might be able to rule their own selves well.
And for this reason, they can indeed be handed over to religion at this age if they are offered by their parents, and there shall be a ratified tradition, especially if, when they should reach the years of puberty, they have a ratified paternal oblation. Hence Gregory says, (Pope Gregory II, Replies to Questions Put by Boniface, letter 14.7 (Nov. 726) (PL 89:524–26).) as is found in the Decretum: you have added: if father or mother should have handed over son or daughter within the enclosure of a monastery in the years of infancy under regular discipline, whether it is licit for them, after they should have fulfilled the years of puberty, to leave and be coupled in matrimony. We altogether shun this, because it is unspeakable that the reins of the will should be relaxed for those sons offered by their parents to God (C. 20, q. 1). (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 20, q. 1, c. 2, 1:843–44; cf. above: Quodlibet III, q. 5, a. 1, resp.)
Yet if in this proper age they hand themselves over to religion freely, this can be ratified through the assent or dissimulation of their parents. Hence it is said in the Decretum: if in whatever minor age either one or both parents gives to their children of either sex either the tonsure of religion or the due clothing of religion or perhaps with them unwilling or unknowing, namely, the parents, they should abdicate from themselves the religion undertaken not soon seen in their sons, but either before themselves or the bishop and plainly in the convent they should permit those same sons to have such things, it shall be utterly illicit for these sons to revert unto the secular habit at any time (C. 20, q. 1). (It is actually Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 20, q. 2, c. 1, 1:847.)
Whereas if boys pass the years of puberty, they can cross over into religion even with their parents unwilling, nor must they be repelled; nay, rather, they must be called in: for as Gregory says in a certain homily: one is led unto the good life in boyhood, another in adolescence, another in youth, another in old age, another in decrepit age. (Gregory the Great, On the Gospels, bk. 1, homily 19, para. 2, on Matthew 20:1–16 (PL 76:1155).) And thus, although at no age must they be repelled, nevertheless they must be repelled less in boyhood. For Chrysostom says in his commentary on Matthew: who merits with Christ approaching, if there should be repelled from him simple infancy? . . . For if they are going to be saints, why do you forbid the sons to come unto the father? Yet if they are going to be sinners, unto what do you proffer a sentence of condemnation before you should see fault? (Pseudo-Chrysostom, Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum, homily 32 (PG 56:804–5).) Which sentence of damnation indeed some men proffer when they say that boys must not be received into religion because they will leave and be made worse. (Above: obj. 3.)
But that which certain men adduce, that it is necessary for boys to be practiced first in keeping the precepts and afterwards to cross over to observing the counsels in religion, (Gerard of Abbeville, “Duplex quaestio,” q. 2, 200; cf. above: obj. 18.) proceeds from a false understanding. For they reckon that the precepts prepare the way to the counsels, yet it is not so. Nay, rather, the counsels prepare the way to observing the precepts because through the counsels man is removed from things of the world, and it is difficult for him to preserve innocence when occupied with the world. Hence Hilary says in his commentary on Matthew: innocence submits to a heavy burden occupied with increases of works; for the service of God does not pursue a thing of the world without the . . . vices of the world. (Hilary of Poitiers, On Matthew 19.9 (SC 258:98; PL 9:1026; CSEL 17).)
And for this reason, the Lord says in Matthew 19:23 that it is difficult for those who have riches to enter into the kingdom of heaven because it is difficult for a man to observe the precepts, by which one enters into the kingdom, unless when following the counsels he forsakes his riches. And for this reason, boys must be prepared and in a certain way fortified in the exercise of the counsels so that they might be able to preserve innocence in observing the mandates. Nor must they be repelled even though they seem uneducated in the precepts. For Origen says in his commentary on Matthew: certain men having boyish speech . . . offer to the Savior boys and infants. . . . Yet those who seem to be more perfect . . . before they should learn the character of justice . . . blame those who . . . offer boys and infants still less educated to Christ. Yet the Lord exhorts his disciples to condescend to the utilities of boys. . . . Therefore, we ought to attend to these things, lest by an estimation of more excellent wisdom we as great should spurn the little ones of the Church . . . prohibiting boys to come unto Jesus. (Origen, Commentary on Matthew 15.7–8, on Matthew 19:13–14 (PG 13:1271–76); Aquinas, Catena aurea on Matthew, on Matthew 19:13–14, ch. 19, lect. 4.)
But that which is asked further, whether before the entrance of religion they should be obligated by vow or by oath unto religion, it is manifestly clear that they should. For just as in evil, the more the will is affirmed towards evil, the worse it is, as is clear in the obstinate and those who sin out of malice, (Cf. below: Quodlibet IX, q. 2, a. 3, resp.) so also in good things so much is the will better as it is more confirmed and bound towards the good. Since, therefore, it is good for boys to come to religion, much more is it good for their will to be confirmed to this, and this is done by a vow or by an oath. Hence also David said: I swore and established to guard the judgments of your justice. (Psalm 119:106.) And Augustine says in an epistle to Paulinus and Armentarius: happy the necessity which compels unto better things. (Augustine, Letter to Armentarius and Paulina, epistle 127.8 (CSEL 44:28; PL 33:487); cf. above: Quodlibet III, q. 5, a. 1, resp., ad 1–4.)
Yet it remains to be considered last whether they should be allured by benefices. And if indeed by compact or bargain a price is given to someone, or any earthly benefice, in order that he might enter religion, this is illicit. Yet if anyone confers upon him any temporal benefices in order that he might remove the impediments which impede his entrance into religion, or even in order to nourish him and make him to be taught so that he should be apt for religion, this is not illicit but is laudable. Similarly also, if by temporal benefices anyone allures someone in order to render him favorable to himself, not intending his own glory, but the glory of God and the salvation of his neighbor, it is laudable, just as also the Apostle says concerning his own self: I please all through all things (1 Cor 10:33). Even God allures some men by temporal benefices unto acting well. Also, in certain churches some men are allured by the distributions of temporal things unto serving the Church. It is not that they should receive a reward, as it were, but there are certain things secondarily alluring unto serving God, just as also the Lord says in Matthew 6:33: seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things, namely, the necessities of life*, shall be added unto you*.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said that, just as Christ invited an adolescent practiced in keeping the precepts unto the counsels, so also he called Matthew the publican not practiced in keeping the precepts, but rather implicated in sins. From this we understand that not only those practiced in keeping the precepts must be called to observe the counsels in religion, but also those not practiced. (Cf. above: Quodlibet III, q. 5, a. 3, s.c.)
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that diversity of rank can be marked in two ways. One way is in diverse states or conditions, and here it is not necessary for one who tends unto a greater state or condition to be first practiced in a lesser state or condition; just as we see that those who desire to become soldiers are not first practiced in wool-working, but are practiced from boyhood in the military. Similarly, those who desire to become clerics are not first practiced in the lay life, but from boyhood are instructed in the clerical life. And in this way, it is not necessary for those who desire to become religious to be first practiced in the secular life, but it is best for them if from boyhood they are practiced in the life of religion because they could advance more in it. Hence it is said in Lamentations 3:27: it is good for a man when he has carried the yoke from his adolescence.
In another way, diverse ranks can apply in the same state or condition, and in this way, Gregory says that in any good way of life (Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezekiel the Prophet, bk. 2, homily 3, para. 3 (CCSL 142:238; PL 76:959).) the beginning must be from lesser things in order that one may arrive at greater ones: for just as soldiers begin from the rudiments of the military and clerics from the rudiments of the clerical state, so also religious begin from the rudiments of religion in order that they might advance even unto the summit.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that occasion is twofold, namely, given and taken. (Cf. Aquinas, Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 3, a. 1, ad 13.)
Then, indeed, someone gives an occasion to someone of being ruined or of falling into a cistern when he makes something or says something less right, from which an occasion of ruin is given to a neighbor; and then the ruin of a neighbor is imputed to the one giving the occasion.
Yet sometimes occasion is not given, but taken: for example, when someone induces someone to the good and from this he is made more degenerate, the good admonition must not be forsaken on account of this: that he takes thence an occasion of ruin. Hence also the Lord did not dismiss the preaching of the truth on account of the scandal of the Pharisees, as is contained in Matthew 15:12–15. And Augustine says in an epistle to Boniface, (Augustine, Letter to Boniface, 185.8, para. 34 (CSEL 57:31: PL 33:808).) as is found in the Decretum (C. 23, q. 4, canon “Piety itself,” and below): but if many were going to be ruined in a house and thence at least one could be freed and, because we would try to do it, the others would kill themselves with inconsiderate haste*, we would grieve concerning the rest, but concerning the salvation of at least one we would be consoled*. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 23, q. 4, c. 24, 1:909–10.)
Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that liberty is opposed to the necessity of coercion, which is absolute necessity; and such necessity must not be presented. But the necessity which is from presupposing the end is not opposed to liberty; and it is expedient to use such necessity for the common utility, otherwise neither bargains confirmed for missions nor oaths ought to be made in human things. Yet much more through things of this sort is it expedient for men to be obligated to divine things, which are better.
Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that difficulty of entrance is observed in religions through this: that a year of probation is given to those entering in which the difficulties of religion are experienced.
Reply Obj. 6: It must be said that upon a wall not yet dried the burden of beams must not be imposed. Nevertheless, it is not prohibited for the wall to be dried. Yet through religion the wall is dried of the depraved humor of worldly affect, and for this reason, it is fitting for any men to be first practiced in religion before the burden of the prelacy or of sacred orders is imposed upon them. Concerning this burden Gregory speaks, as is clear through those things which precede in that chapter and in the second homily on Ezekiel. (Gregory the Great, Register of the Epistles 9.219 (CCSL 140A:787); Gratian, Decretum, P. 1, D. 48, c. 2, 1:174; Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezekiel the Prophet, bk. 1, homily 2, para. 3 (CCSL 142:18–19; PL 76:796–97).)
Reply Obj. 7: It must be said that the state of religion is a state of penance and is the practice or school of perfection. Hence sinners should be received unto religion for the sake of penance, and innocent boys should be received as though in a certain school of perfection so that they might preserve their innocence more perfectly.
Reply Obj. 8: It must be said that, if boys altogether unwilling were to be induced unto religion, their future fall would be feared. But since they obligate themselves and enter religion by their own will, the introduced objection does not hold.
Reply Obj. 9: It must be said that, according to the Philosopher, just as great and small, many and few, are said relatively, so also hastened or swift and slow: (Aristotle, Categories 7, 6b9.) for hastened or swift is that which in a small time is moved much. (Aristotle, Physics 4.10, 218b16.) Therefore, that substance is diminished which is hastened in respect to the due mode: for example, if someone having approached some state at once from the beginning, with the rudiments of that state having been spurned, would wish to attempt those things which belong to the perfect in that state. Yet it is not a hastened substance if someone from boyhood should approach the practice of perfection and as it were a certain school, which is religion. For so great is the peak of Christian perfection that even if from boyhood someone should approach perfection of this sort, he always has somewhere to advance, just as also Augustine says to Volusianus concerning Christian doctrine: so great, he says, is the profundity of Christian letters that I would advance daily in them, if I were to try to learn them alone from boyhood beginning unto decrepit old age . . . with greatest study, with better natural ability. (Augustine, Letter to Volusianus, 137.1, para. 3 (CSEL 44:99; PL 33:516).)
Reply Obj. 10: It must be said that the diverse orders are as though the diverse ranks of one clerical life, and for this reason, it is necessary for he who tends unto greater ones to begin from lesser things; yet it is not necessary for he who tends unto sacred orders to be practiced in what pertains to an inferior state, namely, of lay life. And similarly, in the life of religion it is necessary for someone who enters religion to begin from its rudiments in order that he might reach the highest apex of religion. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for him to be practiced first in the secular life.
Reply Obj. 11: It must be said that in intelligible things it is also necessary for someone to begin from lesser things in the same science so as to arrive at the greater ones. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for whoever wants to learn any greater science to be practiced in any lesser one, just as for those who want to learn the liberal arts it is not necessary to be practiced first in the mechanical arts; this is only necessary when the lesser science prepares the way to the greater. Yet the secular life does not prepare the way to religion, but more so leads away from it. Hence Gregory says in the beginning of the Morals on the Book of Job: since my mind still forces me to the present world as though as far as to serve an appearance, many things have begun . . . to grow out of the care of the same world, in order that I would be retained in it now not by appearance, but, what is graver, by mind. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 1 (CCSL 143A:1; PL 75:511).) Yet conversely, the observance of the counsels prepares the way to observing the divine precepts more safely and more perfectly, which it is also necessary to observe in the secular life.
Reply Obj. 12: It must be said that that objection fails in many ways.
First, indeed, because that man who enters religion is not chosen for this in order to bear more care of himself or of another than before, but rather in order to be under obedience and the care of another.
Second, because it is not conceded by all that it is necessary to elect a better man for the rule of the prelacy, but, according to certain men, it suffices to elect a good man. (Cf. below: Quodlibet VIII, q. 4, a. 1, s.c.)
Third, because, if it is necessary to elect a better man unto the prelacy, it is indeed not necessary to elect a better man absolutely, but better, that is more suitable, for it. Yet boys, although they are not better absolutely than adults, nevertheless are more suitable to be nourished in religion. Hence Anselm in the book On Likenesses compares to angels those who are nourished in religion from boyhood, yet the others to men, because angels arrive unto eternal life from the beginning, men by the procession of time. (Anselm of Canterbury, On Similitudes 78 (PL 159:649–50).)
Fourth, because only one is elected to the episcopacy, and for this reason, there is a greater necessity for a better man to be assumed than for those entering religion, who can be received as many.
Reply Obj. 13: It must be said that not only that which is sin grants an occasion of ruin, but also that which has the appearance of evil. Hence also the Apostle says: from every evil appearance withhold yourselves (1 Thess 5:22).
And because the bronze serpent, although it was good according to itself from its institution, nevertheless has the appearance of evil on account of the likeness of idolatry, for this reason, it was not to be sent amongst those who were prone to idolatry, but laudably was taken away. Yet the entrance of religion neither is evil according to itself nor does it have the appearance of evil.
Yet for a blessing, although it is good from its genus, nevertheless to be an act of a virtue it is necessary for it to be clothed with due circumstances, that is, that it is fitting to person and to place and to time. Yet it is not fitting to person when a lesser blesses with a greater present, because, as is said in Hebrews 7:7: without any contradiction, what is lesser is blessed by a greater.
Reply Obj. 14: It must be said that that man who approaches unto the counsels does not seek an ascent through abrupt ways with the grades neglected, (Gregory the Great, Register of the Epistles 9.219 (CCSL 140A:787); Gratian, Decretum, P. 1, D. 48, c. 2, 1:174.) but rather prunes those things which can impede man from observing the precepts, as has been said. (Cf. above response.)
Reply Obj. 15: It must be said that according to the saying of Damascene the contrary must rather be concluded: for God did not render incorruptibility to men at once after their regeneration, since an abundance of temporal and bodily goods is the matter of pride. And for this reason, it is useful for man unto avoiding pride to cross over unto the counsels, forsaking the abundance of temporal goods.
Reply Obj. 16: It must be said that the embraces of Rachel signify the quiet of contemplation, unto which even those following the counsels cannot arrive at once from the beginning, but after a long practice of good works. Nevertheless, more easily does one arrive at the aforesaid quiet through observing the counsels than through practicing the mandates in the secular life.
Reply Obj. 17: It must be said that, if any men is allured by temporal benefices to religion with a bargain, just as is accustomed to be done in buying and selling, this payment is illicit. Yet if anyone provides for someone without a bargain, the payment is not illicit. Hence after the words said before in the same chapter there is added: unless perhaps concerning the nourishment of the poor anyone should without connection propose; and again he adds: while nevertheless . . . a bargain is absent and every compact ceases. (Gratian, Decretum, P. 2, C. 1, q. 2, c. 2, 1:408.)
Reply Obj. 18: It must be said that the state of religion, as regards those who have advanced in it, is a spiritual military; whereas as regards those who enter it newly, it is as though the exercise of a certain first campaign, and for greater progress it is necessary for anyone to undergo exercise of this sort from boyhood, just as Vegetius also teaches concerning the exercise of the temporal military in the book On Military Affairs. (Publius Flavius Vegetius, On Military Affairs, ed. C. Lang (1885; repr., Leipzig: Tuebner, 1967), bk. 1, ch. 4, p. 8.)
Reply Obj. 19: It must be said that an obligation advancing bodily matrimony cannot be made before the years of puberty, to which obligation the profession to remain perpetually in religion is similar. But before the years of puberty there can be made some solemn promise of a future matrimony, just as there is in betrothals, to which the obligation made unto religion is compared.
Reply Obj. 20: It must be said that, just as the Gloss expounds in the same place, that the cured demoniac wished to be in the boat with Christ signifies the desire of those who are cleansed from sin, by which they desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ, (Glossa interlinearis, at Mark 5:18–19, in Glossa ordinaria 5.531–32.) but this is not conceded to them at once, but it is necessary for them to labor first in this life by announcing the word of God. Hence it is clear that it is not relevant to the question at hand.
Reply Obj. 21: It must be said that, as much as someone more practiced in good should cross over unto religion out of Egypt, that is, out of the world, so much more easily can he advance in it. But because in the secular life many dangers threaten whereby the practice of this sort of virtue is impeded, it is safer that from the beginning he break the impediments through observing the counsels.
Reply Obj. 22: It must be said that it is more difficult to observe the precepts in the secular life than in the religious life: for great virtue is required for anyone living in the world to preserve himself immaculate from the vices of the world. Hence it is said in Sirach 31:8: blessed the rich man who is found without stain; and afterwards there is added: *who is this, and we shall praise him? For he makes marvels in his life (*Sir 31:9). And for this reason, it seems to be of greater presumption: provided that, nevertheless, it is presumption that someone living in the world is confident that he would preserve himself immaculate than that, not reckoning himself of such great virtue, he crosses over unto religion in order to be preserved more easily from the stain of sin, in the manner of Zacchaeus who, since he was tiny in stature, in order to see Christ, ascended a sycamore tree, that is, a ficus fatua, (Isidore of Seville, Etymology 17.7, para. 20 (PL 82:613); Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job 27.46, para. 79 (CCSL 143B:1392; PL 76:444–45); Bede, On Luke 19.4 (CCSL 120:334).) by which religion is designated.
Reply Obj. 23: It must be said that in each state greater things must be attributed to greater men, and, nevertheless, it is necessary for him who wants to advance unto a greater state that while he is lesser he should receive the first beginnings of that state, according to Sirach 25:5: those things which in your youth you did not gather, how shall you reap in old age? And thus, for someone to arrive at the perfection of religion, it is necessary from the beginning of his age to accustom himself to things of this sort.
Article 2
Whether the counsels are directed to the precepts
Second, it was asked whether the counsels are directed to the precepts. And it seems that they are not.
Obj. 1: For that to which something else is directed is posterior, because the end is prior in intention and posterior in execution. (Cf. below: Quodlibet VIII, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1.) But it happens that the observance of the precepts is prior in execution than the fulfillment of the counsels, as is clear in Matthew 19 concerning the adolescent who said he had observed the precepts of the law from his youth, (Matthew 19:16–21.) to whom there is given a counsel of perfection. (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, bk. 5, lect. 1; bk. 5, lect. 10.) Therefore, it seems that the counsels are not directed to the precepts as to an end, but rather conversely. (Cf. above: Quodlibet III, q. 5, a. 3, obj. 1.)
Obj. 2: The end is more perfect than the things which are unto the end. But the counsels are more perfect than the precepts because the counsels pertain to the state of perfection, yet the precepts pertain to common justice, (Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, bk. 5, lect. 1; bk. 5, lect. 10; cf. ST II-II.66.5, ad 3.) hence also the counsels are added to the precepts, as is clear through what the Lord says to the adolescent who had observed the precepts in Matthew 19:21: one thing still is lacking for you: if you will to be perfect, go sell what you have, and give to the poor, and you shall have treasure in heaven: and come follow me. (The first phrase of the quotation is actually from Luke 18:22.) Therefore, the counsels are not directed to the precepts, but rather conversely.
Obj. 3: According to the Philosopher in the second book of the Physics, just as principles relate to conclusions, so ends relate to those things which are directed to the end. (Aristotle, Physics 2.9, 200a15–24.) But such is the condition of principles to conclusions, that with the principles having been posited, the conclusions are posited. Yet this does not hold conversely, because to syllogize the true out of the false happens. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.32, 88a20–21.) Therefore, such is the condition of ends to those things which are directed to the ends: that with the end posited there are posited those things which are unto the end. But with the precepts posited there are not posited the counsels: for many men observe the precepts who do not observe the counsels. Therefore, the counsels are not directed to the precepts as to an end.
Obj. 4: Augustine says in the book On Holy Virginity: marvelously do they act foolishly who . . . on account of the present age feel that only virginity must be observed. (Augustine, On Holy Virginity 1.13, para. 13 (CSEL 41:215; PL 40:402).) But the observance of the precepts pertains to the present age. Therefore, the counsel of virginity must not be fulfilled on account of the precepts. And there is the same reason for the other counsels.
Obj. 5: The precepts seem to pertain to the active life, yet the counsels to the contemplative life. Hence in Matthew 19, where the precepts of the law are enumerated, the Gloss says: behold the active life, yet where there is added afterwards, if you will to be perfect, it says: behold the contemplative life. (Glossa ordinaria, at Matthew 19:18–21, 5.320 (PL 114:149).) But the active life is directed to the contemplative and not conversely. Therefore, the precepts are directed to the counsels and not conversely.
Obj. 6: The Lord is read twice to have restored the crowds miraculously: first, indeed, when there were satisfied five thousand men out of five loaves of bread and two fish (Matt 14:15–21); second, when from seven loaves of bread and a few fish there were satisfied four thousand men (Matt 15:34–38). (Cf. Matthew 16:9–10.) And the Gloss on Matthew 14 says: five thousand for the five senses of the body, these are those which know how to use exterior things rightly in secular habit; for these it is still necessary that with the five loaves of bread, that is, with the legal precepts, they should be instructed: for those who renounce the whole world, are four thousand, and with seven loaves of bread, that is, they are restored sublime by evangelical perfection and spiritual grace. (Glossa ordinaria, at Matthew 14:21, 5.256–57 (PL 114:136).) But the Lord fed the five thousand men out of five loaves before the four thousand out of seven. Therefore, the precepts are previous to the counsels and not conversely. (Cf. Aquinas, Refutation of Teaching that Deters from Religious Life, ch. 2, obj. 5.)
Obj. 7: Dispositions precede perfection and are ordered to it. But the precepts are dispositions unto the counsels: for the Gloss of Jerome on the beginning of Mark says: four are the qualities concerning which the holy Gospels are interwoven: precepts, mandates, testimonies, examples; in the precepts justice, in the mandates charity, in the testimonies faith, in the examples perfection, (Glossa ordinaria, at Jerome’s Preface to Mark, 5.475 (PL 30:590).) unto which the counsels pertain. Therefore, it seems that the precepts are ordered to the counsels, and not conversely.
Obj. 8: Something is not prior to the first; but as a certain gloss on the Psalter says: charity first moves the foot (Glossa ordinaria, at Psalm 120:3, 3.1425 (PL 191:1138); Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, at Psalm 120:5 (CCSL 40:1789; PL 37:1608).) unto the return of life. Yet the precepts are given for acts of charity. Therefore, nothing in the spiritual life is prior to the precepts. Therefore, the counsels are not directed to the precepts, but rather conversely.
Obj. 9: On Psalm 131 [130]:2: just as a weaned child upon his mother, the Gloss says: just as five times are noted in carnal procreation . . . , so also in spiritual. . . . The first time therefore is of conception; the second of nourishing in the womb, the third of emission, the fourth of carrying and breastfeeding, the fifth of weaning; so also in the womb of Mother Church first we are conceived, then we are instructed by the rudiments of the faith; thence as though in . . . the womb we are nourished advancing in these same first beginnings . . . ; thence as though by the hands of the Church we are carried, and we are nourished by milk . . . until already fair-sized from the milk of our mother . . . we approach unto the table of the father; and afterwards there is added: whereas many pervert this order, such as heretics and schismatics, separating themselves from milk before the time, whence they are extinguished. (Glossa ordinaria, at Psalm 130:2, 3.1464–66 (PL 191:1171–72).)
But to be separated from milk is, with easier things having been dismissed, to cross over unto the more difficult. Since, therefore, the counsels are more difficult than the precepts, it seems that they expose themselves to the danger of extinction who approach unto the counsels unless first educated in the precepts. Therefore, the precepts are directed to the counsels, and not conversely.
Obj. 10: Gregory says in his commentary on Ezekiel that to do good out of a precept, is of those beginning. (Gregory the Great, Homilies on Ezekiel the Prophet, bk. 1, homily 10, para. 31 (CCSL 142:159; PL 76:898).) But that which is of those beginning is directed to that which is of perfection, and not conversely. Therefore, the precepts are directed to the counsels and not conversely.
Obj. 11: Virtue imitates nature; (Cf. Aristotle, Physics, 2.2, 194a21–22.) but in the body of an animal, nature first works those things which pertain to being, as, for example, the principal members, (The first of which is the heart; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, lect. 18, nn. 475–77.) before working those things which concern the wellbeing of the animal. Therefore, in the progress of virtue the precepts are prior, which concern the being of virtue, before the counsels, which concern its wellbeing; and thus the same holds as before.
Obj. 12: Just as there is an order in learning, so also in operating; but in learning it is necessary to begin from easier things in order to arrive at more difficult things. Therefore, in operating it is necessary first to fulfill the precepts, which are easier, and thus to cross over to the counsels.
Obj. 13: In the Gloss on Matthew 5 it is said that the divine word is for us the way by which we run. (Glossa ordinaria, at Matthew 5:25, 5.109 (PL 114:94); cf. Psalm 118:32.) But the divine word preordains the precepts before the counsels, as is clear in Matthew 5:20–48, where first is placed a precept for the ancients, and afterwards there is added by the Lord that which is of perfection. Therefore, it seems that the observance of the precepts must be preordained before the observance of the counsels.
Obj. 14: That which is least in some genus is directed to that which is most in that genus. But nothing is less in the Christian life than observance of the precepts, yet nothing is more than the observance of the counsels. Therefore, the precepts are directed to the counsels.
Obj. 15: Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew: he who neglects to fulfill the precepts of the law (Not found in Jerome. See: Gregory the Great, On the Gospels, bk. 2, homily 40.9 (PL 76:1309C).) cannot fulfill more perfect things. Therefore, it is necessary for any men to fulfill the precepts before the counsels, and thus the precepts are directed to the counsels.
Obj. 16: That is prior from which the consequence of being is not converted; (Aristotle, Categories 13, 14a34–35.) but from the precepts it is not a consequence that one turns to the counsels. For it does not follow, if someone observes the precepts, that he will observe the counsels. Therefore, the observance of the precepts naturally precedes and is directed to the observance of the counsels.
On the contrary (1) is that Augustine says in the Enchiridion: whatever things God mandates, from which one is: thou shalt not commit adultery, and whatever things are not commanded, but are admonished by spiritual counsel, from which one is: it is good for a man not to touch a woman, then rightly are they done when they are referred unto loving God and neighbor on account of God. (Augustine, Enchiridion 1.121, para. 32 (CCSL 46:113–14; PL 40:288).) But these two fall under a precept, as is clear in Matthew 22. (Matthew 22:37–40.) Therefore, the counsels are directed to the precepts.
Furthermore (2): That which is of choice is directed to that which is of necessity because choice is of those things which are unto the end. (Aristotle, Ethics 3.2, 1111b26–27.) But the counsels are of choice, yet the precepts of necessity. Therefore, the counsels are directed to the precepts.
Furthermore (3): A thing is directed to that through which it is perfected more fully. But the precepts are preserved more fully and more safely through the counsels. Therefore, the counsels are directed to the precepts.
I answer that the precepts are given concerning the acts of the virtues. Yet the act of a virtue is twofold, namely, interior and exterior, and both acts fall under a precept of the law. (Aristotle, Ethics 10.8, 1178a34–b1.) Hence Augustine says in Against Faustus that because the Jews did not understand homicide except as a destroying of the human body . . . the Lord revealed that every unjust movement unto harming a brother is deputed in the genus of homicide; (Augustine, Against Faustus the Manichee 19.23 (CSEL 25:521–22; PL 42:361).) similarly also, they thought that only illicit bodily commixing with a woman was called adultery, which was prohibited in the law, but the Lord demonstrated that also interior concupiscence pertains to this. (Augustine, Against Faustus the Manichee 19.23 (CSEL 25:521–22; PL 42:361).) Hence it is clear that even interior acts of the virtues fall under a precept.
Therefore, the counsels are directed to the precepts both as they concern interior acts of the virtues and as they concern exterior acts, but in different ways.
For unto interior acts of the virtues they are directed as to an end: for all interior acts of the moral virtues pertain to purity of mind, namely, in order that the mind of man might be free from inordinate passions and from every exterior desire of things. And most of all, all the virtues both moral and theological are directed to love of God and neighbor. And unto these two all the counsels are directed as to an end, namely, unto the charity of God and neighbor, and unto purity of mind. Hence it is said in the Collations of the Fathers: whatever can direct us unto . . . purity of heart, must be followed with the whole of virtue, yet whatever draws us back from this, must be shunned as pernicious and vicious*. For we do and tolerate all things for this: for this is spurned parents, fatherland, dignities, riches, delights of this world, and the whole will, namely, in order that perpetual purity of heart might be retained*; (John Cassian, Conferences (Collations of the Fathers) 1.5 (CSEL 13:11; PL 49:487).) and afterwards it adds: for this we know that we ought to undertake the abstinence of fasting, vigils, labors, nudity of the body, reading, and the other virtues, in order that through those we might be able to prepare and conserve our heart uninjured from all noxious passions and to ascend unto the perfection of charity by resting upon those grades. (John Cassian, Conferences 1.7 (CSEL 13:13; PL 49:489).) And Augustine says this same thing in the book On the Customs of the Church: kinds of foods, he says, must not be thrown away as though polluted, but every intention must keep vigil over taming concupiscence and retaining love of the brethren; (Augustine, On the Customs of the Church 1.33, para. 71 (CSEL 90:76; PL 32:1340).) and in the same place it is said: charity especially is guarded, nourishment is applied to charity, speech to charity, habit to charity, appearance to charity. (Augustine, On the Customs of the Church 1.33, para. 73 (CSEL 90:76; PL 32:1341).) Hence also the Apostle teaches that the counsel of virginity is directed to this: that an unmarried woman thinks about those things which are of God, how to please God (1 Cor 7:34). And the Lord, in Matthew 19, orders the counsel of poverty unto this: (Matthew 19:21.) that a man should follow him, which is done through rectitude and purity of interior affect. Thus, therefore, the counsels are directed to the precepts as unto an end, insofar as they concern interior acts.
But insofar as they concern exterior acts, for example: thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal, and so on, (Fifth and seventh commandment; Exodus 20:13, 15.) the counsels are directed to the precepts, not as unto an end,—for a man does not preserve virginity in order to abstain from adultery, nor with this as the end does anyone renounce his things: in order to not steal others’ things, since the exterior works of the counsels are greater than the exterior works of the precepts,—nevertheless they are directed to those things inasmuch as they make them preserved more safely and more firmly: for he who dismisses his own things abstains much more from plundering the things of others.
Hence also Augustine says in the nineteenth book of Against Faustus: all things commemorated out of the law of the Hebrews the Lord has commended, in order that whatever he would say in addition out of his own person, either would prevail unto commending the exposition, if that law had posited anything obscure*, or unto conserving more safely what that law had willed*; (Augustine, Against Faustus the Manichee 19.27 (CSEL 25:529; PL 42:365–66).) and in the book On the Sermon on the Mount he says that while there are done . . . those things which are added unto perfection, much more are there done those things which had been given before unto the beginning. (Augustine, On the Sermon on the Mount 1.8, para. 20 (CCSL 35:20; PL 34:1239).)
Thus, therefore, it is clear that the counsels are directed to the precepts as to an end insofar as they concern interior acts of the virtues; but insofar as they concern exterior acts of the virtues, the counsels are directed to the precepts that they should be preserved more safely and more firmly by means of removing obstacles. And the first of these is the cause of the second: for the firm observance of exterior acts is caused from the interior affect of a well-disposed mind.
Reply Obj. 1: It must be said, therefore, that according to certain men, the rich man lied when saying he had observed the precepts, and especially as regards the one precept there commemorated which pertains to an interior act, namely: you shall love your neighbor just as your own self. Hence Origen says in his commentary on Matthew: it is written in the Gospel . . . according to the Hebrews, that when the Lord said to him: go and sell all things which you have . . . the rich man began to scratch his head and it was not pleasing to him. And the Lord said unto him: how do you say: I have done the law and the prophets? . . . It is written in the law: you shall love your neighbor just as your own self, and behold your many brothers the sons of Abraham are covered with dung, dying in the face of hunger, and your house is full with many good things, and something out of these does not go out unto them at all. . . . for it is impossible to fulfill the aforementioned mandate . . . and to be rich, and especially to have such great possessions. (Origen, Commentary on Matthew 15.14, on Matthew 19:22 (PG 13:1293–96); Aquinas, Catena aurea on Matthew, on Matthew 19:22, ch. 19, lect. 5.) And this same thing is confirmed through Jerome who says in his commentary on Matthew: the adolescent lies. For if that which was posited in the mandates: you shall love your neighbor just as your own self, he had fulfilled by work, how afterwards hearing: . . . sell all things which you have and give to the poor, would he have gone away sad? (Jerome, On Matthew 3, on Matthew 19:20 (CCSL 77:170; PL 26:137).)
But because Chrysostom and other expositors say that that adolescent did not lie, either interpretation can be salvaged. (John Chrysostom, On Matthew, homily 63 [64], para. 1 (PG 58:603–4); Aquinas, Catena aurea on Matthew, on Matthew 19:16, ch. 19, lect. 5; Refutation of Teaching that Deters from Religious Life, ch. 7.) For this precept: you shall love your neighbor just as your own self, can be observed in two ways. In one way, it can be observed imperfectly, namely, that someone does not do against his neighbor that which he does not will to be done to himself, and that without his own detriment he should help his neighbor. In another way, it can be observed perfectly, namely, so that he disposes himself to helping with his neighbors’ bodily necessities just as to helping with his own personal necessities. For in this way someone does not fulfill this precept who, when he has many riches, reserves them for himself, permitting his neighbors to be in need. Yet the counsels are directed to this: that the precepts might be guarded more perfectly, and for this reason, the Lord, to one observing the precepts imperfectly, adds on top of them the counsels, through which the precepts might be observed more perfectly.
Reply Obj. 2: It must be said that perfection of life consists essentially in the precepts according as they concern the interior acts of the virtues: for charity is the chain of perfection, just as the Apostle says in Colossians 3:14. And for this reason, when the Lord posited the precepts of charity, in Matthew 5:48, he adds: therefore be perfect. But in the counsels, which concern certain exterior acts, perfection consists instrumentally, namely, because counsels of this sort are as though certain instruments through which one arrives at perfection more easily. Hence in the Collations of the Fathers it is said: fasting, vigils, meditation on the Scriptures, nudity, and the privation of all means are not perfection, but the instruments of perfection, because the end of that discipline does not consist in these, but through these it is arrived unto the end. (John Cassian, Conferences 1.7 (CSEL 13:14; PL 49:490).) And Augustine says in the book On the Perfection of Justice: thus let us hear the precepts of perfection, lest we should neglect to run unto the perfection of charity. (Augustine, On the Perfection of Justice 8.19 (CSEL 42:18; PL 44:301).) And Jerome in his commentary on Matthew says, expounding that line: behold we have forsaken all things and have followed you (Matt 19:27) . . . because, he says, it does not suffice only to forsake, he joins that which is perfect: and we have followed you. What therefore shall there be for us? (Matt 19:27) as though he should say: we have done that which you ordered; what therefore shall you give of reward? (Jerome, On Matthew 3, on Matthew 19:27 (CCSL 77:172; PL 26:138).) Therefore, the precepts imperfectly observed pertain to common justice, (Cf. above: obj. 2.) but perfection of life consists in the plain observance itself of the precepts.
Reply Obj. 3: It must be said that something is directed to an end in two ways: (Cf. ST III.65.4; below: Quodlibet V, q. 10, a. 1, resp.) in one way, as necessary to the end and without which the end cannot be, such as food to conserving the life of the body; in another way, as necessary to the end and without which the end cannot be reached as well, such as a horse is directed to a journey not because someone could not go without a horse, but because he goes better on a horse. Similarly also, the counsels are directed to the precepts, not because the precepts could not be observed without the counsels both as regards interior acts and as regards exterior ones (for Abraham, who used both marriage and riches, was perfect before God, according to Genesis 17:1: walk before me and be perfect), but because through the counsels one comes more easily and more expeditiously to the perfect observance of the precepts.
Reply Obj. 4: It must be said that Augustine in those words intends to exclude the saying of certain men who believed that virginity is necessary only as a forfeiture of the tribulation of the body endured in matrimony. Yet observance of the precepts, although it is done in this age, nevertheless does not pertain to this age, but is joined to the future age.
Reply Obj. 5: It must be said that the precepts pertain both to the active and to the contemplative life, whereas the counsels are instruments of the contemplative life. But the mention of the precepts directed to a neighbor there came first, and these pertain to the active life.
Reply Obj. 6: It must be said that even in the very exercise of the precepts it happens that there is found a difference of perfection and imperfection. Hence it cannot be said that the number five thousand pertains to the precepts, and the number four thousand to the counsels; but the first pertains to the imperfect observance of the precepts, such as is sometimes had even in secular life, whereas the second pertains to the perfect observance of the precepts, to which the counsels are directed. Moreover, nor is it necessary that someone, because the Lord first fed the five thousand before the four thousand, first should be exercised in the secular life before he should cross over unto religion, because even those entering religion do not gain perfection at once, but they exercise themselves unto attaining perfection, just as also those entering schools of logic are not made logicians at once but exercise themselves unto this. Hence also religion is a certain school of perfection.
Reply Obj. 7: It must be said that the examples given in the Gospels are the examples of Christ, which pertain not only to the counsels, but also to the perfect observance of the precepts. Hence also in the same place there is added: examples, as this: learn from me because I am meek and humble in heart (Matt 11:29). (Jerome, On the Gospel of Mark, preface (PL 30:590B); Glossa ordinaria, at Mark’s preface, 5.475; at Matthew 11:29, 5.214 (PL 114:123).)
Reply Obj. 8: It must be said that charity has many grades, for first is charity beginning, and afterwards progressing, and finally perfect. Hence charity in the spiritual life is both a principle and an end.
Reply Obj. 9: It must be said that observing the counsels is more difficult than observing the precepts as regards exterior acts. Nevertheless, perfect observance of the precepts as regards interior acts is far more difficult: for it is more difficult to put aside the desires of the mind than possessions. (Cf. Jerome, Letter 71 (Regula Monachorum), 4 (PL 30:333); On Matthew 3, on Matthew 19:21 (CCSL 77:170–71; PL 26:137).) And nevertheless, it is more difficult to observe the exterior acts of the precepts without the counsels than with the counsels, as is clear from what has been said before.
Reply Obj. 10: It must be said that those beginning are in the order of being instructed by others, and for this reason, they are moved by a precept to doing something both in secular life and in religion; but when they are already perfected, they not only do the counsels but also the precepts out of an interior habit, as though out of their very selves.
Reply Obj. 11: It must be said that, as has been said, (Cf. above: ad 8.) charity is the principle of the spiritual life and the end; and for this reason, it both precedes things begun, as concerns the existing being of the spiritual life, and it follows as pertaining to the perfect being of the spiritual life. And nevertheless, those things which concern wellbeing are ordered to the conservation of those which concern the being of a thing.
Reply Obj. 12: It must be said that even in disciplines those are learned first through which other things are understood more perfectly, even though it is easier to understand those or to have them according to the common mode, just as it is easier to know how to argue in the way by which even the uneducated use a certain dialectic than to know the rules of logic. And nevertheless, the rules of logic are learned first so that someone should prevail to argue more perfectly than the uneducated commonly argue. And similarly, it is easier to observe the precepts according to an imperfect mode than to observe the counsels. And nevertheless, for those who tend unto the perfect observance of the precepts, it is necessary for them to begin from the counsels just as from certain instruments.
Reply Obj. 13: It must be said that those things which the Lord there adds in addition are not counsels, but precepts, as is clear both from the very words of the Lord there posited, and also from the exposition of Augustine in the book On the Sermon on the Mount. (Augustine, On the Sermon on the Mount 1.9, para. 21 (CCSL 35:22–23; PL 34:1239–40).)
Reply Obj. 14: It must be said that observing the precepts in an imperfect way is the least thing in the spiritual life, but it is the greatest if they are observed perfectly.
Reply Obj. 15: It must be said that the more perfect things of the Gospel are not only the counsels, but also the precepts, as is clear from what has been said. (Cf. above: ad 13.)
Reply Obj. 16: It must be said that that from which the consequence of being is not converted, (Aristotle, Categories 13, 14a34–35.) although it is prior in nature in a certain way, nevertheless it is not necessary that it always should be prior in time: for in angels to live does not precede to understand, even though not every living thing is an understanding thing, because angels have at once from the beginning a perfect life which is intellectual. And similarly, those who desire to guard the precepts more fully at once from the beginning ought to take up the counsels, even though not everyone observing the precepts observes the counsels.
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